A State Within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948–1973)

In this paper we analyse certain periods in the history of the Bundesbank concentrating on the determinants of central bank independence as suggested in the literature. The Bundesbank law of 1957 was born only after a long and tedious political process which outcome was initially not at all clear. It is concluded that some determinants outlined in the literature played indeed a role in the making of the Bundesbank Law of 1957. Still, the Bundesbank was put in charge of the Dmark by the Allieds and this proved to be advantagous for the new institution, as was the subsequent debate about federalism. We argue that popular backing is one of the important forces in support of the Bundesbank's independence. However, this support is not exogenous, as the Bundesbank has always tried to influence public opinion. Our analysis of the conflicts between the Bundesbank and the federal government over monetary policy suggest that if a conflict concerned interest rate policy, the Bundesbank always got its way. Even with respect to exchange rate policy, which is primarily in the realm of the federal government, the position of the Bundesbank often prevailed, as the Bundesbank behaved skilfully. The history of the Bundesbank also provides ample evidence of coordination problems with fiscal policy that may arise with two independent players. Finally, it is clear that the theory on the determinants of central bank independence overlooks that very often the government and the Bundesbank were not two monolithic entities, but that there were different views about policy.     

Lessons from the ECB Experience: Frankfurt Still Matters!

This paper compares the European Central Bank's (ECB) conduct of monetary policy (1999–2005) with that of the Bundesbank (after the German Unification: 1990–1998) in order to test the hypothesis of an ECB with 'Bundesbank's preferences' put forward in the theoretical literature ( Alesina and Grilli, 1993 ; Fatum, 2006 ). Econometric tests and simulations based on monetary policy reaction functions show that the continuation of the former Bundesbank regime is supported by the data. Given this empirical evidence we discuss the lessons for future Monetary Unions stemming from the ECB experience.     

Disease and development: The role of life expectancy reconsidered

This note estimates the causal effect of life expectancy on per capita income and tests the hypothesis of a non-monotonic effect using finite mixture models. The results confirm the hypothesis and qualify recent evidence for a negative effect by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

Is the Bundesbank different from other central banks: A study based onP *

An important question for the future of European Monetary Union is whether the central banks of the European member states are fundamentally similar or are there real differences between them. Much casual evidence seems to suggest that the Bundesbank is fundamentally different in its method of operation from the other central banks. This paper attempts to find econometric evidence which may clarify this situation. It proceeds by drawing on theP ^* literature, which models the determination of inflation, and recent developments in the cointegration literature which allows a more complete treatment of causality than has hitherto been possible. It is argued that there does appear to be evidence that the Bundesbank operates in a qualitatively different way from the other Banks.     

Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality

We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here to have strong empirical support as exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade’s cross-country studies of financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability and weak democracy are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff’s (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability – Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks’ (2005) work, and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability – persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes. Political instability’s significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960s, the period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Optimal stopping with dynamic variational preferences

We solve optimal stopping problems in uncertain environments for agents assessing utility by virtue of dynamic variational preferences as in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) [16] or, equivalently, assessing risk in terms of dynamic convex risk measures as in Cheridito, Delbaen and Kupper (2006) [4]. The solution is achieved by generalizing the approach in Riedel (2009) [21] introducing the concept of variational supermartingales and variational Snell envelopes with an accompanying theory. To illustrate results, we consider prominent examples: dynamic multiplier preferences and a dynamic version of generalized average value at risk introduced in Cheridito and Tianhui (2009) [5].     

Comparing monetary policy reaction functions: ECB versus Bundesbank

This paper compares the European Central Bank’s (ECB) conduct of monetary policy with that of the Bundesbank. Estimated monetary policy reaction functions show that the ECB reacts similarly to expected inflation but significantly stronger to the output gap than the Bundesbank did. Theoretical considerations suggest that this stronger response to the output gap may rather be due to a higher interest rate sensitivity of the German output gap than to a higher weight given to output stabilisation in the objective function of the ECB. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated interest rate reaction functions reveal that German interest rates would not have been lower under a hypothetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of an unchanged long-run real interest rate for the EMU period and is reversed when the Bundesbank reaction function is adjusted for the lower long-run real interest rate estimated for the ECB regime.

TRIPs, trade and growth: When comparative advantages break down

In this paper we combine a model of Ricardian comparative advantages as in Dornbusch et al. (1977) with Grossman and Helpman's (1991) quality ladder model and derive the consequences of asymmetric IPRs protection for the pattern of trade and the world rate of growth through innovation. Our analysis differs from that already made by Taylor (1994) in that final goods and research technologies do not go exactly along together, so the impossibility of doing licensing under asymmetric protection will here bring forth an infringement of comparative advantages which we call “the invasion effect”.     

Biogeographical conditions, the transition to agriculture and long-run growth

We use new data on the timing of the transition to agriculture, developed by Putterman and Trainor (2006), to test the theory of Diamond (1997) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005) that an earlier transition is reflected in higher incomes today. Our results confirm the theory, even after controlling for institutional quality and other geographical factors. The date of transition is correlated with prehistoric biogeography (the availability of wild grasses and large domesticable animal species). The factors conducive to high per capita incomes today are good institutions, an early transition to agriculture, access to the sea and a low incidence of fatal malaria. Geographical influences have been at work in all of these proximate determinants of per capita income.     

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finance management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.     

Capital controls and welfare

This paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls and compares them with the welfare level under perfect capital mobility by using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal and that capital controls may enhance an economy’s welfare level. There exists an optimal degree of capital-account restriction that achieves a higher level of welfare than that under perfect capital mobility, if the economy has costly financial intermediaries. The results of our analysis imply that as the domestic financial intermediaries are less efficient, the government should impose stricter capital controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing.     

Consumption,wealth and business cycles in Germany

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income—the consumption–wealth ratio—based on German data from 1980 to 2003. We find that departures from this long-run relationship mainly predict adjustments in income. The German consumption–wealth ratio also contains considerable forecasting power for a range of business cycle indicators, including the unemployment rate. This finding is in contrast to earlier studies for some of the Anglo-Saxon economies that have shown that the consumption–wealth ratio reverts to its long-run mean mainly through subsequent adjustments in asset prices. While the German consumption wealth ratio contains little information about future changes in German asset prices, we report that the U.S. consumption–wealth ratio has considerable forecasting power for the German stock market. One explanation of these findings is that in Germany—due to structural differences in the financial and pension systems—the share of publicly traded equity in aggregate household wealth is much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We discuss the implications of our results for the measurement of a potential wealth effect on consumption. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee as well as from Heinz Herrmann, Helmut Lütkepohl, the editor, Baldev Raj, Burkhard Raunig, Monika Schnitzer, Harald Uhlig and Christian Upper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants at the ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the CESifo Macro, Money and International Finance Area Conference 2005, the EEA 2005 annual congress and at the 2005 IAEA Meetings. Last but not least, we would like to thank Mark Weth for very useful information concerning the construction of the financial wealth data. Hoffmann’s work on this paper is also part of the project The International Allocation of Risk funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of SFB 475. Responsibility for any remaining errors and shortcomings is entirely our own.     

An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Central Bank Intervention and Exchange Rate Volatility: Some Australian Evidence

Arguably, market stability is one of the primary reasons behind government intervention in the foreign exchange market. Whether or not the authorities achieve this goal is an empirical matter and testing of this issue is made difficult by the fact that government intervention and exchange rate volatility may be jointly determined. In this paper, the extent to which volatility drives intervention is considered using PROBIT analysis. The results suggest that while support for the hypothesis exists, volatility on its own does not to provide enough information to allow us to accurately forecast government intervention. A modified GARCH model is then tested which incorporates the impact of government intervention in the mean and conditional variance equation. The evidence presented suggest that the dynamics of market are different on the days where the central bank is active in the market.     

Post–Plaza intervention in the DEM/USD exchange rate

In this paper, whether specific methods of conducting central bank interventions increase the likelihood of achieving its objectives in analysed. Daily Bundesbank and Fed intervention data covering the entire Post–Plaza period are used to estimate binary choice models over the sample of observations when at least one of the two central banks were intervening. The results suggest that central banks can, in fact, improve the likelihood of success primarily through coordination and that unilateral intervention conducted by the Bundesbank appears to have been destabilizing. Furthermore, it is shown that relatively infrequent intervention has a higher likelihood of success. JEL classification: E58, F31, F42, G15
Intervention dans le monde du taux de change dollar/mark après l'Accord de Plaza. Ce mémoire explore la question à savoir si des méthodes spécifiques d'intervention par la banque centrale accroissent la probabilité que les objectifs soient atteints. A l'aide de données sur l'impact des interventions de la Bundesbank et de la Federal Reserve pour toute la période qui a suivi l'Accord de Plaza, on calibre les modèles de choix binaires pour l'échantillon des données quand au moins l'une des deux banques centrales est intervenue. Les résultats suggèrent que les banques centrales peuvent en fait améliorer la probabilité de succès dans la poursuite des objectifs via la collaboration et que les interventions unilatérales de la Bundesbank semblent avoirété déstabilisantes. De plus, il semble que des inteerventions relativement moinsfréquentes ont une plus grande probabilité de succès.     

RUSSIAN LIVING STANDARDS DURING THE INDUSTRIALIZATION ERA, 1885–1913*

In this paper, I have examined the relative growth rates of personal consumption, government consumption, and national income in Russia from 1885–1913 and have contrasted them with the “European” model (derived from the U.K. and German experience). Two hypotheses of the conventional model of Russian industrialization were tested: the retarded growth of personal consumption and the accelerated growth of government consumption and investment (relative to the European model) and the growing Europeanization of Russian growth after 1906. The estimates of personal consumption and government consumption failed to sustain either hypothesis. In fact, the reverse hypotheses appear to be more plausible. The lack of data on investment prevented the testing of the investment hypothesis, but the limited evidence which is available does not point to an extraordinary growth of investment. As a final experiment, the combined growth rates of personal and government consumption were compared with a revision of Goldsmith's national income estimates. They were shown to provide strong support for the accuracy of the revision of Goldsmith's estimates.     

Government policy in the formal and informal sectors

The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms' choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz's (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc.) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. The welfare gains from policy reforms are on average 1.2% (measured in terms of consumption) for OECD countries. I also find that the welfare gains from reducing regulation are on average 2.1%. Finally, performing a similar decomposition to that of Hall and Jones (1999), I find that distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.