Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture

Optimal incentive regulation uses transfers. If the regulator is corruptible, the regulated firm can benefit by manipulating the regulator's assessment regarding the distribution of payoff relevant variables, which determine the structure and size of optimal transfers. We show how substituting outcome‐contingent transfers by an obligation to sell simple financial contracts to well informed financial investors can reduce the scope for manipulation. A possible application would be an electricity transmission network operator whose actions can affect electricity prices. In a simple moral hazard model, first‐best outcomes can be implemented by forcing the network operator to auction off forward contracts on the electricity price. We study the optimal mixture of financial instruments and regulatory transfers given different informational assumptions and imperfections of financial markets.     

Real Estate Returns and Risk with Heterogeneous Investors

This article develops a theoretical framework and formulates a unified risk metric that integrates both real estate price risk and uncertainty of time on market (TOM). We demonstrate that real estate sellers with different degrees of financial distress face not only different marketing period risks, but also receive different return distributions upon successful sales. The major findings of this article can be summarized as follows. First, we show that real estate return and risk, which account for both price and TOM risk, are investor specific, varying over investors with different financial circumstances and holding periods. Second, the traditional valuation of real estate return and risk, which is based solely on the return distribution of a successful sale without considering the uncertainty of TOM and the investor's financial circumstances, underestimates real estate risk and exaggerates real estate return. Third, our empirical applications in both residential and commercial real estate markets show that the Sharpe ratio estimated by the traditional approach is seriously overstated—to the largest extent for investors with high financial distress. In addition, we find that, given the typical 5‐ to 7‐year holding period for real estate, the Sharpe ratios estimated by integrating both price and TOM risk are much in line with the performance of financial assets. These findings can help to explain the apparent “risk‐premium puzzle” in real estate.     

Hedging House Price Risk in China

The increasing risk associated with China's housing prices is globally recognized. However, hedging this risk is challenging because of a lack of financial derivatives on China's housing assets. We suggest that the short sale of futures contracts for construction raw materials, i.e., iron ore or/and steel, can act as useful tools to hedge the systematic risk of China's new home price. We first present evidence that there is a strong and stable correlation between changes in China's housing prices and global steel/iron ore prices. Using a hedging strategy model, we then show that, during the sample period between 2009 and 2015, 20.6% of the total unpredicted variance in Chinese housing prices can be hedged by shorting rebar and iron ore futures. We further examine this strategy with an event study based on the announcement of the “home‐purchase restriction” policy in April, 2010. The cumulative abnormal returns show that both steel and iron ore prices reacted significantly to this negative shock, and therefore the proposed strategy could substantially help investors offset losses in the housing market. We finally provide some evidences that this strategy can also help investors in specific regional housing markets, or the resale housing markets.     

Contract Design for Problem Asset Disposition

As a result of declining real estate values and the receivership of numerous financial institutions, government regulators like the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have large inventories of distressed assets. This paper develops a model of the principal/agent issues associated with management and disposition of problem assets. In the model, optimal contracts balance risk sharing with incentives for effort. We argue that the RTC will minimize the ultimate cost of the thrift crisis by placing managerial control of distressed assets in the private sector, while retaining full or partial ownership of the assets for risk-sharing purposes. Recoveries are maximized, however, only when an asset manager is incented to expend a first-best level of effort by indexing asset management and disposition contracts to market movements.     

Using Revenue Sharing to Implement Flexible Prices: Evidence from Movie Exhibition Contracts

Movie exhibition contracts entail revenue‐sharing terms that go down with weeks since release. We develop a simple model to show how the form of these contracts can be explained by the distributors’ desire to set flexible prices. We then use detailed data on theater‐movie contracts in Spain, where we exploit the information available at the time of contracting for movies previously released in the U.S., and other movie and theater characteristics, to show how the implications of our flexible pricing argument are supported in the data, and differentiate our explanation from prior, more standard risk‐sharing and moral‐hazard explanations.     

Optimal Sharing of Interest‐Rate Risk in Mortgage Contracts: The Effects of Potential Prepayment and Default

Much of the literature on the economics of mortgage markets has studied the fixed vs. adjustable‐rate mortgage choice made by individual borrowers. However, to decide if the outcome of such a choice is efficient or approximately so, it is necessary to explore the question of optimal risk‐sharing in mortgage contracts. But because only a small literature has studied this question, more research is clearly warranted. The present article helps fill this gap by developing a simplified version of Arvan and Brueckner's model, using it to characterize optimal contracts in the absence of mortgage termination, and then exploring how termination via prepayment or default affects optimal risk‐sharing. The broad conclusion of the analysis is that potential mortgage termination makes higher risk exposure for borrowers optimal.     

Financial and operational instruments for commodity procurement in quantity competition

We analyze a commodity procurement problem under uncertain future procurement prices and product demands. An optimization model is presented that finds the best mix of advance procurement, spot market procurement, and financial options to satisfy demand in an asymmetric and duopolistic sales market. One firm can only procure just-in-time whereas the other can additionally procure in advance via inventories or option contracts. We show that even under arbitrage-free procurement prices, inventories and option contracts both provide an advantage in comparison to pure just-in-time procurement. However, inventories turn out to dominate option contracts due to a stronger capacity commitment.     

Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration

Retailer differentiation exists in most industries and gives manufacturers an incentive to contract with different retailers to penetrate a market. This paper analyzes the impact of this penetration effect on vertical contract exclusivity in an oligopolistic model with differentiated retailers. In the model, manufacturers endogenously choose contract types and negotiate with retailers on wholesale prices. We show that, when the penetration effect is sufficiently strong, non-exclusive contracts lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and retailers. The model is applied to an example with logit demand, which shows that both manufacturers choosing the non-exclusive contracts is a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium even though they may both be better off under exclusive contracts when the products have high quality or low costs.     

Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non‐discriminatory, linear and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non‐monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation.     

Windfalls of emperors' sojourns: Stock market reactions to Chinese firms hosting high‐ranking government officials

Research summary: We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA ) literature by showing that investors value companies that host visits of high‐ranking government officials (P resident and P remier). We argue that investors may value host official visits for two reasons: (1) the signal received about possibility of firm accessing government‐controlled resources via promotion or protection; and (2) the certification effect from such high‐powered visitors elevating the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high‐ranking government official visits in C hina from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to host firms as reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately compared to state‐controlled . Managerial summary: Do visits by high‐ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? Studying a sample of C hinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the C hinese P resident and the P remier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared with a group of non‐host firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high‐ranking government officials can signal future government‐controlled resource inflows and boost host firms' reputation and legitimacy . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sources of Risk Spillovers among U.S. REITs: Financial Characteristics and Regional Proximity

In this article, we estimate the risk spillovers among 74 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) using the state‐dependent sensitivity value‐at‐risk approach. This methodology allows for the quantification of the spillover size as a function of a company's financial condition. We show that the size of risk spillovers is more than twice as large when REITs are in financial distress and find evidence for the impact of geographical proximity. Our results provide new insights concerning the relevance of geographical diversification for REITs and have important implications for the investment and risk management decisions of real estate investors, mortgage lenders, home suppliers and policy makers.     

Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q ). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general.     

Interest Rate Risk, Residential Mortgages and Financial Futures Markets

Residential mortgage markets in both the United States and Canada have recently been dominated by instruments such as variable-rate and short-term rollover mortgages which require borrowers to assume a greater burden of interest rate risk. An outstanding question is whether this approach to risk allocation is Pareto optimal or whether there are other more effective methods of dealing with the risk created by interest rate volatility. This study examines the potential for shifting this risk from the mortgage market to the financial futures market. After considering the rationale for expecting that neither mortgage borrowers nor lenders wish to absorb the high levels of risk present in the existing financial environment, this study discusses the hedging of interest rate risk through financial futures markets. Empirical tests are then performed to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. futures markets for hedging positions from the U.S. mortgage market. These results indicate that the interest rate risk inherent in residential mortgages can be substantially shifted through one or more positions in the existing futures contracts and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages may still be financially feasible under conditions of interest rate volatility.     

Linking Product Development Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: The Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry*

The purpose of this research was to examine empirically the effects of new product development outcomes on overall firm performance. To do so, first product development and finance literature were connected to develop three testable hypotheses. Next, an event study was conducted in order to explore whether the changes in the stock market valuation of firms are influenced by the outcomes of efforts to develop new products. The pharmaceutical industry was chosen as the empirical context for the present study's analysis largely because the gate‐keeping role played by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides a specific event date on which to focus the event study methodology. As such, this study's events were dates of public announcements of the FDA decisions to approve or to reject the New Drug Applications submitted by the sponsoring firms. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, this study's results show that market valuations are responsive strongly and cleanly to the success or failure of new product development efforts. Hence, one of this study's key results suggests that financial markets may be attuned sharply to product development outcomes in publicly traded firms. This study also finds that financial market losses from product development failures were much larger in magnitude than financial market gains from product development successes—indicating an asymmetry in the response of financial markets to the success and failure of new product development efforts. Hence, another implication of this study's results is that managers should factor in a substantial risk premium when considering substantial new development projects. The present study's results also imply that managers should refrain from hyping new products and perhaps even should restrain the enthusiasm that the financial community may build before the product fully is developed. The effect on firm value is severe when expectations about an anticipated new product are not fulfilled. Managers in effect should take care to build reasonable and realistic expectations about potential new products.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*

Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi‐product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade‐off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price‐coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra‐firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi‐product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit‐sharing, intra‐firm price competition can reduce quality‐adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.     

THE ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS IN FACILITATING MARKET TRANSACTIONS*

We examine the relationship between market conditions and the adoption of exclusive contracts. In particular, we develop a matching model in which agents may decide to adopt exclusive contracts to reduce bilateral bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information. We show that it is optimal for agents to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets and that for intermediate levels of market thickness strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria. We study the welfare properties of market equilibria and discuss under what circumstances courts should enforce exclusive contracts.     

Real Estate in a Mixed‐Asset Portfolio: The Role of the Investment Horizon

In this article, three oft‐mentioned special characteristics of the real estate asset market—high transaction costs, marketing period risk and return predictability—are addressed in analyzing the role of U.K. commercial real estate investments in a mixed‐asset portfolio. Due to favorable horizon effects in risk and return, the allocation to real estate in a portfolio with stocks, bonds and cash increases strongly with the investment horizon. Examining the relative importance of return predictability, transaction costs and marketing period risk for the optimal allocation to real estate, the article finds that the consideration of return predictability is very important, except for short‐term horizons. Accounting for transaction costs is crucial for short‐ and medium‐term investors. Marketing period risk appears to be negligible. Traditional mean‐variance analysis—that is, ignoring return predictability, transaction costs and marketing period risk—can be very misleading.     

Another Take on Real Estate's Role in Mixed‐Asset Portfolio Allocations

This article examines real estate's role in institutional mixed‐asset portfolios using both private‐ and public‐real estate indices, as a means of examining varying real estate‐related risk/return opportunities. In so doing, this article also examines the effects of: (1) increasing the investment horizon, (2) placing constraints on the maximum allocation to any one asset class, and (3) varying the risk preferences of investors. The empirical results suggest—using infinite‐horizon returns and all of the caveats that accompany such a perspective—that real estate allocations of approximately 10–15% of the mixed‐asset portfolio represent an upper bound for most investors. For those investors preferring low‐risk portfolios, (unlevered) private real estate is the vehicle serving this allocation preference; for those investors preferring high‐risk portfolios, public real estate (with its embedded leverage of 40–50%) is the vehicle serving this allocation preference—with such vehicles serving as substitutes for a variety of noncore real estate strategies. In some sense, the distinction between private and public real estate is more about the use of leverage. For those investors preferring moderate‐risk portfolios, an intermediate‐leverage approach seems optimal.     

金融可得性与互联网金融风险防范——基于网络传销案件的实证分析

网络传销作为一种非法互联网金融活动,引发了严重的互联网金融风险。本文利用手工整理的2009—2018年7334份传销刑事判决书,基于传销组织“金字塔”结构特点,以标准化后的被告人数衡量网络传销发案率,构建地级市层面网络传销发案率的面板数据,从投资者资产配置的角度研究地区金融可得性对网络传销参与的影响。实证结果表明:网络传销显著降低了当地社会的信任程度;金融可得性的提高能够有效抑制网络传销的发展,基于一系列稳健性检验和工具变量的分析仍然支持这一结果,这种抑制效果主要出现在东中部地区。在机制分析中,基于2015年存款利率市场化改革的双重差分分析表明,金融可得性通过加剧市场竞争优化了投资收益,降低了投资者参与网络传销的可能性。本文表明,发展普惠金融,扩大金融市场开放,促进金融市场有序竞争,对于从源头上治理和打击网络传销等非法互联网金融活动、防范互联网金融风险、保护中小投资者利益具有积极意义。     

Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry

Revenue sharing contracts, in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers, are now widely used in the video rental industry. We show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic (unpredictable) or variable (e.g., systematically declining), downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition. Unlike two-part tariffs, revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers' inventory decisions. Our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers' adoption of revenue sharing contracts.