Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on the public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 715–731.     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Intellectual property rights as development determinants

Abstract While intellectual property rights (IPRs) are the key drivers of economic performance in R&D based growth models, they have not been fully explored in empirical development studies. We introduce IPRs to this literature, using Two‐Stage Least Squares Bayesian Model Averaging to address endogeneity and model uncertainty at the instrument and income stages. We show that IPRs exert effects similar to ‘Rule of Law’ and therefore provide robust evidence that both physical and intellectual property rights are crucial development determinants. We document that unenforced IPRs exert no effect on development. Instead, it is the level of enforced IPRs that causes development.     

Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy

Abstract.  We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.     

Institutions,governance and incentives in common property regimes for African rangelands

The general distinctions between open access, state property, common property and private property are now well established in the academic literature. When applied to African rangelands, however, common property admits a wide variety of resource management regimes. To formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the structure and operations of particular regimes. In this paper we discuss three examples of common property regimes, two from the southern African nation of Lesotho and one from the west African nation of Senegal, to illustrate some of the key characteristics of common property regimes. In particular, it is important to understand the structure of governance, the types of institutions that govern behavior, and the compatibility between governance, institutions and individual incentives. A common property regime can only be effective if its institutions are compatible with the structure of governance. The extent of its effectiveness also depends upon the incentives and expectations of individuals expected to enforce the rules of the institutions or comply with their terms. At present, most African governments lack the organizational capacity and political will necessary to implement state property regimes, official regulations on resource use, or individual property rights for rangelands resources. In many cases it is more appropriate for governments to define and enforce group rights to particular resources, then help to establish conditions in which internal group dynamics yield efficient resource management outcomes.     

Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis

This paper provides a framework with which to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We focus on an important trade-off facing modern firms: firms can acquire the property of all the innovations developed by their employees and can greatly increase their profits, yet this type of private intellectual property rights regime can discourage the innovative effort of the very same workers. Allowing workers to carry their knowledge outside the firm eliminates this disincentive. Hence, strategic complementarities may exist between innovative partners and a disclosure driven intellectual property rights regime, and passive employees and a private intellectual property rights regime. An evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates these strategic complementarities and shows when economies tend towards disclosure driven or private intellectual property rights regimes.     

Private R&;D and Spillovers in European Agriculture

The objective of this paper is to present econometric evidence of the effects of economic incentives, public policies, and institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments. The main hypothesis we will test in this paper is whether agricultural R&D spillovers represent a disincentive for national private R&D. More specifically, we will test if the spillovers function, which is a determinant of private R&D, follows a quadratic form and if private R&D is determined by the role of incentives and institutions.A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, 10–14 March 2004. Comments from participants have been very useful to improve the paper.     

知识产权保护能促进经济增长吗？--基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析

在Ginarte-Park方法的基础上,考虑到处于司法转型期的发展中国家的执法力度和立法强度,建立知识产权保护强度指标体系,将中国30个省、自治区、直辖市知识产权保护水平量化。接着运用面板数据分析方法,以人均实际GDP对数为被解释变量,以知识产权保护强度为解释变量,通过实证分析验证了我国加强知识产权保护与经济增长的关系,证明了中国的知识产权保护水平与经济增长之间的显著正相关关系。然后对东中西部地区分别进行实证分析,绘制了异常经济增长与知识产权保护强度的散点图,来作为稳健性检验的一部分。并通过对变量的相关系数矩阵图的分析,初步探讨了知识产权保护促进经济增长的具体路径。结果表明,在控制了时间效应后,知识产权保护强度能够解释省份个体效应的37.4%。     

When should market-supporting institutions be established?

Market-supporting institutions play an essential role in successfulmarket economies, yet much remains unanswered about when inthe course of economic development those institutions shouldbe established. This article develops a model that shows howprivate sector growth can depend on the time at which a countryestablishes institutions belonging to a specific category: thosethat have the potential not only to enhance efficiency, butto threaten private property rights by facilitating income redistribution(e.g., agencies to enforce regulations and tax laws). If a countryhas no difficulty committing to secure property rights, it isefficient to establish potentially efficiency-enhancing institutionsas soon as possible. In the presence of commitment problems,however, eventually desirable institutions (even those essentialfor economic growth) can derail growth if established prematurely.Restricting voting rights may have positive or negative effectson growth, and there exist potential complementarities betweendemocracy and efficiency-enhancing institutions.     

Spring cleaning: rural water impacts, valuation, and property rights institutions

Using a randomized evaluation in Kenya, we measure health impacts of spring protection, an investment that improves source water quality. We also estimate households' valuation of spring protection and simulate the welfare impacts of alternatives to the current system of common property rights in water, which limits incentives for private investment. Spring infrastructure investments reduce fecal contamination by 66%, but household water quality improves less, due to recontamination. Child diarrhea falls by one quarter. Travel-cost based revealed preference estimates of households' valuations are much smaller than both stated preference valuations and health planners' valuations, and are consistent with models in which the demand for health is highly income elastic. We estimate that private property norms would generate little additional investment while imposing large static costs due to above-marginal-cost pricing, private property would function better at higher income levels or under water scarcity, and alternative institutions could yield Pareto improvements.     

论我国知识产权战略中的政府角色定位

提高知识产权的利用、保护与管理能力,已成为维护国家利益和经济安全的战略性武器。知识产权制度的非理性扩张,使得政府作用的介入成为一种必然。当前我国正处于紧锣密鼓的知识产权战略制定过程中,政府的角色定位宜比拟为孵化器,通过培育私权精神和促进经济效益,从国内、国际两个层面作出合理选择和战略安排,才能更好地促进我国知识产权战略的运用。     

知识产权保护的技术创新效应——基于技术交易市场视角和省级面板数据的实证分析

文章利用1997-2008年省级面板数据,以技术市场成交额占当地GDP的比重来衡量地区知识产权保护水平,采用系统广义矩估计和门槛回归方法实证分析了知识产权保护对技术创新的影响。研究结果表明,加强知识产权保护能够显著促进技术创新;知识产权保护与研发物质资本和人力资本投入之间分别具有互补性和替代性;我国大部分地区已经跨越了知识产权保护水平的门槛值,加强知识产权保护不会阻碍技术创新。因此,要提高我国的自主创新能力,进一步加强知识产权保护不容懈怠。     

Cambodia: Rapid Growth with Weak Institutions

This paper examines Cambodia's socioeconomic development since the early 1990s peace settlement. The country's economic growth has arguably been the fastest among post‐conflict societies, driven by the credible restoration of peace and security, large public and private capital inflows, economic openness, reasonably prudent macroeconomic management, and a dynamic, integrating neighborhood. A legacy of history and small size is that the government has limited policy space, although this has not necessarily retarded economic development. We also highlight some key challenges, including rising inequality, uneven spatial development, weak institutions, and high levels of corruption. Looking forward, we highlight the importance of strengthening supply side capabilities, broadening the benefits of growth, and developing stronger institutions and property rights.     

南京市科技型小微企业知识产权质押融资主体职能演化分析

利用Bicomb软件提取政策文本中与南京市知识产权质押融资相关的高频关键词,并运用社会网络分析方法绘制出南京市知识产权质押融资网络图,在此基础上对政府、银行以及其它主体的子网络演化特征进行剖析。结果发现,南京市相关政策已经呈现出由补贴融资成本型转向创造融资环境型的演化趋势;银行的专业性逐步提升,但是风险容忍度并没有显著改善;投资机构与金融机构的合作进一步深化,投贷联动将成为南京市知识产权质押融资的新方向。     

On the strength of intellectual property protection that nations provide

Researchers studying the commitment of countries to intellectual property rights run into the claim that the technology-haves (the developed countries) opt for relatively stronger protection of intellectual property, whereas the technology-have-nots (the developing countries) opt for weaker protection. It is but a short step from this assertion to the claim that this results in huge trade losses for the former. Using cross-national panel data for 1981–2000 we find that the evidence is only weakly consistent with this conjecture at best; and that the technology-have-nots more likely provided weaker protection due to paucity of financial resources and human capital, and their inward-looking trade-orientation.     

The Control of Invasive Species on Private Property with Neighbor-to-Neighbor Spillovers

Invasive pests cross property boundaries. Property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion. Each property manager has a right to future use of his own property, but his property may abut others’ properties enabling spread of an invasive species. The incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention. We consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated, discrete control activities. We find that higher rates of dispersal, associated with proximity to neighboring properties, reduce the private incentives for control. Controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location. Control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker-link public good problem, in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity. Future-use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of Coase-like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion. Pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects. A tax with a strong income effect (e.g., failure of effective revenue recycling) can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one’s own property.     

控制权与激励的冲突——兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析

控制权配置与激励安排是组织治理中的两个重要工具,本文首先从组织中委托人私人收益角度分析委托人控制权与代理人激励之间可能的冲突,进而通过上市公司数据对这一冲突关系进行经验检验。我们的研究发现,中国上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在显著的冲突,而且这种冲突与股权性质、公司成长速度相关。民营控股公司中的冲突程度显著弱于其他类型公司,国资委控股公司中的冲突显著强于其他类型公司;而公司成长速度越快,大股东控制权与管理层激励之间的冲突越强。本文的研究结果能够很好地解释中国上市国有企业中股权激励效果不显著、甚至出现负效应的经验现象,并由此提出相应的政策建议。     

我国国防知识产权质押融资模式与政策研究

国防知识产权作为国防科技工业创新发展的基础,是落实军民融合国家战略的重要保障。国防知识产权质押融资能够有效拓宽军工企业融资渠道,解决国防知识产权成果转化过程中大量资金需求与单一融资渠道的矛盾,提高国防知识产权转化运用效率。基于军民融合战略,从我国知识产权质押融资现状着手,剖析国防知识产权质押融资在目前体制下的制约因素,通过对国外军民融合发展过程中知识产权质押融资制度建设的研究,构建我国国防知识产权质押融资模式总体框架,阐述所涉及各机构、部门的职责,并提出相应政策建议,以期释放我国国防知识产权利用潜能,促进军民融合深度发展。     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

Governance Reforms and Growth: Some Ideas from Economic Theory

Ideas from the theory of incentives and organization are deployed to examine how some aspects of economic governance—primarily protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and oversight regulation—can be improved for achieving better economic growth and development. Some suggestions for reform of governance institutions in developing countries are offered.