The assessment: macroeconomic policy after EMU

In this paper we discuss the emergence of the new European macroeconomicstructure within EMU. We focus on three important elements:the wage-fixing authorities in each country, the fiscal authoritiesin each country, and the single European Central Bank (ECB).We identify serious problems which might arise in coordinatingboth the wage-setters and the fiscal authorities, and arguethat these problems could be exacerbated if the ECB conductsmonetary policy inappropriately. In the light of this we providerecommendations for the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB.The paper also briefly discusses financial stability issuesand the interaction between the countries in EMU and the restof the world.     

Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to supply-side shocks sees insufficient monetary adjustment and an imbalance towards fiscal stabilization if shocks are sufficiently symmetric; the opposite occurs if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric. Appointing conservative bankers shifts the fiscal–monetary balance away from monetary towards fiscal policy. Unilateral delegation benefits that country; but when all countries independently delegate, the outcome is only favorable if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric.     

Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article analyzes the transmission and interaction of national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU. A special focus is on the effects of labor market institutions in the participating countries and of the introduction of fiscal stringency criteria like those imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

European monetary unification: a tour d'horizon

This article takes stock of the literature and debate over Europeanmonetary unification. In contrast to other papers, where itis argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty,I argue that in a number of important areas, a reasonable degreeof consensus now exists, as the result of a decade of scholarship.The subsequent stock-taking concentrates on areas where significantquestions remain, starting with the implications of surrenderingthe exchange rate and an independent national monetary policyas instruments of adjustment; the conduct of fiscal policy underthe Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact; andhow quickly the European union is likely to develop an EU-widesystem of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union.Turning from fiscal to monetary issues, I ask whether the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB) will be as inflation averse as the Bundesbank,what exchange-rate policy the ECB will pursue, and whether theeuro will be a leading reserve currency. I conclude with whatmay be the most contentious issue of all, namely whether Europe'smonetary union could collapse after it begins.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area such as the European Union. This paper analyzes the design of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU. To do so, the paper starts with an overview of the most important aspects. Next, it analyzes monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a stylized model of a monetary union, in which monetary and fiscal policy design is modeled as a dynamic stabilization game. Macroeconomic policy making and adjustment are studied under alternative forms of cooperation and in both symmetric and asymmetric settings.     

FTPL-Perspective on Tradable Deficit Permits in the EMU

The Growth and Stability Pact restricts member states in their fiscal policy but also causes inflexibility in the pursuit of wide-ranging economic and social reforms. Tradable deficit permits allow more flexibility for individual member states and provide a stick for those who exceed the deficit limit but also a carrot to those who stay below it. But does the trade in deficit permits affect the monetary objectives of the European Central Bank (ECB)? We argue that from a perspective of fiscal theory of the price level, trade in deficit permits can lead to higher inflation depending on the growth rate and the debt/GDP ratio of the member states.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

中国财政赤字的通货膨胀效应

文章主要以1996年第1季度至2015年第3季度的居民消费价格指数CPI、财政赤字、利率和货币供应量的季度同比增长率等数据为基础,通过构建时变参数向量自回归(TVP-VAR) 模型,对我国财政赤字的通货膨胀效应进行了检验,并探讨了货币当局和财政当局的主导权归属问题。主要得出了二方面结论：一方面是现阶段财政赤字在短期内具有“凯恩斯效应”,而从长期看,既遵循“李嘉图等价”原理,又具有微弱的“挤入效应”;另一方面是财政当局虽占优于货币当局,但财政赤字需要配合货币政策才能影响价格水平。据此,向政府提出了“新常态”时期的政策建议,即政府在短期内可以通过赤字财政的方式诱导适度通胀来实现去库存,从供给侧引导经济增长,同时也要保持货币政策偏紧,增强人民银行的独立性,进一步优化财政收支结构。     

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains from Cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503–36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.     

欧洲央行的最后贷款人角色

欧债危机爆发后,欧洲央行一直在是否充当政府债券市场最后贷款人的问题上摇摆不定。笔者认为,货币联盟中的政府债券市场存在缺陷,很容易爆发流动性危机,只有中央银行做出最后贷款人的承诺才能解决这一问题。文章对以通胀风险、财政影响、道德风险、白芝浩理论、法律异议为理由反对欧洲央行为政府债券市场提供最后贷款支持的声音,进行了逐一驳斥,建议:为了维护金融稳定,欧洲央行必须公开声明将在政府债券市场上坚定不移地履行最后贷款人职责。     

Macroeconomic effects of financial stress and the role of monetary policy: a VAR analysis for the euro area

This paper analyses an otherwise standard macro-financial VAR model for the euro area that includes - apart from conventional measures of output, inflation and monetary policy - a composite indicator of systemic financial stress, namely the CISS index, and total assets of the ECB balance sheet capturing the stance of unconventional monetary policy. I find that the CISS contributes significantly to the dynamics of the macroeconomy and exerts a strong influence on monetary policy when looking at both policy rates and the ECB balance sheet. The significance of the CISS appears robust to the inclusion of a broad set of real and financial control variables. Based on tests of direct versus indirect (Granger-)causality patterns proposed in Hsiao (1982), I also find that unlike unconventional policy as measured by ECB balance sheet growth, the policy rate does not seem to react directly to variations in financial stress but rather indirectly through the impact of financial stress on macroeconomic conditions. These different patterns of reaction are broadly consistent with the ECB’s “separation principle”. The estimated effects of the ECB’s standard and non-standard policy measures on inflation and economic growth are moderate, although an easier stance in both policy tools helps calm down financial stress.     

Maastricht: New and Old Rules

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities from the pressures of fiscal policymakers is a prerequisite for monetary stability. However, in history this point has in fact been a recurrent tenet. We start with David Ricardo’s arguments in favour of central bank independence and against monetisation of public deficits. After WWI, the latter issue was at the heart of the 1920 International Financial Conference of the League of Nations, which fostered and guided the establishment of many new central banks, and shaped various policymaking arrangements of today’s monetary authorities. JEL Classification Numbers: B12, B22, E42, E58, E61     

A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations

We consider a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union. Governments (fiscal policies) pursue national goals while the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objectives. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank. We consider conflicting (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) and coordinated policy-making (cooperative Pareto solutions). We show that there is a trade-off between the deviations of instruments and targets from desired paths; the volatility of output and inflation increases when private agents react more strongly to changes in actual inflation.     

The euro—the experience of the past 2 years

The article analyses the experience of the first 2 years of the euro, focusing on the monetary policy of the ECB and explaining why it should be considered a success story. As a starting point, it gives a look at “what is” the euro area and the structure of its economy. It then reviews the institutional setting of the single monetary policy, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB and the monetary policy instruments at the disposal of the Eurosystem. The article then analyses the conduct of monetary policy in the years 1999–2000 and highlights the importance attached by the ECB to the transparency of the decision making process. Finally it is explained why the euro should be seen as a success story.     

欧洲货币联盟设计中的缺陷

欧债危机暴露了欧洲货币联盟运作机制的设计缺陷:财政纪律松散、金融监管失当和欧洲央行角色定位存在偏差。危机也为欧元区矫正缺陷提供了改革契机。强化财政纪律有两种思路,制定新的"财政条约"和采取"宪制安排";提高监管效率的改革理念是实施金融监管集中化;欧洲央行应将金融稳定作为主要目标,并承担最后贷款人的角色。文章对上述理念进行了评述,指出除此之外欧盟需要开展更加广泛和深刻的改革。     

The European Monetary Policy Responses During the Pandemic Crisis

This paper uses an event-based analysis to describe how the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) policy responses to the pandemic crisis have affected the European financial and economic system. The result of our exercise, which is based on the examination of the main measures taken by the ECB during 2020, is that these responses have positively affected the European economic system by improving banks’ lending activity and by indirectly creating room for expansionary fiscal policies in the euro area’s high-debt countries that do not have fiscal capacity.

     

我国财政货币政策反经济周期作用实证研究

文章回顾了改革开放以来我国5轮经济周期和8次主要反经济周期的财政货币政策。通过构造实际经济增长率、广义货币增长率和财政赤字增长率三变量VAR模型对财政货币政策的反经济周期作用进行实证分析,发现货币政策的作用时效和强度均优于财政政策,同时二者存在双向联动倾向。另外,文章也分析了政策出现不同效果的原因,认为我国反经济周期应构建以货币政策为主、财政政策为辅的调控体系。     

The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: The IS-LM model with optimal policy

The high correlations between saving and investment, which suggest a small variability of the current account, is explored within an IS-LM framework. While Feldstein and Horioka interpret this evidence to imply a low degree of capital mobility, the pattern of shocks to the model is also important. If the monetary authorities are pegging domestic rates to foreign returns, then we would expect the Feldstein-Horioka evidence even under high mobility. We explore whether such a rule is optimal when policymakers wish to avoid income variability where fiscal and monetary policy are coordinated and where monetary policy must act alone. We suggest that the Voicker Federal Reserve switched to the latter stance and created a dramatic exception to the Feldstein-Horioka paradox.