Payday Loan Choices and Consequences

High‐cost consumer credit has proliferated in the past two decades, raising regulatory scrutiny. We match administrative data from a payday lender with nationally representative credit bureau files to examine the choices of payday loan applicants and assess whether payday loans help or harm borrowers. We find consumers apply for payday loans when they have limited access to mainstream credit. In addition, the weakness of payday applicants’ credit histories is severe and longstanding. Based on regression discontinuity estimates, we show that the effects of payday borrowing on credit scores and other measures of financial well‐being are close to zero. We test the robustness of these null effects to many factors, including features of the local market structure.     

The effect of payday lending restrictions on liquor sales

We exploit a change in lending laws to estimate the causal effect of restricting access to payday loans on liquor sales. Leveraging lender- and liquor store-level data, we find that the changes reduce sales, with the largest decreases at stores located nearest to payday lenders. By focusing on states with state-run liquor monopolies, we account for endogenous supply-side variables that are typically unobserved. Further analysis of consumer-level data indicates that the lending restrictions reduce alcohol expenditures without affecting total household spending. This is consistent with a distinct relationship between payday lending access and alcohol purchases, and suggests that present biased motivations underlie some loan use. The finding is significant because it shows that payday loan access is associated with unproductive borrowing, and directly links payday loan access to public health issues.     

Consumer Default,Credit Reporting,and Borrowing Constraints

Why do negative credit events lead to long‐term borrowing constraints? Exploiting banking regulations in Peru and utilizing currency movements, we show that consumers who face a credit rating downgrade due to bad luck experience a three‐year reduction in financing. Consumers respond to the shock by paying down their most troubled loans, but nonetheless end up more likely to exit the credit market. For a set of borrowers who experience severe delinquency, we find that the associated credit reporting downgrade itself accounts for 25% to 65% of their observed decline in borrowing at various horizons over the following several years.     

货币政策、信息披露质量与公司债务融资

信息透明度是影响企业债务融资成本的重要因素。本文以2002-2010年深圳A股公司为样本,研究发现:信息披露质量较好的公司在货币政策趋紧时获得了更多的银行借款,且随着融资需求的增大,获得的银行借款更多,银行借款的利率也更低。结果表明,较高的信息披露质量有助于降低银企间的信息不对称程度,增强企业获得银行贷款的资信度,降低企业的债务融资成本,从而减轻货币政策变动对企业债务融资带来的不利影响。     

The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms

We examine the choice of borrowing source among public debt, syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans and non‐bank private debt. Using a sample of 400 non‐financial firms over the period 2000–2012, we find strong support for the reputational theory of borrowing source. Larger firms are more likely to borrow in public debt markets. Bank dependent firms are less likely to borrow in public debt markets and choose between bank and non‐bank private debt based on maturity, collateral available to lenders and other firm characteristics. These results are consistent with the role of borrower reputation being the primary determinant of borrowing source for UK listed firms.     

Exploring emotions and irrationality in attitudes towards consumer indebtedness: Individual perspectives of UK payday loan consumption

The aim of this research is to explore contemporary consumers’ emotions and irrationality in attitudes towards indebtedness, using the UK payday loan industry as a focus point. UK consumers’ have recently experienced a significant financial crisis, the result of which is expected to alter consumers’ spending, saving and borrowing habits. By using existential-phenomenological interviews to discuss individuals’ experiences of these activities, we observe some of the key issues emerging from this context. A primary theme is the influence of emotions on decision making, and how this shapes ‘irrationality’. This article aims to draw attention to this emotive thinking, which may be significant in thinking about how payday loans are communicated to users in the future.     

Product market relationships and cost of bank loans: Evidence from strategic alliances

This paper examines the relation between strategic alliances and non-financial firms’ bank loan financing. We construct several measures to capture firms’ alliance activities. The key finding is that borrowing firms with active alliance involvement experience lower cost of bank loans. The reduction of borrowing cost is strongest for financially unconstrained firms and firms with high G-index and intensive monitoring from institutional investors. We also relate various characteristics of alliance agreements to the cost of bank borrowing, and find evidence supporting market power hypothesis and organizational flexibility hypothesis. We further report that allying with a prestigious partner (i.e., S&P 1500 firms) provides certification effect that lowers bank loan cost. In addition, firms positioned in the center of the alliance network enjoy lower cost of bank loans. Lastly, we document that firms engaging in alliance activities expand their debt capacity and are less likely to use collaterals and covenants in their bank loan contracts.     

BORROWING RELATIONSHIPS,MONITORING, AND THE INFLUENCE ON LOAN RATES

While monitoring borrowers, a bank obtains private information about its customers, giving the bank an informational advantage in the production of subsequent services. Competing theories exist on the way banks use this advantage in the pricing of subsequent services to the customer. If moral hazard limits the transfer of private information, the borrowing relationship transforms into an informational monopoly and can be characterized as a “wasting asset.” Alternately, if the banks' competitive environment necessitates that cost economies are shared, the relationship has “value.” Ordering pairs of successive loans made to a particular borrower as prior loans and subsequent loans, and controlling for environmental, borrower, and loan characteristics, we show that the subsequent loan is priced significantly lower than the prior loan.     

Payday loans and consumer financial health

The annualized interest rate for a payday loan often exceeds 10 times that of a typical credit card, yet this market grew immensely in the 1990s and 2000s, elevating concerns about the risk payday loans pose to consumers and whether payday lenders target minority neighborhoods. This paper employs individual credit record data, and Census data on payday lender store locations, to assess these concerns. Taking advantage of several state law changes since 2006 and, following previous work, within-state-year differences in access arising from proximity to states that allow payday loans, I find little to no effect of payday loans on credit scores, new delinquencies, or the likelihood of overdrawing credit lines. The analysis also indicates that neighborhood racial composition has little influence on payday lender store locations conditional on income, wealth and demographic characteristics.     

Less Mainstream Credit,More Payday Borrowing? Evidence from Debt Collection Restrictions

Governments regulate debt collectors to protect consumers from predatory practices. These restrictions may lower repayment, reducing the supply of mainstream credit and increasing demand for alternative credit. Using individual credit record data and a difference-in-differences design comparing consumers in states that tighten restrictions on debt collection to those in neighboring states that do not, I find that restricting collections reduces access to mainstream credit and increases payday borrowing. These findings provide new evidence of substitution between alternative and mainstream credit and point to a trade-off between shielding consumers from certain collection practices and pushing them into higher cost payday lending markets.     

High‐Cost Credit and Consumption Smoothing

In this paper, I show that high‐cost credit helps households smooth consumption following periods of temporary financial distress. After experiencing distress—that is, extreme weather events—I find that access to high‐cost payday lending mitigates declines in overall spending and nondurable goods spending generally. The results are particularly concentrated among households with a higher propensity to use payday credit or that have limited alternatives: lower income households, households with less than a college degree, and households with low levels of saving. These results highlight the consumption‐smoothing role that high‐cost credit plays for households with limited access to other types of credit.     

Does Voluntary Disclosure Improve Stock Price Informativeness?

According to theory, comovement in stock prices reflects comovement in the fundamental factors underlying the values of stocks. Recent theory contends that stock price comovement can be driven by information markets or the informational opacity of the firm. To the extent that voluntary disclosure reduces information acquisition cost and enhances firm transparency, we predict that enhanced voluntary disclosure reduces stock price comovement. We provide evidence in support of this prediction using analyst evaluation of firm disclosure policy. Overall, our evidence supports the effectiveness of firm disclosure policy in increasing the amount of firm‐specific information contained in stock returns.     

Payday lenders: Heroes or villains?

Does access to high-interest credit (payday loans) exacerbate or mitigate individual financial distress. Using natural disasters as an exogenous shock, I apply a propensity score-matched, triple-difference specification to identify a causal relation between welfare and access to credit. California foreclosures increase by 4.5 units per 1,000 homes after a natural disaster. The existence of payday lenders mitigates 1.0-1.3 of them, with the caveat that not all payday loans are for emergency distress. Payday lenders also mitigate larcenies (but not burglaries or vehicle thefts). In a placebo test of disasters covered by homeowner insurance, payday lending has no mitigation effect.     

Cheap Credit,Lending Operations,and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance

The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitability for MFIs and promotes a shift toward noncommercial loans but has no effect on total overall lending. Instead, the additional resources are either directed to promoting future growth or dissipated.     

Financial literacy and consumer credit portfolios

We use survey data from a sample of UK households to analyse the relationship between financial literacy and consumer credit portfolios. We show that individuals who borrow on consumer credit exhibit worse financial literacy than those who do not. Borrowers with poor financial literacy hold higher shares of high cost credit (such as home collected credit, mail order catalogue debt and payday loans) than those with higher literacy. We also show that individuals with poor financial literacy are more likely to lack confidence when interpreting credit terms, and to exhibit confusion over financial concepts. They are also less likely to engage in behaviour which might help them to improve their awareness of the credit market.     

The Total Cost of Corporate Borrowing in the Loan Market: Don't Ignore the Fees

More than 80% of U.S. syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spreads and fee types. We test the predictions of existing theories on the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts such as the drawdown option for credit lines and the cancellation option in term loans, and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers based on the likelihood of exercising these options. We also propose a new total‐cost‐of‐borrowing measure that includes various fees charged by lenders.     

Banks as information specialists: The case of hospital lending

This study analyzes data from the US hospital industry for evidence that banks enjoy informational advantages over direct lenders. In a multivariate analysis, we find a strong positive relationship between bank loans (as a share of total borrowing) and profitability among hospitals widely perceived as financially weak. Thus, among such hospitals, reliance on bank loans suggests the presence of hidden factors that enhance the hospital's financial standing. This supports the view that financial intermediaries are information specialists.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

The Monitoring Incentive of Transactional and Relationship Lenders: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market

We identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans (referred to as transactional lenders [TLs]). We show that borrowers borrowing from TLs experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those borrowing from relationship lenders. This difference in the postloan issue performance remains robust after controlling for the potential self‐selection of the lender type, or using percentage of traded loans out of all syndicated loans to capture lenders’ propensity for syndicating tradable loans. Our results also remains qualitatively the same after we drop various types of risky loans.     

Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.