Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups

The governing bodies of the telecommunications industry instituted a major shift from rate of return to price cap regulation in an effort to foster competition and improve efficiency. This paper focuses on the local exchange market and examines the price markup before and after the implementation of price cap regulation to measure the effects of the change on consumer welfare. The average price markup increased slightly after price cap regulation; however, the average price decreased, indicating that consumers benefited without firms losing from the regulatory shift.      

Downstream price-cap regulation and upstream market power

Under “partial separation,” it is increasingly common for a utility’s upstream affiliate (e.g., an electric generation supplier) to be unregulated while its downstream affiliate (e.g., the distribution company offering retail service) is subject to regulation. When choosing the optimal form of downstream regulation, regulators may be confronted with the potential exercise of market power by the upstream affiliate. This paper finds that the imposition of a downstream price cap with an appropriate profit-sharing rate can eliminate the upstream affiliate’s exercise of market power. However, it is less desirable to fully mitigate affiliate market power when upstream rivals also behave strategically.      

The core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility

Summary. This paper studies the core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for core existence in a general m-buyer n-seller market with indivisibility. When costs are dominated by opportunity costs (i.e., a firm's variable costs are sufficiently small), the core condition can be characterized by the primitive market parameters. In a 3-2 market with opportunity cost, the core is non-empty if and only if the larger seller's opportunity cost is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 22, 1999     

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.     

Estimating demand curve in the Korean VoIP telecommunications market

The VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) market in Korea is showing rapid growth since domestic carriers initiated the service in 2006. These carriers are now seeking new revenue sources from various convergence services and are increasing investment into VoIP. In particular, local exchange carriers (LECs), formerly reluctant to invest in technologies that would cannibalize their local telephone revenue, have started to invest in VoIP, in recognition of the current convergence of media and the telecommunications industry, as well as in the face of intensifying competition. In this study, we determined that VoIP call rates and landline telephony call rates were the most important factors affecting VoIP call demand, in addition to network externality. We also verified that landline telephony is no longer a supplement to VoIP, but rather, a substitute that has considerable influence on VoIP call demand. Empirical evidence is expected to be considered in policy decision making on current issues in the IT industry, such as access prices or competitiveness assessment. The current empirical analysis on the Korean VoIP industry and the adherence to lessons learned from policy enforcement should provide valuable information to countries seeking to develop their own VoIP industries, as well as to businesses developing new strategies based on the VoIP market.     

An econometric analysis of the effects of market liberalization on price dynamics and price volatility

The paper investigates price dynamics under market liberalization, with a focus on the effects of lowering price floors. We analyze price dynamics by specifying and estimating a dynamic Tobit model under time-varying volatility, where the market price is censored by a government-set support price. The model is applied to the U.S. butter market over the last three decades. The econometric results show how the price support program affects both expected prices and the volatility of prices. It is found that the censoring effects of a price support program can be significant and large even if the price support is set relatively low.

Efficiency versus social optimality: The case of telecommunications pricing

Standard arguments for efficiency-based pricing policies break down once it is admitted that no lump-sum transfers and taxes are available. In this paper, it is argued that the appropriate solution is to equate the marginal welfare cost of redistributing income through pricing policies that deviate from marginal cost with the marginal cost of redistribution through the tax and welfare systems. For telecommunications pricing, this solution may be implemented by charging usage prices for long-distance services in excess of marginal cost and making corresponding reductions in fixed access charges. An illustrative example, based on data for Australia, is presented.     

Market structure and market performance in E-commerce

We analyze the interaction between market structure and market performance and how it varies over the product cycle. To account for the potential endogeneity in this relation, we use an instrumental variable approach. We combine data from the largest Austrian online market for price comparisons with retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware producer for consumer electronics. Our results show that instrumenting is important for estimating the empirical effect of competition on the markup of the price leader. One more firm in the market is associated with a reduction of the price leader׳s markup which is equivalent to competition between existing firms for an additional 3 weeks in the product life cycle. Our results support search theoretic models and contradict models of monopolistic competition. Moreover our results support the existence of price dynamics over the product cycle. They also highlight the substitutability between newly innovated and old expiring technologies and how it varies with respect to competitors׳ and own brand innovations.     

矿业权市场效果的博弈分析

在矿业权有偿制度确立之前,政府曾花去大量的人力、物力、财力监管矿山企业的"三率"指标.但收效甚微,并且导致影响矿产业航向的矿产品价格也严重扭曲.运用博弈论分析发现,矿业权市场竞争机制是一种能让矿业企业自觉改善"三率"指标、理顺矿产品价格的有效的自我实施机制.     

The changing structure of cost and demand for the U.S. telecommunications industry

This paper formulates a multiproduct structural model to examine the evolution of the structures of production and demand and their dynamic interaction, over an extended period, 1935–1987, in the U.S. telecommunications industry. We estimate the degree of scale economies, cost elasticities, input price elasticities and the determinants of demand for outputs and for various factors of production. The contributions of the quasi-fixed inputs, such as R&D and physical capital, in the evolution of this industry are evaluated. A number of important issues like the changing characteristics of demand for and cost of local and toll services and the variation of price–cost margin over time are examined under different economic conditions, market structures and regulatory environments. We also analyze the effects of the 1984 divestiture of the Bell System on the cost structure, employment and capital formation of the U.S. telecommunications industry.     

土地囤积对房地产市场绩效的影响机制研究

本文针对当前大量存在的土地闲置现象,建立一个以投机为主要目的的土地囤积模型,证明了在高度寡占的房地产市场中,由于地价上涨预期的存在,大房地产企业前期囤积剩下的闲置土地,在未来会更多的用来倒卖而不是生产,导致整个房地产行业的生产成本并没有因为土地囤积而得到明显降低,因而也没有起到平抑房价的作用。囤积土地却因此拉开了企业之间的成本差距,作为其扩张市场的一个重要手段,大房地产企业市场势力进一步增强,造成了房地产行业市场集中度的上升。同时发现土地囤积并进一步倒卖得到的土地转让收入也是房地产企业利润的一个重要来源。最后利用动态面版系统GMM估计对土地囤积对房价、土地转让收入和房地产企业利润的影响进行了计量检验,结果也基本支持了上述结论。     

The network of networks: Localized technological change in telecommunications and productivity growth

Radical innovations in the usage of telecommunication services have drastically changed the role of telecommunications in the economy. Today the usage of telecommunications services is associated with the opportunity to extract significant quasi-rents. An empirical analysis of the Italian case in the mid-eighties confirms the significant difference between telecommunications cost share and marginal productivity levels. The opportunity to reap transient quasi-rents has in turn pushed users to innovate so as to become major players in the arena of technological change in telecommunications and information technologies. In this context the notion of network of networks, implemented in the European Union, seems most appropriate to push the dynamic efficiency of the system and accommodate both centrifugal and centripetal innovations, yet also to retain network interoperability and interconnectivity.     

An assessment of telecommunications reform in developing countries

This paper analyzes the impact of policy reform in basic telecommunications on sectoral performance using a new panel data set for 86 developing countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1985 to 1999. We address three questions. First, what impact do specific policy changes—relating to ownership and competition—have on sectoral performance? Second, how is the impact of change in any one policy affected by the implementation of the other, and by the overall regulatory framework? Third, does the sequence in which reforms are implemented affect performance? We find that both privatization and competition lead to significant improvements in performance. But a comprehensive reform program, involving both policies and the support of an independent regulator, produced the largest gains: an 8 percent higher level of mainlines and a 21 percent higher level of labor productivity compared to years of partial and no reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform matters: mainline penetration is lower if competition is introduced after privatization, rather than at the same time.     

Technical efficiency, market share and profitability of manufacturing firms in Cote d'Ivoire: the technology trap

This paper investigates the sources of inefficiency of firmsin Côte d'Ivoire and examines to what extent these effectstranslate into poor performance. A large majority of firms istechnically inefficient, producing far below the maximum attainableoutput level. Major cost savings can also be realised throughenlarging the scale of activities of firms. Efficiency gainsand scale advantages translate into a better competitive positionand via their impact on market share into higher profitability.However, severe growth barriers and imperfect markets keep firmsfrom realising these gains and prevent firms from catching upin technology with respect to their larger, older and oftenforeign-owned competitors.     

Government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market: the case of China

We show that the many unusual features of China’s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes.     

Price competition in the market for business telecommunications services

We estimate a two-step control-function model that relates incumbent prices for small-business telecommunications services to the number of facilities-based entrants, cost, demand, regulatory conditions, and a correction for endogenous market structure. Results show that the price effects from entry are understated in ordinary least squares regressions. When controlling for endogeneity, prices are negatively related to the number of entrants, indicating that markets without a competitive presence could exhibit market power. These findings should prove helpful to the Federal Communications Commission and other State regulators determining the conditions under which price and other forms of regulation may be relaxed.     

Analysis of price competition and strategic implications for heterogeneous market structure

This paper examines strategic competition behavior in heterogeneous market structure where both conventional offline and online firms coexist in equilibrium and draws strategic implications with some remarks on welfare. Research on the price competition between conventional offline and online firms has been done through empirical approaches; however, the results are conflicting. This paper reconciles the existing conflicting empirical findings on price levels between conventional offline and online firms through a theoretical approach. We find that as the online market matures, prices in both conventional and online firms drop, and the price in the online firm can be higher than that in a conventional offline firm. Furthermore, if convenience associated with the online increases, the online price tends to exceed the conventional offline price.     

The economic impact of telecommunications diffusion on UK productivity growth

This paper investigates the relationship between telecommunications infrastructure competition, investment and productivity. Using a novel methodology comprising of econometric modelling and input–output economics, the extent to which telecommunications has contributed to national and sectoral productivity performance is examined. The main findings from this paper suggest that most industries have benefited from the incorporation of advances of telecommunications technology, which might have, amongst other things, emanated from encouraging infrastructure investment, in their production processes.     

基于我国成品油定价机制的石油双寡头行为分析

我国成品油定价实行最高零售限价已三年有余,价格管制在平抑国际油价冲击的同时也产生许多问题,管制效果备受争议,政府的补贴政策也饱受诟病.基于成品油最高零售限价,石油双寡头、寡头与政府之间的博弈行为表明:最高零售限价不能解决高油价问题,对形成成品油市场的竞争格局作用不大,而且政府在与石油寡头的博弈中处于弱势地位,针对国有石油企业的补贴政策将造成财政资金的浪费.我国成品油定价改革方向为市场定价,根本问题是尚未形成垄断竞争的市场格局.成品油定价改革应在培育垄断竞争格局的基础上,改革燃油税为从价计征、完善石油储备体系,为市场化定价改革铺平道路.     

Exploring the market for breakthrough technologies

In this article, the gap between futures research (long term) and market research (short term) is closed in two ways. Firstly, by describing methods of market exploration that can be used earlier on in the process of development and diffusion of breakthrough technologies, so market research can be applied along with futures research. Secondly, the gap is closed by actually combining futures research and market research. We start the article from the perspective of the market research discipline and describe the problems in market research that require new approaches. The validity of market research results is often low when breakthrough technologies enter the market. To investigate this problem, assumptions for valid market research results are presented. In some cases, when breakthrough technologies first enter the market, these assumptions do not hold and market research becomes problematic whereas in other cases customers' needs and preferences are not an issue at all and attention focuses on technological issues. Potential solutions to explore the market in the former cases are suggested. Four approaches are distinguished: (1) adapting existing methods; (2) combining consumer research with market structure analysis or futures research; (3) using theoretic models; and (4) probe and learn approaches. These approaches require different subsets of assumptions and are therefore applicable in different situations.