Competition, Imperfect Competition, and Dynamic Market Processes

Abstract . Contrary to the conventional hypothesis, the structural elements on the supply side of free product markets are not stable. The variability in the structures of free markets is readily apparent in an appropriate analysis of the emergence, growth, and maturity of free product markets. In this analysis, supply-side entrepreneurship plays a prominent role—one which is only imputed to entrepreneurship in the conventional specification of market conditions. In order to correct this deficiency in the conventional specification, an alternative specification is summarized in which are treated explicitly the effects of entrepreneurial activity with respect to the discovery and development of economically feasible new products and processes and the choice of and variations in the quality characteristics of the products of individual firms. This indicates that firms can and do influence the stage of development—and hence the related size—of a market and their relative shares of it by new product and process development and the quality of their output. In this way entrepreneurial activity affects particular product market structures.     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

Organizational Structure and Product Market Competition

This paper explores the link between delegation of authority and product market competition. It considers a firm that is contemplating entering a market served by an incumbent. The firm can adopt either a decentralized or a centralized authority structure. In the former, authority is delegated to an agent, while in the latter, it is retained by the principal. We address the questions of how the toughness of future product market competition affects the delegation decision, and how this decision in turn affects product market competition. The delegation decision is determined by a trade‐off between inducing the agent to take greater initiative and accepting lower operating profits from a less efficient decision taken by the agent.     

Job Securityand Product Market Competition

In the present paper, we relate the extent of job security offered to incumbent managers to the extent of competition among firms in the product market, where the extent of job security is measured by the probability that an incumbent manager continues to be employed by his current firm and the extent of competition is measured by the degree of differentiation between competing brands. We demonstrate that when competition between firms intensifies and "on-the-job training" is relatively more conducive to reducing the variable costs of production, firms tend to offer reduced (increased) job security to incumbent managers, provided that the degree of differentiation between competing products is sufficiently large (small), respectively. If "on-the-job training" is relatively more conducive to reducing the fixed costs of production, however, the previous result is reversed.     

中铁快运市场竞争状况研究

中铁快运自从重新组建后,对其业务进行了重组,发展迅速,但同时面对快递业激烈的竞争状况也出现了一系列的问题。本文采用对比分析,数据示例等研究方法,按照提出问题、分析问题、解决问题的研究思路对中铁快运所面对的竞争格局进行探讨并提出建议,希望对中铁快运今后的发展提供帮助。     

Investment Incentives and Electricity Spot Market Competition

In this paper we analyze investment decisions of strategic firms that anticipate competition on many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating (and possibly uncertain) demand. We study how the degree of spot market competition affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an application of the model to electricity market data. We show that more competitive spot market prices strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The effect can be severe enough to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive spot markets on social welfare. Our results obtain with and without free entry. The analysis demonstrates that investment incentives necessarily have to be taken into account for a serious assessment of electricity spot market design.     

Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision

Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.     

Product Market Competition and Returns to Talent

This paper investigates how product market competition influences the wages paid to workers and the distribution of talent across industries. We develop a model where firms facing different competitive conditions bid for workers. The model predicts that wages are increasing in talent, decreasing in competition, and the interaction between talent and competition is positive. In addition, the most talented workers will be concentrated in competitive industries and talent dispersion rises with competition. We use linked employee–employer data to test these predictions.     

Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency

We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm-manager relationship.     

逐鹿高端家具

代工企业长丰家具销售人员一句不经意的自白,揭开了“达芬奇”神秘的面纱。     

市场竞争新思路

本文从市场、盈利、竞争、机会、技术、质量、成本、营销等方面 ,力求站在全新的视角上 ,阐述其中的变化规律 ,为市场竞争中的企业、企业中的生意人提供一种全新的思路 ,从而使企业认识竞争的真谛 ,在竞争中始终把握主动权。     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

连接外部性、横向联盟和市场竞争

分析了横向关系的双寡头企业具有连接外部性条件下的联盟决策,得出结论,横向企业的联盟降低了企业自身的成本,同时也降低了竞争对手的成本,具有正的连接外部性。企业先决定是否联盟,然后在市场上进行竞争;证实了市场竞争比较缓和时,横向企业联盟;市场竞争比较激烈时,横向企业不联盟。当存在产品差异化时,结论仍然不变;比较了企业联盟决策和社会计划者决策,论证得出市场竞争比较缓和时,企业和社会计划者联盟决策一致;市场竞争比较激烈时,企业联盟决策背离社会计划者的决策。     

Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper examines the effect of the intensity of short-run price competition and other exogenous variables that affect gross profit margins—such as the degree of product differentiation and the consumers' responsiveness to quality—on market structure and on advertising and R&D expenditure. A key result is that more intense short-run competition can lead to lower concentration in industries with high advertising or R&D intensity, unlike exogenous-sunk-cost industries. Also, price competition has a negative effect on advertising or R&D expenditure. A case study is also presented, which is consistent with the theoretical results of the paper.     

美国医院市场的规制制度与竞争

本文主要分析了美国医院市场的规制制度以及规制下促进竞争的因素。文章第一部分介绍了美国医院行业规制的目标和两大领域的规制：医院投资审核制度和价格规制。第二部分分析了医院市场竞争产生的原因和起点。第三部分则侧重分析在医院行业这个特殊的行业中，规制和竞争的关系以及促进竞争、提高社会福利的因素：保险机构的作用和支付方式的选择。     

研发投入、市场竞争与品牌价值

本文以2013—2017年世界品牌实验室发布的《中国500最具价值品牌》排行榜中我国沪深两市A股上市企业为样本,对研发投入与品牌价值的关系及市场竞争对两者的调节效应进行实证研究。结果表明:研发投入能够正向促进品牌价值的提升,且企业所处行业的市场竞争越激烈,这种正向促进作用越明显。     

产品市场竞争与现金持有动态调整

本文采用中国上市公司2005～2008年812家公司3248个样本的平衡面板数据,对产品市场竞争及其变化与企业现金持有动态调整之间的关系进行研究。实证研究的结果表明,从静态角度看,产品市场竞争对现金持有调整速度的影响不显著;但是从动态角度看,企业的现金持有水平将随着产品市场竞争的动态变化做出调整,产品市场竞争越趋向激烈,企业现金持有调整的速度越快。进一步研究发现,产品市场竞争的动态变化与现金持有调整速度之间的上述关系在非国有企业和高成长企业更为明显。     

产品市场竞争、高管持股与管理层盈余预告

管理层是上市公司盈余预告的执行者,管理层动机会对盈余预告产生直接影响;而产品市场作为重要的外部环境,也会一定程度上影响公司信息披露决策.从信息披露的成本—收益视角出发,可将管理层盈余预告从特征区分为收益型和成本型,在此基础上考察管理层高管持股与盈余预告质量之间的关系;并进一步按照产品市场竞争程度的高低进行分组,检验产品市场竞争对两者关系的影响.研究发现,高管持股会提高盈余预告收益型特征(及时性和准确性)的质量,但是会降低成本型特征(具体性)的质量;激烈的产品市场竞争下,高管持股公司的盈余预告收益型特征的质量没有变化,但成本型特征的质量会显著下降.研究结果丰富了管理层盈余预告的影响因素研究,为高管激励和产品市场竞争对公司信息披露的影响提供了新的证据.     

媒介竞争与市场需求催化报纸专栏发展

我国媒体事业迅猛发展,报纸专栏一直深受报人喜爱和推崇。时至今日,媒体竞争日渐加剧,而专栏在报业界却始终保持永不退色。分析原因,同质、异质媒体激烈竞争和市场需求使然。