Real Estate Risk,Corporate Investment and Financing Choice

This paper empirically examines how real estate risk impacts corporate investment and financing decisions. Using a panel of United States firms from 1985 to 2013, we document that real estate risk is negatively associated with firms’ long-term investments and long-term external financing in equity and debt. The results are robust to different risk measurements and in particular salient during the financial crisis period when the endogeneity between risk and investment is less of a concern. The effect on firm leverage, however, depends on risk measures. Overall, in contrast to previously documented positive effects of the real estate value, real estate risk exposure exhibits mostly the opposite effects on investment, financing and capital structure. This difference is consistent with option value determinants. Findings in this paper shed new lights on the impact of real estate holding on corporate decisions, offer a new explanation for the underperformance of hedge funds’ real estate strategies, and confirm the theoretical predictions in Deng et al. (2015).     

Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

A Theory of Corporate Capital Structure and Investment

This article uses a general equilibrium framework to explorethe origins and limitations of financial intermediaries. Inthe model, investors have a generic lending technology thatthey can improve at a cost. Those who upgrade become intermediariesto exploit their advantage. However, conflicts with depositorswill limit the banks' market presence, and they will only lendto moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash-richcorporations. The article also analyzes the extent to whichinvestors adopt the superior lending technique, the nature ofbank competition, and how corporate and bank conditions affectinterest rates and investment.     

The Theory and Practice of Corporate Risk Management*

The financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting recession caught many companies unprepared and, in so doing, provided a stark reminder of the importance of effective risk management. While academic theory has long touted the benefits of risk management, companies have varied greatly in the ways and extent to which they put theory into practice. Drawing on a global survey of over 300 CFOs of non‐financial companies, the authors report that while most CFOs felt that their risk management programs have significant benefits, the risk management function in general needs more attention. A large percentage of the finance executives surveyed acknowledged that the most important corporate risks extend far beyond the CFO's direct reports, and that risk‐based thinking is not incorporated into everyday business activities or corporate strategies. A large majority of executives also said they were seeking a more widespread understanding of risk throughout their organizations—and many confessed their firms' inability, or lack of interest, in evaluating their own risk management functions. At the same time, the efforts of most companies to develop enterprise‐wide risk management (ERM) programs were said to fall well short of the comprehensive and highly coordinated programs envisioned by the proponents of such programs. Three areas of opportunity were clearly identified as having potential to improve corporate risk management in ways that increase firm value over an entire business cycle:

• ? Incorporate risk management thinking into the strategic planning process. Line executives, and not just technicians, need to be sensitive to risks, thereby building flexibility into the firm's business plan and its execution.
• ? Clearly define the objectives of the risk management function, in part by developing appropriate benchmarks. The risk management process should be subject to the same rigorous evaluation process that is used when measuring risks throughout the business.
• ? Instill a risk management culture throughout the organization. While an effective risk management function is necessary, only when employees at all levels of the company embrace risk management as part of their daily operations will the firm get maximum value from risk management.

     

Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Framework

This article analyzes the interaction between a firm's dynamic investment, operating, and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs. Using numerical analysis, we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects. We find that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm's debt capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing. While higher financial flexibility (resulting from lower recapitalization costs) has a similar effect, production flexibility and financial flexibility are, to some extent, substitutes. We find that the impact of debt financing on the firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant.     

托宾的Q投资理论与资本市场均衡机制

传统的企业投资理论一直忽略了资本市场的作用,但是托宾的Q投资理论却把企业与资本市场有机地结合起来。本文对既有文献的理论脉络进行了简单的总结,在此基础之上评述了托宾的Q投资理论,并对该理论与资本市场的关系进行了更深的挖掘与探讨。文章的最后以美国资本市场为例,阐述了托宾Q理论是如何对资本市场均衡进行评价与验证的。     

企业筹资风险成因分析及防范

对于企业来说,在扩大规模的时候往往面临资金链条的截断,企业自身没有足够的现金流就需要依赖外部资金。外部资金常常伴随着企业资产的抵押,是否可以进行合理的偿还或回报取决于企业所投资项目盈利状况。这个过程具有较高风险。本文针对企业筹资风险的主要构成原因,分析论述企业筹资风险的防范措施。     

"行为融资":公司融资理论的新进展

“行为融资”理论的产生是由于传统公司金融理论已难以解释当前金融市场上出现的一些新的情况。笔者详细地论述了该理论的两种分析方法，即非理性投资者分析法和非理性管理者分析法。前者主要研究投资者的非理性行为是否会影响理性管理者的资产配置行为，亦即当股票市场价格偏离公司真实价值时，致力于实现公司价值最大化的理性管理者将对此做出何种反应；而后者着重强调管理者本身的非理性行为对公司融资行为的影响。     

高管薪酬粘性、风险承担与企业投资效率——管理者权力与融资约束的调节作用

本文选取2010―2019年中国A股上市公司数据,实证分析了高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率具有负向影响,会加剧企业过度投资,由此加大非效率投资及降低投资效率。(2)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响仅对“奖优-低惩劣”薪酬契约有效。相对于非国有、高估值与制造业企业,高管薪酬粘性对国有、低估值与非制造业企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著。(3)管理者权力的提高会加剧高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,加剧高管权力寻租引发的薪酬补偿效应,由此稀释薪酬奖惩对业绩变动的敏感度。融资约束程度的提高会减弱高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,这种负向影响主要针对投资不足企业,对过度投资企业不显著。(4)风险承担在高管薪酬粘性与企业投资效率的关系中承担着中介作用,高管薪酬粘性通过影响企业风险承担来影响企业投资效率,“高管薪酬粘性-风险承担-企业投资效率”的传导渠道有效。     

Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.     

中国城投债现状、风险与机遇

城投债又被称为准市政债券,是指由地方政府投融资平台(一般是隶属于地方政府的城市建设投资公司)作为发行主体公开发行的企业债券,多用于地方基础设施建设或公益性项目。在我国,城投债包括企业债、短期融资券和中期票据等品种。我国城投债发展现状1994年1月1日起,我国实行新一轮的地方财政包干体制改革,各省、自治区、直辖市以及计划单列市实行分税制财政管理体制,其重要内容就是中央政府和地方政府事权和财权的划分。改革使中央财政收入得到很大提高,地方财政在全国总财政收入的比例却不断下降。与此同时,地方政府事权范围     

Corporate Governance and Corporate Financing and Investment during the 2007‐2008 Financial Crisis

We examine the impact of the 2007‐2008 financial crisis on nonfinancial firms’ financing and investment activities and the role of corporate governance in alleviating the adverse consequences of the external capital supply shock. Employing a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that better governance mitigates the disruption caused by the bank credit supply shock to firms’ financing and investment activities. A variety of robustness tests suggest that our findings are unlikely to be driven by an endogeneity problem. We obtain similar results when we extend the sample period to include the delayed spillover from the banking sector to other capital market sectors.     

The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory

We test a catering theory describing how stock market mispricingmight influence individual firms' investment decisions. We usediscretionary accruals as our proxy for mispricing. We finda positive relation between abnormal investment and discretionaryaccruals; that abnormal investment is more sensitive to discretionaryaccruals for firms with higher R&D intensity (opaque firms)or share turnover (firms with shorter shareholder horizons);that firms with high abnormal investment subsequently have lowstock returns; and that the larger the relative price premium,the stronger the abnormal return predictability. We show thatpatterns in abnormal returns are stronger for firms with higherR&D intensity or share turnover.     

Tobin's q-Ratio and Market Reaction to Capital Investment Announcements

There is a significant positive relation between Tobin's q-ratio and the magnitude of stock market reaction to capital investment announcements. The findings have the following implications for capital investment theory: (i) The results provide evidence substantiating the link between the q-ratio and real investment for industrial firms. For public utilities however, no such link exists, (ii) The study finds that average q and marginal q are correlated but the relation is somewhat more complicated than simple equality as assumed by numerous empirical studies. (iii) The findings suggest that investors can use average Tobin's q-ratio to identify companies with profitable real capital investment opportunities.     

基于期权方法的企业信息化投资风险管理研究

本文运用期权的套期保值机理,给出了一种运用期权进行企业信息化投资风险管理的新方法。基于企业信息化投资中的风险特征,将投资风险与相应的期权类型相匹配,在控制风险的同时实现项目价值的最大化,适应了企业信息化投资的决策灵活性特征。     

融资约束、投资效率与融资渠道选择

研究融资约束影响企业的现金持有量、盈利能力、融资渠道与其投资效率,发现融资约束主要通过银行信贷途径影响企业投资效率,对股权融资途径影响较小。充分现金持有、盈利能力强能缓解企业的融资约束。在融资约束条件下,国有企业通过债务融资可以提高投资效率,非国有企业投资效率下降。在非融资约束条件下,非国有企业债务融资的投资效率提高。     

The Value of Corporate Risk Management

We model and estimate the value of corporate risk management. We show how risk management can add value when revenues and costs are nonlinearly related to prices and estimate the model by regressing quarterly firm sales and costs on the second and higher moments of output and input prices. For a sample of 34 oil refiners, we find that hedging concave revenues and leaving concave costs exposed each represent between 2% and 3% of firm value. We validate our approach by regressing Tobin's q on the estimated value and level of risk management and find results consistent with the model.