机构投资者行为与交易量异象

我们验证了在中国资本市场上存在交易量异象,以过去3个月的换手率为基础进行套利,在未来3个月投资者能获取显著的超额回报。使用中期和年度机构持股数据,我们发现机构投资者能识别和利用交易量异象。基于交易量和机构投资者持股比例的信息,我们发现投资者如果买进过去3个月平均交易量最低与机构投资者持股比例最高的一组,同时卖空交易量最高与机构投资者持股比例最低的一组进行交叉套利,他们能在未来3个月获得10.3%的超额回报。     

机构投资者交易行为特征研究

本文通过研究股票收益变化和机构持股变化之间的关系,发现对于高机构持股股票,过去表现较好的股票会吸引机构增加持仓,且机构增持的股票相对减持的股票的后续表现又更好,而低机构持股股票则不然。这表明机构投资者整体上是采用正反馈即惯性交易策略的,而个体投资者的行为则较为随机。对于缺乏投资经验的个体投资者而言,论文结果意味着他们应当委托机构进行理财如投资于基金。     

机构投资者噪声交易行为的理论分析

根据对机构投资者噪声交易行为的理论分析,本文提出由于证券市场在本质上是一个信息市场,天然具有噪声交易动机和行为能力的机构投资者利用个人投资者的认识心理、情绪和投资行为偏差与证券市场制度结构,策略性地实施噪声交易行为,以此加剧信息的不对称性,进而在最大程度上发挥其比较优势、获取超额收益,噪声交易因此成为机构投资者投资行为的本质特征。机构投资者噪声交易行为属于有限理性的主动性噪声交易,噪声交易者风险的分布具有阶段性特征,在机构投资者可控制的范围之内。     

The Weekend Effect: Trading Patterns of Individual and Institutional Investors

In this paper, we document regularities in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors related to the day of the week. We find a relative increase in trading activity by individuals on Mondays. In addition, there is a tendency for individuals to increase the number of sell transactions relative to buy transactions, which might explain at least part of the weekend effect.     

Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and Individual Investors

We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive-feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean-reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.     

Trading Behaviour of Foreign Institutional Investors: Evidence from Indian Stock Markets

Asia-Pacific Financial Markets - The existence of behavioural bias such as positive feedback trading (PFT) and herding is well researched for advanced economies. This paper explores whether foreign...     

机构投资者大幅增减仓对股票价格的影响研究--基于2014年中报数据的实证分析

运用事件研究法,选取2014年中报不同类型机构投资者大幅增减仓幅度、股票的超额收益率、同方向操作的机构数量等作为被研究变量,通过Stata12、Excel软件分析机构大幅增减仓在中短期内对股票价格的影响。研究发现,不同机构大幅增减仓对股价的影响有较大差异,机构大幅增仓比大幅减仓对股票的正面影响明显更大,但减仓的股票整体上也存在超额收益率;机构投资者增减仓幅度与股票超额收益率正相关,机构同买同卖的行为存在一定程度的“羊群效应”。因此,国家需进一步鼓励机构投资者的发展,引入更多的QFII,促进保险、券商、信托与基金发行差异化理财产品,机构应当理性投资,挖掘优质股票,避免羊群行为以减少对股票价格的冲击。     

Selling Fast and Buying Slow: Heuristics and Trading Performance of Institutional Investors

Are market experts prone to heuristics, and do these heuristics transfer across buying and selling domains? We investigate this question using a unique data set of institutional investors with portfolios averaging $573 million. A striking finding emerges: While there is evidence of skill in buying, selling decisions underperform substantially, even relative to random-selling strategies. This holds despite the similarity between the two decisions in frequency, substance, and consequences for performance. Evidence suggests an asymmetric allocation of cognitive resources such as attention can explain the discrepancy: We document a systematic, costly heuristic process for selling but not for buying.     

机构投资者社会责任刍议

“超常规、创造性发展机构投资”的根源和归宿在于确立机构投资的社会责任一一规范投资行为，保护投资环境，促进中国证券市场成熟健康发展。在这个循环命题中，机构投资的社会责任既是“超常规、创造性”的因，又是“超常规、创造性”的果。     

机构投资者与国债市场改革

从世界各国的实际情况来看，大多数国家政府债券的主要持有人都经历了由个人投资向机构投资的转变。我国国债机构投资主要是银行和非银行金融机构，表现出极大的偏向性和垄断性。我国应大力培育各类机构投资，推进国债市场改革。     

How Investors Trade Around Interim Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   This study focuses on non‐institutional trading behaviour around interim earnings announcements in the emerging market. We separate the stock trading activity of Finnish households into five trading classes and compare the results to institutional trading. Data covering the years 1996–2000 shows that earnings news triggers trading in every trading class. We also find some evidence that actively trading individuals especially (compared to passively trading ones) show increased buying and selling activity before the event compared to the non‐event period. After the event we find that Finnish households in the most active investor class tend to follow a contrarian strategy, especially selling after good news. This adds to previous evidence by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000b) . Furthermore, the performance of the active investor classes is superior to that of passive ones. Finally, the institutional trading class is clearly less affected by the announcement than the active investor classes, suggesting that institutions utilize a broader information set than individual investors.     

机构持股对股价微观波动影响的非对称性

文章利用topview机构投资者日持股数据,构建股价波动率与机构投资者日净买率等指标,使用GMM回归、滚动回归、递归回归,从个股角度动态分析机构投资者对股价微观波动的影响。实证结果表明,机构投资者对股价微观波动的影响因不同的市场状态而具有非对称性,并可以用信息假说进行解释。管理层应依据不同的市场状态而采取合适的措施以实现机构投资者的稳定作用。     

我国机构投资者的制度缺陷及其完善措施

从2000年以来,管理层在多种场合提出要“超常规发展机构投资者”,表明了管理层发展壮大机构投资者的决心。管理层试图通过加大培育机构投资者来稳定证券市场,引导证券市场。然而,由于微观经济基础本身的问题和证券市场基本制度安排不到位,中国证券市场无论发展怎样的机构投资者,都不可能真正弥补其基本缺陷。如果我们不在基层制度层面上狠下功夫,不在社会各个层面上建立起健全的基本游戏规则,而仅仅只是在市场     

培育机构投资者,推动债券市场发展

2012年3月份国务院发布的《2012年深化经济体制改革重点工作意见》明确提出,促进多层次资本市场健康发展。债券市场作为资本市场的重要组成部分,不仅是投资者进行资产管理、有效规避金融风险和确定金融资产价格的良好场所,而且作为直接融资的主要途径,为整个金融体系提供流动性支持和风险管理工具,在货币市场和资本市场中发挥桥梁和催化剂的作用。国内外实践表明,机构投资者的发     

Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge overforeign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data,we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic moneymanagers when they buy and receive less when they sell for mediumand large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantageof foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence thatdomestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors.The explanation for these results is that prices move more againstforeign investors than against domestic investors before trades.     

Institutional Investors and Shareholder Litigation

We examine whether institutional investors are able to avoid future litigation. Our results show that institutions provide a fiduciary role by decreasing or eliminating their positions in sued firms well before litigation begins. We also find that institutional groups with high monitoring ability (independent investment advisors and mutual funds) are more proactive in their trading behavior than are institutions with low monitoring ability (banks, insurance companies, and unclassified institutions such as endowments, foundations, and self-managed pension funds). We find that percentage changes in institutional ownership are correlated with public information available more than two quarters before litigation.     

The Dynamics of Institutional and Individual Trading

We study the daily and intradaily cross‐sectional relation between stock returns and the trading of institutional and individual investors in Nasdaq 100 securities. Based on the previous day's stock return, the top performing decile of securities is 23.9% more likely to be bought in net by institutions (and sold by individuals) than those in the bottom performance decile. Strong contemporaneous daily patterns can largely be explained by net institutional (individual) trading positively (negatively) following past intradaily excess stock returns (or the news associated therein). In comparison, evidence of return predictability and price pressure are economically small.     

美国机构投资者发展的解析与启示

美国机构投资者顺应美国社会历史变革和经济环境变化而产生,他们历经国外机构投资者的熏陶,市场的洗礼,在竞争中不断发展壮大起来。中国机构投资者正处在兴起阶段,还存在着美国机构投资者萌芽阶段的类似困境。要培育和发展机构者,还要借鉴美国经验,倡导理性投资,营造良好金融市场环境和构建科学合理的监管体系。     

Institutional Investors and Private Equity

Entrepreneurial finance literature has highlighted that institutionalinvestors are the main contributors to private equity funds.This paper complements these findings by documenting that institutionalinvestors also invest directly in private equity. A major concernfor such investments is the higher agency costs associated withprivate equity. We show that institutions invest in privatefirms with governance mechanisms that tend to reduce the expectedagency costs and risk of minority expropriation. Good governancemechanisms further allow institutional investors to enjoy thebenefits of syndication and thereby reduce idiosyncratic risk.In addition, we show that institutional investments tend tobe followed by further improvements in corporate governanceand tend to occur in high-growth firms within research and developmentintensive industries.     

Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.