Effects of Firm R&D Investment and Environment on Acquisition Likelihood*

abstract R&D investments contribute to the development of firm technology resources, and the possession of such resources often increases a firm's attractiveness as a potential acquisition target. However, the value ascribed to a firm's technology resources by would‐be acquirers may be moderated by its industry's environmental characteristics. Using data from 2886 firms, we find that investments in R&D predict acquisition likelihood and that R&D investments are most strongly associated with acquisition of firms under conditions of high environmental munificence and dynamism. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

Upstream Mergers,Downstream Competition,and R&D Investments

In this paper, we provide an explanation for why upstream firms merge, highlighting the role of R&D investments and their nature, as well as the role of downstream competition. We show that an upstream merger generates two distinct efficiency gains when downstream competition is not too strong and R&D investments are sufficiently generic: The merger increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices. We also show that upstream firms merge unless R&D investments are too specific and downstream competition is neither too weak nor too strong. When the merger materializes, the merger‐generated efficiencies pass on to consumers, and thus, consumers can be better off.     

Externalities of R&D Expenditures

Innovation is generally recognized as a major source of economic growth. R&D investments explicitly aim at generating innovations and creating knowledge. Since knowledge has certain public good properties, positive externalities are likely to exist. In this paper, we extend well-known concepts from the input-output literature (backward multipliers) to indicate at which commodities stimuli should be targeted to enhance R&D and its positive externalities in the economy as a whole. Next, we argue that there may also be negative externalities of R&D, due to increased prices. This issue can be studied by means of forward multipliers. Both concepts are applied to the United States, 1977-90.     

Industry influence on firms' R&D and innovation

This paper examines the effect of peers on a firm's research and development (R&D) policy. We show that firms do not make R&D decisions in isolation, and that industry dynamics play an important role in defining a firm's R&D intensity. Using a large sample of 54,393 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2015 in the United States, we find that firms' R&D decisions are mainly driven by their industry peers' R&D policies. Moreover, we find that R&D mimicking is significant only in the presence of strong product market competition, whereas we do not find any evidence of information-based herding in R&D investments. Our additional analysis shows that our main conclusions remain valid even in the presence of financial constraints, and regardless of the firms' market positions. Finally, we provide evidence that R&D mimicking increases firms' future values, future patent outputs, and estimated patent dollar values. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, and to using alternative sample compositions, R&D intensity proxies, and different industry classifications.     

R&D Outsourcing and the Effectiveness of Intangible Investments: Is Proprietary Core Knowledge Walking out of the Door?

Intangible relationship‐specific investments can be double‐edged swords, as they facilitate not only the governance of business relationships but also undesired knowledge transfers. Building on transaction costs theory and the relational view of alliances, we analyse the effectiveness of these investments in R&D outsourcing agreements from the viewpoint of the client. We argue that, when outsourcing to business firms, the safeguards adopted by the clients to prevent spillovers may reduce the effectiveness of the supplier's specialized investments. Using original survey data from 170 European and US technology‐intensive firms, we find that the contribution of these investments to client performance decreases the more a client's core knowledge is required to perform the service, except when outsourcing to non‐profits. This suggests that as the appropriability hazards associated with outsourcing to business firms rise, the client is able to capture less value from the supplier's relationship‐specific investments.     

Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures

In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy‐makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case‐by‐case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the Capitalization of Development Costs Improve Analyst Forecast Accuracy? Evidence from the UK

It has been documented that investments in Research and Development (R&D) are associated with increased errors and inaccuracy in earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. These deficiencies have been generally attributed to information complexity and the uncertainty of the future benefits of R&D. This paper examines whether the capitalization of development costs can reduce analyst uncertainty about the future economic outcome of R&D investments, provide outsiders with a better matching of future R&D‐related revenues and costs, and therefore promote accuracy in analyst forecasts. UK data is used, because accounting rules in the United Kingdom permitted firms to conditionally capitalize development costs even before the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards. The choice to expense R&D rather than conditionally capitalize development costs is found to relate positively to signed analyst forecast errors. This finding is robust to controlling for the influence of other factors that may affect errors, as well as for the influence of R&D investments on forecast errors. The decision to capitalize versus expense is not observed to have a significant influence on analyst forecast revisions. The findings are interpreted as evidence that the choice to capitalize as opposed to expense may help to reduce deficiencies in analyst forecasts; hence, is informative for users of financial statements. Increased informativeness is expected to have repercussions for the effectiveness with which analysts produce earnings forecasts, and, as a result, market efficiency.     

R&D and regional competitiveness: a study of global entrepreneurial firms

We quantify, using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, the empirical relationship between global competitiveness and R&D investment activity as well as the independent relationship between global competitiveness and R&D investments across geographic regions of economic development. We also explore alternative measures of the effectiveness of R&D investments. Our findings suggest that R&D investments are a possible policy target variable in high-income regions for policy makers to consider for increasing firms’ global competitiveness.

     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

The cyclicality of R&D investment revisited

In Fabrizio and Tsolmon (Review of Economics and Statistics, 2014, 96(4), 662–675) and Barlevy (American Economic Review, 2007, 97(4), 1131–1164) it was concluded that R&D investments are procyclical. Fabrizio and Tsolmon utilized a model based on Barlevy, but it differed in some respects and allowed for more heterogeneity. However, we doubt whether their implied trends are intended. Fabrizio and Tsolmon also set missing values for R&D equal to zero, leading to unrealistic jumps in investment and its first differences. We reconcile and replicate both the Fabrizio and Tsolmon and Barlevy papers by considering extensions that encompass both models. Furthermore, we treat missing values more appropriately and consider some alternative specifications to check the robustness of the results. Procyclicality is confirmed, but we find much less heterogeneity than Fabrizio and Tsolmon did. In particular, obsolescence and patent effectiveness are no longer important but external financing is.     

Competing Research Joint Ventures

Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Technology ladders and R&D in dynamic Cournot markets

Motivated by dramatic and unpredictable technological advances in energy production (for instance drilling and extraction of shale oil), we extend Cournot models of competition to incorporate research and development (R&D) that can lead to (stochastic) drops in production costs. Our model combines features of patent racing with dynamic market structure, capturing the interplay between the immediate competition in terms of production rates and the long-term competition in R&D. The resulting Markov Nash equilibrium is found from a sequence of one-step static games arising between R&D successes, and several numerical examples and extensive analysis of the emerging comparative statics are presented. Analyzing the relationship between current market dominance and the level of R&D investments, we find that market leaders tend to invest more, which in some sense makes oligopoly dynamically unstable. We show that anticipated market transitions have long-term impact; for example the potential of future monopoly can spur R&D investment now, even if the firm is presently uncompetitive and not actively producing. We also show that, surprisingly, random innovations have an ambiguous effect on R&D. This feature, which is driven by the Cournot framework, contrasts with the common situation whereby uncertainty lowers innovation and delays R&D investments. Finally, we demonstrate that increased competition may actually increase efforts to innovate through higher desire to achieve dominance. This would match the anecdotal evidence that the threat of market entrants forces incumbents to maintain high R&D.     

Effective Control Rights in Vertical R&D Collaboration

Because of increasing technological complexity of new products, the manufacturers of final products more often seek access to external sources of knowledge at the early, market‐distant stages of innovation processes. However, they are confronted with a specifically high danger of moral hazard. Traditional management instruments fail to control that danger mainly for two reasons. First, the supplier activities are not transparent. Second, market‐distant R&D results are credence goods whose quality cannot be evaluated, not even ex post. It is the theory of incomplete contracts that solves the problem by allocating the so‐called control rights to the supplier. These rights primarily regulate the assignment of the intellectual property rights, the control of the R&D process, and the marketing of the final products that are based on the delivered R&D results. To date, we do not have any empirical evidence about the relative effectiveness of these control rights. Moreover, studies on incomplete contracts in R&D alliances only focused on the collaboration between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Our study fills these gaps. On the basis of a sample of French and German R&D suppliers, we find that only enforceable intellectual property rights assigned to the supplier effectively control moral hazard. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investments in R&D and innovative behavior: an exploratory cross-country study

The relationship between investments in research and development (R&D) and innovative behavior, measured in terms of new products or services being delivered to the market, is well documented in the literature. This paper departs from the extant literature in that the unit of observation is a country rather than a firm. Using World Bank aggregate data, this level of analysis thus allows for a systematic study of cross-country observations on an R&D ? Innovation relationship.

     

Structural change and technological development

It is important for our understanding of sectoral and regional structural change to analyze the R & D-activities. In this paper we show that R & D should be analyzed as an endogenous, intermediate, public investment variable rather than as ordinary capital investment. The allocation of resources for R&D cannot be decentralized regionally or sectorally but should preferably be decided on as a problem of optimal taxation. It is shown that the optimal rate of taxation for R&D is determined by possibilities of substitution between ordinary capital investments and R&D, by the propensity to invest and by the productivity of the R&D- producing sector. A dynamic model with accessibility representation of knowledge is finally formulated. This interregional R&D-model also has equilibrium growth properties. The equilibrium rate of growth of all regions of this model can be raised by decreasing any interregional distance or by raising any regional propensity to invest.     

Adoption,diffusion, and public R&D

This paper studies the impact of public RD&D (Research, Development, and Demonstrations) on the market penetration of a new government-sponsored technology. First, the technology adoption behavior of a firm under uncertainty is reviewed. Secondly, the diffusion of the new technology in a competitive industry that benefits from learning-by-doing is analyzed. Numerical simulations are conducted to determine the effect that variations in government R&D policies have on the rate and level of market penetration. Productive R&D investments affect thelevel of diffusion and R&D demonstrations therate of diffusion.     

Replicating the R&D investments and financial structure relationship: evidence from Borsa İstanbul

I revisit the empirical relationship between R&D investments and financial structure by trying to replicate seminal paper of Aghion et al. (J Eur Econ Assoc 2:277–288, 2004). In the widely cited study, Aghion et al. (2004) found evidence of a nonlinear (an inverted U-shape) relationship—firms with positive R&D tend to use more debt than firms with zero R&D, but the use of debt falls with R&D intensity—in a sample of U.K. firms from 1990 to 2002. In order to review their significant findings, I use panel data of 177 Turkish manufacturing firms listed in Borsa ?stanbul from 2007 to 2016. Using Aghion et al.’s (2004) model specifications, I found no evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship or of any effect of R&D intensity on the leverage ratio. The study thus suggests that the effect of R&D investments on the financial structure may vary with the different samples of countries and cannot be universally generalized.     

ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM R&D INVESTMENT: A SURVEY

This survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and private R&D investment over the past five decades. The survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues. We aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity. In particular, we emphasise a set of issues that, in our view, are critical to understanding the potential effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D spending. Special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm R&D, the constraints faced by the firm (such as financial constraints), and the amount and source of public subsidies. None of these issues have been investigated in depth. We formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field.     

The negative impact of R&D capitalization: A value relevance approach

Abstract

Accounting for R&D costs is an open issue. SFAS N°2 mandates that all R&D costs must be immediately expensed. IAS 38 requires capitalization of R&D costs if they meet certain criteria. Recent research papers show the value relevance of capitalized R&D. We test the value relevance of R&D reporting in a sample of 197 French firms between 1993 and 2002. The French context provides an interesting field for R&D value relevance studies because both accounting treatments of R&D costs (expensing and capitalization) are allowed. Unlike previous studies, we find that capitalized R&D is negatively associated with stock prices and returns. This negative coefficient on capitalized R&D implies that investors are concerned with and react negatively to capitalization of R&D. We also find that the firms choosing to capitalize (successful) R&D are smaller, more highly leveraged, less profitable and have less growth opportunities. Taking into account these characteristics, our robustness checks confirm that capitalized R&D is not associated with higher prices and is related to lower returns.