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We find that acquirers in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are more likely to hire as advisors investment banks that provided analyst coverage for the acquirer prior to the transaction. We also find that compared to a matched control group of banks, the advisor banks are less likely to terminate and more likely to initiate analyst coverage of the acquirer after the transaction. Finally, the advisor banks that initiate coverage after the transaction collect higher fees. These findings suggest that firms value analyst coverage and use M&A advisor appointments and advisor fees to compensate for it. 相似文献
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Lubomir Petrasek 《Financial Management》2012,41(3):615-636
This paper examines the relation between agency costs and payout policy using a sample of 755 firms that cross‐list shares abroad. Firms increase cash payouts to shareholders by about 9% of earnings after cross‐listing on exchanges with high standards of transparency and shareholder protection. The shift in payout policy is more pronounced in firms controlled by management. No shift is observed if shareholder protection in the country of incorporation is already strong, or if the host exchange does not mandate additional disclosure. The findings support the theory that high corporate payouts are the outcome of transparency and shareholder protection. 相似文献
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A recent innovation in the equity markets is the introduction of market maker services procured by the listed companies themselves. Using data from the Oslo Stock Exchange, we investigate what motivates issuing firms to pay to improve the secondary market liquidity of their listed shares. By examining the timing of market maker hirings relative to corporate events, we show that hirings are more likely when the firm will interact with the capital markets in the near future. Futhermore, a typical firm employing a designated market maker is more likely to raise capital, repurchase shares, or experience an exit by insiders. 相似文献
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States levy insurance premium taxes, which are essentially gross receipt taxes on premiums, with insurance companies paying the higher of the tax rate in the state in which the company is domiciled and the state in which the policy is written. Using firm‐level data for the property–casualty (P‐C) insurance industry, we estimate the extra insurance premium tax that P‐C insurance firms pay by not locating in the state that minimizes their insurance premium taxes. We find that only 4.78 percent of P‐C firms are located in the state that minimizes their insurance premium taxes. We explore the relationship between the extra tax paid and other factors that are thought to be associated with firm location choice. We find that P‐C firms appear to trade off higher taxes to locate in a state that is more urban. 相似文献
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Nasha Ananchotikul Roy Kouwenberg Visit Phunnarungsi 《European Financial Management》2010,16(5):712-737
We test whether Thai listed firms with higher levels of good governance policy adoption are less likely to violate listing rules and laws designed to protect shareholders. Our results suggest that firms on average implement, substantively as opposed to symbolically, recommended governance policies, as violations occur less frequently among firms with higher governance policy adoption scores. However, we also find evidence of symbolic governance among a small group of ‘talk‐only’ firms that issue statements about governance while lagging in the adoption of policies related to shareholder rights and the board of directors. 相似文献
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We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual‐class firms is significantly lower than it is in single‐class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual‐class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long‐term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short‐term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual‐class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions. 相似文献
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We investigate the relation between managerial incentives and the decision to cross‐list by comparing Canadian firms cross‐listed on US stock exchanges to industry‐ and size‐matched control firms. After controlling for firm and ownership structure characteristics, we find a positive association between substantial holdings of vested options held by CEOs prior to cross‐listing and the decision to cross‐list. Further, firms managed by CEOs with substantial holdings of vested options exhibit positive announcement returns and negative post‐announcement long‐run returns. CEOs of cross‐listed firms seem to take advantage of the aforementioned market behaviour, because they abnormally exercise vested options and sell the proceeds during the year of listing only when their firms underperform during the subsequent year. In addition, there is a positive relation between substantial holdings of vested options and discretionary accruals during the year of listing, consistent with the view that CEOs manage earnings to keep stock prices at high levels. Overall, these results have significant implications for the cross‐listing literature, suggesting an association between cross‐listing and CEO incentives to maximize CEO private benefits. 相似文献
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Numerous stock market regulators around the world impose daily price limits on individual stock price movements. We derive a simple model that shows that price limits may deter stock market manipulators. Based on our model's implications, we predict that regulators impose price limit rules for markets where the likelihood of manipulation is high. We present empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our study is the first to formally propose a manipulation‐based rationale for the existence of price limits in stock markets. 相似文献
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Zijun Wang 《Financial Management》2013,42(1):183-209
We study the information content of two new return factors, the investment factor (IA) and the return‐on‐equity factor (ROE), as proposed by Chen, Novy‐Marx, and Zhang in 2011. First, IA is a strong predictor for future gross domestic product (GDP) growth despite the presence of other financial and economic variables. IA subsumes the pricing power of the GDP factor for the cross section of asset returns. Second, ROE is closely related to innovations in dividend yield and term spread. When modeled together with innovations in state variables that forecast future investment opportunities, IA and ROE lose their explanatory power. 相似文献
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By using a unique dataset on mutual fund visits to listed firms in China, we investigate whether mutual funds are able to obtain private information or benefit from their communication with firms. Our findings are as follows: 1) such communication significantly increases the subsequent trading magnitude of mutual funds; 2) mutual fund trades that rely on communication significantly predict the unexpected earnings of visited firms, which is further supported by IV‐regressions that use the number of direct flights between two cities as the instrument of communication; and 3) comprehensiveness of communication topics and firms’ information environment significantly affect the benefits that mutual funds obtain from communication. Our results are robust to alternative measures and specifications, and provide insights for regulators who are concerned with fair disclosure. 相似文献
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Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start-Up Firms? Evidence from IPOs and Acquisitions of VC-Backed Companies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present evidence that corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) add value to start-up companies only when the start-ups have a strategic fit with the parent corporations of CVCs. We find that CVCs provide a variety of services and support that suit the specific needs of start-ups operating in different industries. CVC-backed start-ups are able to obtain higher valuations at the IPO than non-CVC-backed ones, and the value added by CVCs concentrates in start-ups with a strategic overlap with CVC parents. Entrepreneurial companies with strategic CVC backing also receive higher takeover premiums when they become acquisition targets . 相似文献
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Are Market‐Based Measures of Global Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions Useful to Regulators and Supervisors?
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QI ZHANG FRANCESCO VALLASCAS KEVIN KEASEY CHARLIE X. CAI 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2015,47(7):1403-1442
We analyze whether four market‐based measures of the global systemic importance of financial institutions offer early warning signals during three financial crises. The tests based on the 2007–2008 crisis show that only one measure (?CoVaR) consistently adds predictive power to conventional early warning models. However, the additional predictive power remains small and it is not normally confirmed for the Asian and the 1998 crises. We conclude that it is problematic to identify a market‐based measure of systemic importance that remains valid across crises with different features. The same criticism also applies to several conventional proxies of systemic importance, of which size is the most consistent performer. 相似文献
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We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis. 相似文献
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This study investigates whether the relation between aggregate fund flow and market returns differs between retail and institutional funds. For the retail fund sample, we document a contemporaneous relation between flow and market returns and also find evidence of feedback trading. In contrast, there is little evidence of a relation between flow and market returns for the institutional fund sample. Consequently, it appears that retail and institutional fund investors use different investment strategies, with retail investors following a more naive strategy. We find no evidence of flow inducing price pressure for either type of fund. 相似文献
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Valeriy Sibilkov 《实用企业财务杂志》2016,28(3):103-117
Many have long suspected that investment banks, when advising corporate clients on potential acquisitions, have strong incentives just to “get the deal done” with little if any motive for urging clients to walk away from “bad” deals. The incentive to complete deals comes from compensation arrangements in which the bulk of the bankers' fees depend upon completion of the deals. Several earlier studies have provided support for this suspicion by reporting findings that show banks' market shares of advisory services depending mainly on two variables—their previous market shares and their deal completion rate—with little if any connection to the value created (or destroyed) for their clients' shareholders. In their recently published study, the authors revisit that relationship and reach a number of different conclusions: (1) advisors in acquisitions that create more value for clients are more likely to be chosen for future deals; (2) the changes in bankers' advisory market shares are strongly related to the value created for prior clients; and (3) the changes in banks' market values are positively correlated with the value created for their acquirer clients. In sum, the findings suggest that banks have significant market‐related incentives to advise their clients to pursue value‐creating acquisitions and to avoid deals likely to reduce their market values. 相似文献
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We use the number of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) as a proxy for corporate governance and examine its impact in US domestic and foreign acquisitions made by US acquirers. We find that the targets of poorly governed acquirers earn higher postannouncement premiums, despite controls for deal characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and country‐level protections, suggesting that these acquirers overpay. Puzzlingly, in contrast with the domestic US findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie, poorly governed acquirers in cross‐border deals experience higher announcement period returns. The relation between governance and target returns appears concave, but this nonlinearity disappears once differences in country‐level governance and deal characteristics are accounted for. 相似文献
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In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature. 相似文献
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This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee‐based and commission‐based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention. 相似文献