Money,markets, meltdown: the 21st‐century crisis of labour

Analyses of the global crisis that erupted in 2007 in bank failures, liquidity shortages and business bankruptcies have obscured the connections between the real and monetary economies. Money market fetishism dominates. In the past, theories of economic crisis assigned a key causal role to labour's growing strength. In Britain, the focus of debate was trades unions' allegedly unregulated power at workplace level, but labour's presence and influence in state, business and workplace institutions has since receded. This article attempts to re‐insert labour into the contemporary analysis of the crisis and highlights the shifting relations between states, capital and labour in the age of austerity.     

MORE PENSIONS MIS‐SELLING AHEAD: BY GOVERNMENT OF COURSE1

Not only was the infamous Pensions Mis‐selling episode of the 1990s caused directly by government legislation; government has continually mis‐sold on an enormous scale its own pension creations, the state pension schemes. The history of state pensions is a history of broken promises, yet today's pension establishment welcomes the Pension Commission's recommendation for a higher state pension. With this mindset it is hardly surprising that similar approval is given to the Commission's other main recommendation – a National Pensions Saving Scheme, which has all the hallmarks of a fiasco in the making. Furthermore to the extent there is a savings crisis, government is a clear culprit, regularly resorting to low interest rates and the printing press to favour borrowing and not saving. Nor is it surprising that government itself will retain its gold‐plated pension arrangements and in all likelihood will be exempt from these proposals.     

Lisbon After the Crisis: From Credit‐fuelled Suburbanization to Tourist‐driven Gentrification

This article examines Lisbon's post‐crisis transition from a once dominant process of suburban expansion enabled by abundant credit to one of ongoing gentrification of its historic centre. In my research, I draw on quantitative and qualitative data to illustrate the remarkable growth of the metropolitan area's population and dwelling stock until the global financial crisis—which affected the Portuguese economy in the course of a process of financialization that relied heavily on the housing industry—and the intensity of urban rehabilitation in subsequent years. However, there is evidence that the latter has not halted nor reduced the loss of long‐term residents in the historic centre, as tourists and other international gentrifiers occupy the upgraded dwelling stock amid an escalation of house prices and rents. The specific contribution of this research lies in the link that it establishes between Lisbon's ongoing process of inner‐city gentrification and the lack of suburban expansion after 2007. By showing that the credit crunch triggered a shift in the geographic location of real‐estate capital that materialized in a new urban development model, this research adds an empirical layer to the study of the spatial effects of the crisis and contributes to the literature on the subsequent restructuring of southern European housing markets.     

Mutating Neoliberalism: The Promotion of Italian Investors in Slovakia before and after the Global Financial Crisis

In the context of the literature on ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, this article analyzes the policies and services supporting Italian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Slovakia. It identifies a group of organizations, both Slovak and Italian, which shape and deliver neoliberal pro‐FDI policies. By studying such an ‘investment promotion community’ (IPC) before and after the global financial crisis of 2009, and during Italy's prolonged crisis, this article shows both the persistence and adaptability of neoliberal policies and institutions. In so doing, it highlights some of the transnational flows underpinning the ‘domestication’ of neoliberalism in Slovakia. These findings support recent literature arguing that post‐crisis neoliberalism can be interpreted as a stunted Polanyian double movement, in which the state has improved some of its regulatory functions but without questioning the overarching neoliberal principles. Specifically, it shows that FDI policies and the support of Italian investors rest upon a professional community that has not changed much since the 2009 crisis. This community played a crucial role in embedding neoliberal rationalities in Slovakia and supports the persistence of this ideology in the post‐crisis environment.     

Do services hold the key to an improved UK trade performance?

The UK has established a central role in the global market for trade in services, ranking second to the US in terms of its share of global exports. Our modelling finds that the key factor behind the UK's success is that its exports are focused on the markets where demand has been growing quickest. This represents a notable contrast with research on UK goods exports, which has found that the geographical focus of goods exports has been the main reason for the UK's persistent underperformance. The global financial crisis caused significant damage to the UK's export performance, particularly to the key financial sector which accounts for a quarter of UK services exports and almost two‐fifths of the UK's surplus on services trade. However, the UK's export performance is on the mend and we expect it to retain its position as a key global player in the market for services over the coming five years.     

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Leadership as Disturbance,Informed by History

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 cannot be over‐studied for the lessons it teaches about leadership. As documents have become declassified, it has now become known that President Kennedy and his team of advisors considered the crisis from multiple angles, ranging from a traditional response to perceived aggression to transactional leadership—in this case, secretly trading the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the removal of American missiles in Turkey. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis involved more than transactional leadership, however. In the complex negotiations that followed the discovery of the missiles, President Kennedy and his team of advisors experienced an evolution in their thinking, while operating under intense strain. The conceptual frameworks that best describe Kennedy's leadership in this context are Voegelin's notion of historical consciousness and Heifetz's conceptions of adaptive leadership.     

Executives’ Orientations as Indicators of Crisis Management Policies and Practices*

ABSTRACT The paper examines effects of executives’ orientations on crisis management awareness and practices, drawing on the simplicity and paradox management theories. It is suggested that a focus on single‐sided management constitutes an antecedent of crisis proneness. Employing a set of key corporate domains and based on a holistic organizational approach, the study aims at assessing the extent to which companies are crisis prone or prepared. In a sample of 82 Istaeli business and not‐for‐profit organizations it was found that human resource management, strategy, structure, and unlearning factors significantly predicted crisis preparedness. These results suggest that unlearning, despite a mere allusion to this correlate in the simplicity and paradox management theories, correlates better with crisis preparedness. By contrast, traditional strategy‐related and structural effects were marginally related to crisis management policies. Implications and suggestions for further research are proposed.     

On Life as a Fictitious Commodity: Cities and the Biopolitics of Late Neoliberalism

Building on a biopolitical understanding of the economic crisis, this essay contends that the occurrence of the crisis warns that life is not a real commodity but — to put it in Karl Polanyi's terms — a ‘fictitious commodity’. This means that life cannot be integrally subsumed within the economy, and therefore the crisis is to be seen as a pathological way in which societies react to the pervasiveness of capitalist relations, showing the illusory character of self‐regulating markets and ownership ideologies. Two mutually contradictory biopolitical responses to the neoliberal crisis, led by the state and grassroots movements respectively, are discussed in the concluding section of the essay.     

The Ascendance of New York Fashion

This article examines the evolution of New York City from a low‐end, high‐volume apparel manufacturing hub to an international fashion capital. Drawing on evolutionary economic theories of path‐dependence, it argues that New York City's initial specialization in ready‐to‐wear apparel has shaped its subsequent development as a mass‐market oriented industry. At the same time, however, it shows how key institutional actors were able to alter the industry's course of development at critical historical junctures by nurturing and promoting their own local design talent. As such, the article's investigation into New York's ascendance as an international fashion center challenges the dominant interpretation of path‐dependence in regional development theory and practice. It contends that industries are not held captive to past choices and illustrates how an industry's origins can shape but not over‐determine its economic development trajectory. L'article examine l'évolution de la ville de New York, laquelle est passée d'un centre de manufacture industrielle de vêtements bas de gamme à une capitale internationale de la mode. En se basant sur les théories économiques évolutionnaires de path‐dependence, il affirme que la spécialisation initiale de New York dans le prêt‐à‐porter a modelé son évolution ultérieure vers une industrie de masse. Parallèlement, il montre toutefois comment des acteurs institutionnels clés ont modifié le cap de l'expansion industrielle à des moments historiques cruciaux en encourageant leurs talents de création locaux. Ce faisant, l'étude de la suprématie new‐yorkaise en tant que centre international de la mode défie l'interprétation dominante de la ‘dépendance de sentier’ dans la théorie et la pratique du développement régional. En effet, elle soutient que les secteurs d'activité ne sont pas prisonniers des choix passés, et illustre comment les origines d'une industrie peuvent influencer sa trajectoire d'expansion économique sans la déterminer irrésistiblement.     

Entry into Insular Domains: A Longitudinal Study of Knowledge Structuration and Innovation in Biotechnology Firms

We focus on the firm's decision to enter insular technology domains and its effect on the impact that its subsequent innovation has on the field. Insular domains are technical domains that rely heavily on prior innovations within the same domain for subsequent innovations. We show that the returns to entering insular domains vary with the firm's depth and breadth of knowledge. By analysing data from 128 biotechnology firms over a 20‐year period, we find that the relationship between depth of technological capabilities and technology impact is nuanced: depth is necessary but not sufficient for high impact innovation. Firms whose knowledge is spread over disparate domains have negative returns from entering insular domains. The implications of these findings for theories of innovation and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities are discussed.     

Public service restructuring in the UK: the case of the English National Health Service

This article overviews welfare state retrenchment in the UK under the Conservative‐led coalition government that formed in May 2010 and has centred its response to economic crisis on rapid public deficit reduction through public expenditure austerity targeted increasingly on the welfare benefits budget. It locates the coalition's reforms of public services and public sector employment relations in the long trajectory of public sector restructuring in the UK: the policies of New Right governments in the 1980s and New Labour from 1997 to 2010 that installed marketisation and privatisation in a permutation of forms, intensifying challenges for trade union organising. Focusing on the English NHS, the article identifies the respects in which the coalition's reforms continue and depart from New Labour's.     

The Coalition's Economic Strategy; Has it made a bad thing worse?

The source of the present recession in the UK and elsewhere was the world‐wide financial crisis that followed a generalised collapse in inter‐bank and bank lending to the private sector, which led to huge falls in spending and a collapse in output in most developed countries. By effectively ignoring this amplified credit effect, supply‐side explanations place their emphasis instead on changes to the pattern of productivity shocks, downgrades in risk premia or shifts in aggregate production functions. Our review of some high profile examples of supply‐side accounts suggests that the evidence is against them and a world‐wide fall in aggregate demand seems a more likely explanation. Nonetheless, the supply‐side view still appears to be the approach preferred by the Treasury suggesting, as it does, that present levels of slack in the economy are small. The Coalition's main response to the recession here has been fiscal consolidation, based on the claim that the jump in the fiscal deficit was not due to the world recession and was instead caused by Labour's profligate spending. Also, the Coalition's strategy treats the two problems; that of ensuring recovery and that of achieving a sustainable debt ratio in the longer term as if they were the same problem. Not only are these two claims wholly wrong, the risks they pose to the economic future of the country are very large and of long duration. It is already evident that the “cuts now” programme has retarded the recovery as it assumes, incorrectly, that the deficit can be reduced by making cuts to spending without these having adverse effects on economic growth. And its precipitate rush to cut Welfare and non‐investment Education budgets are visibly leading to worse, not better, efficiency outcomes in these key sectors, in spite of government claims to the contrary. A low wage, low productivity economy seems a highly likely outcome of the present policy over the medium to longer term.     

THE CHINA MODEL: IS IT A GOLDEN FORMULA?

The economic crisis is an opportunity for governments to face the fact that Keynesian interventionist policies are not the path to success. However, support for such policies is being sustained by misperceptions of China's remarkable economic progress in recent years. Its success is commonly attributed to government‐led initiatives, labelled as ‘The China Model’, which divert credit away from the true source of growth: its experience of the free market. This article examines the development of the free market in China and explains why the government's recent behaviour threatens to undermine the gains of recent decades.     

City of talents? Berlin's regional economy,socio‐spatial fabric and ‘worst practice’ urban governance

Berlin's reinstatement as the capital of Germany has raised great expectations of its transformation into a major economic centre of the European urban system. However, the city has not been able to fulfil these expectations. Today, Berlin is being hit by a financial crisis with dramatic consequences for the city's future development prospects. This article outlines the main outcomes of Berlin's socio‐economic restructuring in the 1990s: a tremendous loss of jobs in traditional industries has contributed to rising unemployment and the spread of urban poverty. The city has been a prime playground for speculative real estate investment, which has left behind a huge amount of unoccupied office space. On the other hand, new islands of economic growth have been developing in Berlin, particularly in knowledge‐intensive economic activities and the media industry. This development is related to the city's functioning as a highly attractive living place for the ‘creative class’ in Germany. At the same time, the city is an outstanding example of ‘worst practice’ urban governance, which has led to a financial crisis with truly catastrophic effects. The current financial consolidation policy may damage the prospects of Berlin's few growth sectors in the field of knowledge‐intensive economic activities. Le rétablissement de Berlin en capitale de l'Allemagne a suscité d'énormes attentes quant à sa transformation en centre économique majeur du réseau urbain européen, espoirs qui se sont révélés vains. Aujourd'hui, Berlin est frappée par une crise financière aux conséquences dramatiques pour les perspectives de développement de la ville. Cet article présente les principaux aboutissements de la restructuration socio‐économique de la capitale dans les années 1990: une terrible déperdition d'emplois dans les industries traditionnelles a nourri une progression du chômage et de la pauvreté urbaine; devenue terrain de jeu privilégié des spéculateurs immobiliers, la ville compte désormais une multitude d'espaces de bureaux inoccupés. En revanche, ont éclos des îlots de croissance économique, notamment dans les médias et les domaines où le savoir est important. Cette évolution tient au fonctionnement de la capitale comme lieu de vie particulièrement attrayant pour les ‘créatifs’ en Allemagne. Parallèlement, la ville constitue un remarquable cas de ‘pire pratique’ de gouvernance urbaine ayant amené une crise financière aux effets réellement catastrophiques; pour finir, la politique de consolidation financière actuelle va peut‐être entraver l'avenir des rares secteurs berlinois en expansion dans les sphères d'activités économiques demandeuses de savoir.     

Democratization and Politics in South African Townships

In South Africa, as in many other countries, there appears to have been a demobilization of mass urban movements following the achievement of representative democracy. This apparent demobilization has led to a perception that South Africa's neighbourhood‐based civic organizations are in crisis. This article builds on existing studies by sharpening analysis of the nature of this ‘crisis’. We show that there continue to be high levels of popular engagement with self‐governing civic structures at the local level. The decline in mass direct action in civil society appears to be linked to public confidence in political society, i.e. in the political parties and elected councillors that provide mechanisms for local representation in representative democracy. The crisis facing civic organizations is in large part a crisis of adjustment, as civic activists redefine their roles in the new institutional context and accept that their roles will be more limited than in specific extraordinary periods in the past. What makes this task of redefinition so difficult is that civil and political society cannot be easily separated, but, rather, form a tangled web in the minds of civic activists (and, we suspect, ordinary citizens also). The lesson of this South African case‐study is that changing patterns of popular politics need to be located in a careful analysis of political society as well as civil society, and especially of the real and perceived links between them. En Afrique du Sud, comme dans de nombreux pays, une démobilisation se dessine, semble‐t‐il, dans les mouvements urbains de masse depuis l'accès à une démocratie représentative. Cette sensation laisse à penser que les organisations civiques de quartier sont en crise en Afrique du Sud. S'appuyant sur des études existantes, l'article affine l'analyse de la nature de cette ‘crise’. Il montre qu'il existe toujours des niveaux élevés d'engagement populaire avec, au niveau local, des structures civiques autonomes. Le recul de l'action directe de masse au sein de la société civile semble liéà la confiance générale dans la société politique, c'est‐à‐dire dans les partis et les conseillers élus qui assurent les mécanismes locaux de la représentation démocratique. La crise que connaissent les organisations de citoyens est en grande partie une crise d'ajustement, les activistes devant redéfinir leur rôle dans le nouveau contexte institutionnel et accepter que celui‐ci soit plus limité que durant certaines périodes du passé. Cette opération de redéfinition est particulièrement problématique, car il n'est pas facile de séparer société civile et société politique, celles‐ci étant étroitement m7ecirc;lées dans l'esprit des activistes civiques (et, à notre avis, dans celui des citoyens ordinaires). Cette étude de cas sud‐africaine démontre qu'il faut situer les nouveaux schémas de politique générale par une analyse précise tant de la société politique que de la société civile, notamment en ce qui concerne les liens réels et supposés entre les deux.     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

Inclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Development: The Politics of ‘Affordable Housing' in North Brooklyn

A key element of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's New Housing Marketplace program has been the use of voluntary inclusionary zoning, through which private developers have been offered tax breaks and density bonuses to develop affordable housing on newly rezoned land. While this program has failed to alleviate the housing affordability crisis in New York City, little attention has been paid to its political effects on community‐based struggles over housing. This article addresses this question by examining the 2005 Greenpoint‐Williamsburg Waterfront Rezoning, which combined a voluntary inclusionary zoning program with a tenant services contract intended to mitigate the residential displacement effects of the rezoning. I critically examine its design, execution and monitoring, based on two years of work as an organizer and administrator of the tenant services contract. I argue that technologies of consent and control have reshaped the politics of housing in North Brooklyn by replacing resistance to gentrification with amelioration of its effects, through the anticipated creation of affordable housing. The upshot has been an emergent politics of housing in which real estate‐led development is regarded not as a cause of gentrification but as its solution.     

Canada's Housing Bubble Story: Mortgage Securitization,the State,and the Global Financial Crisis

Canada's experience during and after the financial crisis appears to distinguish it from its international peers. Canadian real estate sales and values experienced record increases since the global financial crisis emerged in 2008, rather than declines, and Canada did not witness any bank failures. The dominant trope concerning Canada's financial and housing markets is that they are sound, prudent, appropriately regulated and ‘boring but effective’. It is widely assumed that Canadian banks did not need, nor receive, a ‘bailout’, that mortgage lending standards remained high, and that the securitization of mortgages was not widespread. The truth, however, does not accord with this mainstream view. In fact, the Canadian financial and housing markets reveal marked similarities with their international peers. Canada's banks needed, and received, a substantial ‘bailout’, while federal policies before and after the financial crisis resulted in the massive growth of mortgage securitization and record household indebtedness. This article documents the growth of Canada's housing bubble, the history of mortgage securitization, and of government policies implemented before and after the crisis. Instead of making the Canadian financial and housing sectors more resilient and sustainable, the outcomes of state responses are best understood as regressively redistributive.     

The fiscal and monetary response to COVID‐19: What the Great Depression has – and hasn't – taught us

Although some regard the New Deal of the 1930s as exemplifying an aggressive fiscal and monetary response to a severe economic crisis, the US fiscal and monetary policy responses to the COVID‐19 crisis have actually been far more substantial – and, so far, much more effective in reviving aggregate spending. Although many fear that these responses, and the large‐scale increase in bank reserves especially, must eventually cause unwanted inflation, the concurrent sharp decline in money's velocity has thus far more than offset any inflationary effects of money growth, while forward bond prices reflect a general belief that inflation will remain below 2 per cent for at least another decade. Notwithstanding the growth of the Fed's balance sheet, Fed authorities can always check inflation by sufficiently raising the interest return on bank reserves. Nonetheless, recent developments have heightened the risk of ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy at some point in the future.     

Secular stagnation – are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• We estimate that the UK has a relatively large output gap of around 2¾% of potential output. With the legacy of the financial crisis fading, the UK should see healthy growth in potential output of around 2.1% a year from 2015–24. Usually this would drive a period of strong economic growth, but we expect GDP growth to average a relatively underwhelming 2.4% a year over this period, largely due to the drag from aggressive fiscal consolidation.
• There is significant disagreement amongst economists about the size of the output gap. Estimation of the output gap has been problematic since the financial crisis because of the depth of the recession and relatively slow pace of the subsequent recovery, while sizeable revisions to the national accounts data have been an added complication. Our estimate of the output gap is towards the top of the range of independent forecasters surveyed by HM Treasury, but it is consistent with the literature on the impact of financial crises on potential output.
• We expect potential output growth of 2.1% a year from 2015–24, a faster pace than that seen since the financial crisis, but some way short of the experience of the pre‐crisis decade. The shortfall relative to the pre‐crisis period is largely due to a smaller contribution from growth in labour supply, which reflects the impact of an ageing population. However, labour is set to make a much stronger contribution to potential output growth in the UK than in most other major European countries over the next decade.
• The combination of a large output gap and healthy growth in potential output will provide the conditions for firm growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.4% a year from 2015 to 2024. Growth could be stronger were it not for the sizeable drag from fiscal consolidation over the next four years and the dampening effect that this will have on activity. This will ensure that the output gap closes very slowly. The government's fiscal plans are heavily influenced by the OBR's view that there is limited scope for stronger growth to drive an improvement in the public finances. But if our view turns out to be correct, it will become apparent that the government has pursued a more austere path than is strictly necessary in order to comply with its fiscal rules.