共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72. 相似文献
2.
Abderrahmane Ziad 《Bulletin of economic research》2003,55(3):311-317
We consider an n ‐person non‐zero‐sum non‐cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay‐off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay‐off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
3.
We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72. 相似文献
4.
Hannu Salonen 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,14(2):208-219
In this paper the existence problem of undominated Nash equilibrium in normal form games is analyzed. It is shown that an undominated Nash equilibrium exists, if (a) strategy sets are convex polytopes inRnand (b) utility functions are affine with respect to each player's own strategy. It is shown by counterexamples that, first, it is not sufficient to have concave utility functions instead of affine under condition (b) even when condition (a) is satisfied, and, second, it is not sufficient to have just compact and convex strategy sets instead of polytopes in condition (a) even when condition (b) is satisfied. 相似文献
5.
Tristan Tomala 《Games and Economic Behavior》1999,28(2):208
We study a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring where the payoff vector is observable. In this situation, any profitable deviation is detectable by all the players but the identity of the deviator may be unknown. We design collective punishments directed against the set of potential deviators. A particular class of signals is studied for which a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73. 相似文献
6.
Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles. 相似文献
7.
Nicolaas J. Vriend 《The Journal of economic education》2013,44(4):358-362
This study reviews the status of student outcomes assessment in departments of economics at colleges and universities across the country. 相似文献
8.
We consider the class of all abstract economies with convex and compact strategy sets, continuous and quasi-concave payoff functions, and continuous and convex-valued feasibility correspondences. We prove that the Nash correspondence is the unique solution on the foregoing class of abstract economies that satisfies nonemptiness, rationality in one-person economies, and consistency.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D50. 相似文献
9.
Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash graph to the space of games. We show that the index and the degree of each component are the same. Further, they are invariant to adding or deleting redundant strategies, so they depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. Applications include Kohlberg and Mertens' existence theorems for stable sets and a simple procedure for calculating the degree of a component.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
10.
PAUL ROTHSTEIN 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2007,9(2):335-368
We define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for any finite number of regions, permits general preferences over private and public goods, and does not assume that production technologies have a particular functional form, or are identical in all regions, or satisfy the Inada condition at zero. 相似文献
11.
E. Somanathan 《Games and Economic Behavior》1997,21(1-2)
Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C72. 相似文献
12.
This note discusses some issues related to bandwidth selection based on moment expansions of the mean squared error (MSE) of the regression quantile estimator. We use higher order expansions to provide a way to distinguish among asymptotically equivalent nonparametric estimators. We derive approximations to the (standardized) MSE of the covariance matrix estimation. This facilitates a comparison of different estimators at the second order level, where differences do occur and depend on the bandwidth choice. A method of bandwidth selection is defined by minimizing the second order effect in the mean squared error. 相似文献
13.
This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each player's payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy. Under these conditions, the Pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
14.
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games. American Mathematical Society Classification Numbers: 90A06, 90A07, 90A43, 90A56, 90D06, 90D10, 90D35, 90D40, 90D80. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D10, D11, D80, D83. 相似文献
15.
WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ RICHARD CORNES WOLFGANG PETERS 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2006,8(3):401-408
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors. 相似文献
16.
Masaki Aoyagi 《Journal of Economic Theory》1996,70(2):444-469
The paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptotic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.Journal of Economics LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83. 相似文献
17.
We consider a class of differential games with transition equations that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r , consider a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game G , which differs from G only in that its rate of discount r is equal to r plus a suitably chosen constant. In the context of a resource depletion game, this implies that the open-loop solution is more conservationist.
JEL Classification Nos.: C72, C73, Q30. 相似文献
JEL Classification Nos.: C72, C73, Q30. 相似文献
18.
Christian Hellwig 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,107(2):191-222
I study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the players' signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. The same condition also determines the convergence of common p-belief to common knowledge, which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. 相似文献
19.
ALEJANDRO SAPORITI 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2008,10(5):827-857
This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two‐party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game, referred to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoff secure and reciprocally upper semi‐continuous. Conditional payoffs, however, are not quasi‐concave. Hence, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne ) is ensured only if parties have homogenous interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism, and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. 相似文献
20.
We study the one-way flow model of network formation with owner-homogeneous link costs and heterogeneous profits. Recently,
several proofs of existence of Nash networks are discussed in literature. The proof by Billand et al. (Econ Theory, 2007,
forthcoming) is based on a nice and clear idea, but the technical elaboration is tedious and too complex in our opinion. In
this note, we provide an alternative and easy accessible proof based on the same idea. Also, we show by means of a counterexample
that Nash networks may not exist for games where link costs are heterogeneous, but arbitrarily close to owner-homogeneity. 相似文献