Technological prospects toward the 21st century: The case of Toshiba Corporation

Growth of industry has been driven by technology innovation and is expected to turn into a new phase through creative technology innovation. The recent technology environment, however, has changed drastically. Instead of a technology breakthrough, which has played a leading part so far, fusion and integration of technologies will be key to future technology innovation. In this article Toshiba's case is introduced with regard to technological prospects in the fields of electronics, electric energy, and environment. Investment in research and development (R&D) increases rapidly along with the advance of technology. Strategic alliance that utilizes each partner's strength will be one of the options in the company's R&D management. Examples of international research collaboration are described in this article.     

A dynamic model of R&D competition

This study considers a dynamic model of R&D competition in a situation of no uncertainty with identical firms in a perfect foresight. We are going to find out about the effects of firms' absorptive capacity on R&D strategies in the presence of technological spillovers. The conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a feedback–Nash equilibrium on firms' R&D expense will be also discussed. Numerical simulations will show as the introduction of the absorptive capacity reduces the impact of spillovers degree on firms' R&D strategies.     

Dynamic R&D competition with memory

We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough.     

Cooperation in R&D through a network,an ‘organizational gamble’? an empirical analysis of rhône poulenc rorer-gencell

This paper is based on the empirical analysis of innovation challenges to Rhône Poulenc Rorer-Gencell (RPR-Gencell) resulting from development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industy. These we identify as an organizational innovation involving the development of a network of partners following and/or inducing a technological innovation. RPR-Gencell represents a ‘style of innovation’ since it is based on various factors specific to the firm and corresponds to a new organizational form, the ‘tight network’ of partners. We argue that this organizational from, in the context of the development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry, can be likened to an ‘organizational gamble’ associated with a ‘technological gamble’ Altogether, this ‘gamble’ dimension means that the network of partners in R&D is still a marginal organizational form. After an introduction we show that the specficities of the pharmaceutical industry especialy since the emergence of biotechnohgy have led to the emergence of a multiplicity of institutional arrangements governing cooperation in R&D. We take as a specific example that of gene therapy. Later on, we present some stylized facts to emphasize the diversity among the network organizational forms. The network of partners is an alternative to the other complex but ‘clarsical’ forms of cooperation (R&D agreements, cross-licensing, joint-ventures, mergers/acquisilions). We propose a new definition of the network based on the case of RPR-Gencell: the ‘tight network’. We distinguish between the ‘tight network’ and all the other approaches, focusing in particular on the ‘loose network’ of cooperative relationship (mostly multifirm alliances implemented with several bilateral contracts). Only two pharmaceutical companies have adopted the ‘tight network’ to govern their cooperation in R&D. We present the network ofpartners as an organizational innovation governing a technological innovation. We argue that this organizational innovation could be likened to an ‘organizational gamble’ in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, we show that the network raises several organizational issues since it short-circuits traditional strategic operations in the pharamaceutical industry. We argue that among many different reasons, RPR's technological choices (especially the priorig given to gene therapy) have influenced the creation of its network of partners. As a conclusion, we discuss the link between the organizational innovation and the technological innovation focusing on the ‘gamble’ dimension of such an innovation.     

Welfare and growth impacts of innovation policies in a small, open economy; an applied general equilibrium analysis

We explore how innovation incentives in a small, open economy should be designed in order to achieve the highest welfare and growth. The computable general equilibrium model we develop for the purpose allows for research and development (R&D)-driven endogenous technological change embodied in varieties of capital. We study policy alternatives targeted towards R&D, capital varieties formation, and domestic investments in capital varieties. Subsidising domestic investments, thereby excluding stimuli to world market deliveries, generates less R&D, capital formation, economic growth, and welfare than do the other alternatives, reflecting that the domestic market for capital varieties is limited. In spite of breeding stronger economic growth, a higher number of patents, and a higher share of R&D in total production, direct R&D support generates slightly less welfare than subsidising formation of capital varieties. The costs in terms of welfare relates to a lower production within each variety firm, which in presence of mark-up pricing results in efficiency losses.     

Joint R&D projects: Experiences in the context of European technology policy

Joint R&D projects have emerged as a significant model for the development of research and technological activities. Our study examines, through an exploratory analysis, the typology of joint R&D projects and the characteristics of R&D networks in which the projects are developed. In addition, the interrelation between the R&D projects in the context of European Technology Policy is analysed. Findings from survey data collected on joint R&D projects carried out in the context of European Framework Programmes indicate that three groups of R&D projects can be identified (invention, innovation and diffusion projects), and that each of these projects is managed inside the R&D network with a different degree of structuring and external opening. The analysis of interrelations between R&D projects also shows a low, non-linear and non-progressive interrelation. This conclusion is an important question to bear in mind in the design of scientific and technological policies.     

Lock-in and break-out from technological trajectories: Modeling and policy implications

The prevailing models explaining how technologies develop along a specific trajectory largely focus on the circumstances that lead to technological lock-in. We contribute substantially to this area of research by investigating the circumstances under which technological development may break-out of a trajectory. We argue that for this to happen, a third selection mechanism—beyond those of the market and of technology—needs to upset the lock-in. We model the interaction, or mutual shaping among three selection mechanisms, and thus this paper also allows for a better understanding of when a technology will lock-in into a trajectory, when a technology may break-out of a lock-in, and when competing technologies may co-exist in a balance. As a system is conceptualized to gain a (third) degree of freedom, the possibility of bifurcation is introduced into the model. The equations, in which interactions between competition and selection mechanisms can be modeled, allow one to specify conditions for lock-in, competitive balance, and break-out.     

Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation

We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resistance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department's effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

Global Technology Policies for Economic Growth

With the end of the Cold War, nations throughout the world are placing ever greater emphasis on economic growth. Over the last 50 years, advances in technology have been the single most important factor in creating growth in many economies, and thus policies to promote technological innovation rank high on the list of priorities for both developed and developing countries. In general, as countries progress up the economic ladder, national R&D intensity, (i.e., R&D/GDP), tends to increase along with per capita income. In addition, nations move through a discernible sequence of technology policies from an initial focus on infrastructure, through a set of actions designed to encourage technology acquisition from more advanced economies, to comprehensive education and research agendas targeted to the creation and development of new technology. In the United States, national technology policy for economic growth focuses on education, building a 21st century infrastructure, and creating a business climate that encourages growth, technological innovation, and risk taking.Throughout the last 50 years there have been significant changes in the competitive position of nations. In recent years, U.S. corporations have regained some of the competitive leadership they lost in the 1980s. This has been accompanied by significantly increased R&D spending by U.S. industry, particularly in the information and health care related sectors. U.S. industry funding of R&D overtook that from the government in the early 1980s and accounts for almost two-thirds of the national total.     

Schumpeterian cycles with pro-cyclical R&D

Recent empirical work finds that R&D expenditures are quite pro-cyclical even for firms that are not credit-constrained during downturns. This has been taken as strong evidence against Schumpeterian-style theories of business cycles that emphasize the idea that downturns in production may be good times to allocate labor towards innovative activities. Here we argue that the pro-cyclicality of R&D investment is in fact quite consistent with at least one of these theories. In our analysis we emphasize three key features of R&D investment relative to other types of innovative activity: (1) it uses knowledge intensively, (2) it is a long-term investment with uncertain applications, and (3) it suffers from diminishing returns over time.     

Government funding strategy in technology programs

Industrial R&D in a market economy is mainly implemented in the private sector, therefore public funding is a very important tool of government to guide private R&D activities. This paper investigates the experience of funding national programs in a number of industrialized countries, and reaches some preliminary conclusions: (a) To reduce opportunistic behavior and ingrain intrinsic incentive in firms, both competition and cost-sharing principles should be used concurrently in underwriting firms' R&D projects. (b) Competition principles can be applied across many candidate projects around the same time or a series of one-of-a-kind projects over a longer time horizon. (c) The major threat to application of competition principles is that there is no “real competition” due to few qualified candidates in specific technological fields or in some, especially small, countries. (d) In practice, the appropriate cost-sharing level is difficult to determine. Fifty-fifty is used as a rule of thumb in many countries to simplify the decision making and circumvent “bounded rationality.” (e) Full cost endorsement may be another “quantum” alternative for projects urged by government but not felt to be very relevant by firms.     

A practical approach to R&D project selection

We present a technique to allocate available resources more systematically to competing R&D projects in a government laboratory setting. The technique is simpler than most models described in the literature, systematically utilizes the expertise of various organizational units in the corporation, and does not try to substitute complex calculations for good managerial judgment. The literature on R&D project selection models is briefly reviewed. Key factors identified are used to develop the approach. Details are presented on the sequence of the R&D project selection process through alternative levels of corporate management. Sample forms used for R&D ideas submittal and evaluation are included. Experiences gained from applying the approach in a large R&D laboratory are discussed.     

Subsidized technology and its utilization: Aids for the disabled

Subsidized research into advance technology is one means employed to attain social and ideological goals recognized as vital to a society. Increasing sensitivity to the social uses of technology has recently led to funding of R&D in aids for the disabled. An analysis of 89 such projects between 1979 and 1983 confirm the impact of subsidized public funding on such research, leading to a narrow focus on applied research in specific disability areas with the objective of creating a viable commercial prototype for a highly visible but extremely small number of severely disabled. Subsidized funding also reinforces specialization through selective support of projects by institutional setting. This specialization further focuses research into areas likely to be rewarded by further funding and through this mechanism scientific output matches needs for those whom R&D is subsidized. The impact of subsidized R&D for the disabled can therefore be said to be effective as an example of societal intervention in directing technological advances.     

Product market competition, R&D, and welfare

We compare the subgame perfect equilibrium emerging in four regimes of research and development (R&D) competition between duopolists: (i) full competition, (ii) coordination of research strategies, (iii) joint venture with cross licensing of patents, and (iv) full collusion in R&D and the product market. The outcome of the firms' interaction depends on the interplay of the degree of product market competition, the similarity of the research strategies, and the cost of R&D, relatively to market size. Our main result is that each of the four regimes can, for plausible parameter combinations, yield the highest level of welfare. Therefore it is problematic to draw general rules applicable to all proposed research joint ventures.     

Estimation of R&D depreciation rates: a suggested methodology and preliminary application

Abstract The 2008 version of the SNA has recommended capitalization of R&D expenditures. To implement this recommendation, we need to determine the depreciation rate of R&D capital. In this paper, we develop a simple model, based on a production function method that allows for monopolistic competition, to estimate the annual depreciation rate of R&D capital. We treat R&D capital as a technology shifter instead of as an explicit input factor. Both the R&D stock and the time variable are used to capture technological progress. Estimated R&D depreciation rates and markup factors are presented for the U.S. manufacturing sector and four U.S. knowledge‐intensive industries.     

后发企业技术创新的演化动力机制研究-以华为早期(1988-1995年)研发为例

以演化经济学和系统动力学视角,综合运用文献分析和访谈等研究方法,对华为早期技术研发进行系统性分析,建立后发企业技术创新及其演化的系统动力模型。研究发现：新产品开发是资本增长的动力,技术创新是产品开发的动力,人才和研发组织是技术创新的动力,同时人才也是组织结构优化的动力,而发挥人才价值的关键是人才激励;市场既为后发企业提供不断进化的市场动力,也传递先发企业和后发企业的竞争压力,促使后发企业不断产品开发和集成创新,供应商为后发企业快速进入市场并对关键技术进行模块化创新提供动力;企业家和研发组织把外部动力和压力转化为内部动力,使内部动力及进化选择机制与外部市场竞争协调一致。     

R&D cluster quality measures and technology maturity

“Innovation indicators” strive to track the maturation of an emerging technology to help forecast its prospective development. One rich source of information is the changing content of discourse of R&D, as the technology progresses. We analyze the content of research paper abstracts obtained by searching large databases on a given topic. We then map the evolution of that topic's emphasis areas.The present research seeks to validate a process that creates factors (clusters) based on term usage in technical papers. Three composite quality measures—cohesion, entropy, and F measure—are computed. Using these measures, we create standard factor groupings that optimize the composite term sets and facilitate comparisons of the R&D emphasis areas (i.e., clusters) over time.The conceptual foundation for this approach lies in the presumption that domain knowledge expands and becomes more application specific in nature as a technology matures. We hypothesize implications for this knowledge expansion in terms of the three factor measures, then observe these empirically for the case of a particular technology—autonomous navigation. These metrics can provide indicators of technological maturation.     

What are good R&D investment strategies for leaders and followers?

Research and development (R&D) investment affects the growth of firms in the same industry differently according to their technological positions. This study empirically investigates differences in how R&D investment influences firm growth between technological leaders and followers. Additionally, this study investigates the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition on the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth. Using a sample of 2322 observations from 492 firms in the U.S. chemical and allied products industry for the period 2000–2009, we show that an increase in R&D investment leads to greater firm growth for technological followers than for technological leaders. We also find that the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition vary depending on whether a firm is a technological leader or follower.     

Invention, innovation, and economic evolution

This paper provides a synopsis of logic and adventure in the process of fundamental innovation. The contemporary viewpoint of R&D management would have us believe that innovation is a rational process subject to prediction, regulation, and control. The alternative viewpoint is advanced here that innovation is neither merely a mechanical nor solely a goal-driven process. In reality, innovative systems are inherently untidy systems. The most important clue to any possible uniformity in the behavior of such systems is to be found in their very multiformity. Thus, the process of innovation is first and foremost a self-organizing process. This theory, based on the author's work of the past several years in this area, has led to identification and explanation of several lawlike relationships in the origin of fundamental technical breakthroughs, transfer of technical knowledge, and long-term economic evolution. There are a number of important implications of these regularities for technology and science policy during 1980s and beyond. First, success in innovation critically depends upon pursuing several small-scale experimental projects at the same time. Thus popular attempts to avoid duplication in R&D activity constitute what is really a penny-wise but pound-foolish policy. Second, nothing is more important in the future than to promote greater decentralization in the conduct of R&D enterprise. Third, one way out of the current worldwide economic stagnation is to be found in the development of a few, already available, fundamental innovations such as those in the microelectronics, solar energy, and biotechnology fields rather than in the eternal search for more technical breakthroughs. Thus the need in the future is not so much for disproportionate increase in basic research in relation to technological development effort as it is for striking a congruence between various components of R&D activity.