团队创造力影响主流与新流创新绩效的机制及路径

基于创造力理论,对团队创造力进行了向例与变例、过程与结果的二维度、两阶段划分,分析了其对主流、新流创新绩效的作用机理,并提出研究假设。利用来自278份有效调研问卷的数据进行多元回归分析和结构方程模型分析。结果显示:向例团队创造力两阶段均正向促进主流创新绩效,结果阶段抑制新流创新绩效;变例团队创造力两阶段均正向促进新流创新绩效,结果阶段抑制主流创新绩效;向例(变例)团队创造力创造结果阶段在创造过程阶段与主流(新流)创新绩效之间起部分中介作用,向例(变例)团队创造力创造结果阶段在创造过程阶段与新流(主流)创新绩效之间起完全中介作用。     

Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: Some results on compromise alternatives

We consider an impossibility result in Börgers (1991), which says in a restricted environment with two players or three alternatives it is impossible to implement a social choice correspondence that is efficient, enforces compromises at a profile and is implementable in undominated strategies by a bounded mechanism. We extend and refine this result in many ways- we generalize the impossibility result for any number of players and alternatives when the compromises are enforced at a near-unanimous preference profile. We further show that the impossibility result in Börgers (1991) holds good if we replace efficiency of SCCs by neutrality. Also the impossibility result holds good for two agents and any number of alternatives when the SCC is unanimous and minimal. Interestingly, we get a possibility result when we relax the assumption of minimality.     

人民币升值的宏观经济影响评价

本文通过建立中国可计算一般均衡模型定量研究了人民币升值对中国经济的影响。结果表明人民币升值对中国实际GDP增长的影响不是线性变化的,对进出口影响的模拟结果与直观判断一致;人民币升值对就业不利,但下降幅度也是随着升值幅度的上升而提高。升值对城乡居民消费的影响不同,会加大城乡差距。人民币升值对不同部门的影响不同,受冲击较大的是劳动密集型的制造业。我们的基本判断是,人民币的大幅度升值对中国经济整体不利,而小幅度的升值的影响甚微。因此,既要避免大幅度的升值,又可适当地扩大汇率的浮动范围,缓解人民币升值压力。     

Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty

For an outside innovator with a finite number of buyers of the innovation, this paper compares two licensing schemes: (i) fixed fee, in which a licensee pays a fee to the innovator and (ii) ad valorem profit royalty, in which a licensee leaves a fraction of its profit with the innovator. We show these two schemes are equivalent in that for any number of licenses the innovator puts for sale, these two schemes give the same licensing revenue. We obtain this equivalence result in a general model with minimal structure. It is then applied in a Cournot oligopoly for an outside innovator. Finally, in a Cournot duopoly it is shown that when the innovator is one of the incumbent firms rather than an outsider, the equivalence result does not hold.     

论中国利用外资的两条战线

随着跨国并购的展开，正在形成两条利用外资战线。一是跨国绿地投资前景继续看好，并向中西部地区延伸；二是跨国并购承担着改组改造国有企业的艰巨任务，刚刚拉开序幕。如何协调这两条战线，取得更好的利用外资效果，本文进行了相关分析与探讨。     

城市化对农民收入增长影响的动态计量分析

农民收入的提高关系到整个社会的顺利发展,而城市化是提高农民收入的一个重要途径。通过动态计量模型分析来说明城市化对农民收入增长的影响,即对城市化与农民人均纯收入两个经济变量进行协整分析;对两个经济变量进行格兰杰因果关系检验;在VAR模型的基础上,运用脉冲响应函数来分析两个经济变量之间的关系;在实证结果的基础上提出了相应的政策建议。     

Tax Competition and Economic Geography

Tax competition between two countries is considered in a trade–and–location setting with differentiated products and monopolistic competition. There are two groups of workers, mobile ones and immobile ones. Taxes are used for producing a public good. It is shown that an equilibrium with mobile workers dispersed across countries is destabilized by increased taxes on these mobile workers—even for perfectly coordinated tax increases. It is also shown that while tax competition gives rise to standard distortions in a tax–competition game when mobile workers are dispersed, different distortions result when they are concentrated in one country.     

分行业大中型工业企业专利活动动态评价

提出了一种新的动态综合评价方法.该方法的特点是:综合评价结果完全基于评价指标所提供的信息,不受主观因素的影响;基于二次差异驱动原理,最大程度地体现了不同评价对象间的差异。使用该方法计算了1996—2010年我国33个工业行业大中型工业企业的专利经费投入产出率,并据此进行排序。然后,将我国大中型工业企业的专利活动发展过程划分为两个阶段,通过对比两阶段的客观评价值,将我国33个工业行业划分为7大类,并针对不同行业的特点提出相关建议。     

排污权交易条件下污水处理商投资行为分析

基于排污权交易制度,运用Hotelling模型,在双寡头垄断专业污水处理市场中引入竞优机制,分析专业污水处理企业的投资动机。结果表明:在条状城市中,两企业的建厂选址策略受双方边际成本及单位污水运输费的影响;两寡头垄断企业竞优的结果存在两种情形,一种是两企业分别选择在城市两端建厂的策略,一种是边际成本较小的企业在选址上具有主动权、有多种选择策略;双方关于边际成本的竞优博弈具有直接效应和策略效应。     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

We study how between‐group wealth and size asymmetries affect aggregate rent‐seeking efforts when two groups compete for the allocation of a pure public good. Unlike with previous analyses on between‐group asymmetries, we measure the utility cost of rent‐seeking in terms of the loss in private consumption an individual faces when contributing to this activity. Our main result is that fewer between‐group asymmetries do not necessarily imply greater aggregate rent‐seeking efforts. The result is at odds with the commonly held notion that the more homogeneous the contestants in a static rent‐seeking model, the greater the aggregate rent‐seeking efforts.     

Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements” can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient. Our setting is a bargaining game in which agreements form sequentially. The individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global agreement is always the socially optimal structure. There are two equilibrium outcomes, the global agreement and an asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions of different sizes, the small one free riding on the contributions of the larger one. We run an experiment which lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. However, subjects do not play Nash and the experimental outcome is, on average, even more inefficient than the theory predicts. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that different types of behaviour co-exist.     

TOURISM AND REGIONAL IMMISERIZATION

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the consequences of tourism in rural and urban areas on regional incomes, welfare and urban unemployment using a generalized Harris Todaro model. In this model two urban and two rural goods are produced. A distinguishing characteristic of this model is that the urban non-traded good is not consumed in the rural region and, similarly, the rural non-traded good is not consumed in the urban region. The most important result we obtain is that a tourist boom in the urban region may immiserize the rural area. Hence the welfare interests of rural and urban consumers may be in conflict as a result of tourist expansion in the urban region.     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

Money Metric, Consumer Surplus and Welfare Measurement

The paper provides a rigorous derivation of the 'welfare triangle approximation' (WTA), which is at the centre of cost–benefit analysis. The result is generalized by showing that the WTA is one of two dual expressions, one of which approximates the change in real consumption, the other the change in the cost of living. The result is based on a correction of a proof attempted by Hicks. Many other derivations are also given, each based on a different definition of the theoretical functions to be approximated. The final result is the following: each of the empirical variations corresponds to a range of theoretical variations. The edges of the range are theoretical Laspeyres and Paasche variations which are approximated linearly; the interior region of the range is approximated quadratically; the centre of the range is replicated exactly by the empirical measures.     

A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment

In a recent article, Jain and Singh (2002) prove that a condition they call negligence liability is necessary and sufficient for any liability rule to be efficient. In this note I criticize their result on two accounts: First, their result crucially depends on implicit restrictions they impose on the liability assignment function. If we drop the assumption that the liability apportionment between two non-negligent parties is constant for all combinations of non-negligent care levels, the equivalence between the condition of negligence liability and the efficiency of liability rules breaks down. Second, their attempt to drop the assumption of uniqueness for the social optimum improves the generality of the model at a substantial cost, since it must be accompanied by a new assumption that is possibly even more unrealistic. The importance of the uniqueness assumption is shown in a simple discrete care model, in which comparative negligence may lead to an inefficient outcome when the existence of two social optima leads us to interpret due care as a varying standard based on the other partys actual choice.     

‘I’ve been to Bali too’ (and I will be going back): are terrorist shocks to Bali's tourist arrivals permanent or transitory?

International visitor arrivals to Bali are examined using univariate and panel Lagrange multiplier (LM) unit root tests with one and two structural breaks to ascertain if shocks to the time path of tourist arrivals are permanent or transitory. The univariate LM unit root tests with one and two structural breaks fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in international visitor arrivals to Bali. However, the panel LM unit root tests with one and two structural breaks applied to a panel of Bali's 11 major source markets reject the null and support the alternative hypothesis of a joint trend-stationary series with transitory shocks. This result suggests that, the effects of the recent terrorist acts on Bali on the growth path of tourist arrivals from major markets are only transitory and that as a consequence Bali's tourism sector is sustainable in the long run.     

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

We propose two characteristics of beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic, type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second characteristic, optimism, is related to how “favorable” a player expects the outcome of the game to be. The paper has two main results: the first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles; the second gives a lower bound on the change of location of this set. These bounds are explicit expressions that involve type-sensitivity, optimism, and payoff characteristics. Our results generalize and clarify the well-known uniqueness result of global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993). They also imply new uniqueness results and allow us to study rationalizability in new environments. We provide applications to supermodular mechanism design (Mathevet, 2010b) and information processing errors.     

The artist–art dealer relationship as a marketing channel

This article studies the relationship between the artist and the art dealer, interpreted as being the two members of a “marketing channel”, as defined by industrial organization and marketing science literature. The result for both parties depends on the individual effort that each of them puts in; uncoordinated effort levels are shown to result in an inefficient outcome. Efficiency, subject to different institutional settings and agreements, is studied here with specific reference to the visual arts. The results may easily apply to the stage of creation of a number of different artistic goods. Possible ways to reach efficient outcomes in marketing channels in artistic fields are suggested and discussed.     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.