Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information

Multi-attribute negotiation is an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements in real-world situations. It allows the possibility of reaching “win-win” solutions for both parties, who trade off different attributes in a solution. Existing research on multi-attribute negotiations has mainly focused on the situations when negotiation parties have complete information about each other's preference. This paper presents a model with incomplete information, while considering Pareto-efficiency and computational efficiency. A non-biased mediator, who applies query learning to maintain near Pareto-efficiency without heavy computation, is adopted in the model. In addition, the mediating mechanism proposed in the model overcomes the difficulty of preference elicitation which usually arises in the preliminary step of a multi-attribute negotiation. Our model also reduces the negotiation complexity by decomposing the original n-dimensional negotiation space into a sequence of negotiation base lines. Agents can negotiate upon a base line with rather simple strategies. The experimental results show that near Pareto-efficient agreements can be reached effectively.     

Response modes in negotiation

Negotiators may respond to each other’s offers and demands in different ways. Whereas many negotiation experiments present participants with numerical information about offers and counteroffers (e.g., “I propose 6–8–2”; numerical response mode), real life negotiations often involve affective and evaluative statements (e.g., “I didn’t like your last offer, but I would be happy to explore alternatives”; affective response mode). The present research explores the differential consequences of responding in affective as opposed to numerical terms. Specifically, we predicted and found that affective responses increase the impact of social and contextual cues on negotiation behavior. Three studies demonstrate that the impact of other’s toughness (Experiment 1), other’s respectability (Experiment 2), and other’s appearance (Experiment 3) on a negotiator’s demands and concessions is greater when the other provides affective rather than numerical feedback.     

Advances in Drama Theory for Managing Global Hazards and Disasters. Part I: Theoretical Foundation

Global risk and disaster management challenges are complex and ill-structured group decision processes characterized by time-sensitive, multi-faceted, and self-organizing negotiations, high decision stakes, extreme uncertainty, and dynamic, value-laden tradeoffs. Drama theory asserts that conflict resolution requires players to engage in a rational-emotional process of re-defining both the game and their “positions” in it until agreement on a satisfactory resolution is reached. While game theory has been widely applied to problems dealing with hazards, risk, and disasters, it assumes fixed players, options, and preferences, and hence does not allow for the re-definition of the conflict under consideration. Results show that drama theory constitutes a flexible and powerful tool for modeling group decision and negotiation processes involving natural, man-made, and health-related hazards, risk, and catastrophes in the post-911 security environment by modeling emotional responses that, throughout the course of a game, can lead to unanticipated reactions and change basic assumptions. This is achieved through the use of option boards to construct and analyze emergency, disaster, or crisis models that are structurally similar to game models. Finally, drama theory is compared and contrasted to conflict analysis, which developed from common roots in metagame analysis. The strengths and weaknesses of drama theory are critically evaluated in the context of global climate change and the mounting risk of a worldwide influenza pandemic.     

Hot Versus Cool Behavioural Styles in Electronic Negotiations: The Impact of Communication Mode

In this paper, we study the effects of synchronous and asynchronous communication mode on electronic negotiations. By applying content analysis, we compare the negotiation processes of two e-negotiation simulations conducted in a synchronous and an asynchronous setting. Our results show significant differences in communication behaviour of subjects. Synchronous negotiation mode leads to less friendly, more affective, and more competitive negotiation behaviour. In the asynchronous communication mode, negotiators exchange more private and task-oriented information and are friendlier. These results suggest that negotiators in the asynchronous mode, who have more time to reflect, cool down and control emotions better while negotiators, who communicate synchronously engage more in emotional and competitive “hot” debates. In addition, negotiators in the asynchronous mode are more satisfied with the process and outcome of the negotiation. We conclude that de-individuation and escalating effects might be caused by communication mode rather than by the ability of the media to transmit social cues.     

Meta-level Coordination for Solving Distributed Negotiation Chains in Semi-cooperative Multi-agent Systems

A negotiation chain is formed when multiple related negotiations are spread over multiple agents. In order to appropriately order and structure the negotiations occurring in the chain so as to optimize the expected utility, we present an extension to a single-agent concurrent negotiation framework. This work is aimed at semi-cooperative multi-agent systems, where each agent has its own goals and works to maximize its local utility; however, the performance of each individual agent is tightly related to other agents’ cooperation and the system’s overall performance. We introduce a pre-negotiation phase that allows agents to transfer meta-level information. Using this information, the agent can improve the accuracy of its local model about how other agents would react to the negotiations. This more accurate model helps the agent in choosing a better negotiation solution for a distributed negotiation chain problem. The agent can also use this information to allocate appropriate time for each negotiation, hence to find a good ordering of all related negotiations. The experimental data show that these mechanisms improve the agents’ and the system’s overall performance significantly.     

A Classification of Bargaining Steps and their Impact on Negotiation Outcomes

In this paper, we develop a typology of bargaining steps for multi-issue negotiations, which is derived from possible changes in single issues. By considering all combinations of such changes, we create a consistent classification of steps. This classification forms the basis of an empirical analysis of the impact of different types of bargaining steps on various outcome dimensions of negotiations. We perform an exploratory analysis based on an ex-post analysis of existing negotiation data, which was collected over several years using an Internet-based negotiation support system. Empirical results indicate a strong positive impact of log-rolling strategies and a negative impact of “hard” tactics like insistence on the chances of reaching an agreement. Contrary to expectations, hard tactics do not improve the efficiency of agreements.     

An Experimental Investigation of Virtual Negotiations with Dynamic Plots

Advanced information and communications technologies provide the basis for virtual negotiations where competitors continuously alter their assignments in real-time in response to market changes. Dynamic plots, which depict the competitors' possible profits and hints for how to improve them, provide a way to support these types of negotiation settings. This research reports on an experimental assessment of dynamic plots for visual interactive negotiations. Dynamic plots are compared to an alternative dynamic method of real-time negotiation support using selected conflict situations to test five hypotheses. The results of the laboratory assessment provide evidence for the hypotheses that dynamic plots stimulate negotiations, provide effective support to reach efficient, system optimal, and equitable solutions, and are well received as negotiation tools in real-time settings.     

Computer-supported cooperative negotiations

This article describes an environment for interactive negotiations based on current and emerging information technology. Over the past few years a suite of methods, tools, and techniques have emerged which promise to revolutionize the negotiations planning and decision-making processes. Some of these technologies include collaborative computing, electronic publishing, intelligent systems, and networked communications—all supported by a network of processors, applications, and data bases. This article explores these opportunities by examining how the methods, tools, and techniques might all combine to facilitate “computer-supported cooperative negotiations.”     

WTO电子商务谈判与数字贸易规则博弈

2019年1月,76个WTO成员签署《电子商务联合声明》,确认启动与贸易有关的电子商务议题谈判,旨在制订电子商务/数字贸易领域的国际规则。本文在对谈判成员、提案内容和规则议题进行梳理的基础上,研究分析了数字贸易规则博弈焦点和国家间立场分歧。研究发现:从成员构成看,发达经济体是谈判的主导者,发展中经济体参与谈判和提交提案的比例偏低;从议题设计看,谈判内容远超以往电子商务谈判,更多聚焦于跨境数据流动、源代码披露等数字贸易规则议题;从博弈焦点看,谈判核心包括数据要素、市场空间、监管治理、技术发展与收益分配5个方面,发达经济体和发展中经济体的诉求差异巨大。在此形势下,中国既要加快完善国内体制机制,营造有利于数字经济和数字贸易发展的环境,又要积极参与数字贸易国际规则制订,提出中国规则主张。     

Disclosure of Energy Operating Cost Information: A Silver Bullet for Overcoming the Energy-Efficiency Gap?

Consumers frequently act contrary to rational economic theory by overvaluing an initially higher purchase price while heavily discounting future energy operating costs. One opportunity to help limit the scale of over-discounting is to fully disclose the energy consumption of a product, e.g., by means of an energy label. However, not only the availability of information, but also the way in which specific information about the energy consumption is framed, is likely to affect how individuals discount future operating costs. A cost accuracy estimation experiment reveals that disclosing annual energy operating costs for the product category of televisions might risk assisting consumers in realising that the possible energy operating cost savings fall below initial estimates. A subsequent choice-based conjoint experiment shows that disclosing annual energy operating costs thus affects consumers by causing them to discount future energy operating costs of a television more heavily than when the information is disclosed in the form of “watts.” Owing to the power of the reversed “pennies-a-day” effect, disclosing lifetime energy operating cost information, however, proves to be most effective in guiding consumers towards more energy-efficient shopping behaviour. Implications for consumer policy and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Modeling the Caspian Sea Negotiations

The objective of this study is to identify techniques for predicting the outcome of a negotiation and then apply them to the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which has been in dispute since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The five coastal states—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—entered negotiations in 1993, but have not yet agreed on who owns the waters or the oil and natural gas beneath them. We identify the five well-defined options for resolving the dispute and then discuss the states’ preferences regarding these options. We apply some well-known social choice rules to find the “socially optimal” resolution. Then we review several versions of Fallback Bargaining, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction of the bargainers, and apply them to the dispute. Finally, we represent the dispute in financial terms and apply several well-known bankruptcy procedures, which are fair division methods for settling monetary claims. We end with some suggestions on how the value of the Caspian seabed resources could be allocated among the five Caspian states.     

A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation

Agents in a negotiation may have to negotiate multiple issues simultaneously. Automated multi-attribute negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements on multiple issues. Moreover, it also furnishes the opportunity to reach “win–win” solutions. In this paper, we first provide a survey that synthesizes the research on multi-attribute negotiation. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and conclude that three key issues need further study: incomplete information, Pareto optimality, and tractability. We then present a generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation with two new mechanisms that address the above issues. Finally, we discuss the challenges and directions for future work.     

A Multi-Agent Model for Overlapping Negotiations

In the last few years, research on multi-agent systems has addressed different aspects of intelligent negotiations using methods developed in different domains including game theory, decision theory, and economic models. The research proposed in Andersson and Sandholm (1999), Sandholm (1993), Sandholm and Lesser (1995) and Aknine et?al. (2004), Aknine (2002) are significant examples. However, only some of this work focuses on problems related to complex negotiations, particularly those concerning new generation applications. This new research raises fundamental difficulties we have encountered, especially in overlapping negotiations and combined negotiations. This article is interested essentially in overlapping negotiations, which include several agent roles in a same negotiation. One or more agents may play each of these roles. This work shows that the high-level negotiation models are necessary in order to control the execution of overlapping negotiation processes, since, in these negotiations we are facing both classical problems of multi-agent negotiations based on two agents’ roles and the problems concerned with the interdependence of these negotiations. Synchronization of these different processes is thus necessary because of the multiplicity of the roles. Thus, this paper presents a formalized negotiation model, which deals with this problem. It gives a theoretical analysis of the suggested model and discusses the results of the experimental evaluation. To perform this evaluation, we use the application of intelligent service agencies on the Internet.     

Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations

Negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenous preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on and independent of the history of offers made. On the contrary, this paper argues that preferences might be based on attribute-wise reference points changing during the negotiation process. Aversion against losses relative to the reference point determines negotiators’ decisions in the negotiation and after its termination. The emergence and implications of reference points in a negotiation context are motivated, exemplified, and modeled formally. Furthermore, data from an internet experiment on endogenous preferences in bilateral multi-attribute negotiations is presented. The data supports the behavioral model.     

Two-Party Negotiation Modeling: An Integrated Fuzzy Logic Approach

Game theoretic models attempted to predict unique equilibrium outcomes of negotiations with limited success. The imprecise character of negotiation is often altered to fit the game theorist's exacting approach. Alternative models deviated from the formal game theoretic approach and attempted to accommodate concepts such as negotiator power and time pressure. In this paper, we introduce a model which uses a fuzzy logic approach to deal with the imprecision in the negotiation process and to integrate several negotiation theories. The new model is used to simulate multiple-issue, two-party negotiations and results are consistent with established negotiation theories.     

A prototype NSS based on problem structure and suggestions toward more comprehensive negogiation support

Seeking an effective approach to supporting negotiation through the use of computer technology, we have constructed a prototype negotiation support system based on the concept of problem structure. Problem structure refers to the characteristics of the feasible settlement space and efficient frontiers as defined by the joint utility distribution of negotiators' utilities. Problem structure is recognized as playing a major role in negotiation processes and outcomes. The cognitive complexity and inherent uncertainty of typical negotiations make it difficult for negotiators to effectively visualize and “navigate” the settlement space defined by the problem structure. As a result, negotiators often resort to suboptimizing heuristics which produce inefficient and/or unsatisfying outcomes. It follows that a promising approach to negotiation support is to exploit the computational speed and graphics capabilities of computer technology to make problem structure and its implications more accessible. Thus, our prototype is designed to allow negotiators to hypothesize problem structure and to explore and manipulate the resulting settlement space quickly and easily. Preliminary experimentation has demonstrated the value of this approach and has suggested areas for extended, comprehensive support. A negotiation process formalism, Cognitive Action Theory, neural network technology, and computer simulation are well-suited to providing more comprehensive support, and we suggest an architecture for delivery through NSS.     

Negotiation over Costs and Benefits in Brownfield Redevelopment

A quantitative methodology is developed to support negotiations over the allocation of costs and benefits in brownfield redevelopment projects by utilizing cooperative game theory. In particular, guidelines for estimating the net benefits of various coalitions that can be formed by the landowners, developers and governments are presented. A general n-player cooperative game is formulated to model the negotiations. Two simple conditions are obtained for checking whether or not a three-player brownfield redevelopment negotiation game has a nonempty core. Various nucleolus concepts and the Shapley value are utilized to find alternative fair cost and benefit allocation schemes, from which the decision makers can negotiate. An illustrative example is employed to demonstrate how the proposed approach can be applied in practice.     

Positive affect and decision frame in negotiation

This study examined decision frame (“gain” vs. “loss”) and negotiator affect (positive vs. control) in a simulated bilateral negotiation where negotiators dealt with a programmed opponent and made offers and counteroffers on three issues that differed in value. Direct comparisons between the gain and loss frame conditions, in the control-affect condition, revealed a replication of the standard frame effect: a loss frame produced fewer concessions than a gain frame. However, an interaction effect indicated that the frame effect reversed in the positive affect condition: under positive affect, a loss frame produced greater concessions than a gain frame. In addition, the data indicated a replication of earlier work showing that positive affect can lead to more integrative agreements in negotiation. The results suggest that positive affect can influence location of a reference point in evaluating prospective outcomes; one implication is that prospect theory can be useful for understanding the effects of affect in bilateral negotiation.     

The Long-Term Performance of Small Businesses: Are there Differences Between “Christian-Based” Companies and their Secular Counterparts?

Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of “Christian” companies in the U.S. These firms declare their belief in, and active pursuit of, the successful merging of biblical principles with business activities. Economic success, hard work, and biblical values are seen as capable of existing together in harmony. While the number of such businesses appears to be growing, there has been a dearth of any scientific study of these companies. No empirical research has been conducted to determine whether these religious values and behaviors have any significant impact on a company’s performance. The present study is designed to partially fill this gap. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether there are differences in long-term performance between self-proclaimed “Christian-based” businesses and their secular counterparts. Data were collected from 312 companies. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), followed by univariate ANOVAs, found significant differences between these two groups of firms on three of the four performance variables that were analyzed. Some explanations as well as limited generalizations and implications are developed.