A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation*

In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.     

Overlapping Generations or Infinitely-Lived Agents: Intergenerational Altruism and the Economics of Global Warming

Do we need an overlapping generations model for the economics of global warming? To answer this question, an infinitely-lived agent (ILA) approach and an overlapping generations (OLG) model are contrasted. ILA and OLG can be viewed as polar representations of intergenerational altruism. With ILA an immortal agent acts through his investment/savings decisions as trustee on the behalf of the future generations. With OLG, agents need not behave altruistic. They simply save during working years and dissave completely during retirement. Nevertheless, ILA and OLG must not differ in their implication for greenhouse policy. Greenhouse gas abatement is a straightforward alternative to physical capital formation and, even without altruism, each age cohort has an incentive to provide current abatement in order to reduce future damages attributable to climate change. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions and parameter values, our simulations reveal such an invariance result. Provided carbon taxes are the only policy tool and tax revenues are recycled through socially mandated rules, projections of economic growth, climate change and energy consumption are only insignificantly affected by the choice of approach.     

Love thy children or money

This paper presents a simple OLG model which is consistent with observed consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuals are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so much motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. In this setting, estate taxation is a questionable instrument of redistribution: it penalizes the wealthy, but favors the top wealthy. On the other hand, even though Ricardian equivalence holds, both public debt and PAYG pensions lead to a transfer of resources from the top wealthy to the other individuals.     

Self-enforcing exchange among generations: Implications for consumption and mobility

A three-generation OLG model with one-directional altruism and two-directional intra-family transfers is presented. Adults invest in their children's education and make transfers to their elderly parents. However, due to lack of altruism, adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children's education. This allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility: (i) consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family, (ii) consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations, and (iii) the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution.     

WEARING OUT YOUR WELCOME: EXAMINING DIFFERENTIAL MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY OF NEW ENTRANTS AND CONTINUING RECIPIENTS

Until recently, states were permitted to have different “new entrant” and “continuing recipient” income limits for parental Medicaid eligibility by implementing income disregards that changed with spell length. Some states utilized this option—either tightening income limits for the same family over time or loosening them. In this article, we construct a theoretical model of utility‐maximizing workers facing different time‐dependent eligibility thresholds to predict the Medicaid participation and employment behavior of workers with varying wage levels. The model reveals some inter‐temporally perverse incentives created by linking eligibility thresholds to Medicaid duration. Then, we empirically test these predictions using the Survey of Income and Program Participation and a unique compilation of state‐by‐family size Medicaid thresholds for both new and continuing recipients. We find that patterns of Medicaid participation and spell duration are consistent with the predictions of our model. There is also evidence that the individuals predicted by our model to lower their work hours may supply fewer hours of labor. As of January 2014, the Affordable Care Act disallows time‐varying income disregards; our findings suggest that states previously using this strategy will experience an adjustment in Medicaid caseloads and possibly labor market outcomes because of the change. (JEL H4, I1, J2)     

On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules

A taxation problem consists of collecting a given amount of taxes out of a population whose gross income vector is given. A tax rule R is more equitable than a rule R′ when the after‐tax income vector generated by R Lorenz dominates that generated by R′. In this paper, we present a one‐parameter family of tax rules whose members are fully ranked in terms of relative equitability, for any (finite) income distribution.     

Capital Income Taxation,Economic Growth and Heterogeneity in the Motivation to Give

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy‐of‐giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.     

SAVINGS AND PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATES IN A MATCHED SAVINGS PROGRAM FOR LOW‐INCOME FAMILIES

The ability to save for future needs is critical to family well‐being and is especially challenging for low‐income families with little extra income and limited access to institutional structures like employment‐based retirement funds or low cost savings mechanisms. Many nonprofits and governments have created new savings vehicles to fill this void. The ability of families to succeed in these programs may depend on their personal discount rates (time preferences). In this paper, we use survey data from a matched savings program and factor analysis to characterize family time preferences in order to predict their influence on savings levels. We find that a single latent factor describing the level of discount rates (rather than other dimensions of time or amount inconsistency) best describes family differences and is significantly related to the ability of families to save within the program. (JEL D91, I30)     

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE ON LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 COULD AFFECT THEM

A substantial part of the U.S. inequality literature focuses on yearly levels and trends in pre‐tax, post‐transfer cash income and its distribution over time and finds that median income appears to be stagnating, with income growth primarily coming at higher income levels. When we use data from the Current Population Survey for 1995–2008 and add the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance coverage, not only does it increase the upward trend in the level of resources controlled by Americans, but also reduces the level of inequality in these resources and its upward trend. We then provide a highly stylized example of this broader income measure's value in capturing the impact of two key provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010—an expansion in Medicaid and the provision of subsidies to lower‐income families for purchasing private coverage on state‐run exchanges. Even though these incremental expansions build on existing systems of government‐provided health insurance, we find that the vast majority of the benefits would still accrue to the bottom three deciles of the income distribution when we include the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance in our expanded yearly income measure. (JEL D31, H51, I14)     

TRIBAL CASINO IMPACTS ON AMERICAN INDIANS WELL‐BEING: EVIDENCE FROM RESERVATION‐LEVEL CENSUS DATA

After the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, tribal gaming revenues increased dramatically. Using a differences‐in‐differences methodology with 1990 and 2000 census data, this study finds that American Indians (AI) on gaming reservations experience a 7.4% increase in per capita income and reductions in both family and child poverty rates relative to AI on non‐gaming reservations. Large and medium casinos are associated with changes in well‐being while smaller casinos are not. These results are sensitive to the inclusion of the Navajo reservation, a large non‐gaming reservation with increased income during the 1990s. (JEL I32, L83)     

STATE‐LEVEL CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT: UPDATES AND IMPLICATIONS

This paper presents state‐by‐state capital stock and gross investment estimates for 1990–2007. I follow the methodology of Garofalo and Yamarik (The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 2002, 316–23) and apportion the national capital stock to the individual states using one‐digit NAICS income data. I then test the soundness of the data by estimating a Cobb–Douglas production function and a Solow growth model using a variety of panel data estimators. Under both models, I obtain estimates of the output elasticity for capital that are plausible and close to the observed national income share of one‐third. (JEL O47, O51, R11)     

Redistributive taxation with heterogeneous relative consumption concerns

Abstract This paper studies the impact of redistributive income taxation in a society where only some individuals are motivated by relative consumption concerns. Introducing this heterogeneity raises theoretical challenges since (i) earned income becomes an imperfect indicator of underlying ability and (ii) relative concerns may be inadmissable in the social objective. A new behavioural model is developed in which only relatively‐concerned individuals choose work effort strategically. Linear tax/transfer systems schemes are then characterized and simulated for a series of welfarist and non‐welfarist social objectives, and for different degrees of preference heterogeneity. A key result is that a government which understands the extent of relative consumption concerns–but places no social weight on individuals with such preferences–nevertheless sets a significantly more progressive tax system than a government which ignores relative consumption motivations altogether.     

Non‐linear finance–growth nexus

This paper revisits the question of whether the finance–growth nexus varies with the stages of economic development. Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental variables approach proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) to the dataset used in Levine et al. (2000) we detect overwhelming evidence in support of a positive linkage between financial development and economic growth, and this positive effect is larger in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The data also reveal that financial development tends to have stronger impacts on capital accumulation and productivity growth in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The findings are robust to alternative financial development measures and conditioning information sets.     

POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

Trust,ability‐to‐pay,and charitable giving

In the literature on privately provided public goods, altruism has been motivated by what contributions can accomplish (public goods philanthropy), by the pleasure of giving (warm‐glow philanthropy), or by the desire to personally make a difference (impact philanthropy). Underlying these motives is the idea that individuals trust that their donations reach their goal. We revisit these models but allow for distrust in the institutional structures involved. An important result we derive is that trust considerations determine whether crowding out is less or more than complete, and we thus open up possibilities in terms of the extent of crowding out not currently available. We also model socially motivated philanthropy when income‐heterogeneous donors take trust and ability‐to‐pay into account. With ability‐to‐pay in social motivation, an important result we obtain is that low‐income donors may contribute more than high‐income donors (in both absolute and percentage‐of‐income terms), giving a potential theoretical foundation to the frequently observed “U‐shaped” pattern of giving.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

The Political Economy of Policy Reform in the Philippines: 1992–1998

Accurately measuring Turkey's informal sector is important for policymaking. We utilize household income‐expenditure surveys to examine this sector's income underreporting. The Pissarides‐Weber approach hypothesizes that data would reflect such underreporting as “excess food consumption”. Our results suggest informal sector members spend more than their formal sector counterparts with comparable reported income levels. Using this information, we estimate the average size of the true informal sector to be about 1.25 times the official estimate. The informal sector accounts for around 83% of officially reported disposable income. Therefore, true Turkish disposable income is (25%)?(83%), roughly 21% larger than the officially estimated magnitude.