Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.     

Aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für die Tätigkeit von EU-Versicherern in der Türkei

In recent years the Turkish insurance market has exerted a strong appeal, especially for insurers seated in the EU, in view of its exponential growth rates and its dormant growth potential. EU insurers are, however, subject to more stringent insurance supervisory requirements when entering this insurance market, external to the EU, than when expending into other European insurance markets.     

Competition,efficiency and soundness in European life insurance markets

This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone indicator. We analyse 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation period 1999–2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones.     

State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

Capital Market Development,Competition, Property Rights,and the Value of Insurer Product‐Line Diversification: A Cross‐Country Analysis

In this article, we show that the effect of product diversification on performance is not homogeneous across countries. Diversified insurance companies perform significantly worse than their focused competitors in countries with well‐developed capital markets, high levels of property rights protection, and high levels of competition. In addition, we find that the diversification–performance relationship for insurance companies depends on company size. For large insurers operating in countries with less developed capital markets, diversification significantly increases performance. Our results suggest that the optimal organizational structure may be different for insurers operating in emerging economies than for insurers operating in developed countries.     

Adverse Selection and the Opaqueness of Insurers

While adverse selection problems between insureds and insurers are well known to insurance researchers, few explore adverse selection in the insurance industry from a capital markets perspective. This study examines adverse selection in the quoted prices of insurers' common stocks with a particular focus on the opacity of both asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities. We find that more opaque underwriting lines result in greater adverse selection costs for property-casualty (P-C) insurers. A similar effect is not apparent for life-health (L-H) insurers and we find no effect of asset opaqueness on adverse selection for either L-H or P-C insurers.     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry

Corporate cash holdings play a significant role in the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry yet the topic of insurer cash holdings policy has largely been overlooked by prior empirical research. While a number of studies have investigated firm‐specific factors related to cash holdings in the insurance industry, prior research has not examined how market concentration and potential predation risk impact cash holdings. We propose a new measure of market concentration and provide evidence in support of the predation risk theory. Specifically, we show that insurers exposed to more concentrated markets tend to hold more cash. Furthermore, the relation between market concentration and cash holdings is influenced by access to internal capital. While unaffiliated insurers without access to internal capital hold greater levels of cash in more concentrated markets, group insurers with access to internal capital do not hold greater levels of cash to mitigate predation risk.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Determinants of International Insurers' Participation in Foreign Non-Life Markets

Mirroring the trend in the broader marketplace, the global insurance industry is steadily moving toward increased liberalization and deregulation. This study seeks to develop the first empirical model that examines the importance of foreign market characteristics as they relate to the participation of international insurers in the non‐life business of those countries. The analysis reveals that market structure is an important factor in determining whether international insurers participate in a given foreign market. In addition, for markets that are not competitive, removing trade barriers would significantly improve the desirability of those countries as host markets. The results also suggest that countries with higher gross domestic product tend to attract more involvement from international insurers. While this research focuses on the markets of industrialized countries, the findings will provide significant implications for those emerging markets that have not yet collected relevant data on a number of the variables included in this study.     

Relative Hedging of Systematic Mortality Risk

A number of problematic issues have arisen in anticipation of the potential role of molecular tests for genetic predispositions to illness in risk assessment by insurance underwriters. We argue in this paper that the regrettable history and current risks of genetic discrimination warrant a presumption that genetic predisposition status should not be used in any nonmedical contexts, unless compelling evidence can demonstrate that serious harm will result to third-party interests without such use. We argue that insurers should not be able to initiate testing for genetic predisposition. We also argue that there are many reasons to doubt whether patients’ test results will result in such serious adverse selection as to cause substantial harm to insurance markets, except possibly at higher policy amounts in life or disability income insurance. We conclude that the burden of proof must be on insurers to demonstrate necessity of use in specific cases in which test availability shows high probability of imminent, serious harm to insurance markets.     

Cost efficiency and board composition under different takaful insurance business models

This study examines the link between cost efficiency and board composition in non-life takaful insurance firms operating in 17 Islamic countries using panel data for 2004–2007. Nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to compute cost efficiency scores and a second-stage logit transformation regression model is then employed to test the influence of corporate characteristics on these efficiencies. We find that average levels of cost efficiency in takaful insurance markets mirror the efficiency in developed non-life insurance markets. The relative influence of board composition, such as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, on the cost efficiency of takaful insurers depends on its interaction with other firm-specific characteristics such as board size. Hence, the effect of corporate governance systems on the cost efficiency of takaful insurers can be complicated by various firm-specific factors. Our results could have important commercial and policy implications.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Bargaining Power and Efficiency in Insurance Contracts

Insurance contracts are frequently modelled as principal–agent relationships. The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between differential bargaining power and the efficiency of insurance contracts. The analysis is undertaken in a framework of state-contingent production, which allows us to consider, as separate choices, the level of effort committed by the client and the riskiness of the equilibrium state-contingent production vector. Our central result is that, in the presence of hold-up problems, the exercise of monopoly power by insurers leads clients to undertake socially costly self-protection, leading to suboptimal levels of insurance. Clients can exploit information asymmetries to offset the bargaining power of the insurer, but this process is also socially costly. Hence, competitive markets for insurance will yield a Pareto-superior outcome to the constrained Pareto-optimum reached in markets where insurers have monopoly power. More generally, in a bargaining situation, an increase in the bargaining power of clients will increase social welfare.     

Aspekte internationaler Durchdringung des Seeversicherungsgeschäftes im 20. Jahrhundert

The business of marine insurance is characteristically international in scope, with many transactions across national borders, and it is only lightly regulated in a free market. Apparently there is no need to cast doubt on the general importance of foreign business, neither for single competitors in this branch nor for the world-wide market of marine insurance as a whole. Keeping a closer focus on recent history of individual marine insurance markets reveals that selected countries will show an individual character referring to international competition: host market characteristics affect the international marine insurers participation in foreign markets in different ways.     

Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress,Incentive Distortions,and Gains Trading

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.     

The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries

This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.     

Reinsurance for Natural and Man-Made Catastrophes in the United States: Current State of the Market and Regulatory Reforms

U.S. insurers are heavily dependent on global reinsurance markets to enable them to provide adequate primary market insurance coverage. This article reviews the response of the world's reinsurance industry to recent mega-catastrophes and provides recommendations for regulatory reforms that would improve the efficiency of reinsurance markets. The article also considers the supply of insurance and reinsurance for terrorism and makes recommendations for joint public–private responses to insuring terrorism losses. The analysis shows that reinsurance markets responded efficiently to recent catastrophe losses and that substantial amounts of new capital enter the reinsurance industry very quickly following major catastrophic events. Considerable progress has been made in improving risk and exposure management, capital allocation, and rate of return targeting. Insurance price regulation for catastrophe-prone lines of business is a major source of inefficiency in insurance and reinsurance markets. Deregulation of insurance prices would improve the efficiency of insurance markets, enabling markets to deal more effectively with mega-catastrophes. The current inadequacy of the private terrorism reinsurance market suggests that the federal government may need to remain involved in this market, at least for the next several years.     

Die Marktabgrenzung im Versicherungskartellrecht am Beispiel der Berufshaftpflichtversicherungen

The definition of the relevant market is crucial to the application of European and German competition law and especially difficult when dealing with insurance markets. Generally, the product and geographic market comprises all products or services that are regarded as substitutable by consumers. In addition, the supply-side substitutability can be taken into consideration. In defining insurance product markets, the supply-side substitutability is decisive, because insurance products are seldom interchangeable from a policy holder’s point of view. Applying the concept of supply-side substitutability to professional indemnity insurances leads to product markets correlating with the different professional groups: Indemnity insurances for physicians constitute a product market; insurances for lawyers, notary publics, tax advisers and public accountants form another market and insurances for architects and construction engineers another one. These product markets are still national markets. Professional indemnity insurances are extensively shaped by the differing legal systems, namely by national insurance contract law, by liability provisions and by a legal obligation to insure. Consequently, policy holders cannot substitute their indemnity insurance with foreign insurance products and insurers are confronted with market entry barriers. However, the proposed directive on services on the internal market and the adopted directive on insurance mediation could result in community-wide markets in the near future.