Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.     

How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?

We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’ management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

百事:Do Better By Doing Better

在百事我们有个口号叫Do better by doing better,意思是说我们要通过更好的表现来使我们的工作实现更好的发展。     

Do Shareholder Tender Agreements inform or expropriate shareholders?

By signing a Shareholder Tender Agreement (STA) a shareholder pre-commits to tender her shares to a particular bidder, forsaking the right to tender to any subsequent bidder. In a representative sample of tender offers between 1995 and 2010, 60% of the offers contain an STA. STA deals are associated with lower premiums, greater ownership concentration, greater management ownership, and greater information asymmetry. The results support the hypothesis that STAs certify value to uninformed shareholders, thereby increasing the efficiency of the tender offer process. The evidence does not support the view that STAs expropriate value from shareholders of target companies.     

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.     

Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know,and When Do They Know It?

We study put option sales on company stock by large firms. An often‐cited motivation for these transactions is market timing, and managers' decision to issue puts should be sensitive to whether the stock is undervalued. We provide new evidence that large firms successfully time security sales. In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock return, with much of the abnormal return following the first earnings release date after the sale. Direct evidence on put option exercises reinforces these findings: exercise frequencies and payoffs to put holders are abnormally low.     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Monitoring Managers: Does It Matter?

We study how well‐incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity–backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. “Soft” information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements.     

Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance

We examine whether mutual fund performance is related to characteristics of fund managers that may indicate ability, knowledge, or effort. In particular, we study the relationship between performance and the manager's age, the average composite SAT score at the manager's undergraduate institution, and whether the manager has an MBA. Although the raw data suggest striking return differences between managers with different characteristics, most of these can be explained by behavioral differences between managers and by selection biases. After adjusting for these, some performance differences remain. In particular, managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate institutions have systematically higher risk-adjusted excess returns.     

Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution

We find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: The number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and funds of all ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 3 months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The discontinuity disappears when using bimonthly returns, indicating a reversal in fund performance following small gains. This result suggests that the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily overstated returns.     

Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

In measuring performance persistence, we use hedge fund style benchmarks. This allows us to identify managers with valuable skills, and also to control for option-like features inherent in returns from hedge fund strategies. We take into account the possibility that reported asset values may be based on stale prices. We develop a statistical model that relates a hedge fund's performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer the performance of a hedge fund that left the database. Although we find significant performance persistence among superior funds, we find little evidence of persistence among inferior funds.     

Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?

We examine the impact of labor union shareholder activism through the submission of shareholder proposals during the period 1988–2002. We examine the effect of labor union‐sponsored shareholder proposals on announcement period returns; on the corporate governance environment of the firm including shareholder rights, board composition, and CEO compensation; on changes in unionization rates and labor expense; and on long‐run shareholder wealth. We do not find any observable patterns for the overall sample of proposals. However, subsets of proposals associated with union presence at the target firm and shareholder voting support for the proposal are associated with significant effects surrounding and subsequent to targeting.     

Do Decomposed Financial Ratios Predict Stock Returns and Fundamentals Better?

We investigate the prediction of excess returns and fundamentals by financial ratios, which include dividend‐price ratios, earnings‐price ratios, and book‐to‐market ratios, by decomposing financial ratios into a cyclical component and a stochastic trend component. We find both components predict excess returns and fundamentals. Cyclical components predict increases in future stock returns, while stochastic trend components predict declines in future stock returns in long horizons. This helps explain previous findings that financial ratios in the absence of decomposition find weak predictive power in short horizons and some predictive power in long horizons. We also find both components predict fundamentals.     

Do Managerial Skills Vary Across Fund Managers? Results Using European Mutual Funds

This paper uses stochastic dominance techniques to examine whether managerial skills vary across fund managers in European equity funds. The use of these techniques allows us to compare different investment alternatives in an uncertain setting under very simple assumptions regarding investor behaviour. The results for style-adjusted returns are consistent with varying degrees of managerial skill and cannot be explained by the impact of the choice of style-adjustment procedure, country, fee policy, and fund age, fund size or survivorship bias. This result allows us to conclude that style-adjusted returns may provide a reliable guide for selecting European investment funds.     

Do Weather‐Induced Moods Affect the Processing of Earnings News?

We investigate whether unpleasant environmental conditions affect stock market participants’ responses to information events. We draw from psychology research to develop a new prediction that weather‐induced negative moods reduce market participants’ activity levels. Exploiting geographic variation in equity analysts’ locations, we find compelling evidence that analysts experiencing unpleasant weather are slower or less likely to respond to an earnings announcement relative to analysts responding to the same announcement but experiencing pleasant weather. Price association tests find evidence consistent with reduced activity due to weather‐induced moods delaying equilibrium price adjustments following earnings announcements. We also use our analyst‐based research design to re‐examine an existing prediction that unpleasant weather induces investor pessimism, and find evidence of both analyst pessimism and reduced activity in the presence of unpleasant weather. Together, our study provides new evidence that both extends and reaffirms findings of a relation between unpleasant weather and market activities, and contributes to the broader psychology and economics literature on the impact of weather‐induced mood on labor productivity.     

Do Sentiments Matter in Fraud Detection? Estimating Semantic Orientation of Annual Reports

We present a novel approach for analysing the qualitative content of annual reports. Using natural language processing techniques we determine if sentiment expressed in the text matters in fraud detection. We focus on the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports because of the nonfactual content present in this section, unlike other components of the annual reports. We measure the sentiment expressed in the text on the dimensions of polarity, subjectivity, and intensity and investigate in depth whether truthful and fraudulent MD&As differ in terms of sentiment polarity, sentiment subjectivity and sentiment intensity. Our results show that fraudulent MD&As on average contain three times more positive sentiment and four times more negative sentiment compared with truthful MD&As. This suggests that use of both positive and negative sentiment is more pronounced in fraudulent MD&As. We further find that, compared with truthful MD&As, fraudulent MD&As contain a greater proportion of subjective content than objective content. This suggests that the use of subjectivity clues such as presence of too many adjectives and adverbs could be an indicator of fraud. Clear cases of fraud show a higher intensity of sentiment exhibited by more use of adverbs in the “adverb modifying adjective” pattern. Based on the results of this study, frequent use of intensifiers, particularly in this pattern, could be another indicator of fraud. Moreover, the dimensions of subjectivity and intensity help in accurately classifying borderline examples of MD&As (that are equal in sentiment polarity) into fraudulent and truthful categories. When taken together, these findings suggest that fraudulent MD&As in contrast to truthful MD&As contain higher sentiment content. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Managers Use Meeting Analyst Forecasts to Signal Private Information? Evidence from Patent Citations

This study examines whether firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal superior future performance. Prior research finds that firms use earnings management to just meet analyst forecasts and that these firms have a positive association with future performance (Bartov et al., 2002). There are two potential explanations for the positive association – signaling and attaining benefits that allow for better future performance (i.e., the real benefits explanation). Prior studies cannot provide evidence of signaling because they do not control for the real benefits explanation. Our research design enables us to control for the real benefits explanation because we can identify potential signaling firms within the sample of firms that just meet analyst forecasts. We use a unique database from the National Bureau of Economic Research to construct a proxy for the manager's belief about future firm value due to patents. We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the analyst forecast and manage earnings to achieve this goal. We also find firms that just meet analyst forecasts with more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms with fewer patent citations, which is consistent with signaling and not the real benefits explanation.     

Corporate Groups and Minority Shareholder Wealth: A Role for Private Benefits?

This paper aims at developing a theoretical framework to address the issue of internal resource allocation within corporate groups, representing an extension of the internal capital market approach developed for Anglo-Saxon type multidivisional enterprises. In particular, the paper investigates how private benefits from control affect investment decision processes in a capital constrained business group. We consider a group of n listed companies controlled by one main shareholder (i.e., a hierarchical group), and suppose that the group as a whole is endowed with an exogenous and limited amount of capital for investment. We analyze the effects of private benefits on the investment allocative efficiency and on the wealth of the group';s various claimants. Under reasonable assumptions, we show that the controlling shareholder always finds preferable to secure private benefits. Moreover, and surprisingly enough, we find that the appropriation of control benefits may give rise to an increase in the market value of the group as well as in the portfolio wealth of the set of minority shareholders. In particular, the positive effect of control benefits on minority interests increases with the capital rationing of the group. Therefore, the effects of private benefits can be different in different markets, depending on the degree of development and the credit capacity of the single market. The findings of this paper challenge the largely accepted view that private benefits from control are always harmful to minority shareholders.