The going-concern qualification debate: Some UK evidence

Using logistic regression models, derived from financial statement data, this paper provides a novel demonstration that UK quoted companies which were issued with a going-concern qualification in their last accounts before failure were significantly more acutely financially distressed than failing firms whose last accounts were not qualified on this basis.Auditors did not appear to be qualifying the last accounts of failing companies in an arbitrary fashion. More particularly, high gearing, low profitability and low ‘ownership concentration’ were consistently associated with the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern qualification. The analysis is extended to include explanatory variables derived from ‘traditionally’ estimated failure-prediction models. In addition, the properties of multilogit (multi-outcome) models, which attempt to discriminate simultaneously between failing firms with/without going concern qualifications, and a random sample of non-failed companies, are examined. The empirical results offer interesting new evidence relating to the auditor's decision to qualify/not qualify the last accounts of failing firms on the going-concern basis.     

Strategic Auditor Behavior and Going-Concern Decisions

This paper analyzes a game-theoretic model in which a client can potentially avoid a going-concern opinion and its self-fulfilling prophecy by switching auditors. Incumbent auditors are less willing to express a going-concern opinion the more credible the client's threat of dismissal and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Similarly, the client is more willing to switch auditors the more likely it is that auditors' reporting judgments will differ and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Further, with greater noise in the auditor's forecast of client viability, the auditor tends to express fewer going-concern opinions.     

Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Auditor Going-Concern Reporting Decisions in the United Kingdom

The accounting profession has come under increased scrutiny over recent years about the growing number of non-audit fees received from audit clients and the possible negative impact of such fees on auditor independence. The argument advanced is that providing substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of the client management when difficult judgments are made. Such concerns are particularly salient in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients.
 This study empirically examines audit reports provided to financially stressed companies in the United Kingdom and the magnitude of audit and non-audit service fees paid to the company's auditors. We find that the magnitude of both audit fees and non-audit fees are significantly associated with the issuance of a going-concern modified audit opinion. In particular, financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion, whereas companies with high non-audit fees are less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion. Additional analyses indicate that the results are generally robust across alternative model and variable specifications. Overall, evidence supports the contention that high non-audit fees have a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. companies.     

Can banks monitor small business borrowers effectively using hard information?

We investigate whether banks rely on hard information to monitor small business borrowers and to what extent hard information is credible. Using Japanese firm-level data, we show that banks reduce the amount of lending to defaulting firms if the firms are financially distressed and suffer operating losses. In contrast, banks do not significantly reduce the amount of lending to defaulting firms with low levels of leverage and high profitability. This implies that banks mitigate type II errors if they receive default signals using the hard information of informationally opaque small businesses.     

Addressing Issues Relating To Going-Gongern Audit Qualifications And Corporate Failure

This study examines the incidence of going-concern audit qualifications and of corporate failure for Australian publicly listed companies over the period 1980-90. The analysis includes a review of annual reports for companies that attracted going-concern qualifications but did not subsequently fail, in order to identify potential indicators of survival. The differences between the indicators noted for failed companies that had their last accounts qualified on the basis of going concern, and those of failed companies not qualified, was also examined. Other issues of interest include a comparison of going-concern qualifications by Big Eight (Six) and other audit firms, and the extent and location of disclosure of going-concern problems in the annual report.     

Non-GAAP earnings reporting following going-concern opinions

We examine non-GAAP earnings reporting following a going-concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a propensity score-matched sample, matching first-time going-concern issuing companies with firms in financial distress that did not receive a going-concern report, we find that the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP earnings reporting are lower following GCOs. In additional analyses, we find the negative association between the announcement of GCOs and the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP earnings reporting stronger when GCOs are issued by industry-specialist auditors and when GCOs are unexpected, but do not find litigation risk or managers' ability to affect the association. These results are consistent with a decrease in investor demand for non-GAAP earnings disclosures following GCOs.     

Delays in reporting price-sensitive information: The case of going concern

Regulators require firms to disclose all price-sensitive information at the earliest possible date. The going-concern opinion constitutes a fundamental uncertainty for the firm and thus is likely to be of a price-sensitive nature. This paper explores whether going-concern uncertainty disclosures are price sensitive in the London market, and then tests whether managements report such audit report information to investors on a timely basis. We capitalize on a London Stock Exchange regulatory loophole which, in effect, allows financially-distressed firms to choose either to report a forthcoming going-concern at the preliminary results announcement stage, or to delay this crucial information to their annual report release. In line with the regulatory requirements, we expect that firms with more price-sensitive, i.e., more serious, adverse news will disclose their forthcoming going-concern opinion at the earliest stage i.e., in their preliminary announcement, rather than delay to their annual report.     

Decision‐making capabilities of a hybrid system applied to the auditor's going‐concern assessment

The purpose of this study is to evaluate a hybrid system as a decision support model to assist with the auditor's going‐concern assessment. The going‐concern assessment is often an unstructured decision that involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative information. An expert system that predicts the going‐concern decision has been developed in consultation with partners at three of the Big Five accounting firms. This system is combined with a statistical model that predicts bankruptcy, as a component of the auditor's decision, to form a hybrid system. The hybrid system, because it combines the use of quantitative and qualitative information, has the potential for better prediction accuracy than either the expert system or statistical model predicting separately. In addition, testing of the system provides some insight into the characteristics of firms that experience problems, but do not necessarily receive a going‐concern modification. Further investigation into those firms that have problems could reveal factors that may be incorporated into decision support systems for auditors, in order to improve accuracy and reliability of these decision tools. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

U.S. Audit partner identification and auditor reporting

After a lengthy and protracted debate, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) adopted new rules requiring disclosure of the engagement partner’s name and information about other accounting firms on the new PCAOB Form AP, Auditor Reporting of Certain Audit Participants. We investigate the impact of this regulation on auditor behavior in the context of the auditor’s going concern report modification propensity. We document an increase in the propensity to issue a going concern report modification in the disclosure regime, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the Type I (‘false positives’) error rate. Thus, an unintended consequence of Rule 3211 is the potential reduction in the audit report's informativeness. Conceivably, a more significant repercussion is that going concern modifications can hasten bankruptcy for firms since financial institutions may be reluctant to lend money to firms with modified audit reports. An unjustified increase in the going concern modification rate as evinced in our paper may make U.S. capital markets potentially less attractive to young, upstart, albeit financially-distressed, companies.     

Is an Auditor's Propensity to Issue Going Concern Opinions a Valid Measure of Audit Quality?

A number of previous studies use auditor propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) as a proxy of audit quality when examining a sample of financially distressed firms. This study examines whether audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals) influences the probability of financially distressed firms receiving GCOs using a non‐specific sample of 2937 firm‐year observations from Australia over the period 2011–2015. The study first investigates the association between financially distressed firms and the issuance of GCOs. This association is then re‐tested after separating the total sample into low and high audit quality subsamples. The results indicate that financially distressed firms are more likely to receive GCOs, confirming the application of ASA 570 Going Concern. However, financially distressed firms that receive GCOs from their auditors are limited to firms that have higher‐quality audits.     

Default prediction with dynamic sectoral and macroeconomic frailties

This paper extends the macroeconomic frailty model to include sectoral frailty factors that capture default correlations among firms in a similar business. We estimate sectoral and macroeconomic frailty factors and their effects on default intensity using the data for Japanese firms from 1992 to 2010. We find strong evidence for the presence of sectoral frailty factors even after accounting for the effects of observable covariates and macroeconomic frailty on default intensity. The model with sectoral frailties performs better than that without. Results show that accounting for the sources of unobserved sectoral default risk covariations improves the accuracy of default probability estimation.     

Recovery rates,default probabilities,and the credit cycle

In recessions, the number of defaulting firms rises. On top of this, the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease. This paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time-variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved Markov chain, which we interpret as the “credit cycle”. This model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time-variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables. We use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time-variation in recovery rates, which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models.     

Audit opinion and earnings management: Evidence from Greece

This study examines the relationship between audit opinions and earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals, for listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). We divide the qualified audit opinions into two categories: qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. The results indicate that audit opinions are not related to earnings management. Client financial characteristics, such as profitability and size are determinants of the going-concern audit opinion decision. The decision of auditors to issue qualified opinions for other reasons is explained by the type of audit opinion issued in the previous year.     

What happens after corporate default? Stylized facts on access to credit

In this paper, we investigate what happens to firms after they default on their bank loans. We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of corporate default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset from Portugal, we observe that half of the corporate default episodes last 5 quarters. Most firms continue to have access to credit immediately after resolving default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more difficulties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting firms record another default in the future. We observe that firms with repeated defaults are, on average, smaller and experience longer and more severe defaults.     

The effect of strategic and operating turnaround initiatives on audit reporting for distressed companies

Empirical research on the effect of turnaround initiatives on audit reporting is scant. This paper addresses this gap by examining audit reporting for distressed companies and its association with a broad array of strategic and operating turnaround initiatives. In particular, we study the association between business risk information and going-concern decisions for distressed clients. Using a sample of distressed firms in the US manufacturing industry, we find that both short-term cash flow potential as well as strategic growth and hence long-term cash flow potential are necessary for strategic turnaround initiatives to have a mitigating impact on the auditor’s going-concern decision. Strategic turnaround initiatives for which only one of these two conditions holds and operating turnaround initiatives appear to function as going-concern risk factors as they are associated with a higher likelihood that a going-concern opinion will be issued. We also find that specialist and non-specialist auditors assess the mitigating potential of some but not all turnaround initiatives differently. Overall, our results suggest that auditors’ strategic risk assessment (typically done in a business risk auditing context) is associated with the outcome of the audit process (the opinion).     

制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见

客户重要性是否影响审计师独立性,是审计理论界和实务界都非常关注的话题。本文以企业集团作为一个整体来研究集团客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响,发现集团客户经济依赖性会损害审计师的独立性,这种现象对于小规模事务所而言尤为严重。此外,本文还进一步考察了2007年新会计准则、审计准则及事务所民事诉讼风险加强等制度环境变化对审计师行为的影响。研究发现,在制度环境改善之后,审计师执业总体上变得更加谨慎,大规模事务所尤其如此。     

持续经营审计意见、分析师跟踪与融资约束

以2011-2016年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,运用现金—现金流敏感性模型,研究持续经营审计意见及分析师跟踪对融资约束的影响。研究发现：持续经营审计意见的出具加剧了上市公司面临的融资约束;分析师跟踪人数越多,上市公司面临的融资约束越小;分析师跟踪能够缓解被出具带强调事项段持续经营无保留审计意见公司的融资约束,加剧被出具其他持续经营审计意见（保留意见、无法表示意见和否定意见）公司的融资约束。     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.