Political uncertainty and city bank lending in China: Evidence from city government official changes

Using data hand collected in China between 2001 and 2016, this paper examines how political uncertainty affects city bank lending. Our results show that political uncertainty causes banks to significantly increase loan growth. These results are moderated by the characteristics of government officials, bank characteristics, and the degree of marketization. Our results further show that changes by government officials increase medium-term loan growth, mainly for the real estate and public utilities sector. Finally, we show that city government official changes increase bank lending and, thus, increase credit risk, that is, bank lending has a mediating effect.     

Collectivism and Corruption in Commercial Loan Production: How to Break the Curse?

Recent research suggests that collectivism breeds corruption in bank lending. This finding, together with the stickiness of culture, poses a direct challenge to economic growth in collectivist societies. In this paper, we address this grim outlook by examining the types of firms that are susceptible to the detrimental effect of collectivism on lending integrity and the formal institutions that can help alleviate such effect. We find that the adverse effect of collectivism on bank corruption is more severe in small and medium-sized firms, privately owned firms, and non-exporting firms, while it is considerably weaker in countries with more effective private monitoring, a higher (lower) fraction of foreign-owned (government-owned) banks, a more competitive banking sector, better information sharing, and stronger legal and political institutions. Our findings are robust to using alternative measures of collectivism and alternative dependent variables. These results highlight how firm-level characteristics and formal institutions interact with collectivism in affecting firms’ access to bank credit.     

Does bank efficiency affect the bank lending channel in China?

This work examines the impact of bank efficiency on the bank lending channel in China. Using a sample of 148 Chinese banks over the period 2006–2017, we investigate how the reaction of the loan supply to monetary policy actions depends on a bank's efficiency. We find limited evidence that bank efficiency hampers the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. In addition, bank efficiency does favor the transmission of monetary policy for banks with low loan-to-deposit ratios. These results suggest that bank efficiency may influence the bank lending channel in certain cases.     

美国放松银行业地域管制与中小企业贷款

美国放松银行业地域管制后出现大规模的银行并购,但银行业的并购和跨区域扩张并没有使美国银行业市场过度集中和对中小企业贷款造成明显冲击。中国银行业可以从中得到有益启示:放开中小银行跨区域限制的同时必须保证足够数量的中小银行业机构,使银行市场保持适度的竞争;中小银行应更多立足本地,积极发挥对中小企业关系型贷款优势;大型银行发展中小企业贷款必须进行贷款技术创新,以降低对中小企业交易型贷款成本。     

Defaults in bank loans to SMEs during the financial crisis

We investigate the role of (business) collateral and (personal) guarantees alongside small and medium enterprise (SME), lending bank and loan characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, sectors, and geographic locations while controlling for unobserved time effects in predicting default at the peak of the financial crisis. First, we find a positive relation between collateral and default, and a negative relation between guarantees and default. Second, we find a negative relation between the joint influence of collateral and high credit score, and a positive relation between the joint influence of collateral and low credit score and default. We also find a negative relation between the joint influence of guarantees and high credit score. These findings are relevant for SME policies aimed at facilitating access to credit, reducing the cost of borrowing, and decreasing default; risk management of banks; and the application of theories of financial economics in the context of a financial crisis.     

Bank Loan Announcements and Borrower Stock Returns: Does Bank Origin Matter?

Banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and value of their borrowers. Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as the banks' selection and monitoring abilities may differ. Using an event study methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of the banks for the investors' assessments of firms' credit quality and economic worth following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank loans to US firms over the period of 1980–2003. We find that investors react positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm's headquarters state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign. Our evidence suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. These results are applicable also to the European markets where regulatory and economic borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem to matter a great deal.     

Credit risk and bank competition in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper investigates the relationship between bank competition and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using financial statements on 221 banks from 33 countries over the period 2000–15, we provide evidence for a U-shaped relationship between bank competition and credit risk. Up to a certain threshold, higher levels of bank competition are associated with lower credit risk. Above this threshold, more competition increases credit risks as the positive effects of competition are outweighed by the adverse effects of rising competition. The optimal threshold appears to be higher for African banks compared to banks from developed countries. We also find that credit risk in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only related to macroeconomic determinants, such as growth, public debt, economic concentration and financial development, but also to the business and regulatory environment. In particular, bank risks appear to be lower in countries where credit registry coverage is higher and the tenure of supervisors is shorter.     

Financial underdevelopment,distorted lending and export market survival

This paper examines the impact of financial development on exporter survival in foreign markets with Chinese firm-level data over the period 1998–2008. We measure financial development using the size, lending efficiency, term structure of bank loans and degree of state intervention in financial resource allocation, respectively. We find that a larger scale and greater efficiency of bank lending and less state intervention facilitate while the relative abundance of long-term credit deteriorates exporter survival. These effects are more pronounced for private exporters compared with state-owned exporters. For foreign-invested exporters, weakened state intervention is of relatively great importance. We attribute this disproportional impact to the government's intervention in funding investment and the distortional lending of banks, which varies across regions and industries with different levels of presence of state-owned enterprises.     

The Aggregate Behavior of Banks: A Proposal for Prudential Supervision

This study seeks to investigate a macroeconomic approach that could help bank regulators and supervisors perform their task of ensuring financial stability. To achieve this, an attempt is made to explain the behavior of banks by analyzing aggregate time series of credit lending and deposit-taking, which are the variables involved in financial intermediation. This article's main contribution is to present evidence of banks’ behavior in their role as financial intermediaries, in terms of the performance of the variables that represent their credit-granting or deposit-taking decisions. For this purpose the study used a vector autoregressive model to construct impulse response functions and the Granger test. The results demonstrate the existence of bilateral causality between credit lending and deposit--taking, suggesting that banks actively manage the financial intermediation process. In addition, the results show that shocks to deposits destabilize the credit lending process, and credit supply shocks, in turn, destabilize deposit-taking. The latter result is important for understanding how financial instability can arise, and is thus relevant for the bank regulator.     

Competition, herd behavior, and credit cycles: evidence from major Swiss Banks

I use time-series analysis to investigate the dynamic interdependence of the credit supplies of the three major Swiss banks from 1987 to 1996. The statistical results document that all three banks reacted to their competitors’ changes in lending. The estimated individual credit supply functions are then used in counterfactual experiments to study the total lending of these three banks (which is roughly half the bank lending in Switzerland) under different assumptions regarding leader/follower behavior. These simulations highlight the role of competitive behavior for the persistence of aggregate credit cycles.     

The effect of stimulus policy on lending behavior and bank risk: Evidence from the Chinese banking sector

Considering China's stimulus policy in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment, our study attempts to provide evidence to understand how expansionary monetary policy is likely to influence bank risk-taking in emerging markets, specifically in China. Using data on Chinese counties from 2006 to 2011, we theoretically discuss and empirically observe a positive relationship between the stimulus policy and bank risk-taking, as measured by nonperforming loans. Such a nexus stems from the negative effect of the stimulus policy on banks' lending standards and the positive effect on banks' credit support to small and medium sized enterprises. In addition, our study is enriched by estimating the moderating effects of bank capitalization based on the “risk-shifting” effect and “search for yield” effect caused by the stimulus policy. Specifically, we find important differences across banking groups, such that small and medium-sized banks with low capitalization increase their exposure to risk, while large state-owned banks with high capitalization notably reduce their risk tolerance. The results of this study may help to characterize monetary policy and macro prudential regulation, especially for emerging economies.     

Does ICT adoption improve access to credit for small enterprises?

Using data at the bank–firm level collected through the 9th UniCredit Survey conducted in 2012 on a large sample of small businesses, we investigate the extent to which a large international bank offers better credit conditions to enterprises that use ICT more extensively. The results, which are robust to selection and endogeneity issues, show that banks tend to grant increasing volumes of credit to such enterprises. We interpret this evidence as the ceteris paribus effect of ICT adoption by small businesses on the quality of information transmitted to banks. Another possible interpretation is that banks consider ICT adoption as a signal of firms’ willingness to innovate. We also discuss implications concerning the key role that technology plays in changing the ‘arm’s length’ versus ‘relationship’ lending paradigms.     

Bargaining power and information in SME lending

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are informationally opaque and bank dependent. In SME lending, banks largely rely on soft information, because the scale and scope of hard information are limited. We analyze whether and how hard and soft information affects the borrower??s bargaining power vis-à-vis its bank. We use the fact that, for a given credit rating, certain borrowers obtain better loan terms than others to define measures of relative bargaining power. Using SME loan data from the USA and Germany, we find that more favorable soft information (management skills and character) increases borrower bargaining power. We also show that more favorable soft than hard information improves borrower bargaining power. The results are not driven by manipulation or statistical limitations of the credit ratings. Our study suggests that soft information represents an important and direct determinant of borrower bargaining power, affecting the outcomes of the loan contracting process.     

次贷危机背景下我国商业银行对个人住房信贷风险的防范

美国次贷危机已演变成为了全球性的金融危机。我国商业银行的个人住房信贷扩张累积了较大风险与个贷危机,次贷危机的冲击将使个人住房贷款者信用风险的集中爆发,也会使房地产市场发展的不确定性风险加大等问题完全暴露。我国商业银行必须采取措施,提前防范其对银行体系内个人住房信贷所产生的不良影响,严格控制个人住房贷款者的信用级别,完善并严厉执行银行体系的内部控制,增强银行自身的流动性,加强金融创新监管,以全面保证商业银行信贷资产运作的安全性。     

The Global Financial Crisis and Stock Market Reaction to Bank Loan Announcements

This study investigates how equity investors react to bank loan announcements in China using an event study methodology. By estimating the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) over the event period and controlling for the impact of other factors such as borrower, lender and loan characteristics, we find that the overall reaction is negative. However, the results for the two sub-sample periods are different. After the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the average CARs are no longer statistically different from zero, indicating higher lending standards and improvement in the quality of credit analysis of Chinese banks.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Interest Rates in Ghana

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of the bank lending rate in Ghana using annual time series data from 1970 to 2013. We found evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the average lending rate charged by commercial banks and its determining factors. In the long run, bank lending rates in Ghana are positively influenced by nominal exchange rates and Bank of Ghana’s monetary policy rate but negatively with fiscal deficit, real GDP and inflation. We also find positive dependence of the bank lending rate on exchange rates, and the monetary policy rate both in the short and long run. Specifically, our findings reveal that the Bank of Ghana’s monetary policy rate and the exchange rate, by far, show strong contemporaneous effects on the average bank lending rate in Ghana.     

Cyclicality of lending in Africa: The influence of bank ownership

Ownership structure of banks has dramatically changed over the past two decades in African countries with privatization and foreign bank entry, including the expansion of Pan-African banks. The objective of this paper is to investigate how bank ownership influences cyclicality of lending in Africa. We are then able to assess how changes in bank ownership influence the economy. To this end, we measure the sensitivity of bank loan growth to GDP per capita growth of the host country with dynamic GMM estimations. We use panel data from 190 commercial banks covering 20 African countries spanning the period from 2002 to 2015. We find that lending of African banks is procyclical for all types of banks. However, we observe that Pan-African banks are the least procyclical banks, while no significant difference in procyclicality is observed between state-owned banks, domestic private banks, and other foreign banks. In addition, we find evidence that foreign banks are influenced by GDP per capita growth of their home country. Therefore, our findings support the view that the expansion of Pan-African banks contributes to reduce cyclicality of lending. However, foreign bank entry can enhance the transmission of external shocks.     

Is banking competition beneficial to SMEs? An empirical study based on Italian data

Using a large panel of Italian firms, spanning the years from 1995 to 2003, this study investigates the relationship between bank debt and non-financial SMEs’ performance, evaluating whether and to what extent this link is affected by the degree of competition characterising the local credit market where firms operate. Controlling for inertia, unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of some performance determinants, we find that the (negative) impact of bank debt on firms’ performance is weaker for firms running in more competitive banking markets. We interpret this result as evidence that a more intense banking competition may lead to better credit conditions for small and medium-sized firms.     

The Moderating Influence of Financial Market Development on the Relationship between Loan Guarantees for SMEs and Local Market Employment Rates

We empirically examine whether a major government intervention in the small firm credit market yields significantly better results in markets that are less financially developed. The government intervention that we investigate is Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed lending. After controlling for the appropriate cross‐sectional market characteristics, we find that SBA guaranteed lending has a significantly more positive impact on the average annual level of employment when the local market is relatively less financially developed. This result has important implications for public policy directives concerning where SBA guaranteed lending should be directed.     

Fiscal risk and financial fragility

We propose a new methodology to evaluate the importance of fiscal risk to financial stability. We first develop a method to estimate the probability of non-compliance of public entities, which takes into account the strict legal framework that is mandatory for governments. While in our model the evolution of public entities' revenues is stochastic and heavily depends on expectations about macroeconomic risk factors, the evolution of their personnel expenses and debt is rather deterministic due to the stickiness of the regulation. We then estimate the resilience of the financial sector to the public sector by simulating bank credit defaults in a multilayer network with interacting agents comprising banks, firms, and the public entities. Using Brazilian data at the state level, we establish a statistical link between states' probability of non-compliance and probability of default, enabling us to estimate the expected impact of the public sector in terms of financial losses on the economy. We find that, while most Brazilian states are struggling to comply with budget legal constraints on personnel expenses, the richest states are more likely to not comply with limits on their consolidated debts. We show that financial contagion is small mostly because banks that are more exposed to the public sector are highly capitalized.