Examining the effect of IMF conditionality on natural resource policy

Can International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending improve natural resource governance in borrowing countries? While most IMF agreements mandate policy reforms in exchange for financial support, compliance with these reforms is mixed at best. The natural resource sector should be no exception. After all, resource windfalls enable short-term increases in discretionary spending, and office-seeking politicians are often unwilling to forgo this discretion by reforming the oil, gas, or mining sector. I investigate how and when borrowers go against their political interests and establish natural resource funds—a tool often promoted by the IMF—in the wake of a loan agreement. Using text analysis, statistical models, and qualitative evidence from natural resource policy and IMF conditionality for 74 countries between 1980 and 2019, I show that borrowers under an IMF agreement are more likely to create or regulate a resource fund, particularly if the agreement includes binding conditions that highlight the salience of natural resource reforms. This study contributes to extant research by proposing a new method to extract information from IMF conditions, by introducing a novel dataset on country-level natural resource policy, and by identifying under what circumstances international reform efforts can help combat the resource curse.     

The political economy of housing in England

Problems of housing affordability have been afflicting parts of the UK, especially the South East of England, for a number of years. The problem is closely related to shortages in housing supply, which are, in turn, largely associated with constraints imposed by the English land planning system. A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits that they reflect political economy forces that convey the interests of current homeowners to planning decisions in disproportionate and excessively influential ways. We test this theory by examining survey data on public attitudes to house building in local communities; and by investigating whether these attitudes are related to local planning decisions. We find that there is a tendency for owner-occupiers to express greater opposition to local house building and that, in the decade to 2011, the housing stock grew significantly less in local authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households. The results suggest the risk that planning decisions might have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and economically significant. We discuss a range of historical, socio-economic and policy trends that help explain why successive governments of various stripes have been reluctant to address head-on problems in housing supply and put a curb on house prices.     

The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default

Many have argued that democracies are able to make credible commitments to repay their debts and consequently enjoy higher sovereign credit ratings. In contrast to this expectation, I argue that the advantage of democracies in credit ratings is conditional on the countries' level of financial vulnerability and adjustment needs. Because democracies have more diffuse decision-making and are more accountable to the public, they encounter greater difficulty than autocracies in passing unpopular economic adjustment measures. Thus, I argue that democracies with high debt levels and low foreign reserve assets experience worse credit outcomes, whereas democracies with low vulnerability experience more positive outcomes. In a sample of up to 96 developing countries, I show that democracies have worse credit ratings and CDS Spreads and are more likely to default than their autocratic counterparts when foreign reserves are low relative to external debt. Notably, I also show that large debt burdens increase credit risk mainly in more democratic countries. I further test the causal pathway of the democratic advantage by constructing democracy scores of “market-friendly” and “adjustment-difficulty” democracy, finding that democracy worsens debt outcomes due to adjustment difficulty. These findings help to revise and clarify the causal logic surrounding the democratic advantage hypothesis.     

The political economy of state-level adoption of natural resource damage programs

U.S. states can implement programs to pursue damage recovery when firms cause natural resource damages (NRDs). We present new empirical evidence that such programs have effectively reduced oil spills in states that adopt them. However, only 34 states had implemented such programs by 2003. We analyze data on 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1980 to 2003 to ascertain the likely determinants of NRD program adoption. We find that states with many environmental accidents adopt programs more rapidly, while income and interest-group pressure have no significant impact on the process. While non-adopting states might benefit from such programs, at least NRD programs are being adopted most rapidly where they can do the most good.      

The political economy of land reform choices in Central and Eastern Europe

In all Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) land reform has been a key part of the overall agrarian reforms and land reform procedures differ significantly among CEECs. This paper, by focusing on distributional effects and political economy implications, explains why thirteen CEEC governments chose particular reform procedures. Key factors in their choices are the history of the land ownership, including the post-collectivization ownership status, length of Communist rule, the ethnicity of pre-collectivization owners, and the equality of pre-collectivization asset distribution. These factors influence the distributional consequences of the land reform, including the (potential) conflicts between efficiency, social equity, and historical justice, and thus the political economy equilibrium.     

The self and its interests in classical political economy

Because economic affairs involve individual action, they must be understood on the basis of a theory which is both subjective, depending on a conception of individual decision-making and especially private interest, and objective, demonstrating how the objective forces of a system of interaction including a system of production and reproduction shape outcomes of individual action. Economic theory, then, requires a conception of the individual agent or subject of economic activity. In this essay, I explore this conception as it develops in the classical theory exemplified by the work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx.     

Religion and political economy in Saint-Simon

Abstract

The project of Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825) was to complete the French Revolution by a social change in order to eliminate the so-called “feudal-military” system and to bring about a new society which he named “the industrial system”. Everything had to be changed, including religion and its relation to political economy. In this paper, I examine: (i) the recurring problem of religion, raised by Saint-Simon as early as his first text; (ii) the emergence of the economic problem of identifying production with politics; (iii) and finally, the metamorphosis of the Christian religion into a moral and industrial religion.     

The trade wind,the statesman and the system of commerce: Sir James Steuart's vision of political economy

In the conception of history of the abbé de Condillac, one thing is really original. He establishes a causal relation between the functioning of the human mind and the history of societies. First, the understanding of humankind is not disordered: society develops, stages follow one another. But the commercial stage leads societies to divide into classes, the landowners are interested only in frivolous, luxurious objects: they have become denatured. Their behaviour entails society in a long phase of decline. However, this course is not inevitable. Condillac wishes to reform the individual in order to modify society and he proposes economic safeguards capable of reducing disparities. Life is simple, but history is not halted.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

The political economy of public employment programs

What are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs (ALMPs) have to please the employed majority? This issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker–firm wage bargaining. It turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of ALMPs and the political weight attributed to firm interests. If firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure, the employed will opt for excessive program activity.     

Classical political economy: the subsistence wage,and job guarantee concerns

Abstract:

In the theoretical framework of classical political economy, including the revisions of Marx and the more recent work of Piero Sraffa and others, the concept of the subsistence wage figures prominently. Here, following a recounting of this concept and demonstrating its significance not only for classical theory but also for larger social concerns, I argue that the “base wage” (as it is sometimes termed) as articulated within a “Job Guarantee” program, is (or should be) comparable to the subsistence wage but requires modification to make it (roughly) equivalent. It will be demonstrated that adherents of the classical approach did not rest their wage theory on a quasi-neoclassical supply–demand approach (with some primitive marginal productivity notion lying behind a supposed demand for labor schedule), but understood wages as socially determined where institutional and historic forces established a normative standard around which market wages gravitated. Such an approach was shared by, among others, Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes.     

Trade liberalization and political support in transition economies

Most transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have rather surprisingly resisted protectionist pressures-at least during early stages of reform-and pursued fairly liberal trade policies. In this paper, trade policy during transition is explained from a political economy perspective. It is shown that pursuing liberal trade policies can be a rational strategy of reform politicians, maximizing the probability of electoral success.     

Religion and the sociological critique of political economy: Altruism and gift

Abstract

This article shows that there is a strong connection between the religious component of French sociology and the critique of political economy. In the first section, I consider how selfish behaviour, or egoism, became treated as a major threat endangering the creation of industrial society by those concerned about the diffusion of political economy. I then summarise the methodological critique set forth in the Cours, before connecting this critique to the economic content of the Système and the concept of altruism. In the following section, Spencer's view of altruism is contrasted to that held by Comte, and then I consider the reaction of French political economists, defending the moral value bought about by their science. In the final section, I explain how the Comtean approach was re-enacted by Durkheim and then by Mauss, at the head of the “sociology of religion” section of L'Année sociologique, the Durkheimian journal, to give birth to the theory of gift-giving behaviour that Mauss used to critique political economy in the 1920s.     

The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements

Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies – notably the World Bank – often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributes this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., the paper presents evidence that World Bank structural adjustment loan disbursements are less dependent on macroeconomic performance in countries aligned with the United States.     

The place of education in W. S. Jevons's political economy

The paper begins with the question of what became, in Jevons's new economics, of the imperative in classical political economy to educate the masses. Much of the core of classical thought, including the Malthusian principle and the wages-fund theory, together with Mill's new arguments about market failure, rationalized the need for state-supported general education as a benefit to both the labouring classes and society at large. Jevons's strong claim that Ricardo-Mill economics must be abandoned would seem to leave education policy without a strong mooring. However, he re-anchored it in his productivity approach to wage theory, his utility maximization approach to value theory and public works spending, and his empirical analyses of business cycles, the potential of long-term austerity, and poor consumption-saving behaviour of the working classes. The end result was similar to that of classical political economy, a multi-dimensional rationale for a policy of State-supported general education.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.     

The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.     

Moving through the political participation hierarchy: a focus on personal values

This study empirically explores the determinants of political participation. Using data from the European Social Survey, we investigate the relationship between political participation and personal values, using the Schwartz (1992) values inventory. A political participation hierarchy is theorized, and activities are categorized into four levels of participation (none, weak, medium and strong), based on the cost of participating and how unconventional the activity is. Empirical analysis points to individuals who are more open to change and more self-transcendent, being more likely to participate. Sub-sample analysis, contrasting East and West Europe, suggests that the role for personal values is more subdued in the East, with respect to moving individuals from not participating to at least voting. Furthermore, the use of a generalized ordered logit model in this study illustrates the complex nature of many of the determinants of political participation. In particular, we find that the influence of the majority of individual characteristics is not monotonic in nature, as you move up through the political participation hierarchy. These findings are important for researchers and policy-makers who may be interested in understanding determinants of and/or enhancing the level of political participation in an economy.     

The political economy of long-term care

We build a two-dimensional political economy model to explain the provision and financing of long-term care and income redistribution. Voting agents differ in need and income opening up two conflicts: one sets families with disabled parents, who are in favor of a public long-term care program, against the ones without such parents who oppose public financing. The other sets the poor against the rich with the former preferring heavier income taxation than the latter. We show that a structure induced equilibrium always exists and that it is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium. The equilibrium not only explains the negative association of income inequality and long-term care financing but also allows predictions about how demographic change might impact long-term care arrangements and expenses.