Modelling seasonality in residential water demand: the case of Tunisia

This article proposes to model seasonal patterns of residential water demand using the techniques of seasonal integration and cointegration. The methodology is applied to quarterly aggregate time series data for Tunisia (1980–2007), applying the same increasing, multi-step pricing scheme in the whole country. First, a seasonal cointegration analysis demonstrates the relevance of a pricing policy that increases the size of the lower consumption block in summer. Second, the nonseasonal cointegration analysis reveals a relatively high price elasticity for the highest consumption block. Therefore, we also propose to increase the tariff progressivity to promote water savings. This modified pricing scheme will help to achieve goals of environmental protection and social equity.     

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

We consider the design of a nonlinear social tariff for residential water in Côte d'Ivoire, which is a case of a monopolistic private operator supplying a population of heterogeneous consumers. The proposed optimal tariff includes an initial “social” block with a low unit price, and higher consumption blocks with a monopoly pricing rule. This optimal nonlinear tariff is calibrated using econometric estimates of a panel-data residential water demand equation. Welfare changes associated with moving from the actual tariff to approximations of the optimal pricing system are computed under different tariff scenarios. We find that gains in consumer welfare would outweigh losses in producer surplus in a majority of Ivorian local communities.     

Desperately Seeking θ's: Estimating the Distribution of Consumers Under Increasing Block Rates

This paper shows that increasing block rate pricing schedules usually applied by water utilities can reduce the efficiency and equity levels. To do this, we first present a two step method to estimate the demand and to recover the distribution of consumer tastes when increasing block rate pricing is used. We show that in this case the tariff induces a pooling equilibrium and customers with different taste parameters will be observed to choose the same consumption level. Second, we show that a two-part tariff that neither reduces the revenue for the firm nor increases the aggregate level of water consumption increases the welfare and equity levels in relation to an increasing block rates schedule.     

Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets

This paper firstly shows that in a vertically related industry with either domestic upstream monopolist or foreign upstream monopolist, when the upstream firm adopts uniform input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-revenue tariff, if the number of foreign competitors is sufficiently large. Secondly, when domestic upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. Thirdly, when foreign upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff if the sizes of domestic and foreign firms become more unequally distributed.     

Effects on the medical revenue of comprehensive pricing reform in Chinese urban public hospitals after removing drug markups: case of Nanjing

Aims: The State Council of China requires that all urban public hospitals must eliminate drug markups by September 2017, and that hospital drugs must be sold at the purchase price. Nanjing-one of the first provincial capital cities to implement the reform—is studied to evaluate the effects of the comprehensive reform on drug prices in public hospitals, and to explore differential compensation plans.

Methods: Sixteen hospitals were selected, and financial data were collected over the 48-month period before the reform and for 12 months after the reform. An analysis was carried out using a simple linear interrupted time series model.

Results: The average difference ratio of drug surplus fell 13.39% after the reform, and the drug markups were basically eliminated. Revenue from medical services showed a net growth of 28.25%. The overall compensation received from government financial budget and medical service revenue growth was 103.69% for the loss from policy-permitted 15% markup sales, and 116.48% for the net loss. However, there were large differences in compensation levels at different hospitals, ranging from –21.92% to 413.74% by medical services revenue growth, causing the combined rate of both financial and service compensation to vary from 28.87–413.74%, There was a significant positive correlation between the services compensation rate and the proportion of medical service revenue (p?<?.001), and the compensation rate increased by 8% for every 1% increase in the proportion of services revenue.

Discussion: Nanjing’s pricing and compensation reform has basically achieved the policy targets of eliminating the drug markups, promoting the growth of medical services revenue, and adjusting the structure of medical revenue. However, the growth rate of service revenue of hospitals varied significantly from one another.

Conclusions: Nanjing’s reform represents successful pricing and compensation reform in Chinese urban public hospitals. It is recommended that a differentiated and dynamic compensation plan should be established in accordance with the revenue structure of different hospitals.     

OPTIONAL REAL-TIME PRICING OF ELECTRICITY FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS

Abstract. This paper proposes a pricing mechanism, optional real-time pricing (RTP), with day-ahead hourly prices, that exploits the potential offered by a competitive wholesale power market. When an electric utility offers the option to its industrial customers, the retail prices are based on an existing Hopkinson tariff and expectations as to the wholesale market's next-day hourly spot prices. The proposed RTP mechanism is Pareto-superior to the tariff in that it assures both the utility and the customer of profits that will be at least as great as under the tariff.     

Measuring the Impacts of Global Trade Reform with Optimal Aggregators of Distortions

Aggregation of trade distortion measures is essential in applied work, but traditional trade‐weighted average measures are egregiously flawed. This paper shows how appropriate tariff aggregation can overcome underestimation of both efficiency and terms‐of‐trade gains from reform. The improvement is shown to result from better measurement of a distortion effect that is most important in the early stages of reform and a weighting effect that becomes more important as protection is reduced. Applications confirm that the technique can be applied relatively easily, and—with elasticity estimates suggested by the available econometric evidence—point to close to a doubling of the global welfare gains from global trade reform, and dramatic changes in the measured welfare impacts in many individual cases. Sensitivity analysis suggests that, for global trade reform, the ease of substitution between tariff lines is much more important than that between varieties from different countries. We provide an online aggregation tool to allow replication of our analysis or investigation of alternative scenarios for global reform. We hope that this paper will contribute both to wider use of optimal aggregators and improved estimates of the key elasticity parameters.     

Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination

In this paper, I compare two-part tariff competition to linear pricing in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Consumers have identical tastes for quality but differ in their preferences for quantity. The main finding is that quality differentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if two-part tariffs are feasible. Furthermore, two-part tariff competition encourages entry, which in turn increases welfare. Nevertheless, two-part tariff competition decreases consumer surplus compared to linear pricing.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

转轨时期国有企业资产转让价格过低的形成机制分析

转轨国家在大量出售国有企业资产的过程中,都出现了售价过低的现象。针对这一问题,首先从经济学理论入手探求一般意义上的企业资产转让价格过低的形成机制。然后结合转轨国家政治、经济、社会等方面的特殊性,挖掘转轨国家国有企业资产转让价格过低的深层原因。最终得出转轨国家国有企业资产转让价格过低主要是市场机制作用的结果。并且在此基础上,给出我国国有企业主要是国有中小型企业和乡镇企业产权改革的一些参考建议。     

Efficiency, equity, and sustainability in a water quantity-quality optimization model in the Rio Grande basin

Integrated hydrologic and economic optimization models at the basin scale provide a framework for policy design, implementation, and evaluation in water-stressed basins. Despite the considerable potential that basin scale analysis offers, few basin-wide studies have examined tradeoffs among efficiency, equity, and sustainability when analyzing the design of water resource programs. This paper develops a basin scale framework to identify hydrologic and economic impacts of alternative water pricing programs that comply with environmental regulations for protecting water quality. Key issues are examined that confront integrated hydroeconomic basin models: linking water and economics, spatial and temporal scale integration, and quantity-quality relationships. Economic efficiency is defined and measured for each of two urban water pricing arrangements that comply with urban water quality protection regulations. Alternative measures of equity are analyzed in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Sustainability is evaluated physically for protecting the water supply and financially for long-term revenue viability. The approach is illustrated from results of a dynamic nonlinear programming optimization model of water use in North America's Rio Grande basin. The model optimizes the net present value of the basin's total economic benefits subject to constraints on equity, sustainability, hydrology, and institutions. It is applied to assess impacts of a two-tiered pricing program that complies with recently implemented drinking water quality standards for the basin's two largest U.S. cities: Albuquerque, New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas. Results suggest that two-tiered pricing of urban water supply has considerable potential to perform well in meeting the aims of efficiency, equity, and sustainability. Findings provide a general framework for designing water pricing programs that comply with environmental regulations.     

Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?

In many preferential trade agreements (PTAs), countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non-trade issues such as labour and environmental standards, intellectual property, etc. We provide a model of PTAs motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues and analyse its implications for global free trade and welfare. We find that such PTAs increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade. This occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in PTAs and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them. By explicitly modelling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations, we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model's key prediction. The welfare analysis shows that the current World Trade Organization rules allowing this type of PTAs may be optimal for economically large countries, thus the model can predict the rules we observe. We also analyse alternative rules that constitute a Pareto improvement.     

The Role of Gatt in Trade Negotiations: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the role of GATT in tariff negotiations, without narrowly interpreting GATT as an agreement. This paper, which establishes a game model where two nations are involved in tariff negotiations, shows the following points. First, free trade is difficult to realize even in a world with complete information. Second, GATT can serve as a mechanism for nations to find a particular cooperative tariff under incomplete information. Third, gradual tariff reduction can be explained as the interaction between the gradual decline of domestic political pressure and multilateral tariff negotiations under GATT. [F13]     

All you can drink: should we worry about quality?

“All you can drink” specials are forbidden by law in several places. Authorities claim that establishments tend to offer low quality drinks when they use this type of promotion. In this paper, I elaborate a model to determine whether a monopolist produces higher or lower quality goods when using buffet pricing (all you can drink) instead of a two-part tariff. I find that the more profitable strategy is usually associated with a higher quality good than the less profitable strategy. However, under certain conditions buffet pricing is more profitable and leads to lower quality goods than the alternative.      

When does tiered wholesale pricing create an incentive to reduce retail prices?

Wholesale ‘ladder pricing’ involves setting the wholesale price retailers face as a nonlinear (generally increasing) function of price chosen by retailers. This form of wholesale pricing occurred recently in UK Telecoms, and the issue became extensively debated in the law courts. A major concern in deciding the merits of the case lay with the question of whether or not the introduction of tiered wholesale pricing created incentives for retailers to actually reduce their prices. This paper examines the incentive for the case where the wholesale tariff is a non-linear continuous differentiable function. It is shown that so long as the tariff is strictly increasing, convex, and positive only for retail prices greater than the maximum retailer marginal cost, then there is indeed an incentive to reduce price, whatever the actual gradient of the tariff schedule.     

Complementarity between water pricing, water rights and local water governance: A Bayesian analysis of choice behaviour of farmers in the Krishna river basin, India

To ensure efficient water allocation and use, policy designers have adopted various strategies, including price setting, decentralising irrigation water management or improving water rights. Most of these strategies have been applied individually, without considering the complementary relationships between them. This paper uses a discrete choice model to analyse the scope for combinations of tools for irrigation water demand management and farmers' acceptance of these. In terms of local irrigation water governance, the presence or absence of collective irrigation water management, in the form of a Water Users Association, is considered. Water rights are specified in terms of the duration and quality of the entitlement and its transferability. Finally, four types of water pricing methods (area, crop, block and volumetric pricing) are considered. Using a choice experiment, we elicit the most preferred water pricing method, under different water rights situations, at different price levels and under various contexts for local irrigation water governance. Our results indicated that under conditions of improved water rights, preference for volumetric pricing increases, whilst the presence of a Water Users Association reduces this preference. Furthermore, it was found that using an appropriate combination of water demand management tools considerably increases the willingness to pay for a change in scenario.     

Ex post vs. ex ante pricing: Optional calling plans and tapered tariffs

We study optimal nonuniform pricing in a setting where a customer's demand at the start of a billing period contains a random variable whose realization becomes known by the end of the billing period. In this context, an optional calling plan is a tariff which the consumer must select based on his/her expectations about the random variable, whereas, under a tapered tariff, the consumer's choice of usage charge is made after he/she knows the realization of the random variable. We show that for low to moderate levels of uncertainty about the random variable entering the demand function, the optional calling plan approach to nonuniform pricing yields higher expected profit than does the tapered tariff approach, given risk-neutral consumers. We illustrate this finding with a case study and argue that it is consistent with the historical evolution of tariffs in the interexchange telecommunications market.     

基于完全成本的水利工程供水价格研究

文章阐述了合理制订水利工程供水价格的重要意义,通过建立水资源完全成本定价模型,对工程供水成本进行测算分析,制订完全成本水价区间,为合理制订水价提供科学依据,同时提出了相应的配套政策措施。     

买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策

本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式（线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持（RPM））之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优干RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。