马克思对沉淀成本概念的分析及其意义

虽然马克思没有使用沉淀成本这一概念,但已认识到沉淀成本的本质特征——成本补偿或价值实现问题。因此,从马克思价值实现角度扩展西方学者对沉淀成本概念的理解,不仅突破了西方学者沉淀成本概念仅仅与资产特征和市场交易成本相关的局限性,而且将沉淀成本和生产过程与产品价值实现联系起来,从而纳入社会再生产运动过程中。从马克思价值实现角度出发,再次回到投资生产上来,充分理解影响沉淀成本的诸多因素,为政府制定政策或制度安排提供一种新的分析视角,在于避免出现沉淀成本,形成良好的再生产过程。     

"支撑+手段"成就历史性转变的推动力

政治支撑、技术支撑、制度支撑和社会支撑是实现历史性转变的现实基础;法律手段、良好的制度与政策、经济手段、体制与政府职能转变的协调合作,则能够在推进历史性转变的过程中,以较小的管理和政策成本,达到较大的社会和环境效益。     

基层农行组织对公存款应摆正五个关系

基层农行组织对公存款应摆正五个关系●徐景荣朱余明农业银行向商业银行转变，追求利润最大化成为新的经营目标。而要实现利润最大化，就要努力降低资金成本。为此，各级农行都把组织成本较低的对公存款摆上全行工作的突出重要位置。但组织对公存款也和组织储蓄一样，政策...     

2012：向自主增长转变

虽然明年宏观调控的基调维持不变,但政策内容会有所不同。财政政策在继续发行赤字、扩张政府支出的同时,辅之以结构性减税措施,推动经济增长由政策刺激向自主增长转变。     

“三农”政策支持路径选择

"三农"问题是经济转型中的重要问题。"三农"问题的本质是农民问题,而农民问题的本质是农民的转变问题。农民转变是社会、经济转型问题,其成本应该由全社会承担,但现实情况是农民被迫承担了过多的社会成本。对农民转业、农户迁移提供政策支持,能缓解转型带给农民的过大压力。政策支持应重点针对农村人力资源的开发。     

公有制实现形式理论的两次重大历史性创新

中共十五大报告第一次系统阐述了社会主义公有制实现形式多样化理论,十六届三中全会第一次明确提出把股份制作为公有制的主要实现形式,从而在理论上和政策上第一次彻底实现了我国社会主义公有制实现形式的“两个根本转变”：公有制实现形式由“二元”模式转变为“多样化”模式,公有制主要实现形式由国有制转变为股份制。这是我党在社会主义公有制实现形式理论上成熟的重要标志,是对马克思主义所有制实现形式理论的继承、发展和重大创新。     

中国计划生育政策直接成本估算：1997-2012年

现代国家治理离不开公共政策评估,人口政策的选择同样如此。政策成本越高,代表社会资源投入越多。中国人口政策已经转向,但既往政策运行成本的研究还不够到位。本文基于中国人口结构大转变的背景,使用分项加总的方法,估算人口政策的直接成本,结果表明,1997—2012年中国计划生育总投入累计达到8113.18亿元,其中占比最大的是社会抚养费和国家计划生育投入经费。为了更直观地显示计划生育成本,本文对计划生育投入与教育投入和医疗卫生投入做了横向比较,以期为中国公共政策的权衡取舍提供依据。     

影响我国就业增长的产业因素分析

文章认为虽然我国目前人口转变、产业结构转变和城市化进程的滞后严重影响了第二、三产业的就业吸纳能力,城镇失业率和城市化水平呈正相关关系,但第二、三产业仍具有较大的吸纳就业的潜力。解决就业问题需要同时大力发展第二产业和第三产业,将加快产业结构转变与提高城市化政策相结合,有助于促进劳动力就业增长。     

实施积极财政政策向可持续财政政策转型的构想

积极财政政策虽然在扩大内需上已经有所作为，但由于其负面作用的存在而不具有可持续性。为实现我国可持续发展的长期战略要求，我们应当适时实施由积极财政政策向可持续财政政策的转变。因此，应当对现行的财政支出政策进行调整，防范直接与间接财政风险的扩大化，完善现行税制，运用财政政策促进人力资本可持续发展。     

未来五年我国经济增长速度预测

2010年,我国的宏观调控政策逐步从应对危机状态回归正常,同时把调整经济结构和转变经济发展方式放在重要位置。这一政策转变,虽然带来经济增速的一定回调,但为未来五年经济平稳发展奠定了基础。根据潜在增长能力的测算,综合考虑国内外经济发展环境的影响,预计2011-2015年我国GDP年均实际增速为9%左右。未来五年应把注意力聚焦在改革与转变经济增长方式上来,适度提高对经济增速放缓的容忍度。     

Transboundary Pollution in a Dynamic Game Model

We consider a dynamic game model in which N countries produce a single product that is not traded. Production results in emissions that accumulate a stock of pollution in each country. Households in each country derive utility from consuming the product but face costs depending on the level of the country-specific stock of pollution as well as the pollution stocks of the other countries. We distinguish three different cost scenarios. For all three, we show the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) and derive the collusive outcome. The MPEs are associated with the case where countries fail to coordinate their policies, while the collusive solutions correspond to the coordinated policy.
JEL Classification No.: C73.     

Trade,Strategic Environmental Policy,and Global Pollution

This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs.     

External Costs of Aquaculture Production in West Virginia

Temperate hill-lands of the U.S.A. such as those in West Virginia are areas from which increasing output of farm-raised fish may be possible. However, the downstream economic impacts of current and projected future effluent as a result of aquaculture production have not been extensively studied. Using an externality framework and a combination of primary and secondary data, this study determines pollution prevention costs (PPC), and downstream pollution damage costs resulting from fish farm wastewater effluent measured as willingness to pay (WTP) for restoring water quality. PPC is estimated at $0.11 per kg of trout produced (which would add 6% to private production cost), and WTP is estimated at $0.49 per kg of trout produced (representing 25% of private production cost) at current production and price levels. This study shows that installation of filtration units is a low-cost (less than 6% of total cost) and an effective technology for controlling pollution at the source. Internalizing external costs (adding this 6% to private production costs) is one strategy that could contribute to sustainable growth of the aquaculture industry.     

The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection

Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.     

Political persistence and economic growth

Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provide evidence that political persistence (measured as the longest tenure in office of main political entities) is negatively associated with growth, after controlling for country and time fixed effects, and that this association is stronger in countries with low bureaucratic quality, where the cost of red tape is high. This evidence can be rationalized by means of a growth model with quality improvements where political connections with politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to mitigate red tape costs, defend their monopoly position and prevent entry of higher-quality competitors. The model implies a negative relationship between persistence in office of politicians and economic growth in high red-tape countries, while no association is expected where red tape costs are low.     

Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR

Transboundary air pollution is analysed as a dynamic game between Finland and the nearby areas of the Soviet Union. Sulphur emissions are used as the environmental control variables and the acidities of the soils as the state variables. Acidification is consequently considered to be a stock pollutant having long-lasting harmful effects on the environment. The state dynamics consist of two relationships: first, of a sulphur transportation model between the regions and, second, of a model describing how the quality of the soil is affected by sulphur deposition. The countries are assumed to be interested in maximizing the net benefits from pollution control as measured by the impacts on the values of forest growth net of the abatement costs. Cooperative and noncooperative solutions of the game are compared to assess the benefits of bilateral cooperation. Using empirical estimates of abatement costs, acidification dynamics and impacts on forest growth it is shown that cooperation is beneficial to Finland but not to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Finland has to offer monetary compensation to induce her neighbor to invest in environmental protection.     

Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions. Further it is assumed that in such cases they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as spillover effects increase until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached.     

Bio-economic modeling of water quality improvements using a dynamic applied general equilibrium approach

An integrated bio-economic model is developed to assess the impacts of pollution reduction policies on water quality and the economy. Emission levels of economic activities to water are determined based on existing environmental accounts. These emission levels are built into a dynamic economic model for the Dutch economy and subsequently coupled to a national water quality model. The modular approach has the advantage that the impacts on the economy and water quality are evaluated simultaneously, but each within their own domain based on the appropriate scale and level of detail. The dynamic nature of the economic model allows us to also evaluate a derogated water policy as foreseen in the European Water Framework Directive. The indirect costs of different water quality improvement policy scenarios are at least as high as the direct costs related to investments in pollution abatement technology. The stricter the policy scenario, the more important the role of economic adjustment and restructuring mechanisms at the macro-economic level. Significant water quality improvements can be achieved through stringent domestic emission reductions. However, reaching water quality standards is highly dependent on water quality improvement policy in surrounding river basin countries and climate change.     

Taxesversus tradable discharge permits: A review in the light of the U.S. and European experience

The U.S. and West European environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution. The U.S. has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes. The countries of the European Community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits. A review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system.     

Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements

This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements: the non-cooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the non-cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules.