Managerial risks and rewards in public enterprises

This essay explores a twofold problem: from the standpoint of the community, what is the appropriate attitude for managers of a public enterprise to have toward decisions with uncertain outcomes; and what is implied for the managerial rewards or penalties that are required to induce managers to adopt that attitude. Taking a theorem of Arrow's as a point of departure, the essay argues that managers should be induced to maximize expected benefit. With the aid of “career” and “bonus” functions, implications for managerial rewards and penalties are explored under     

“Large” versus “Small” Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks

What is the role of “large players” (e.g., hedge funds) in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest‐rate differentials. We propose a model in which large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, because interest rates did not increase.     

Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A “desensitizer” from uncertainty

In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player’s bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation.     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.     

At the crossroads of “futurism” and “prospective”: Towards a Canadian synthesis?

North American “future studies” and the French concept of “prospective” have been integrated to provide the basis for an attempted “Canadian Synthesis” in the approach developed by the Montreal-based think-tank, the Gamma Institute. In this paper the founding president of Gamma outlines the four stages of the approach in a conceptual framework entitled the “Chronospace” and illustrates its applicability by referring to some of Gamma's projects in the last 12 years.     

The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and “Rational Learning”

D. Blackwell and L. Dubins (1962, Ann. Math. Statist.38, 882–886) showed that opinions merge when priors are absolutely continuous. E. Kalai and E. Lehrer (1993, Econometrica61, 1019–1045) use this result to show that players in a repeated game eventually play like a Nash equilibrium. We provide an alternative proof of merging of opinions that clarifies the role of absolute continuity while casting doubt on the relevance of the result. Persistent disagreement, the opposite of merging, allows the construction of a sequence of mutually favorable “bets.” By a law of large numbers, both agents are certain they will win these bets on average. This certain disagreement violates absolute continuity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C11, C69, C72, D83.     

The “similarity” and “heterogeneity” theses in studying innovation: evidence from the end-of-life vehicle case

The paper seeks to understand how eight companies in the European car industry responded to changing business conditions under the threat of regulation on the waste problem of end-of-life vehicles. It was observed that the companies pursued diverging innovation tracks in dealing with the regulatory pressure, although competing in the same markets and subject to similar regulatory pressure. The case is interesting to consider in the light of recent discussions of differences in styles of innovation. The question then is whether any sort of style of innovation may be distinguished in the diverging innovation tracks. The objective of the paper is to add to these discussions by considering the results of this case study in the light of “similarity” and heterogeneity hypotheses that may be advanced around “styles” of innovation.     

Accumulative pollution, “clean technology,” and policy design

This paper addresses the optimal long-term management of an accumulative but assimilable pollutant through economic incentive policies that restrict more damaging production processes and induce more benign alternatives. Using a simple general equilibrium approach, we consider the possibility that the assimilative capacity of the environment is eventually exhausted by pollution accumulation. In this case, there is a nonconvexity in the problem that gives rise to multiple potential optima; environmental quality may be preserved or completely degraded in the long term. We characterize the circumstances under which phasing out dirty production is consistent with an intertemporally optimizing path and we discuss the design of price-based and quantity-based policies for supporting an optimal solution with the nonconvexity.     

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information

We characterize equilibria in a private‐provision public‐good game where individuals are allowed arbitrary contribution levels and the level of the public good equals the least contribution made by an individual. Equilibrium comparative statics are derived for the interim Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. First, improvements in the cost distribution of even only one player benefit all. Second, even with such “weakest‐link” public goods, for which greater similarity of preferences would seem to facilitate coordination, decreased heterogeneity can actually decrease payoffs. Indeed, increasing the riskiness of cost distributions has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Two mechanisms are provided for improving equilibrium payoffs: Technology transfer and cheap‐talk communication. While substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that (a) technology transfer may be futile if a “regularity” condition is not satisfied and (b) cheap talk may be useless if the language for communication is not sufficiently rich.     

Stabilizations, crises and the “exit” problem – A theoretical model

Exchange-rate-based stabilizations, even if successful, usually lack credibility initially. This is reflected in high (ex post) real interest rates and some degree of real exchange rate appreciation. Empirical observation suggests that wage inflation declines smoothly over time whilst interest rates are volatile. Our model captures these features and provides insights into: the eruption of exchange rate crises after a long period of apparently successful stabilization; the potential advantages of a heterodox approach; when to delay a stabilization attempt; and the optimal date for “exit” to a floating exchange rate.     

Picking “Lemons” or Picking “Cherries”? Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Norwegian Manufacturing*

We compare the performance in employment, wages and productivity for domestic plants acquired by new domestic and foreign owners. Prospective foreign owners pick large, high‐wage, high‐productivity plants, while new domestic owners choose average performers of above‐average size. Employment, labour productivity, and total factor productivity decline in domestic acquisition targets before acquisitions; only wages recover afterwards. Employment, wages and labour productivity increase after foreign acquisitions. The sample selection introduced by long‐term comparisons and a focus on unique events introduces a downward bias into the results for domestic acquisitions and an upward bias for the foreign acquisitions.     

WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF-INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT*

We develop a model of political support seeking politicians and support supplying voters. Based on Downs' original formulation, the framework yields endogenous political weights with both liberal and conservative properties. Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self-interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns. We show that the “altruistic” aspect of government behavior is consistent with its “self-interested” behavior. We determine that the Olson-Becker pressure group model is not unique. An increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy. Smaller groups receive a larger per capita subsidy. These results are consistent with Becker's model.