An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes*

abstract We examine how cognitive style, as measured by the MBTI, affects strategic decision outcomes. Executives participated in a simulated strategic decision making environment that allowed controlled collection of decision outcomes, including manager decisiveness, decision quality, and perceived effectiveness. We found that iNtuiting/Thinking managers used their intuition to make cognitive leaps based on objective information to craft more decisions of higher quality than other managers. In contrast, Sensing/Feeling types used time to seek socially acceptable decisions, which led to the lowest number of decisions and the lowest perceived effectiveness of all. We found no effect on decisiveness or perceived effectiveness based on a manager's preference for Perceiving or Judging. However, we found that others perceived Extraverted managers as being more effective than Introverted managers when, in fact, the Extraverts were no more decisive than Introverts. Thus, cognitive style influences actual decision outcomes as well as how others perceive one's decision performance.     

Theorizing about the deviant citizen: An attributional explanation of the interplay of organizational citizenship and counterproductive work behavior

We present an attribution-based explanation about how helpful organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and harmful counterproductive work behavior (CWB) are positively related under some circumstances. Attributions concerning controllability and locus of causality are important factors. Controllability attributions for OCB-eliciting demands, such as coworker lack of performance, organizational constraints, or supervisor expectations, can lead to CWB. Conversely, controllability and internal attributions for one's own CWB can lead to OCB.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

From Self-Interest Motives to Justice Motives: The Challenges of Some Experimental Results

A bstract .   This article begins by presenting experimental evidence that remains unexplained by standard and utility-extended economic models: experimental subjects tend to honor their promises even on occasions when an assessment of consequences asks them to defect; subjects voluntarily contribute to collective goods, and this contribution is highly conditional on others contributing as well; subjects evaluate and value the intentions behind actions as well as the consequences of actions. Arguments are sought for in moral philosophy that would more plainly explain the collected experimental evidence and that would help economists revise their explanatory frames. The hypothesis advanced is that the observed behavior may be interpreted as resulting from the moral strength of indignation and justice norms.     

Counteracting Free‐Riding With Team Morale—An Experimental Study

This study focuses on a behavioral perspective to examine the detrimental effects of free‐riding on team performance, and investigates team morale as a key factor that counteracts the tendency of free‐riding among team members. Results of the empirical test imply that enhancing team morale can effectively reduce the scale of free‐riding behavior in project teams; in addition, controlling team size also provides help to constrain the undesired behavior. The two means can be carefully applied to project management during early stages of project development before the commitment of significant resources. Implications for both research and team practices are discussed.     

Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production

The tendency to underestimate others' relative performance compared with one's own is widespread among individuals in all work environments. We examine the relationship between, and the driving forces behind, individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender‐specific link: overconfident men hold more optimistic beliefs about coworkers' cooperativeness than men who lack confidence and are accordingly significantly more cooperative, whereas overconfidence, beliefs, and cooperativeness are not correlated in women. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Political Economy of Confucian Harmony: A Xunzian Vision

A global market economy of pure instrumental rationality now poses a growing threat, jeopardizing common citizenship, the capacity for human flourishing, and harmony between humans and nature. Growing skepticism about the sustainability of market capitalism and its moral legitimacy propels us to search for a new economic model in which humans are no longer held hostage to the unbridled pursuit of self‐interest and limitless possession at the expense of the well‐being of others and nature and that attempts to overcome the old conflict between capitalism and socialism. We can call this alternative model “moral economy,” an economic system that reconciles private interests with the public good broadly construed. In this article I reconstruct the Confucian ideal of moral economy by paying close attention to Xunzi's ethical and political thought. Xunzi, one of the key classical Confucians, stipulates the threshold of sufficiency by extending the ruler's care to the most destitute of society as well as giving moral priority to their basic needs without dismissing the foundational importance of individual merit and contribution. Rejecting both pure economic meritocracy and dogmatic egalitarianism, Xunzian Confucianism aims to create a political economy of harmony where various distributive values (need, equality, and merit, among other things) each have their own place.     

International free riding on institutions

Economic institutions are linked to economic growth because they create conditions favourable for production and exchange. Institutions can give a country comparative advantage in producing some goods. If its trading partners lack such institutions, it can still enjoy their benefits by importing these goods. Some institutions, such as intellectual property rights, have non‐excludable benefits because the resulting production is intangible, non‐rival, and often publicly disclosed. The profits, or surplus, that result, however, is rival. Foreign countries can ‘free ride’ on this benefit by misappropriating rival surplus through infringement. This article develops a theory of institutional free riding in which firms in one country free ride on the benefit of foreign institutions to the detriment of their competitor firms and their countries' institutions. It evaluates the incentives of firms and governments for this free riding, its effects, and potential responses to mitigate these effects.     

Rater Bias and Incentive Provision

The tendency of supervisors to judge an employee as either good or bad and then to seek out evidence supporting that earlier established opinion is regarded as one of the major problems of performance appraisal. We investigate the implications of this rater bias in a dynamic moral hazard model with a wealth‐constrained agent. Although rater bias weakens the agent's incentives to exert effort in late periods, at the same time it strengthens implicit incentives in early periods. Under the optimal contract, as long as rater bias is not overly strong, its adverse effect on late‐period incentives is fully offset by exploitation of stronger early‐period incentives and thereby leaves the principal's profits unchanged.     

The impacts of perceived moral obligation and sustainability self‐identity on sustainability development: A theory of planned behavior purchase intention model of sustainability‐labeled coffee and the moderating effect of climate change skepticism

This study sought to elucidate the antecedents that may influence the effect of people's purchase behavior on the Earth's sustainable development. It included people's perceived moral obligation and sustainability self‐identity in the theory of planned behavior (TPB) model to investigate attitudes among the Taiwanese public's attitude toward purchasing sustainability‐labeled coffee and their purchase intentions. The moderating effect of climate change skepticism is also considered in this study. A total of 745 nationwide and self‐reported questionnaire valid data was collected in Taiwan. Hierarchical and moderated regression analysis results indicated that the components of the TPB model had positive influences on the public's purchase intention. The public's perceived moral obligation and sustainability self‐identity, proposed for inclusion in the TPB model, had significant and positive influences on purchase intention. The extended TPB model has higher explanatory power than that of the original model. The positive relationship between sustainability self‐identity and intention to purchase sustainability‐labeled coffee was moderated by climate change skepticism. This study provides marketers and the players in the supply chain with a comprehensive framework for understanding the influence of perceived moral obligation and sustainability self‐identity on purchase intention toward sustainability‐labeled products. In addition, this study responds to a call for a more thorough investigation of the effect of people's skepticism about climate change in the context of ethical and sustainable consumption decision‐making processes.     

Multiple motives behind single acts of co-operation

To understand co-operation in social dilemmas, we need to allow for individual variation along several motives and beliefs instead of declaring that co-operativeness is merely self-interested or is merely a consequence of one's culture or the situation. This paper describes three beliefs and eight motives for co-operation or non-co-operation based on research on social dilemmas from a number of disciplines. It also proposes a framework that describes how beliefs and various motives interact with a given situation leading to a specific behaviour.     

OCB and external–internal social networks: effects on individual performance and adaptation to change

In this study, we develop and test a model that links one's internal and external social network structures to his or her willingness and ability to adapt in a changing work context. Using a survey data from 371 employees working in 133 different branches of a large financial firm, we find that individual behaviors that explain task performance and individual adaptation to change are affected by a number of supportive social ties (size of the support network) with which one receives support inside and, mostly, outside the workplace. The results also show that individual performance and adaptation to change are affected by the level of workers' organizational citizenship behavior. We also identify a mediating effect exerted by the informational network structure (mostly an internal network) on the relationship between the support network (mostly an external network) and individual task performance.     

Uncertain information structures and backward induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether each agent’s sequential choices are visible to other participants or not: agents might be deluded about others’ ability to acquire, interpret or keep track of data. Following this idea, this paper introduces uncertainty about players’ ability to observe each others’ past choices in extensive-form games. In this context, we show that monitoring opponents’ choices does not affect the outcome of the interaction when every player expects their opponents indeed to be monitoring. Specifically, we prove that if players are rational and there is common strong belief in opponents being rational, having perfect information and believing in their own perfect information, then, the backward induction outcome is obtained regardless of which of her opponents’ choices each player observes. The paper examines the constraints on the rationalization process under which reasoning according to Battigalli’s (1996) best rationalization principle yields the same outcome irrespective of whether players observe their opponents’ choices or not. To this respect we find that the obtention of the backward induction outcome crucially depends on tight higher-order restrictions on beliefs about opponents’ perfect information. The analysis provides a new framework for the study of uncertainty about information structures and generalizes the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) in this direction.     

Differences in Promotion Stress across Career Stage and Orientation

Promotion stress is the experienced feelings of anxiety, concern, or tension with one's career reality in terms of the level one has reached in the organization. This study considers how promotion stress may differ depending on an individual's internal career orientation (balance, high, free, ahead, secure) as well as an individual's external, professional career stage (apprentice, colleague, mentor, sponsor). The results suggest no clear pattern of differences based on internal career orientation; however, there is a clear pattern with regard to external career stage such that as an individual progresses in his/her professional career, promotion stress decreases. Implications for research and practice are discussed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information

Why do businesses such as fast‐food restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels cluster? In the classic analysis of Hotelling, firms cluster to attract consumers who have travel costs. We present an alternative model where firms cluster because one firm is free riding on another firm's information about market demand. One consequence of this free riding is that an informed firm might forego a market that it knows to be profitable. Furthermore, an uninformed firm might earn higher profits when research costs are high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance.     

The Research‐Practice Gap in Human Resource Management: A Cross‐Cultural Study

In this study, we examine the cross‐cultural differences in human resource (HR) managers’ beliefs in effective HR practices by surveying HR practitioners in Finland (N = 86), South Korea (N = 147), and Spain (N = 196). Similar to previous studies from the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia, there are large discrepancies between HR practitioner beliefs and research findings, particularly in the area of staffing. In addition, we find that interpersonal‐oriented aspects of HR practices tend to be more culturally bound than technical‐oriented aspects of HR practices. We interpret the differences using Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, Long‐Term Orientation versus Short‐Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance). We discuss the overall nature of the science‐practice gap in HR management, and the implications for evidence‐based management. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Competition Between Online and Physical Stores: The Implications of Providing Product Information by Pure‐Play E‐tailer

This paper studies the competition between a single pure‐play e‐tailer and a bricks‐and‐mortar retailer, which are originally spatially differentiated. By utilizing information and communication technology, a pure‐play e‐tailer can strategically control consumers' disutility for online purchase. However, such an action may also raise consumers' motivation to visit the physical store, which causes free‐riding by the bricks‐and‐mortar retailer. We show that in the presence of a high free‐riding effect, the e‐tailer should be willing to provide information only about ‘niche’ products, which also results in improving the welfare of all members in the market. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leadership and information in a single‐shot collective action game: An experimental study

We consider a leader–follower mechanism in a collective action game, which exhibits both free riding and coordination problems. Leaders can persuade group cooperation by making a costly commitment to a project. Followers can choose to follow their leaders. The project's return can be transparent to all or only to the leaders. We show experimentally that when free riding is the dominant strategy of an informed subject, concentrating information in the hands of the leaders improves cooperation more effectively than a regime of information dispersal. The coordination problem, however, may be reduced more effectively in a regime of information dispersal. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of technology licensing: the case of licensors

This paper empirically analyzes the behavior of technology licensors using a large dataset of US‐traded companies. The stock of technological knowledge of the licensor, this company's prior exposure to licensing, the rate of growth of its primary sector, the strength of IPR protection, and the nature of the technology are found to be important determinants of the propensity to sell technology through nonexclusive licenses. Smaller firms in industries with ‘simpler’ technologies tend to sell technology through exclusive licenses more than others. In contrast, larger firms in industries dealing with more ‘complex’ technologies engage relatively more in cross licensing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Market fundamentals versus rational bubbles in stock prices: a Bayesian perspective

Using Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo methods, we decompose the log price‐dividend ratio into a market fundamentals component and a bubble component. The market fundamentals component depends on expectations of future dividend growth and required returns, while the bubble component is assumed to follow a Markov switching model that allows for the possibility of exploding and collapsing regimes. If prior beliefs allow for the possibility of persistent shocks to dividend growth and/or required returns, the posterior distribution suggests the bubble component contributes virtually nothing to the stock price movements over our sample. On the other hand, if one's priors rule out the possibility of persistent shocks to dividend growth and required returns, the bubble component can have a much larger role to play in stock price movements. However, the regime switching behavior of the bubble bears little resemblance to infrequent switching from an exploding bubble regime to a collapsing or dormant bubble regime. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.