Market Learning and Radical Innovation: A Cross Case Comparison of Eight Radical Innovation Projects

Does customer input play the same key role in every successful new-product development (NPD) project? For incremental NPD projects, market information keeps the project team focused on customer wants and needs. Well-documented methods exist for obtaining and using market information throughout the stages of an incremental NPD project. However, the role of market learning seems less apparent if the NPD project involves a really new product—that is, a radical innovation that creates a line of business that is new not only for the firm but also for the marketplace. In all likelihood, customers will not be able to describe their requirements for a product that opens up entirely new markets and applications. To provide insight into the role that market learning plays in NPD projects involving really new products, Gina Colarelli O'Connor describes findings from case studies of eight radical innovation projects. Participants in the study come from member companies of the Industrial Research Institute, a consortium of large company R&D managers. With a focus on exploring how market learning for radical innovations differs from that of incremental NPD projects, the case studies examine the following issues: the nature and the timing of market-related inquiry; market learning methods and processes; and the scope of responsibility for market learning, and confidence in the results. Observations from the case studies suggest that the market-related questions that are asked during a radical innovation project differ by stage of development, and they differ from the questions that project teams typically ask during an incremental NPD effort. For example, assessments of market potential, size, and growth were not at issue during the early stages of the projects in this study. Such issues came into play after the innovations were proven to work under controlled conditions and attention turned to finding applications for the technology. For several projects in the study, internal data and informal networks of people throughout relevant business units provide the means for learning about the hurdles the innovation faces and about markets that are unfamiliar to the development group. The projects in this study employ various techniques for reducing market uncertainty, including offering the product to the most familiar market and using a strategic ally who is familiar with the market to act as an intermediary between the project team and the marketplace.     

A Comprehensive Model of Uncertainty Associated with Radical Innovation

Large established firms typically focus on enhancing their ability to manage their core businesses, with an emphasis on cost reduction, quality improvements, and incremental innovation in existing products and processes. To sustain competitive advantage over the long term, mature firms must in parallel develop radical innovations (RI) as a basis for building and dominating fundamentally new markets. Management practices that are effective in established businesses are often ineffective and even destructive when applied to RI projects because of higher levels of uncertainty inherent in the latter. Understanding the characteristics of RI projects and the nature of the uncertainty that pervades them is critical to developing appropriate managerial practices. This paper reports the results of a longitudinal study of 12 RI projects in 10 large established U.S.‐based firms. A qualitative, prospective design was used to collect and analyze data. Project team leaders, members, and sponsors for each project were interviewed repeatedly over five years. The analysis centers on the dimensions and characteristics of uncertainty that project teams experienced. The analysis of the challenges they confronted is used to construct a multidimensional model of RI uncertainties. The model identifies four categories of uncertainty as key drivers of project management: technical, market, organizational, and resource uncertainty. Each of these four categories is elaborated in the context of radical innovation and further distinguished via two additional dimensions: criticality and latency. These are substantiated through case based data. Implications for management skills, processes, and appropriate tools associated with radical innovation projects are discussed.     

The Role of Suppliers in Market Intelligence Gathering for Radical and Incremental Innovation*

Drawing on transaction cost economics theory, this study addresses the following research questions: (1) Does supplier involvement in market intelligence gathering activities have a greater impact on innovation success in predesign or commercialization activities? and (2) Does supplier involvement in market intelligence gathering activities have a greater impact on success in radical or incremental product innovation? Hypotheses are tested using both subjective and objective measures of success from a study of 205 incremental and 110 radical new product development projects. Results from the estimation of a two‐group path model suggest that this theoretical framework is useful in providing guidance as to when product developers should emphasize the gathering of market intelligence through suppliers. Consistent with conventional wisdom, the findings suggest that supplier involvement in market intelligence gathering activities are positively related to success in incremental innovations across predesign and commercialization activities. However, supplier involvement in market intelligence gathering activities is found to have no significant impact on market share and is negatively associated with perceived product performance in radical innovations in predesign tasks. Also, while there was no significant difference in market share for supplier involvement in market intelligence gathering activities between radical and incremental innovation in commercialization activities, supplier involvement in these activities did have a greater impact on perceived product performance in radical innovation than it did in incremental innovation. Although current practice suggests that teams allocate fewer resources to the gathering of market intelligence through their suppliers during predesign activities in incremental innovation projects compared with radical innovation projects, the findings in this study suggest that they should do the opposite. Shifting resources allocated for engaging suppliers in market information gathering activities in predesign activities from radical innovation projects to incremental innovation projects could increase the return on these investments. Alternatively, these resources currently allocated to the gathering of market intelligence through suppliers in predesign activities of radical innovation projects could also provide greater benefits if allocated to commercialization activities of radical innovation projects, where they have the greatest positive impact.     

Serial Innovators' processes: How they overcome barriers to creating radical innovations

Formal new product development processes typically are depicted in the literature as linear processes having some number of stages, each of which is completed by a cross-functional team. At the end of each stage a management committee makes a decision as to whether the project will proceed to the next stage, be stopped, or recycle through the previous stage to better complete some of the tasks or steps in the stage. Teams proceed stage by stage, until the product is launched into the market.However, this formal process typically is positioned as occurring after the “fuzzy front end” (FFE), the chaotic, messy up-front part of new product development before there is a solidified concept. Because incremental, evolutionary innovations go through an abbreviated FFE, or even have none at all, these formal processes work quite well for them. However, radical innovations typically have very messy, chaotic and fuzzy front ends, which are not helped by these formal processes. Formal product development processes may actually act as a barrier to radical innovation. Very little research to date has investigated processes that overcome the barriers to radical innovation and allow firms to successfully bring radical innovations to market.This research investigates the product development processes used by 19 Serial Innovators—individuals in large, mature firms who have been associated with one after another radical innovation success. We find that Serial Innovators' processes have four specific features that enable them to overcome organizational barriers and allow them to create and successfully commercialize radical innovations. Serial Innovators' processes:

• •are not at all linear in nature;
• •focus significant time and effort on the fuzzy front end;
• •explicitly manage the transition from the fuzzy front end tasks and outputs (a proposed solution to a problem) to the more formal and institutionalized development process; and
• •proactively work to create market acceptance.

     

Project visioning: Its components and impact on new product success

The concept of corporate vision has been receiving considerable attention in the strategy scholarship. A clear and lofty organizational vision can provide direction to a company and can positively impact its ability to succeed. Yet research on vision at the project level has been curiously lacking. The purpose of this research is to define project vision, discuss its components and explore its impact on successful new product development. After studying the vision on a series of 13 innovations at three companies (Apple, IBM and HP), we identified several components of an effective project vision that include vision clarity, vision agreement/support and vision stability and assessed their impact on new product success. To confirm the validity and generalizability of our observations, we then tested these insights on 509 new product teams from a wide variety of firms. We found that an effective vision varies depending on the innovation type - incremental, evolutionary and radical. Our results demonstrate that vision clarity is positively associated with success in evolutionary (market or technical), and radical innovations, but not for incremental projects. Vision stability is positively associated with success in incremental and evolutionary market innovations; and vision support is positively associated with success in incremental, and evolutionary technical innovations.     

Antecedents of open innovation at the project level: empirical analysis of Korean firms

The concept of open innovation has recently gained wide academic attention, as it seems to have significant impact for company performance. Most empirical investigations about this emerging concept have been case studies of successful early adopters of open innovation, and their analyses have largely been at the company level. Although case studies at that level provide meaningful implications, the new phenomena merit a more in‐depth examination: that is, we need to collect and analyze data on multiple companies to explore more systematic findings about open innovations across companies. Moreover, analyses may need to go down to the individual project rather than the whole company level because innovation activities are often conducted as part of research and development (R&D) projects. To meet these needs, this study examines companies' open innovation efforts at the level of the individual R&D project. Specifically, the present study focuses on project‐level openness to better understand the mechanisms of open innovation. It explores systematic relationships between various antecedent factors and the degree of openness. Project‐level openness could be affected by team and task characteristics, such as team size, learning distance, strategic importance, technology and market uncertainty, and relevance to the main business. Relevant data collected from 303 companies in Korea were used to identify the antecedents that affect inbound and outbound openness. The research findings are expected to help provide a concrete theoretical framework suited for more generalized application and further practical development of open innovation strategy.     

Product Development as Core Competence: How Formal Product Development Practices Differ for Radical,More Innovative,and Incremental Product Innovations

Although universally recognized as an important consideration in building product development (PD) competency, the effect of a firm's ability to vary its PD practices to develop winning products has been given scant attention in large‐scale, multiorganizational, quantitative studies. This research explores differences in formal new PD practices among three project types—incremental, more innovative, and radical. Using a sample of 380 business units, this research investigates how development practices differ across these three classes of innovation with respect to the formal PD process, project organization, PD strategy, organizational culture, and senior management commitment. Our results diverge from several commonly held beliefs about formal PD processes and the management of radical versus incremental innovations. Our results indicate that radical projects are managed less flexibly than incremental projects. Instead of being an offshoot of less strategic planning, radical projects are just as strategically aligned as incremental projects. Instead of being informally introduced entrepreneurial adventures, radical projects are often the result of more formal ideation methods. While these results may be counterintuitive to suppositional models of how to radical innovation happens, it is the central theme of this research to show how radical innovation actually happens. Our findings also provide a foundation for reexamining the role of control in the management of innovation. As the level of innovativeness increased, so too did the amount of controls imposed—e.g., less flexibility in the development process, more professional, full‐time project leadership, centralized executive oversight for new products, and formal financial assessments of expected NP performance.     

Product Innovation Processes in Small Firms: Combining Entrepreneurial Effectuation and Managerial Causation

This article reports a multimethod study of product innovation processes in small manufacturing firms. Prior studies found that small firms do not deploy the formalized processes identified as best practice for the management of new product development (NPD) in large firms. To explicate small firms' product innovation, this study uses effectuation theory, which emerged from entrepreneurship research. Effectuation theory discerns two logics of decision‐making: causation, assuming that means are selected to attain goals; and effectuation, assuming that goals are created based upon available means. The study used a process research approach, investigating product innovation trajectories in five small firms across 352 total events. Quantitative analyses revealed early effectuation logic, which increasingly turned toward causation logic over time. Further qualitative analyses confirmed the use of both logics, with effectual logic rendering product innovation resource‐driven, stepwise, and open‐ended, and with causal logic used especially in later stages to set objectives and to plan activities and invest resources to attain objectives. Because the application of effectuation logic differentiates the small firm approaches from mainstream NPD best practices, this study examined how small firms' product innovation processes deployed effectuation logic in further detail. The small firms: (1) made creative use of existing resources; (2) scoped innovations to be realizable with available resources; (3) used external resources whenever and wherever these became available; (4) prioritized existing business over product innovation projects; (5) used loose project planning; (6) worked in steps toward tangible outcomes; (7) iterated the generation, selection, and modification of goals and ideas; and (8) relied on their own customer knowledge and market probing, rather than early market research. Using effectuation theory thus helps us understand how small firm product innovation both resembles and differs from NPD best practices observed in larger firms. Because the combination of effectual and causal principles leverages small firm characteristics and resources, this article concludes that product innovation research should more explicitly differentiate between firms of different sizes, rather than prescribing large firm best practices to small firms.     

Paths Toward Radical Service Innovation in Manufacturing Companies—A Service‐Dominant Logic Perspective

Research on servitization of manufacturing companies concentrates on typologies of product–service bundles, on transition pathways to increased servitization, and on resource and capabilities configurations necessary to accomplish this transition. Missing from existing research is an analysis of the degree of novelty of service innovations introduced by manufacturing companies. Therefore, this article shifts the focus from the transition process itself to the question of how manufacturing companies can introduce radical service innovations to the market. This article links servitization literature with service innovation literature and investigates how manufacturing companies can introduce radically new services in terms of three forms of innovations: service concept innovations, customer experience innovations, and service process innovations. Service‐dominant logic (SDL) is applied as the theoretical lens because it covers four significant factors influencing the success of companies’ innovation activities: actor value networks, resource liquefaction, resource density, and resource integration. Based on a multiple case study of 24 Danish business‐to‐business manufacturing small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises and through a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, different configurations of the principles of SDL are analyzed. They describe the paths to radical service innovation. Digitalization appears as a central causal condition in the bulk of the configurations. Big and rich data generated internally within the focal company in combination with for instance customer data can enhance the innovativeness of the service offerings. However, digitalization is not a sufficient condition for launching radical service innovation—it should be combined with an efficient mobilization of resources internally within the focal company and/or collaboration with other organizations within the value system. In addition, the analysis hints to a need to detach from immediate customers as the prime driver of service innovation.     

Contextual Innovation Management Using a Stage‐Gate Platform: The Case of Philips Shaving and Beauty

To improve its innovation process, Philips Shaving and Beauty (S&B) designed a blueprint for its innovation process. Although it has proved to be quite effective, it has experienced a lack of efficiency, in terms of frequent cost and time overruns, in the fuzzy front end of this process. We suggest a contextual innovation management approach to set up a stage‐gate‐based innovation process platform and thus improve the efficiency in the fuzzy front end, which means that, for different contexts, stage‐gate process variants will be designed from which unnecessary activities are removed and important activities are emphasized. The design is based on the identification of relevant contextual factors to develop variations of the common innovation process within Philips S&B. We distinguished different variants of the innovation processes within Philips S&B that can increase the efficiency in the fuzzy front end. Based on interviews within and outside Philips S&B, we identified problems and potential solutions with regard to efficiency in eight recently finished innovation processes. The results indicate that the most important contextual factors are the distinction between incremental and radical innovations, and between market and technology‐based innovations. We used these factors to design three variants on the basic platform of the stage‐gate process.     

University‐industry collaboration and front‐end success: the moderating effects of innovativeness and parallel cross‐firm collaboration

Collaboration with science‐based and/or market‐based partners is a promising means for firms’ R&D groups to leverage complementary expertise and resources to generate innovative results. However, R&D managers face the dilemma which partner type to choose in different innovative contexts and whether to focus on one partner type or to integrate both types in early stage R&D. Using survey data from 166 heads of R&D groups, this study investigates university–industry collaboration’s impact on front‐end success depending on the degree of innovativeness and the interaction with other industry partners. The results confirm an overall positive relationship between university–industry collaboration and front‐end success. However, innovativeness increases complexity in this relationship. Parallel collaboration with firms and universities can have a mixed impact on front‐end success depending on the degree of innovativeness. This simultaneous collaboration with firms and universities strengthens front‐end success for more radical innovations, while parallel collaboration activities for more incremental innovations do not necessarily strengthen front‐end success. These findings imply that both collaboration types should be used simultaneously in the front end of radical innovation and that firms could reduce complexity by focusing on either firms or universities as partners for incremental innovations.     

Innovation Management Practices Compared: The Example of Project‐Based Firms*

The importance of project‐based firms is increasing, as they fulfill the growing demands for complex integrated systems and knowledge‐intensive services. While project‐based firms are generally strong in innovating their clients' systems and processes, they seem to be less successful in innovating their own products or services. The reasons behind this are the focus of this paper. The characteristics of project‐based firms are investigated, how these affect management practices for innovation projects, and the influence of these practices on project performance. Using survey data of 203 Dutch firms in the construction, engineering, information technology, and related industries, differences in characteristics between project‐based and nonproject‐based firms are identified. Project‐based firms are distinguished from nonproject‐based firms on the basis of organizational configuration, the complexity of the operational process, and the project management capabilities of the firm. Project‐based firms also differ with regard to their level of collaboration and their innovation strategy, but not in the level of autonomy. A comparison of 135 innovation projects in 96 of the firms shows that project‐based firms do not manage their innovation projects different from other firms. However, the effects of specific management practices on project performance are different, particularly the effects of planning, multidisciplinary teams and heavyweight project leaders. Differences in firm characteristics provide an explanation for the findings. The implication for the innovation management literature is that “best” practices for innovation management are firm dependent.     

Managing radical innovation: an overview of emergent strategy issues

Despite differences in definitions, researchers understand that radical innovation within an organization is very different from incremental innovation , and and that it is critical to the long-term success of firms. Unfortunately, research has also shown that it is often difficult to get support for radical projects in large firms [14], where internal cultures and pressures often push efforts toward more low risk, immediate reward, incremental projects. Interestingly, we know considerably less about the effective management of the product development process in the radical than in an incremental context. The purpose of this study is to explore the process of radical new product development from a strategic perspective, and to outline key observations and challenges that managers face as they move these projects to market. The findings presented here represent the results of a longitudinal (since 1995), multidisciplinary study of radical innovation projects. A multiple case study design was used to explore the similarities and differences in management practices applied to twelve radical innovation projects in ten large, established North American firms. The findings are grouped into three high-level strategic themes. The first theme, market scope, discusses the challenges associated with the pursuit of familiar versus unfamiliar markets for radical innovation. The second theme of competency management identifies and discusses strategic challenges that emerge as firms stretch themselves into new and unfamiliar territory. The final theme relates to the people issues that emerge as both individuals and the project teams themselves try to move radical projects forward in organizations that are not necessarily designed to support such uncertainty.A breadth of subtopics emerge within and across this framework relating to such ideas as risk management, product cannibalization, team composition, and the search for a divisional home. Taken together, our observations reinforce the emerging literature that shows that project teams engaging in radical innovation encounter a much different set of challenges than those typically faced by NPD teams engaged in incremental innovation.     

The Effects of Mainstream and Emerging Customer Orientations on Radical and Disruptive Innovations

The merits of being customer‐oriented for firm innovation have long been debated. Firms focused on their existing customers have been argued to be less innovative. This paper distinguishes between mainstream and emerging customer orientations and examines their effects on the introduction of disruptive and radical product innovations. Radical product innovations draw on a substantially new technology and could initially be targeted at a mainstream or an emerging market. In contrast, disruptive innovations are initially targeted at an emerging market, and may not involve the newest technology. This paper hypothesizes that mainstream customer orientation is negatively related to disruptive innovation and positively related to radical innovation, and that emerging customer orientation is positively related to disruptive innovation. To test these hypotheses, longitudinal and multiple informant data from senior executives in 128 SBUs of 19 Fortune 200 corporations are analyzed, with technology scanning and willingness to cannibalize as key control variables. The results support the hypotheses, providing evidence for contrasting effects of being oriented to mainstream customers and/or emerging customers on radical and disruptive innovations. Mainstream customer orientation has a positive impact on the introduction of radical innovations but a negative impact on disruptive innovation, while emerging customer orientation has a positive effect on disruptive innovation and is unrelated to radical innovations. Technology scanning is positively related to radical innovation but not to disruptive innovation, supporting the idea that disruptive innovation may not require new technology. In contrast, willingness to cannibalize is positively related to disruptive innovation but not to radical innovation, supporting the idea that radical innovation does not require cannibalization of existing investments. Additionally, mainstream customer orientation is found to have a near‐zero correlation with emerging customer orientation, indicating that the two can coexist and can be pursued simultaneously.     

Innovation and new product introductions in emerging markets: Strategic recommendations for the Indian market

While radical innovations and growth strategies supporting such innovations may provide the firm with very high returns, there are also considerable risks in devising and implementing such innovations. Apart from the business risks of venturing into new territories and new markets, radical innovations also carry with them the burden of accounting for market and environmental factors that are often not under the control of the firm. The opportunities presented by the emergence of several Asian markets, such as India and China, are particularly appealing for Western countries willing to expand into these markets. However, market characteristics, institutional development, and customer behaviors bring into sharp focus the choice of a specific innovation and new product development strategy for such markets. This paper examines these various strategic issues in the context of India. The paper concludes with strategic recommendations for managers and some propositions for future academic research.     

Five stories that illustrate three generalizations about radical innovations

Why do organizations resist radical innovations? How can organizations make radical innovations when they want to do so? This paper offers three generalizations about the processes that generate radical innovations, and it illustrates these generalizations with five symbolic stories. Two stories tell about organizations that had trouble innovating but ultimately succeeded, and three stories tell about tremendously successful radical innovation. The generalizations assert that radical innovation is a discovery process that yields unintended outcomes, that participants in radical innovation have to market their innovations to intended coworkers, funding sources, and potential customers, and that social interaction can stimulate, reinforce, and steer radical innovation.     

The Role of Marketing Resources in Radical Innovation Activity: Antecedents and Payoffs

While radical product innovations represent significant engines of firm growth, questions remain over whether marketing helps or hurts (1) a firm's radical product innovation activity and (2) its rewards from radical product innovation activity. By attaching an attention‐based view of the firm to a market‐based assets view of marketing, this paper examines the role of three marketing resources—market knowledge, reputation, and relational resources—on radical innovation activity. Our conceptual framework posits differentiated effects among marketing resources as antecedents of radical innovation activity and as moderators of its impact on firms' financial performance. Using a survey of a broad set of high‐tech business‐to‐business (B2B) firms to test hypotheses, it is found that firms with strong relational resources enjoy a higher propensity for, and stronger financial rewards from, radical innovation activity. Reputational resources come with a trade‐off as they hurt the incidence of radical innovation but enhance its financial rewards. However, market knowledge resources appear to hurt both radical innovation activity and its financial rewards. Our results point to the multifaceted role of marketing in radical innovation activity, which is unlikely to come with a single benefit or liability as prior work often posits. Rather, our research heightens the alertness of managers to assess their firms' marketing strength as a bundle of stocks of several marketing resources. Managers must understand the distinct benefits and drawbacks of each resource in developing and launching radical innovations. Our research underscores the differentiated value of marketing in radical innovation activity in B2B high‐tech contrary to the entrenched idea of a limited or even stifling role of marketing in this context.     

Seeking the Ideal Level of Design Newness: Consumer Response to Radical and Incremental Product Design

To develop successful new products, new product development managers need to have a thorough understanding of the consumer adoption process, specifically in how consumers evaluate new products. This research examines the value of product design for consumers' evaluation of radical and incremental innovations. The primary goal was to empirically test how design newness affects consumer response to product innovations. Design newness (also referred to as novelty or atypicality) is defined as the deviation in a product design from the current design state of a certain product category. Although prior research has suggested that higher levels of design newness may have a positive effect on consumers' evaluations of new products, higher levels of design newness may also have negative consequences for consumer response to radical innovations. An experimental context (n = 130) using systematically designed products for three product categories was used to test how consumers respond to high and low levels of design newness for both radical and incremental innovations. The findings show that for radical innovations, embodying the product in a design with a low (versus high) level of design newness led to more positive evaluations and less learning‐cost inferences. Because the functional attributes of a radical innovation are incongruent to existing products, consumers find it difficult to access the relevant product category schema in order to transfer knowledge to the new product. Because of this poor knowledge transfer, consumers may feel that they lack the ability to make effective use of the radical innovation, resulting in greater learning costs. In this case, a product design with a low level of design newness can provide consumers with a frame of reference for understanding the radical innovation. Contrasting this result, no difference was found between a low and a high level of design newness for incremental innovations. For incremental innovations, by definition the functional attributes characteristic to the innovation are highly comparable with those products that are already stored in consumers' memory. Thus, there is no need for an additional reconfirmation of the preexisting schema through product design, and consumers are able to access the relevant schema regardless of the level of design newness inherent in the product. These findings are integrated into a discussion of the managerial implications and the potential avenues for future research.     

New Product Development Practices and Early‐Stage Firms: Two In‐Depth Case Studies

New product development practices (NPD) have been well studied for decades in large, established companies. Implementation of best practices such as predevelopment market planning and cross‐functional teams have been positively correlated with product and project success over a variety of measures. However, for small new ventures, field research into ground‐level adoption of NPD practices is lacking. Because of the risks associated with missteps in new product development and the potential for firm failure, understanding NPD within the new venture context is critical. Through in‐depth case research, this paper investigates two successful physical product‐based early‐stage firms' development processes versus large established firm norms. The research focuses on the start‐up adoption of commonly prescribed management processes to improve NPD, such as cross‐functional teams, use of market planning during innovation development, and the use of structured processes to guide the development team. This research has several theoretical implications. The first finding is that in comparing the innovation processes of these firms to large, established firms, the study found several key differences from the large firm paradigm. These differences in development approach from what is prescribed for large, established firms are driven by necessity from a scarcity of resources. These new firms simply did not have the resources (financial or human) to create multi‐ or cross‐functional teams or organizations in the traditional sense for their first product. Use of virtual resources was pervasive. Founders also played multiple roles concurrently in the organization, as opposed to relying on functional departments so common in large firms. The NPD process used by both firms was informal—much more skeletal than commonly recommended structured processes. The data indicated that these firms put less focus on managing the process and more emphasis on managing their goals (the main driver being getting the first product to market). In addition to little or no written procedures being used, development meetings did not run to specific paper‐based deliverables or defined steps. In terms of market and user insight, these activities were primarily performed inside the core team—using methods that again were distinctive in their approach. What drove a project to completion was relying on team experience or a “learn as you go approach.” Again, the driver for this type of truncated market research approach was a lack of resources and need to increase the project's speed‐to‐market. Both firms in our study were highly successful, from not only an NPD efficiency standpoint but also effectiveness. The second broad finding we draw from this work is that there are lessons to be learned from start‐ups for large, established firms seeking ever‐increasing efficiency. We have found that small empowered teams leading projects substantial in scope can be extremely effective when roles are expanded, decision power is ground‐level, and there is little emphasis on defined processes. This exploratory research highlights the unique aspects of NPD within small early‐stage firms, and highlights areas of further research and management implications for both small new ventures and large established firms seeking to increase NPD efficiency and effectiveness.