Two Models of Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Received December 22, 2000; revised version received August 31, 2001     

Teaching Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Abstract: Third-degree price discrimination is taught in almost every intermediate microeconomics class. The theory, geometry, and the algebra behind the concept are simple, and the phenomenon is commonly associated with the sale of many of the goods and services used frequently by students. Classroom discussion is usually vibrant as students can relate their experiences of being on the receiving end of third-degree price discrimination, usually to their advantage. However, the precision of the language used in the exposition of the theory in textbooks is generally less precise than one would hope for, leading students to confuse slope and elasticity. The authors ask textbook writers to provide greater precision in their explanation of why differing elasticities are associated with the prices paid by two (or more) distinct groups of buyers facing third-degree price discrimination.     

Replacement cycles,income distribution and dynamic price discrimination

This article analyses how income distribution, Intellectual Property Rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good. Discrimination through quality and screening in this article takes place in a context where consumers buy several versions of the durable good during their lifetime, instead of a single version as in Inderst’s (2008) or Koh’s (2006). It also differs from Glass (2001) in that an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies. Our modelling is motivated by stylized facts from the last Brazilian POF (household budget survey).     

Network Externality and the Coordination Problem

We show that Rohlfss (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model á la Hotelling (1929) with uniform consumer distribution and quadratic transportation costs, where location is exogenous and the good yields no intrinsic utility. By relaxing these assumptions, we prove that the coordination problem typically thought to affect markets for network goods may not arise in general. Endogenizing location makes it easier for the monopolist to extract consumer surplus but also to cover the entire market. We also show that the main conclusions remain qualitatively unmodified if consumer distribution is triangular.revised version received September 16, 2003     

论产品价格、劳动力价格与消费需求

价格高水平变动与消费需求变动的关系比较间接。劳动力相对其他商品的价格不断提高，是经济发展表现出的普遍规律。劳动力价格对产品价格不断提高是消费需求持续增长的必要条件。通过企业之间的竞争来实现劳动生产率的提高和非农产业就业人数的增长，是实现大众消费良性循环的根本措施。     

中国城镇居民用电需求估算及阶梯电价方案设计

估计了不同收入水平的中国城镇居民家庭用电需求的价格弹性和收入弹性,分析了现行的阶梯电价政策对不同收入组城镇居民家庭生活用电量和福利的影响。研究结果表明:中国城镇居民家庭用电需求的价格弹性在-0.239~-0.660之间,收入弹性在0.343~0.577之间;2007—2011年,收入水平为0~10%的城镇居民家庭的月均生活用电量在50千瓦时以下,收入水平为10%~100%的城镇居民家庭的月均生活用电量在189~240千瓦时之间。指出中国现行的阶梯电价方案还有很大的改进空间。根据中国城镇居民家庭的用电特性和价格弹性,提出新的阶梯电价方案。该方案既可提高低收入城镇居民家庭的福利,又可减少高收入城镇居民家庭的超额用电需求,并降低城镇居民家庭的人均生活用电量。     

网络外部性、专用性投资与机会主义行为——双边锁定与关系持续

机会主义行为是营销研究核心问题之一。文章通过模型分析表明,渠道购买商网络外部性引起的正反馈循环会使销售商被"锁定",这种被"锁定"的专用性投资进而会导致购买商攫取"准租"的机会主义行为,不考虑关系持续和双边锁定,实证研究验证了模型结论。但渠道双方都发生专用性投资时,机会主义行为会受到限制;另外,渠道关系期限也有效地缓解专用性投资"锁定"导致的机会主义行为。     

基于网络外部性的产品差异化与兼容性选择

本文研究了网络外部性与转移成本存在下的新进入企业的产品差异化与兼容性选择问题,并考虑了在位企业的兼容性动机。研究结果表明:对于新进入企业而言,只存在两种策略组合,即(最大差异化,不兼容)和(最大差异化,兼容);在位企业是偏好兼容的。     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

电信网络外部性的一个注释及管制实践含义

网络外部性的存在使相关利益主体权利边界模糊,从而限制了电信网络竞争业务领域的可竞争性,同时理论上网络效应与网络外部性的混同,使管制政策与工具选择无力消除外部性,反而使现有的分拆式结构管制政策本身出现矛盾.本文的意义在于为网络性产业的合理管制路径提供一个基于外部性视角的理解.     

网络外部性下基于投资溢出的企业合作研发博弈模型

本文建立了网络外部性环境下基于投资溢出的企业合作研发博弈模型,研究了企业合作研发策略,分析了网络外部性、兼容性以及投资溢出等对企业合作研发动机、企业利润和社会福利等的影响。研究表明,合作研发能提高企业利润和社会福利;兼容性较大或外部性较小时,提高产品外部性会增强企业合作研发意愿;提高兼容性或投资溢出则始终会增强企业合作研发意愿,提高企业利润和社会福利。因此,政府应鼓励企业生产高网络外部性和高兼容性的产品,并增强投资溢出效应,激励企业投入更多研发资源,提高企业利润和社会福利。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

技术进步、价格调整与制造业电力需求

电力需求快速增长引发的碳排放问题日益严重,中国环境容量能否承载未来电力需求持续高速增长的压力备受关注。不同产业部门电力需求存在直接和间接的经济技术联系,基于东部11个省份2007年投入产出表,测算生产过程中某一部门技术进步引致的经济系统中所有产业部门电力需求的变化幅度,以此判断对电力需求影响较大的制造业部门,并利用投入产出价格模型计算各产业部门生产成本对电力价格增加的敏感度,识别出价格效应显著的各制造业部门。综合技术进步效应与价格效应后,比较各产业部门在电力需求上的节能减排潜力的结果显示：在经济发展水平相似的东部各省份,非金属矿物制品业、金属冶炼及压延加工业、化学工业、通用、专用设备制造业4个产业的技术进步效应、价格效应均能显著抑制电力需求增加,具有较大的节能减排潜力。但实践上通过价格效应实现降低碳排放的目标,还需考虑碳成本转化率、市场结构、替代品替代效应、产品需求弹性等因素的影响。     

河北省农户储蓄与借贷需求分析

河北省农户金融活动除具有普通农户金融活动的特征外,还具有现金流量不稳定、资金用途难以区分、收入不平衡等特征。因此,需要构建新型农村金融体系,进行农村金融制度创新,为社会主义新农村建设提供资金支持。     

Household Income,Demand, and Saving: Deriving Macro Data With Micro Data Concepts

We develop adjustments to align the NIPA measures of key household variables with cash flow concepts that reflect household budgets and actual demand generated by households. The adjusted variables have substantially different behaviors across time than NIPA measures of household spending and saving. Furthermore, household income aggregated from micro data sets like the CPS, SCF, and PSID differs significantly from NIPA personal income. But the micro survey data likely reflect cash flow concepts rather than NIPA definitions. Indeed the adjusted cash flow measure of income eliminates much of the gap between micro data income variables and NIPA household income.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

转移成本、价格歧视与银行竞争——基于霍特林模型的实证分析

在银行业竞争中,转移成本能够锁定消费者,使银行能够对锁定的消费者定一个较高的价格,但是,转移成本也使银行对没有被锁定的消费者的竞争更加激烈。研究发现,转移成本的存在增加了银行的利润,并且转移成本越高,银行从信贷中获得的利润越高。但是,当存在存款市场和贷款市场竞争时,由于价格歧视的存在,银行的利润随着转移成本的增加而降低,转移成本没有给银行带来优势。     

基于外部性内部化与国家意愿支付的脱硝电价定价研究

本文从外部性内部化理论和费用效益理论出发,提出按照国家意愿支付确定脱硝电价,并在研究国家意愿支付与脱硝边际成本的变动规律基础上论证了该脱硝电价算法的合理性。接着,构建了基于国家意愿支付的脱硝电价模型,在分析2004年我国电力行业脱硝成本与脱硝环境效益的基础上,对脱硝电价进行了案例研究,对在实践上如何计算脱硝电价做了有益的尝试。     

市场歧视、区际边界效应与经济增长

跨区域商品价格差被认为是研究国内区际贸易的有效替代指标,文章首先以我国12个样本城市六大类商品价格为考察对象,经回归分析认为:除了距离等控制因素外,"樊纲指数"和"政府支出占GDP的比率"较好地解释了我国六大类商品价格偏差的边界效应,说明市场化进程落后的地区更可能筑起商品贸易的政策壁垒,而具有"父爱"意识的政府在高财政支出比率情形下更有能力实施保护战略,从而验证了文章的边界效应假说.实证分析还获取了两个层次的边界效应(包括品类边界效应和省份边界效应),并作为市场一体化指标被纳入文章的经济增长方程进行回归;结果显示:地方保护壁垒造成的省份市场分割,影响到保护战略实施省份的自身经济绩效.