Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Coworker Relations

In many workplaces, coworkers have the best information about each other's efforts. This paper studies a principal who only observes the joint output by two limitedly liable agents, while agents receive signals about each other's effort levels. The principal attempts to exploit this information through peer evaluation; agents are asked to report their signal and may receive a bonus for being evaluated positively. Lying aversion ascertains that truthful evaluation is possible, while interpersonal relations between colleagues give an incentive to misreport. This paper shows that peer evaluation gives an incentive for effort, even when the evaluations are not truthful. The peer evaluation bonus is constrained by more intensive coworker relations. Still, the optimal contract always includes a peer evaluation bonus, sometimes complemented with a team bonus. Coworker relations have nonmonotonic effects on profits in the optimal contract.     

The Rise of Individual Performance Pay

Existing empirical evidence suggests that individual performance pay is more prevalent in human‐capital‐intensive industries. We introduce a model that can contribute to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer‐dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the agents can hold up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer‐dependent incentives. In a setting with complementary tasks, we show that although team‐based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and, in fact, suboptimal, to provide team incentives when the agents become indispensable.     

The ethics of peer reporting in Chinese societies: evidence from Hong Kong and Shanghai

The purpose of this study was to investigate the ethics of peer reporting in Chinese societies. Based on a review of the literature, we develop a framework that explains peer reporting behaviour in terms of the individual's ethical ideology, locus of control and subjective judgement regarding the ethicality of peer reporting. Hypotheses derived from these speculations are tested with data from Chinese managers (n?=?362). Statistical analysis largely supports the hypotheses. The implications of this finding are discussed.     

Automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information

Automobile insurance is an example of a market where multi-period contracts are observed. This form of contract can be justified by asymmetrical information between the insurer and the insured. Insurers use risk classification together with bonus-malus systems. In this paper we show that the actual methodology for the integration of these two approaches can lead to inconsistencies. We develop a statistical model that adequately integrates risk classification and experience rating. For this purpose we present Poisson and negative binomial models with regression component in order to use all available information in the estimation of accident distribution. A bonus-malus system which integrates a priori and a posteriori information on an individual basis is proposed, and insurance premium tables are derived as a function of time, past accidents and the significant variables in the regression. Statistical results were obtained from a sample of 19,013 drivers.     

DO PEERS AFFECT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA USING GROUP SIZE VARIATION

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (Journal of Econometrics 2007; 140 (2), 333–374) to estimate peer effects in a linear‐in‐means model when individuals interact in groups. Assumingsufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control for correlated effects at the group level and to solve the simultaneity (reflection) problem. We clarify the intuition behind identification of peer effects in the model. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in French, Science, Mathematics and History in secondary schools in the Province of Québec (Canada). We estimate the model using conditional maximum likelihood and instrumental variables methods. We find some evidence of peer effects. The endogenous peer effect is large and significant in Mathematics but imprecisely estimated in the other subjects. Some contextual peer effects are also significant. In particular, for most subjects, the average age of peers has a negative effect on own test score. Using calibrated Monte Carlo simulations, we find that high dispersion in group sizes helps with potential issues of weak identification. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning from peers in signaling game experiments

We investigate peer group effects in laboratory experiments based on Milgrom and Roberts' (1982, Econometrica 50 : 443–459) entry limit pricing game. We generalize Heckman's (1981, in Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA) dynamic discrete‐choice panel data models by introducing time‐lagged social interactions, using the unbiased GHK simulator to implement the computationally cumbersome maximum likelihood estimation. We find that subjects' decisions are significantly influenced by past decisions of peers on several dimensions, including potential entrants' choices and strategic play of like‐type monopolists. The proposed model and estimation method may be applicable to other experiments where peer group effects are likely to play an important role. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

国外两种网站信息服务管理质量评价体系的分析与综合

网站信息服务管理质量的评价对于现代化信息服务管理来说意义重大。文章首先对网站信息服务管理质量评价的内涵进行了说明;其次,分析了基于ITIL的网站信息服务管理质量评价体系,指出了该评价体系的局限性以及缺陷;然后,分析了基于用户满意度的网站信息服务管理质量评价体系,讨论了该评价体系的导人原因以及优点;最后,将两者进行了综合,建立了更加全面系统、面向用户的网站信息服务质量综合评价指标体系。该综合评价指标体系能更加有效地对网站信息服务管理的质量做出评价,从而使网站信息服务管理的质量得到不断的改进和提高。     

Conditions for the success of peer evaluation

Peer evaluation has recently become popular as an alternative to traditional performance appraisal. Research has described peer evaluation's growing use, its potentially high validity and some of its related psychological mechanisms, but has not developed a framework for measuring or predicting its success. This paper proposes such a framework and examines its elements in a multi-method field study. Several context, design and implementation factors are found to correlate with successful peer evaluation. Based on the findings, a dynamic model is developed, and implications are discussed.     

Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?

This paper provides a solution to a puzzle in the analysis of tournaments, that of why there is no agent discrimination or differential contracting in certain business practice settings. The paper examines the problem of a principal contracting with multiple agents whose activities are subject to common shocks. The presence of common shocks invites the use of relative performance evaluation to minimize the costs of moral hazard. But, in the additional presence of adverse selection, the analysis shows that there may be no need for ex ante screening through menus of offers. This is so because the principal becomes better informed ex post about agent types, via the realization of common uncertainty, and can effectively penalize or reward the agents ex post. Thus, unlike the standard adverse selection problem without common uncertainty where the principal always benefits from ex ante screening, it is shown that ex post sorting through relative performance evaluation reduces the scope for ex ante screening through menus, and can eliminate it completely if agents are known to not be very heterogeneous. This is consistent with observed practice in industries where the primary compensation mechanism is a cardinal tournament which is uniform among employees. The analysis connotes that by using relative instead of absolute performance measures, firms with employees who are not substantially heterogeneous not only can alleviate the agency problem, but there is also no need to extract the agents' ex ante private information about their innate abilities via a screening menu.     

基于多层面分析的高技能人才评价指标体系构建

针对高技能人才的特点,构建了由专业知识、技能水平和综合素质3个一级指标和受教育程度、技术等级等15个二级指标组成的评价体系,利用AHP层次分析法对各指标进行了权重的确定,指出高技能人才的技术等级、受教育程度、计算机应用能力、解决难题的能力以及同行对其的评价在所有指标中所占的比重较大。在此基础上,提出企业应采取相应措施,不断促进高技能人才的培育和发展。     

P2P网络对等体节点的组织机制研究

JXTA协议在现有的物理网络基础上建立了一个虚拟的P2P网络,汇聚对等体是给其它对等体提供网络中节点位置和资源信息的节点。文章针对现有汇聚对等体节点组织机制的不足,引入信息熵概念,提出对对等体数目进行控制的对等体节点自组织机制,保证了网络查询的效率,使得P2P网络对等体节点的优越性能能够得到充分的发挥。     

论物流信息系统的效益

物流信息系统是物流系统的重要构成部分。时该系统进行效益的分析，可评价企业物流信息系统的运行和投资效果．为物流企业管理部门的计划和决策提供依据。对物流信息系统进行效益分析，可从信息技术的项目投资回报和物流系统的整体效益两个方面进行。从投资角度看，其评价方法包括投资回收期法、投资报酬率法、净现值法、内舍报酬率法、综合评价法等；从物流系统的整体角度看，信息系统的效益有时不一定是经济上收益的增加，而是作业系统工作效率的提高和整个物流系统管理水平和服务质量的提高．可用存货周转率、应收账款周转率、订单处理速度、客户满意度等相关的财务指标和非财务指标来表示。     

Personalised news filtering and recommendation system using Chi-square statistics-based K-nearest neighbour (χ2SB-KNN) model

Recommendation problem has been extensively studied by researchers in the field of data mining, database and information retrieval. This study presents the design and realisation of an automated, personalised news recommendations system based on Chi-square statistics-based K-nearest neighbour (χ²SB-KNN) model. The proposed χ²SB-KNN model has the potential to overcome computational complexity and information overloading problems, reduces runtime and speeds up execution process through the use of critical value of χ² distribution. The proposed recommendation engine can alleviate scalability challenges through combined online pattern discovery and pattern matching for real-time recommendations. This work also showcases the development of a novel method of feature selection referred to as Data Discretisation-Based feature selection method. This is used for selecting the best features for the proposed χ²SB-KNN algorithm at the preprocessing stage of the classification procedures. The implementation of the proposed χ²SB-KNN model is achieved through the use of a developed in-house Java program on an experimental website called OUC newsreaders’ website. Finally, we compared the performance of our system with two baseline methods which are traditional Euclidean distance K-nearest neighbour and Naive Bayesian techniques. The result shows a significant improvement of our method over the baseline methods studied.     

Public and expert collaborative evaluation model and algorithm for enterprise knowledge

Knowledge is becoming the most important resource for more and more enterprises and increases exponentially, but there is not an effective method to evaluate them cogently. Based on Web2.0, this article firstly builds an enterprise knowledge sharing model. Synthetically taking the advantage of the convenience and low cost in public evaluation and of the specialty in peer review, a public and expert collaborative evaluation (PECE) model and algorithm for enterprise knowledge are put forward. Through analyzing interaction between user's domain weights and scores of knowledge points, the PECE model and algorithm serve to recognise valuable knowledge and domain experts efficiently and therefore improve ordering and utilisation of knowledge. This article also studies malicious and casual evaluation from users and a method is proposed to update user's domain weights. Finally, a case of knowledge sharing system for amanufacturing enterprise is developed and realised. User's behaviour of publishing and evaluating knowledge is simulated and then analysed to verify the feasibility of PECE algorithm based on the system.     

A security evaluation approach for information systems in telecommunication enterprises

In recent years, information systems in telecommunication enterprises have been characterised by boundary expansion and increase of departmental-level applications. These changes increase the complexity of security evaluation and pose new challenges to enterprises' information security. Taking into account the behaviour characters of system users, we put forward a system security evaluation approach based on access paths. This approach can help evaluators and users find out potential security risks without figuring out the boundary of systems explicitly. It has no special requirements for system scale and can be used in the evaluation of enterprise-level and departmental-level systems. This paper also presents the formal definition of access path and related evaluation rules.     

Peer pressure,incentives, and gender: An experimental analysis of motivation in the workplace

We present results from a real-effort experiment, simulating actual workplace conditions, comparing the productivity of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. Workers, who were paid to enter data, were exposed to different degrees of peer pressure under both payment systems. The peer pressure was generated in the form of private information about the productivity of their peers. We have two main results. First, we find no level of peer pressure for which the productivity of either male or female workers is significantly higher than the productivity without peer pressure. Second, we find that very low and very high levels of peer pressure can significantly decrease productivity (particularly for men paid fixed wages). These results are consistent with models of conformism and self-motivation.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

浅析延安农业信息网络平台的开发与应用

笔者就延安农业信息网络服务平台建设,系统开发技术路线、系统功能、数据库设计、新闻发布系统实现、网页设计等六个方面阐述了延安农业信息网络服务平台的开发过程,服务功能及取得的结果,目的在于同行探讨借鉴。     

Information Management and Incentives

We ask how the incentives of an agent are affected by an information management system that lets the agent receive information about the performance of a colleague before (“transparent firm”) rather than after he provides effort (“nontransparent firm”). Transparency is detrimental for incentives if the performance of the colleague provides information on the relative impact of the agent’s effort on his success probability. The findings imply that firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for compensation are transparent. Firms in which they play a major role sometimes choose to be nontransparent despite the flexibility gains transparency provides.