Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Media Independence

Using a large international sample of 47,307 firm‐years from 52 countries, we investigate the impact of media independence on the forecast quality of financial analysts. We find that analyst forecast errors are positively associated with the extent of a country's state media ownership and its lack of freedom of the press. We also find that financial analysts with more inaccurate forecasts disappear from the institutional broker's estimate system more quickly in countries with more independent media.     

ESG Controversies,ESG Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy

We investigate whether an environmental social governance (ESG) disclosure moderates the relation between ESG controversies and analyst forecast accuracy. The previous literature has shown that ESG controversies increase uncertainty about a firm's future prospects, while ESG disclosure decreases this uncertainty. We therefore take the next step and integrate ESG controversies, ESG disclosure and uncertainty into one model. Our study is based on 8,369 firm-year observations across 51 countries from 2008 to 2017, containing data from RepRisk, Bloomberg and the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System. We find that analyst forecast errors are generally higher for firms with higher exposure to ESG controversies. More importantly, we establish ESG disclosure as a moderator that mitigates the strength of the relation between ESG controversies and analyst forecast errors. Additionally, we identify that the most important pillar for the relation derives from social controversies and disclosure.     

The Effects of Disclosure and Analyst Regulations on the Relevance of Analyst Characteristics for Explaining Analyst Forecast Accuracy

We posit and find an effect of disclosure and analyst reporting regulations implemented from 2000 through 2003 (including Regulation Fair Disclosure, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the Global Settlement Act) on the importance of analyst and forecast characteristics for analyst forecast accuracy. Following the enactment of these regulations, more experienced analysts and All‐Star analysts do not maintain their superior forecast accuracy, and analysts employed by large brokerage houses perform worse than other analysts. In addition, we find a decrease in the importance of analyst effort, the number of industries and firms followed, days elapsed since the last forecast, and forecast horizon. While the importance of bold upward forecast revisions does not change, bold downward revisions lose their relevance for forecast accuracy after 2003. Finally, we find an increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy. We find that the importance of these characteristics varies with the precision of publicly available information. Specifically, the decrease in the importance of most analyst and forecast characteristics and the increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy are greater when the precision of publicly available information is low. Overall, our results suggest that the positive effects of experience, effort, brokerage house size and All‐Star status on forecast accuracy in the pre‐regulation period were because of the information advantages that these analysts enjoyed (rather than their ability to generate private information). In contrast, our results suggest that prior forecast accuracy is related to analysts’ ability to generate private information.     

On the Structure of Analyst Research Portfolios and Forecast Accuracy

This study provides insights into the forces and constraints that shape analyst research coverage along country and sector dimensions and the impact of the structure of an analyst's portfolio on forecast accuracy. We find that analyst specialization by country and sector is sensitive to the extent to which firms  within  a country or sector and firms  across  country-sectors are exposed to common economic forces, the potential for revenue generation, and broker culture. Our tests indicate that existing research on the relation between analyst portfolio structure and forecast accuracy may suffer from an endogeneity bias. We use our analysis of analyst specialization to develop controls for this bias. Once we employ these controls, we find that country diversification is associated with superior forecast accuracy. However, the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context-specific. Specifically, sector diversification enhances forecast accuracy in an international context, while it detracts from forecast accuracy in a domestic U.S. context.     

Interlock Concentration and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Value Implications of Interlock

From the perspective of information commonalities among firms with director interlock relationships, this study mainly investigates the outcomes of earnings forecasts by analysts who choose to concentrate on interlocked firms (analysts following both a firm and its interlocked partner firm in their research portfolio). Using interlocked A‐share firms listed in the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2013 as samples, we empirically find that analysts who concentrate on interlocked firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who do not. In additional analysis, we also find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide superior earnings forecast quality for other non‐interlocked firms in their research portfolios. Finally, through examining the market reaction to interlocked firms, we find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide new information and improve information efficiency for the capital market.     

Market Institutions,Fair Value,and Financial Analyst Forecast Accuracy

This study investigates the valuation usefulness of fair values and related information disclosure in China and examines how regional-level market institutions influence the valuation usefulness of fair value information. Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2007 to 2016, the empirical results show a negative association between overall fair values and analyst forecast accuracy. Further analyses suggest that the negative association is likely driven by biases and/or errors in fair value estimates. Using a difference-in-difference research design, the study also documents that the implementation of ASBE 39 in 2014 has improved the valuation usefulness of fair values. There is evidence that different aspects of market institutions—including the extent of government intervention in the market and the legal environment—influence analysts’ use of fair value information. This study contributes to the literature by providing new and different evidence on the usefulness of fair values to financial analysts outside developed countries. Moreover, by taking advantage of the uneven institutional development across China, the study shows that different aspects of market institutions influence the valuation usefulness of fair value information.     

Analyst Forecast Consistency

We show empirically that analysts who display more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy. These results lead to three implications. First, consistent analysts are less likely to be demoted and are more likely to be nominated All Star analysts. Second, analysts strategically deliver downward‐biased forecasts to increase their consistency (if at the expense of stated accuracy). Finally, the benefits of consistency and of “lowballing” (accuracy) are increasing (decreasing) in institutional investors’ presence.     

Analyst Firm Coverage and Forecast Accuracy: The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure

In this study, we revisit the relationship between analyst firm coverage and forecast accuracy. In contrast to the proposed negative association in Clement (1999) owing to the portfolio complexity effect, we hypothesize an ‘economy‐of‐scale effect’ that is likely to dominate when analysts rely mostly on public information. In support of the latter effect, we find a positive association between firm coverage and forecast accuracy after the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which substantially reduces the flow of material private information to analysts. Such a result survives a battery of robustness analyses. We further show that, in the post‐Reg FD period, covering more firms increases an analyst's probability of being selected as a star analyst in the subsequent year. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of the information environment in shaping the economic link between an analyst's firm coverage and forecast accuracy.     

Analyst Pessimism and Forecast Timing

In this study, we show that on average relatively pessimistic analysts tend to reveal their earnings forecasts later than other analysts. Further, we find this forecast timing effect explains a substantial proportion of the well‐known decrease in consensus analyst forecast optimism over the forecast period prior to earnings announcements, which helps explain why analysts’ longer term earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased than their shorter term forecasts. We extend the theory of analyst self‐selection regarding their coverage decisions to argue that analysts with a relatively pessimistic view–compared to other analysts–are more reluctant to issue their earnings forecasts, with the result that they tend to defer revealing their earnings forecasts until later in the forecasting period than other analysts.     

A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Analysts' Forecast Bias, Analyst Following, and Institutional Ownership

In this paper we use a simultaneous equations model to examine the relationship between analysts' forecasts, analyst following, and institutions' investment decisions. Estimates of our three equation model using US data indicate that higher institutional demand leads to greater optimism among analysts and lower analyst following. At the same time, institutional demand increases with increasing optimism in analysts' forecasts but decreases with analyst following. We also investigate firm characteristics as determinants of analysts' and institutions' decisions. Empirical estimates of the effects of these characteristics indicate that agency‐driven behavioral considerations are significant.     

信息披露、市场关注与融资约束

本文运用中国证券市场的实证数据,研究了信息披露水平、市场关注程度对企业融资约束的影响。本文的理论分析表明,主动信息披露是解决信息不对称的有效方式,并且,市场关注程度对企业的融资约束也有影响,市场对企业越关注,越有利于企业私有信息的挖掘和公开信息的传播,进一步会减轻企业与市场的信息不对称问题。实证结果支持了上述理论:信息披露水平和以分析师为代表的市场关注程度提高能显著降低企业的融资约束。     

Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings

We examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings completed between 1975 and 1987 to see how they relate to three well-documented IPO anomalies. We find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential and long term growth prospects of recent IPOs. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, IPOs have better stock performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential rather than high growth potential. These results suggest that the anomalies may be partially driven by overoptimism.     

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.     

非财务信息披露与分析师预测——基于深市上市企业社会责任报告的实证检验

以深市上市企业披露的社会责任报告作为非财务信息的替代变量,实证检验了非财务信息披露质量与分析师盈利预测的关系。多元回归分析结果表明,企业社会责任报告披露质量越好,其分析师盈利预测越精确,并且在财务透明度低的企业中,这种正向关系更显著。这说明社会责任报告披露的这类非财务信息对分析师预测不仅具有信息含量,而且能够通过对财务信息的补充作用,缓解财务不透明对分析师预测精度的不利后果。     

Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions and the Pricing of Accruals

We investigate the relation between two market anomalies to provide insights into analysts role as information intermediaries. Prior research finds that accruals and analyst earnings forecast revisions predict future returns. We find that the accrual and forecast revision strategies generate hedge returns of 15.5% and 5.5% when implemented independently. Strikingly, a combined strategy that uses forecast revisions to refine the accrual strategy generates a hedge return of 28.5%. Firms with consistent accrual and forecast revision signals have less persistent accruals and earnings. We also find that accruals can be used to refine the forecast revision strategy—high accruals are associated with overoptimism in analyst forecasts. Our findings indicate that although forecast revisions reflect information about accrual and earnings persistence beyond that reflected in the level of current year accruals, investors do not fully incorporate this information into their valuation assessments.     

持续经营审计意见、分析师跟踪与融资约束

以2011-2016年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,运用现金—现金流敏感性模型,研究持续经营审计意见及分析师跟踪对融资约束的影响。研究发现：持续经营审计意见的出具加剧了上市公司面临的融资约束;分析师跟踪人数越多,上市公司面临的融资约束越小;分析师跟踪能够缓解被出具带强调事项段持续经营无保留审计意见公司的融资约束,加剧被出具其他持续经营审计意见（保留意见、无法表示意见和否定意见）公司的融资约束。     

分析师跟踪、股权结构与内部人交易收益

内部人交易一直是资本市场监管的重点和难点,如何有效实施内部人监管,保护投资者利益不受侵害,维护资本市场"三公"原则,已成为现阶段亟待解决的重要问题。本文采用我国沪深两市A股上市公司2008~2013年间内部人交易数据检验了分析师跟踪对内部人交易收益的影响,实证结果表明:(1)内部人交易获利能力随着分析师跟踪数量的增加有所下降;(2)股权结构会影响分析师外部治理功能的发挥,国有控股和机构投资者持股显著削弱了分析师跟踪与内部人交易收益之间的负相关关系。本文的研究对于充分认识分析师跟踪的外部治理效应、强化内部人交易监管具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。     

证券分析师VS统计模型:证券分析师盈余预测的相对准确性及其决定因素

本文使用2005年35家券商对我国上市公司做出的每股盈余预测数据,考察了证券分析师盈余预测相对于统计模型的相对准确性及其决定因素。我们发现,我国证券分析师做出的盈余预测,同以年度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较小,证券分析师盈余预测具有一定的优势;但同某些以季度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较大,证券分析师盈余预测不具有优势。我们同时考察了决定证券分析师盈余预测相对准确性的决定因素。我们发现,公司每股盈余的波动性越大,公司上市越晚,跟踪公司的分析师越多,证券分析师的优势就越大。我们的研究对证券分析师以及投资者都有一定的启示作用。     

Earnings Management and Analyst Following: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis

We use a simultaneous equations system to examine the relationship between earnings management and analyst following. We find that analysts’ decisions to follow firms and managerial decisions to manage earnings are jointly determined. Firms with lower levels of accrual‐based earnings management offer a better information environment to attract analyst following. Analyst following, in turn, has important monitoring effects on managerial behavior and results in lower levels of both accrual‐based and real earnings management. The information intermediary effect on analyst following is much weaker for expected “suspect firms” that manage their earnings continuously.     

Institutional Investors, Analyst Following, and the January Anomaly

Average stock returns for small, low stock price firms are higher in January than for the rest of the year. Two explanations have received a great deal of attention: tax-loss selling and gamesmanship. This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for small firms' stock or those with low prices. Strong seasonality in excess returns is reported for a sample of widely followed firms. Sample firms have unusually low excess returns in January and returns adjust upward over the year. These results are consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis, but not the tax-loss-selling hypothesis.