从历史的高度看中国并购市场的发展趋势——访全国工商联并购公会会长王巍

记者:首先请王会长简要介绍一下中国并购市场的发展脉络?王巍:从历史发展的角度看,真正意义上的并购在中国出现已经有上百年的     

缺乏契约精神下的资本市场发展

股票市场隐性契约的沉积,对以显性契约为主的资本市场的构建带来了制度上的弊端.本文讨论这种契约精神实质和针对所有者缺位条件下的契约复位问题.笔者认为,基金机制引入股票模式,能改变目前股票所代表的投资双方的隐性契约关系,使其显性化.     

海外并购考验中国企业智慧——专访中国并购专家王巍

最近一段时期中国企业在海外进行了的一些大型并购活动，引起国内外的广泛关注。中国企业的海外并购是否已经发展到一个新的阶段？如何看待某些国家对此作出的激烈反应？在这些并购活动中，有哪些成功的经验和需要汲取的教训——本刊特组织专家学就此撰，供读参考。     

重拾友好的精神契约

晚饭过后,我和老妈正在收拾餐桌,忽听有人敲门。“您好!我是您楼上的邻居,因为装修有点事想跟您商量一下。”来者是一位女子,语气相当客气。一听“有事商量”,老妈立马防备起来,隔着一扇开着窗的铁门反问：“有什么亨需要跟我们商量的？”听老妈的语气是不打算“商量”。女孩又再次用客气的语气加强了一下此行的重点：“我家在装修,改暖气管道需要麻烦你们一下。”听到“麻烦”,老妈的排斥情绪愈加明显：“你们怎么改我们不管,但不要麻烦我们!”说完扭头往里走。     

“2007中国十大并购”评选揭晓

由全国工商联并购公会、全球并购研究中心、中国并购交易网发起,《中国金融》杂志提供独家战略合作媒体支持的"2007中国十大并购"评选揭晓,李荣融、梁锦松、楼继伟等荣登"2007中国十大并购人物"榜单;达能-娃哈哈争议、中国投资公司入股黑石、国家开发     

契约制度与中国资本市场发展

中国资本市场参与主体众多，功能各异，关系纷繁复杂。在纷乱的现象后面，应该有一种共性和本质的东西，这就是契约制度。     

“2007中国十大并购”点评

纵观全国工商联并购公会2007年度中国十大并购事件榜单,我们发现上榜者无一例外是跨国并购动作。三起来自外国企业对本土企业的收购,剩下的七起,则皆是中国企业海外亮剑的典型代表作。我们深刻地感受到中国企业正在扬帆远航,不断谋求全球化发展     

公共事务中的契约精神

3月11日，湖北省美术联考遭遇尴尬一幕。速写题要求监考老师充当模特，模仿考卷上的图样，拿着扫帚作弯腰扫地状15分钟。虽然监考老师们出于担心考生成绩受影响的考虑。都按要求客串了模特，考后还是多有抱怨，还有人表示此举侵犯了自己肖像权，将要申诉。（武汉晚报3月12日）这看似小事，推想下去，这种公权运行模式却伤及社会和谐和每一个人利益。     

2010中国十大并购事件

全国工商联并购公会、全球并购研究中心、中国并购交易网共同主办的2010年“中国十大并购”评选活动揭晓。十大具有标志性意义的事件获选“2010中国十大并购事件”。     

契约精神与刑法融合的体现

由于经济的快速发展对上层建筑中的法律文化和法律观念的冲击,契约精神不仅遍及整个司法领域,也在逐渐向公法领域渗透,更好地平衡了国家利益与个人利益的实现.契约精神与刑法的融合主要包括辩诉交易和刑事和解的制度体现以及一些学者提出的民权刑法的观念体现,将保障人权作为惩罚犯罪的终极目标     

市场经济与财务报告规范研究

我国市场经济的建立与发展为我国会计理论的研究开辟了新的土壤.研究会计理论,规范我国的证券市场,特别是规范我国上市公司的财务报告,是当前会计学术界应重视研究的课题之一.本文从三个方面对市场经济和财务报告的规范问题进行探讨.第一部分提出了在市场经济条件下是否需要对公司的财务报告进行规范的问题;第二部分从财务报告规范的性质、行为和影响等方面探讨了市场经济条件下如何对财务报告进行规范的问题;最后一部分归纳了财务报告规范理论给我们的一些启迪.     

我国城市化进程与城乡收入差距的内在关系研究——基于托达罗模型的分析

本文以托达罗模型为框架,在“双二元”假设下,构造了劳动力转移的数理模型,分析中国城市化进程与城市劳动力市场的关系.结果显示,城乡收入差距是影响城市化进程的主要因素.随着城乡收入差距的扩大,城市化以单纯的人口迁移和农民工进城的方式展开,表现为粗放式的城市化.只有提高现代工业部门生产效率,同时引导金融资源进入农村,加快产业...     

试论合同关系中的诚信原则

文章探讨合同关系中的诚信原则问题。     

Devaluation with contract redenomination in Argentina

This study offers the first empirical microeconomic analysis of the effectiveness of dollar debt and contract redenomination policies to mitigate adverse financial and relative price consequences from a large devaluation. An analysis of Argentina’s policy of devaluation with redenomination in 2002, in contrast to Mexico’s policy of devaluation without debt redenomination in 1994–1995, shows that devaluation benefited tradables firms, and that dollar debt redenomination in Argentina benefited high-dollar debtors, as shown in these firms’ investment behavior, especially non-tradables firms whose revenues in dollar terms were adversely affected by devaluation. That investment behavior contrasts with the experience of Mexican firms in the aftermath of Mexico’s large devaluation, in which non-tradables producers with high dollar debt displayed significant relative reductions in investment. Stock return reactions to Argentine debt redenomination indicate large, positive, unanticipated effects on high-dollar debtors from debt redenomination. Energy concession contract redenomination likewise increased investment by high energy users in Argentina, and that benefit was apparent also in positive stock returns of those firms.      

Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich

This article examines the determinants of contractual form and renegotiations in the German construction industry during the Third Reich. At the beginning of World War II, firms dealt with growing uncertainty by convincing procurement agencies either to use cost‐plus contracts or to include an additional risk premium in fixed‐price contracts. In the later years of the war, procurement agencies initiated renegotiations over contract clauses to reduce the extraordinary profits resulting from information rents and high‐risk premiums. This regulatory course undermined the credibility of the regulatory commitment, thereby weakening the incentives of the fixed‐price contracts still in use.     

Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

This paper studies a duopolistic credit market in which borrowers differ in risk. In our competition game, one lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. We investigate the features of the equilibrium contract and show that the best borrower is indifferent between the dominant and the opponent lenders’ contract while the other borrowers prefer that of the dominant lender. Also, repayment and collateral do not depend upon the borrowers’ respective project risk. The author is grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet for his comments and encouragement. The author acknowledges the reviewer’s very careful reading of the paper. The final version has benefited considerably from his comments and suggestions.     

The world economy and the German economy in the spring of 1992

The world economy and the German economy in the spring of 1992     

Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance

Non-performance lies at the heart of much of the regulation that insurance companies face. Consumers’ concerns about non-performance of the insurance provider have also been cited as a possible explanation for low demand of microinsurance. We provide a behavioral evaluation of the welfare effects of non-performance risk. We test the hypothesis that the presence of non-performance risk negatively impacts not just take-up of insurance but more importantly the welfare of the insured. We also test if violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom could drive this decrease in take-up and welfare. The results show that the compound risk characteristic of non-performance risk does not significantly decrease the welfare of insurance choices made by individuals. This counter-intuitive result is sensitive to the structural modeling of risk preferences. If one assumes the reduction of compound lotteries axiom does characterize behavior towards risk, one finds evidence that non-performance risk reduces welfare for the insured. But if one correctly allows for violations in that axiom in the representation of risk preferences, which is appropriate if one is going to test for the effect of compound risk from non-performance, then the counter-intuitive result is obtained. Take-up is not a reliable proxy for welfare, and the behavioral drivers of take-up are again not the same drivers of welfare. These results provide structural behavioral insight to inform normative policy design with respect to insurance regulation.