On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion

This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity‐setting firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non‐cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case‐by‐case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intermediated surge pricing

Although Uber and Lyft are known for their flexible “surge pricing,” they are surprisingly rigid in another way: each firm takes a constant percentage of passenger fare whether or not there is a surge. In this paper, I investigate the possible reasons for, and the impact of, this rigidity. I study a market in which a profit‐maximizing intermediary facilitates trade between buyers and sellers. The intermediary sets prices for buyers and sellers, and keeps the difference as her fee. Optimal prices increase when demand increases, that is, shifts right. If a demand increase is due to an increase in the number of ex ante symmetric buyers, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee decreases. If, instead, a demand increase is due to a reduction in the elasticity of demand, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee increases. In either case, if the intermediary keeps a constant percent fee regardless of shifts in demand, as is the case with Uber and Lyft, then surge pricing (i.e., the ratio of price during high demand to price during low demand) is amplified on one side of the market and diminished on the other side.     

Impacts on optimum location of different pricing strategies,market structures and customer distributions over space

This paper considers the ways in which pricing policies will affect location choice in both monopolistic and duopolistic markets. It is shown that the monopolist's optimal location depends crucially on the shapes of demand and delivery cost functions and the pricing policy applied. The median location is unlikely to be chosen. With spatial competition, pricing strategies also affect location choice. There will be greater production concentration under f.o.b. or uniform delivered pricing than under optimal discriminatory pricing. For certain consumer distributions, Hotelling-type concentration is to be expected whereas collusion will lead to some dispersion of production.     

Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information: Collusion in English Auctions with Affiliated Values

In an English auction, a bidder’s strategy depends on the prices at which his competitors drop out, because these convey information on the value of the object on sale. A ring of colluding bidders can strategically manipulate the information transmitted through its members’ bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and thus allow a designated bidder to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that the ring wins the auction and reduces the price it pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency.     

网络外部性、内生成本差异与企业定价策略

在产品成本内生条件下,通过建立扩展的Hotelling模型,分析网络外部性对企业定价策略的影响,结果显示:当网络外部性强度较低时,企业将选择歧视定价策略,当网络外部性强度较高时,企业将选择单一定价策略;在两种定价策略下,Nash谈判能力强的企业将获得更高的市场份额和利润;社会福利大小由网络外部性强度和企业Nash谈判能力共同决定,与产品定价策略无关,当网络外部性强度较高时,社会福利与企业间Nash谈判能力的差异正相关,反之则负相关。     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

Pricing training and development programs using stochastic CVP analysis

This paper sets forth, analyzes and applies a stochastic cost‐volume‐profit (CVP) model specifically geared toward the determination of enrollment fees for training and development (T+D) programs. It is a simpler model than many of those developed in the research literature, but it does incorporate one advanced component: an ‘economic’ demand function relating the expected sales level to price. Price is neither a constant nor a random variable in this model but rather the decision‐maker's basic control variable. The simplicity of the model permits analytical solutions for five ‘special prices’: (1) the highest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level; (2) the price which maximizes expected profits; (3) the price which maximizes a Cobb–Douglas utility function based on expected profits and breakeven probability; (4) the price which maximizes breakeven probability; and (5) the lowest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level. The model is applied to data provided by the Center for Management and Professional Development at the authors' university. The results suggest that there could be a significant payoff to fine‐tuning a T+D provider's pricing strategy using formal analysis. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Study of Vertical Integration and Vertical Divestiture: The Case of Store Brand Milk Sourcing in Boston

This article investigates whether a retailer’s store brand supply source impacts vertical pricing and supply channel profitability. Using chain‐level retail scanner data, a random coefficients logit demand model is estimated employing a Bayesian estimation approach. Supply models are specified conditional on demand parameter estimates. Bayesian decision theory is applied to select the best fitting pricing model. Results indicate that a vertically integrated retailer engages in linear pricing for brand manufacturers’ products while competing retailers make nonlinear pricing contracts with brand manufacturers for branded products and store brands. A simulated vertical divestiture based on real world events provides evidence for improved channel efficiency.     

Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate‐input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler’s marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than the market value of an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm’s initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby the assembler keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability.     

投标人平行串谋与最优公开保留价博弈分析

本文将投标人平行串谋问题与招标人公开保留价定价策略相结合,研究了第二价格密封招标方式下投标串谋联盟的串谋报价及利润分配机制,分析了串谋联盟的存在对非串谋联盟中成员的投标策略和期望利润的影响,揭示了串谋联盟成员人数与串谋联盟总收益之间的关系,探讨了招标人公开保留价定价策略、串谋联盟成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系,指出了招标人应通过降低公开保留价的方式来防止或减少投标人平行串谋行为的发生。     

Exploring the impact of innovation strategy on R&D employees’ job satisfaction: A mathematical model and empirical research

This study develops a mathematical model to examine the effect of innovation strategy on R&D employee’s job satisfaction and to identify the optimal guidelines of innovation strategy, with conflict and organization performance being treated as the intermediary variables. The study further conducts an empirical survey to illustrate the contributions of this mathematical model. The results indicate that the product innovation has a greater influence on organizational performance, while the process innovation has a greater influence on conflict resolution among R&D employees. The mathematical and empirical results have provided an optimal guideline for determining the allocation of resources, which suggests that firms must focus on product innovation to gain the optimal R&D employee’s job satisfaction. In addition, the types of innovation policies along with rivals’ attitudes influence the advantages to be taken from a firm innovation strategy.     

DPWeVote: differentially private weighted voting protocol for cloud-based decision-making

ABSTRACT

With the advent of Industry 4.0, cloud computing techniques have been increasingly adopted by industry practitioners to achieve better workflows. One important application is cloud-based decision-making, in which multiple enterprise partners need to arrive an agreed decision. Such cooperative decision-making problem is sometimes formed as a weighted voting game, in which enterprise partners express ‘YES/NO’ opinions. Nevertheless, existing cryptographic approaches to Cloud-Based Weighted Voting Game have restricted collusion tolerance and heavily rely on trusted servers, which are not always available. In this work, we consider the more realistic scenarios of having semi-honest cloud server/partners and assuming maximal collusion tolerance. To resolve the privacy issues in such scenarios, the DPWeVote protocol is proposed which incorporates Randomized Response technique and consists the following three phases: the Randomized Weights Collection phase, the Randomized Opinions Collection phase, and the Voting Results Release phase. Experiments on synthetic data have demonstrated that the proposed DPWeVote protocol managed to retain an acceptable utility for decision-making while preserving privacy in semi-honest environment.     

An excellent approximation for the m out of n day provision

The m out of n day provision (MooN) of convertible bonds is difficult to handle. To approximating the MooN better, this paper proposes an approach named the conditional range probability (CRP). CRP is the simulated probability of the MooN being reached within a price range at a future time, conditional on today’s price of the underlying, and can be incorporated into any conventional derivatives pricing method. For a purposely designed exotic call option with a 20 out of 30 day provision, CRP under finite difference is found to outperform significantly several existing approaches and produce a mean pricing error of 1% over a wide range of initial underlying prices for the exotic call. The result implies that finite difference utilizing CRP will yield excellent approximating prices for convertible bonds.     

A much robust and updated evidences of the alternative real-estate based asset pricing

To response Harvey, Liu and Zhu’s and Gospodinov, Kan and Robotti’s criticism for an empirical study, we develop an alternative real-estate based model in asset pricing for an updated robustness. We make an innovation for the perspective of practitioners: the real-estate pricing factor is an alternative excess return of real estate portfolio. The results suggest that an updated and much robust role of the real-estate based asset pricing model: for example, the t-statistic of the real-estate pricing factor is higher than 3.00, suggesting that one is not derived from a data mining strategy. Moreover, we examine the performance of our alternative real-estate based model in a series of various portfolios (sorted in some vital anomalies); eventually, the results statistically support the real-estate based model.     

Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

This article analyzes a manager's incentives to establish and sustain an illegal collusive agreement if her firm is subject to profit shocks, if her utility function is concave in profits (e.g., because of risk aversion), and if she incurs opportunity costs (e.g., by violating a social norm). The model supports the empirical observation that if collusion is to be established and sustained in a state with low profits, then this state must be quite persistent. It also indicates that compliance with antitrust laws can be ensured best by combining a zero tolerance policy with a strategy of forgiveness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Min–max multi-step barrier options and their variants

This paper studies a new type of barrier option, min–max multi-step barrier options with diverse multiple up or down barrier levels placed in the sub-periods of the option’s lifetime. We develop the explicit pricing formula of this type of option under the Black–Scholes model and explore its applications and possible extensions. In particular, the min–max multi-step barrier option pricing formula can be used to approximate double barrier option prices and compute prices of complex barrier options such as discrete geometric Asian barrier options. As a practical example of directly applying the pricing formula, we introduce and evaluate a re-bouncing equity-linked security. The main theorem of this work is capable of handling the general payoff function, from which we obtain the pricing formulas of various min–max multi-step barrier options. The min–max multi-step reflection principle, the boundary-crossing probability of min–max multi-step barriers with icicles, is also derived.     

Exploring the link between organizational values and human resource certification

We contribute to the discussion of human resource (HR) certification by identifying organizational values as a key antecedent to (1) an organization's use of HR certification and (2) whether organizational members choose to pursue HR certification. Building on research which has looked at the influence of organizational values on the behavior and attitudes of the organization and its employees, we propose that key organizational values will influence the extent to which an organization and its members value HR certification. Specifically, we explore the relationship between the organizational values of innovation, people orientation, and stability and the extent to which an organization uses HR certification for selection purposes. In addition, we propose that these key organizational values will also influence whether the organization's members pursue HR certification. Exploring the link between key organizational values and HR certification is critical to our understanding of an organization's HR practices and the behavior of its employees. By taking a more organization focused perspective, we highlight the top-down effects of organizational values on the value of HR certification and call for additional research on the antecedents of the value of HR certification.     

Strategic Buying to Prevent Seller Exit

We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first‐period purchase decision not only depends on current period preferences and prices, but also on the potential effect that their behavior has on the probability of seller survival. Specifically, some buyers may choose to purchase from the seller with the lower survival probability even though they like the other seller's product better, a behavior that we call “strategic buying.” We analyze how the incidence of strategic buying depends on parameters and also the implications of the strategic buying motive for sellers' first‐period pricing decisions.     

Pricing strategy in the product and service market

Existing studies have mainly focused on pricing in either primary markets or aftermarkets. However, in practice, prices in primary markets and aftermarkets are closely correlated. This study examines the joint pricing strategy in both primary markets and aftermarkets based on customer utility and establishes a pricing model for profit-maximization firms. Our results show that overpricing in the aftermarket is caused by customer myopia, while the motivation of the firm to avoid customer myopia depends on its pricing strategy. A quantity–price contract in the aftermarket is designed to raise the firm’s profit.     

Resale price maintenance: A managerial perspective

Managers can improve firm profits by selecting the appropriate pricing strategy. In this article, we show how managers can use one particular controversial pricing strategy—resale price maintenance (RPM)—to enhance firm profits. We first discuss the antitrust treatment of RPM, both in the United States and internationally. Then we examine the economic effects of implementing RPM in several key contexts: product promotion, quality certification, prestige goods, and online retail. We also discuss the effects of RPM on entry of new firms.