Entry regulation and international trade

We use cross-country, cross-industry data to analyse the relationship between entry regulation and international trade. We find robust evidence that entry regulation discourages exports of industries with low natural barriers to entry. This implies that, in international markets, countries with heavy entry regulation have a comparative disadvantage in industries that are technologically easy to enter. Further analysis shows that the result is partly due to the negative impact of entry regulation on productivity.     

Environmental regulation and intra-industry trade

The paper analyses complex interactions between intra-industry trade (IIT) and environment by extending Krugman's model of monopolistic competition and trade. It is found that an increase in exogenous environmental tax by a country leads to a fall in its output (the scale effect) and aggregate pollution, and an increase in its number of varieties (the selection effect). With IIT, if Home is a net exporter, an increase in its environmental stringency leads to a negative scale effect, which reduces its export demand and raises its import demand. In contrast, a positive selection effect reduces its import demand. However, the first-order scale effect on exports dominates the second-order effect on imports, implying a rise in Home's share of IIT with Foreign. The opposite holds true when Home is a net importer. Furthermore, the impact of a rise in environmental tax on aggregate welfare comprises the following counteracting effects: a negative scale effect, a positive selection effect, a lower level of aggregate pollution and a higher environmental tax revenue in autarky, and two additional effects, namely, changes in the level of exports and imports, under free trade. The overall change in aggregate welfare, in both autarky and free trade, is in general ambiguous.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

国际数字贸易监管新发展与新特点

当前,数字贸易的发展已不再局限于电子商务及流通产业,而是将物联网技术和数字技术应用普及于多产业中,我们要以超前的眼光洞察和把握数字经济为全球贸易模式、规则等领域带来的新发展和新特点,从而推动中国大数据产业健康有序快速发展。     

Environmental regulation and trade pattern：a case of China

As a growing number of countries, including both developed and developing countries, have in recent yearstaken environmental regulation at different levels, a question of great concern has been raised： can the regulation alterthe existing trade volume and trade pattern, and ultimately drive pollution-intensive industries to countries with low-levelregulations or even those without regulations at all？ Starting from the three different propositions concerning therelationship between environmental regulation and trade pattern, this paper applies cointegration analysis and errorcorrection model to empirically testing the relationship between environmental regulation and trade in China during theperiod of 1985-2005. Our empirical results indicate that in the short run the collection of pollution discharge fees bearsa positive impact on the export share of clean products of total exports. Thus, higher pollution discharge fees raise theratio of clean products exports to total exports. This further indicates that more stringent environmental regulationpromotes the exports of clean products. In the long run pollution discharge fees are positively correlated with the exportshare of clean products but negatively associated with their import share. Such correlations imply that environmentalregulation tends to facilitate the international specialization in line with comparative advantages.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

Ancestry and international trade

This paper examines whether the relatedness of populations across the world shapes international trade flows. Using data on common ancestry for 172 countries covering more than 99% of global trade, we document that country pairs with weaker ancestral relationships are less likely to trade with each other (extensive margin) and, if they do trade, they exchange fewer goods and smaller volumes (intensive margin). The effect of ancestry is robust to a vast array of micro-geographic control variables and mitigated, yet still sizable and significant, when controlling for other measures of cultural distance as well as for current migrant stocks.     

Multinational firms, international trade and international telecommunications

The study analyses the determinants of international telephone, telex, telegram and leased lines communication between the United States and 46 countries. It focusses on the role of multinational firms, international trading firms and new information technologies within the framework of the theory of transaction costs.Results of the econometric estimates suggest that: (a) technological conditions of telecommunication infrastructure, i.e., international diffusion lags of new information technologies, play an important role in the explanation of international telephone and telex telecommunication flows but not in the demand for telegraph and leased lines, (b) multinational firms use international telecommunication to reduce the coordination costs and are strong customers of leased lines and telephones, but less so of telex and telegrams, (c) international trading firms exhibit less clear preferences in the use of the different media to reduce transaction costs.     

Global inequality and international trade

The paper analyses the effect of widespread trade liberalisationon global income inequality. The analysis of the trend in globalinequality during 1981–97, presented in the first partof the paper, shows that the apparent growth of income inequalityamong countries conceals a process of convergence. Some developingcountries achieved significantly faster economic growth thanthe advanced industrialised countries and, though small in number,they actually account for a majority of the population of thedeveloping world. Thus international inequality (i.e., the inequalityof distribution of per capita incomes among the world's population)in fact declined even though the inter-country income inequalityincreased. The analysis in the second part of the paper shows(i) that while improved trade performance did have a stimulatingeffect on growth performance of countries, trade liberalisationhad extremely varied effects on trade performance across countries,and (ii) that the distribution of benefits and costs of tradeliberalisation across countries has been such as to reduce internationalinequality without affecting inter-country inequality.     

Environmental regulation of a power investment in an international market

We examine the optimal environmental regulation of three Norwegian power projects: energy conservation, a natural gas fired CCGT and a new hydro project. All projects reduce emissions elsewhere in the Nordic region, and the environmental costs of these emissions are not, in general, fully reflected in market prices. We develop a theory of second best optimal regulation for this case. The optimal regulation is found to deviate substantially from a purely domestic regulation. For instance, we find it optimal to grant a substantial credit to energy conservation. The credit is sensitive to the value of reduced CO₂ emissions and whether the current Norwegian end user tax should be interpreted as an environmental or a fiscal tax.     

Wholesalers in international trade

Recent empirical research in international trade has revealed overwhelming evidence that, in all countries, a remarkably small proportion of firms report exports in Customs statistics. However, a large share of these are wholesalers. This suggests that the number of producers selling their products abroad might be much greater than that suggested by a simple count of the firms directly reporting their exports. This paper sheds light on the role of wholesalers in international trade. Our model uses very general assumptions to show that intermediated exporters may contribute significantly to the extension of countries' export opportunities. The model predicts a twofold role in international trade. First, wholesalers alleviate the difficulty of reaching less-accessible markets. Second, they help less-efficient firms to supply foreign markets, thus increasing the number of exported varieties at the aggregate level. We use French firm-level export data to provide empirical support for these two predictions.     

Financial constraints and international trade patterns

Growing empirical literature shows that financial constraints reduce the chance of exporting, suggesting that financial constraints are an important determinant of international trade patterns. In this aspect, I develop a model of international trade based on new trade theory with financial constraints and non-homothetic preferences. With these two modified assumptions, the main findings are i) financial constraints act as trade barriers, ii) the largest amount of trade is between countries that have healthier financial systems in terms of access to loans and iii) financial constraints can cause one way or zero trade. As a result, this paper provides a single framework able to account for all possible patterns (two-way, one-way, and no trade) within the same industry. All these findings have important policy implications for countries suffering from relatively poor financial systems.     

Congestible communications networks and international trade

We build a two-country model of monopolistic competition with communications networks. A communications network is characterized by (1) the existence of large fixed costs of network provision, and (2) the presence of congestion. It is demonstrated that both the size of a country and the relative magnitude of the congestion effect determine its comparative advantage: if the congestion effect (resp., the cost-sharing effect) prevails universally, a comparative advantage in the goods that require communications is held by the smaller (resp., larger) of the two countries. JEL Classification: D43, F12
Réseaux de communication, congestion et commerce international. Ce mémoire présente un modèle de concurrence monopolistique à deux pays avec des réseaux de communication. Un réseau de communication est caractérisé par (1) l'existence de coûts fixes importants pour la mise en place du réseau et (2) la présence de congestion. On montre que la taille du pays et la magnitude relative de la congestion déterminent l'avantage comparatif : si l'effet de congestion (ou respectivement l'effet de partage des coûts) prévaut, un avantage comparatif dans les biens qui demandent plus de communication est détenu par le plus grand (respectivement le plus petit) des deux pays.     

Federalism, separatism and international trade

This paper explores whether countries that have a federal Constitution engage in more international trade. We identify two possible mechanisms through which political fragmentation of nation-states, namely federalism, might impact positively on trade globalization processes: domestic market fragmentation and the free trade strategy pursued by certain separatist regions in federal countries. We use a gravity equation running panel regressions to estimate the impact of federalism on trade. The Poisson estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is used to handle the null trade flows. We test our predictions on a large data set of 148 countries on the 1980–2002 period. After controlling for determinants of trade potentially correlated with federalism, a federalist system is found to increase international trade. We also find that separatism and linguistic fractionalization impact positively on trade openness.     

Hofstede national culture and international trade

The objective is to analyse if international trade is affected by different national cultures. International trade of 21 World Bank listed countries is estimated as function of the Hofstede cultural dimensions, gross domestic product and population. First, we estimate the combined Hofstede culture dimensions and find significant positive effects on countries’ international trade. Secondly, we decompose the Hofstede culture dimensions and estimate the effects of each separate dimension on international trade, finding only the MAS dimension to significantly affect international trade. We estimate additional equation versions to account for occasional trade restrictions with no international trade, as well as estimating how international trade varies between years. These additional estimations further support our original findings, and therefore act as robustness check.     

Innovation and international trade in technology

The international market for technology is growing rapidly relative to world GDP. To study the international technology market, I present a model of innovation and international trade in which inventors auction their technology in both domestic and foreign markets. There is monopolistic competition in differentiated products. International trade in technology has number of significant economic effects. Technology trade improves the quality of innovation by increasing the pool of R&D experiments from which the best technology is chosen. Technology trade increases the efficiency of invention while at the same time lowering the total number of inventors relative to the equilibrium without technology trade. Technology trade increases the volume of trade in goods. Technology trade increases product variety at the market equilibrium. Technology trade increases national income in each country and increases total gains from trade.     

Manipulable behavior in international trade

In this paper, we present a Cournot duopoly model to analyze the manipulated behavior in international trade. The WTO is assumed as an arbitrator for the exchange in an oligopolistic industry and sets tariff rules according to the SDT principles; a firm's cost is private information both for the WTO and the foreign rivalries. Subsequent to our analysis of several cases we find that a firm may misreport to the WTO for more production revenue and the government may collude with a firm for higher welfare. It is shown that the misreporting and collusion incentives are related to the WTO tariff rule, the misreported cost and market size. Furthermore, a strategy proof tariff rule has been designed in which firms can never make his revenue better off by misreporting production cost.     

Heterochrony,industrial evolution and international trade

This paper uses the biological concepts ofheterochrony andK- and r-strategies to construct an economic theory about industry life cycles and trade policy. Relations between various types of heterochrony and different competitive environments provide a general explanation for the Japanese and Korean successes in international trade, the decline of the U.S. and E.U. performance and the relative failures of some Latin-American states.