不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及差异——基于中国家庭住户收入调查数据的经验研究

文章利用2002年住户收入调查(CHIP)数据对我国不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及工资差异进行了经验研究。结果发现,长期劳动合同与短期劳动合同的工资差异符合补偿性工资差别理论,企业对没有签订劳动合同的员工存在工资歧视。排除特征因素和选择性因素,长期劳动合同工的工资比短期劳动合同工低42.84%,比无劳动合同员工高29.6%。文章研究表明:短期劳动合同没有对生产率表现出显著的负面影响,提升劳动合同签订率是比限制短期劳动合同使用更为合适的劳动政策。     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

Economic transition and gender differentials in wages and productivity: Evidence from Chinese manufacturing enterprises

We use firm-level data to analyze male–female wage differences in Chinese industry in the late 1990s. Our estimates indicate that employers' discrimination against women was not a significant source of the gender wage gap in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Instead, we find that the relative wage of unskilled female to male workers was higher than their relative productivity. This result indicates that unskilled female workers in the state sector had historically received wage premiums and consequently accounted for a disproportionate share of the sector's labor surplus.     

DYNAMIC CONTRACTS WITH WORKER MOBILITY VIA DIRECTED ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH

This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on‐the‐job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long‐term contract exhibits an increasing wage–tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitions—between employment, unemployment, and across different employers—and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers.     

Trade unions vs. statistical discrimination: Theory and application to post-apartheid South Africa

A simple model of statistical discrimination is analyzed, which captures some stylized facts of the South African labor market. It shows that this type of discrimination disappears when the wage rates are determined by efficient bargaining between a representative firm and a union, with endogenous membership. This may explain why the wage gap between Black and White workers in post-apartheid South Africa is smaller among unionized workers than among non-unionized ones.     

Layoffs,wages and unemployment insurance

The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision.     

Share contracts and macroeconomic externalities

Weitzman's analysis of the share economy contrasts fixed-wage and fixed-share contracts; this paper notes that neither is an optimal labor contract, rendering the comparison suspect. Given this comparison, though, share contracts may be superior to wage contracts in an economy characterized by a “macroeconomic externality,” whereby firm-level employment decisions affect the demand for other firms' goods.     

Wage differentials, discrimination and efficiency

I analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity. I show that the model has a unique equilibrium. The wage differential depends positively on the workers’ productivity differential only when the latter is large. When the productivity differential is small, high-productivity workers get a lower wage than low-productivity workers. This reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero. However, the equilibrium is socially efficient. High-productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers. Although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist, conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model.     

Wage discrimination and antidiscrimination policy in unionized industries

We consider industries where the equally skilled workers/members of firm-specific monopoly unions can be grouped according to different reservation wages. We show that, in absence of active antidiscrimination policy, discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees may emerge, in equilibrium, under either oligopoly or a perfectly competitive product market. We subsequently propose that to combat wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker should under either market structure subsidize the employment of the low reservation wage group. The reason is that taxing wage discrimination, as an alternative antidiscrimination policy, always entails a welfare loss relative to the no policy/wage discrimination status quo.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

A Note on Franchising and Wage Bargaining

A franchising contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargaining relocation modifies the position of the union in the wage bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union is not able to raise wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase the franchise fee at the expense of the union. Therefore the overall rent assigned to labor depends on the differences of labor intensity in the franchisor's and franchisee's firms. Firm owners may be able to transfer distributable rents from a firm with a strong union to one with a weak union. Furthermore, a franchising contract shows a first mover advantage. A franchising contract is placed before wage bargaining, benefiting the franchisor.     

Staggered wages,unanticipated shocks and firms’ adjustments

This paper empirically investigates the employment and wage effects of contract staggering, i.e., the asynchronous and infrequent way in which wages adjust to changes in the economic environment. Using an identification strategy based on exogenous start dates of collective agreements around the Great Recession, we estimate the effect of increases in base wages on firms’ labor cost adjustments. Our analysis is based on a large employers-employees dataset merged to collective agreements in the Netherlands, a country in which collective bargaining is dominant and contract staggering is relatively pervasive. The main result is that staggered wage setting has no real effect on employment. We find significant employment losses only in sectors covered by contracts with much longer durations than those normally assumed in macroeconomic models featuring staggered wages. Instead, we show that firms adjust labor costs by curbing other pay components such as bonuses and benefits and incidental pay. The overall result supports the idea that wage rigidities are not the main source of employment fluctuations.     

Trend inflation as a workers’ discipline device

The paper shows that a monetary policy regime that allows for a positive inflation rate disciplines monopolistic wages setters if these, when setting contracts, internalize the consequences of their choices for economic outcomes over the life of the contract. We also show that discretionary monetary policy has real effects when wage setters are non atomistic, whereas commitment to a positive inflation rate is effective irrespective of the degree of labor market centralization. Finally, the model may explain the different unemployment dynamics in Europe and in the United States, following the 1980 disinflationary episode. Our approach suggests that disinflation induced an adverse effect on the labor market wedge and that such effect was stronger in Europe, due to the particular importance of large wage setters.     

不确定性与早期劳动合同 --契约理论的一个新发展

在劳动力市场上 ,劳动者和厂商未来的生产率都具有不确定性。早期劳动合同或签约由于一方面可以保证劳动者被排除在劳动力市场之外 ,同时也保证了厂商被排除在事后职位市场的风险之外 ,因而厂商和劳动者具有签订早期劳动合同的激励。尽管早期劳动合同或签约存在成本 ,但只要事前利益超过事后无效率的损失 ,那么早期劳动合同或签约就会发生。对于那些不能获得完全市场保险的人来说 ,签约是一种帕累托最优。早期劳动合同或签约是市场失灵的一种证明 ,早期劳动合同是一种不完全合同 ,也是一种非正式合同 ,它是对契约理论的一个发展。     

Differences in Work Hours and Hours Preferences by Race in the U.S.

Significant differences exist in actual and preferred work hours by race. Specifically, black males work 20 percent fewer annual hours than white males. The differences between black and white women are small. Black workers are significantly more likely than white workers to prefer additional work and fewer are satisfied with their current hours of work. I use the hours-inequality hypothesis of Bell and Freeman (1995,1997) to evaluate the extent to which race differences in work hours and hours preferences are related to race differences in incentives. I demonstrate that whereas white workers work longer hours in response to overall wage variation in their relevant labor market cell, black workers react to the wage variation among black workers but not to the variation overall. The fact that labor market incentives are different for otherwise similar black and white workers is difficult to reconcile with standard competitive theory.     

Globalization,welfare, and the attitudes toward higher education

In this paper we study how the attitudes toward higher education may affect labor market outcomes in the context of globalization. In particular, we show that different educational attitudes are responsible for differences in the wage differential among countries. Using a matching model with two types of workers and firms, we find that there is a trade-off between the wage differential and the workers’ welfare, namely, that an economy that is less willing to educate itself will display a lower wage differential but will lose in terms of welfare. Moreover, from a policy perspective, we show that the negative effects on welfare due to this disinclination to study can be offset by increased labor market flexibility. All things considered, policy makers ought to keep in mind that both a positive attitude toward higher education and labor market flexibility, can lead to improved overall performance in this increasingly globalized world.     

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the model's equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.     

The labor supply of fixed-wage workers: Estimates from a real effort experiment

Fixed-wage workers comprise the bulk of the labor force and yet little is known about how they respond to changes in their wage. Given recent interest in theories of reciprocity and intrinsic motivation and their implications for effort provision, the neoclassical prediction seems less obvious today. To better understand the motivation of these workers, I estimate their labor supply using a real effort experiment. Two results stand out. First, no one theory seems to fit the pooled data. On average, people work considerably harder than the minimum but they do not respond to changes in the wage. Second, pooling the data is deceptive because there seem to be distinct types with differing responses to the wage. Most workers can be classified as reciprocal or intrinsically motivated and, indeed, these types respond as theory would predict: reciprocators return wage gifts with increased effort and extrinsic incentives crowd out motivation for intrinsic workers.     

How important is the type of working contract for job satisfaction of agency workers?

Previous research finds that agency workers are less satisfied with their job than regular workers. This paper analyzes whether this difference can be explained by the duration of the working contract agency workers are employed on. The analysis leads to three results. First, agency workers’ contract type does not explain their lower job satisfaction. Second, agency workers on permanent contracts are significantly less satisfied with their job than regular workers on the same contract. Third, agency workers on fixed-term contracts do not differ in job satisfaction from regular workers on both fixed-term and permanent contracts. The difference in job satisfaction between permanently employed agency and regular workers can partly be explained by changes in the reference point. Overall, the results, however, lend support to the conclusion that agency workers on fixed-term contracts regard their employment as stepping stone while those on permanent contracts appear to be trapped in this type of employment.