Money non-neutrality in a Rational Belief Equilibrium with financial assets

Summary. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral. Given the expectational perspective proposed by the Theory of Rational Belief Equilibrium, we show that one of the most important factors in the emergence of money non-neutrality is played by Endogenous Uncertainty. This, in contrast to the Rational Expectations results of money neutrality and policy ineffectiveness, leads to a scenario in which monetary policy has an impact on the real economy and price volatility. The heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution and intensity of agents' states of optimism/pessimism can amplify the real effect of monetary policy and/or generate endogenous fluctuations in the economy which are not explained by any exogenous shock. We claim that money non-neutrality is mostly an expectations driven phenomenon. Indeed, additional assumptions of asymmetry of information and/or unanticipated monetary policy are not needed to explain the real effect of monetary policy as it is customary in the New Classical Theory. Received: May 30, 2000; revised version: December 28, 2000     

Floating exchange rates versus a monetary union under rational beliefs: the role of endogenous uncertainty

Using the concept of ex-post optimality, we compare different exchange rate regimes, including floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates with a Monetary Union in a two country OLG model with stochastic endowments. The emphasis of this comparison is on the welfare consequences of agents having incorrect beliefs. We do not assume that agents can hold any beliefs, but rather that their beliefs are rational that is consistent with the observed empirical behavior of the economy. We study a large set of possible policies, but two of them have our particular interest. The first policy implies devaluations in reaction to a negative shock, while the other implies a fixed exchange rate. These policies have very different consequences. The first will for generic beliefs not result in an ex-post optimal allocation. The other policy is on the other hand always feasible and results in an ex-post optimal allocation. When the two countries form a Monetary Union, the ex-post optimal allocation is also achieved. The meaning of “endogenous uncertainty” as an institutionally induced uncertainty is illustrated. Received: September 1, 2001; revised version: 24 June 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I would like to thank Horace W. Brock, Gianluca Cassese, Paula Orlando, Ho-Mou Wu as well as seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, ESEM98, Keio University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, SITE (Stanford) and University of Copenhagen for many useful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to Mark J. Garmaise, Takako Fujiwara-Greve, and an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions for improving the paper. Without the many discussions about Rational Beliefs and related issues I have had with Mordecai Kurz over the years, the research presented here would not have been possible. Financial support from The Carlsberg Foundation, Danish Social Research Council, University of Copenhagen and SITE is gratefully acknowledged.     

Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria

Summary The paper introduces some simplifying tools and methods for studying Rational Beliefs and for proving existence of Rational Belief Equilibria. We identify a set of stable non-stationary stochastic processes, named SIDS processes. Furthermore we introduce the concept of a Rational Belief Structure, which formulates the Rational Beliefs of the agents as beliefs about the distribution of exogenous variables and the beliefs of other agents. The use of the developed apparatus is demonstrated by showing existence of a set of Rational Belief Equilibria in an Overlapping Generations Model with money and one commodity.The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis from Stanford University ([13]). The dissertation is devoted to the study of the theory of Rational Beliefs as developed by Mordecai Kurz. I gratefully acknowledge the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with him over the years about this subject. His suggestions were instrumental for writing the thesis and this paper. The paper benefited much from a thorough reading by Trinidad Casasus, Mordecai Kurz and Ho-Mou Wu. Financial support from The Academy for Research (Forskerakademiet), Aarhus, Denmark and The University of Copenhagen, during my time as a Ph.D. student and from Danish Social Science Research Council thereafter and in addition from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei of Milan, Italy is gratefully acknowledged.     

Speculative trading with rational beliefs and endogenous uncertainty

Summary. This paper introduces the framework of rational beliefs of Kurz (1994), which makes the assumptions of heterogeneous beliefs of Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) more plausible. Agents hold diverse beliefs that are “rational” in the sense of being compatible with ample observed data. In a non-stationary environment the agents only learn about the stationary measure of observed data, but their beliefs can remain non-stationary and diverse. Speculative trading then stems from disagreements among traders. In a Markovian framework of dividends and beliefs, we obtain analytical results to show how the speculative premium depends on the extent of heterogeneity of beliefs. In addition, we demonstrate that there exists a unique Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) generically with endogenous uncertainty (as defined by Kurz and Wu, 1996) and that the RBE price is higher than the rational expectation equilibrium price (REE) under some general conditions Received: March 15, 2001; revised version: April 26, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are deeply grateful to Mordecai Kurz for his constant encouragement and inspiring guidance over the years. We wish to express our gratitude to an anonymous referee for the very valuable comments provided. We also thank Kenneth Arrow, Peter Hammond, Roko Aliprantis and Nicholas Yannelis for their helpful suggestions and Academia Sinica and the National Science Council of the R.O.C. for their indispensable support. Correspondence to: H.-M. Wu     

Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining

We study a complete-information alternating-offer bargaining game in which one “active” player bargains with each of a number of other “passive” players one at a time. In contrast to most existing models, the order of reaching agreements is endogenously determined, hence the active player can “play off” some passive players against others by m oving back and forth bargaining with the passive players. We show that this model has a finite number of Markov Perfect Equilibria, some of which exhibiting wasteful delays. Moreover, the maximum number of delay periods that can be supported in Markov Perfect Equilibria increases in the order of the square of the number of players. We also show that these results are robust to a relaxing of the Markov requirements and to more general surplus functions. Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: August 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"This paper grew out of my dissertation submitted to Stanford University. I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Paul Milgrom, for his insights and guidance. I would also like to thank Douglas Bernheim, Sushil Bikhchandani, Harold Demsetz, Bryan Ellickson, Avner Greif, Peter Hammond, David Levine, Bentley Macleod, Joe Ostroy, John Pencavel, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, David Starrett, Robert Wilson, Bill Zame and especially John Riley and Jeff Zwiebel for their helpful comments. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for extremely constructive suggestions.     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,” i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.” Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974, and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995. RID="*" ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis     

房地产周期、固定资产 投资周期与经济周期的关联性 ——基于货币政策视角下的分析

本文应用TVSTAR方法实证研究了房地产周期、固定资产投资周期与经济周期的关联性，以及货币供给量M0，M1和利率的调整对联动的影响。研究结果显示，经济增长周期与房地产周期间存在显著的区制性特征。在收缩区制，房地产周期的变动是引起CPI周期变动的原因，而固定资产投资周期具有显著的逆经济增长周期的波动特征。在扩张区制，货币供给量M0和M1增加，对稳定经济增长、增加投资和维持房地产市场的繁荣具有积极作用，但持续和过度的宽松货币政策易引发通胀和房地产泡沫，在收缩区制，上述货币政策工具失效。     

Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium

I develop a dynamic model of individual decisionmaking in which the agent derives utility from physical outcomes as well as from rational beliefs about physical outcomes (“anticipation”), and these two payoff components can interact. Beliefs and behavior are jointly determined in a personal equilibrium by the requirement that behavior given past beliefs must be consistent with those beliefs. I explore three phenomena made possible by utility from anticipation, and prove that if the decisionmaker’s behavior is distinguishable from a person’s who cares only about physical outcomes, she must exhibit at least one of these phenomena. First, the decisionmaker can be prone to self-fulfilling expectations. Second, she might be time-inconsistent even if her preferences in all periods are identical. Third, she might exhibit informational preferences, where these preferences are intimately connected to her attitudes toward disappointments. Applications of the framework to reference-dependent preferences, impulsive behaviors, and emotionally difficult choices are discussed.     

Quasi-fundamental exchange rate variation

Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with “quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive probability. Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Monetary policy regimes and beliefs*

This article investigates the role of beliefs over monetary policy in propagating the effects of monetary policy shocks within the context of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. In our model, monetary policy periodically switches between low and high money growth regimes. When individuals are unable to observe the regime directly, they form inferences over regime‐type based on historical money growth rates. For an empirically plausible money growth process, beliefs evolve slowly in the wake of a regime change. As a result, our model is able to capture some of the observed persistence of real and nominal variables following such a regime change.     

Whose money is it anyway? Using prepaid incentives in experimental economics to create a natural environment

Simulating a real world environment is of utmost importance for achieving accurate and meaningful results in experimental economics. Offering monetary incentives is a common method of creating this environment. In general, experimenters provide the rewards at the time of experiment. In this paper, we argue that receiving the reward at the time of the experiment may lead participants to make decisions as if the money they are using were not their own. To solve this problem, we devised a “prepaid mechanism” that encourages participants to use the money as if it were their own.     

On bubbling dynamics generated by a stochastic model of herd behavior

This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular, there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”: limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding” or “epidemic” features. RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions. Correspondence to: L. Gaio     

货币冲击与中国经济波动——基于DSGE模型的数量分析

基于1993~2008年的季度数据,本文在一个包含Calvo价格粘性的新凯恩斯主义模型中,讨论了中国货币冲击与经济增长的关系。在假定货币政策通过调整货币供给增长实施的前提下,本文根据模型模拟和实际数据的对比以及脉冲响应函数分析得出以下结论:(1)货币并非我国经济波动根源,实际产出对货币供给具有一定反馈作用。(2)通货膨胀的顺周期性和领先增长表明中国经济周期存在总需求拉动的特性。物价波动在中短期主要由货币供应量波动引起。(3)货币政策对实体经济有效但效果有限,货币供给变动对投资的作用效力更大,对消费需求刺激有限。     

Reserve requirement, reserve requirement tax and money control in China: 1984–2007

In recent years, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has carried out monetary policy by means of reserve requirement frequently in an effort to hedge the excess liquidity in the banking system. But just like other government taxes, reserve requirement maybe have an optimal required reserve rate (RRR). When the RRR have been raised to the optimal level, the effect of reserve requirement policy in money control and liquidity sterilization should also be withered due to the loss of the “tax base”. Therefore, we establish a theoretical model and analysis framework and make the corresponding econometric test and empirical analysis. The main conclusions are as follows: The optimal RRR in China at present is about 23%. If the RRR is further raised above 23%, the monetary authority should adjust the deposit and loan interest rates, interest margins between deposits and loans and the deposit reserve requirement rate to expand the using scope of the reserve requirement policy. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (10): 37–51     

Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature

During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called “new growth theory”). RID="*" ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker, April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback. Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged.     

The impact of fiscal policy under rational expectations: Some tests

The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically for Canada the implication of the Macro Rational Expectations (MRE) hypothesis that only unanticipated fiscal policy matters for real economic activity. The empirical results generated over the quarterly period 19601 to 1982iv do not reject the MRE hypothesis for Canada. These results, therefore, cast doubts on the appropriateness of using systematic fiscal policy to stabilize the real economy in Canada.     

Real exchange rate shocks on tradables,nontradables, and the current account: Mexico, 1980–2000.

Effects of external and income shocks on consumption and on the current account in Mexico from 1980 to 2000 are investigated. An intertemporal model captures the extent into which non-traded goods consumption affects traded-goods consumption, clarifying the roles of intratemporal or intertemporal substitution. Vector autoregressions (VARs) show that the 1% shock to non-traded goods consumption affects traded-goods consumption by −2% immediately, reverting to zero only after one year, supporting the intratemporal channel. Real exchange rate (RER) shocks exert considerable macroeconomic fluctuations. The 1% shock to RER affects traded goods consumption by −2% immediately, reaching −5% one year later. At the expense of income shocks, RER shocks grow in explanatory power over time: from 20%–25% at 1 quarter to 65%–69% of the variance of traded goods consumption 3 years later. Figures for the current account range from 14% to 68%, while income shocks appear less important. In contrast, for non-traded goods, RER shocks roughly match the quantitative importance of income shocks, reinforcing the theoretical analysis. First version received: June 2001/Final version received: July 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  Previous versions of this paper were presented at the conferences: “Economic and Financial Cycles and NAFTA: Micro and Macro Issues and Analysis” in Mexico City and at the “35^th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Economics Association” in Montréal. I wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for very helpful comments, Steven Ambler, Vincent Dropsy, Jo?o Faria, Michel Normandin, Yoshi Otani, Tsunemasa Shiba and Gerardo Villoslado for comments and encouragement. I remain solely responsible for the shortcomings of this paper. Financial support from the Japanese Ministry of Education and Culture in early parts of this project is gratefully acknowledged.     

Why has US monetary policy become ineffective lately?

Some recent studies show that US monetary policy has lost its stimulative traction, especially since the early 1980s. They argue that the Fed’s forward guidance has enabled economic agents to anticipate the changes in interest rates more accurately. As a result, it is harder to find truly exogenous monetary policy shocks, which has made monetary policy ineffective. In this article, we find that anomalous economic behaviours of financial institutions might be the true reason for the ineffective monetary policy. Our structural vector autoregressive model shows that increases in the US money supply mostly flowed into the financial sector to increase its profits instead of stimulating the real sector of the economy through business investment.     

Nominal uniqueness and money non-neutrality in the limit-price exchange process

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price orders. Money has a positive value except on optimal rest-points where it becomes a ??veil?? and trade vanishes. Typically, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve both in real and in nominal variables. Money is not neutral, either in the short-run or long-run and a localized version of the quantity theory of money holds in the short-run. An optimal money growth rate is derived, which enables monetary trade curves to converge towards Pareto optimal rest-points. Below this growth rate, the economy enters a (sub- optimal) liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineffective; above this threshold inflation rises. Finally, market liquidity, measured through the speed of real trades, can be linked to gains-to-trade, households?? expectations, and the quantity of circulating money.