On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Explaining Export Performance through Inputs: Evidence from Aggregated Cross‐country Firm‐level Data

Which trade barrier related to intermediate inputs forms a greater burden on the export performance of firms in developing countries? Using aggregated cross‐country firm‐level data covering 43 mostly developing economies, this paper estimates the marginal importance of the impact of various intermediate input trade cost barriers, namely tariffs, non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) and services barriers, on firms' export behavior. In a cross‐sectoral setting, this paper takes the firm's export performance in goods as a central focus to study the effects of these different trade barriers through the exporting firm's choice of use of intermediate inputs. The results show that the most significant trade barriers on inputs that impede export performance in developing countries are mainly NTBs and restrictions of services.     

Consumer Heterogeneity,Free Trade,and the Welfare Impact of Income Redistribution

Demographic differences, like young and elderly, and healthy and disabled, are summarized as consumers' heterogeneity in expenditure shares, and introduced into an otherwise standard Heckscher–Ohlin model, together with income distribution in this paper. We prove that free trade may hurt consumers who spend more on the exporting good if the volume of trade is small, while redistributing more income to consumers who spend more on the exporting good may make everyone in the country better off. By contrast, redistributing more income to consumers who spend more on the importing good may make everyone in the country worse off.     

Horizontal Mergers,Entry and International Trade

We use a two‐country trade model to analyze an authority's decision to approve or reject a merger followed by entry, when the entrant can choose where to locate. We show that approval of a merger in the small country followed by timely, likely and sufficient entry may lead to lower consumer welfare than its rejection: when the alternative to such entry is entry into another country that also benefits consumers through trade, then the gains of attracting entry are small. In this context, we discuss differences between optimal decisions by the small country's authority, large country's authority and supranational authority.     

Unity versus Collaboration: Construction of China's Belt and Road Free Trade Agreement 2.0 Network

In the context of the United States prioritizing bilateral as well as trilateral trade agreements and China's regional economic integration strategy based on the Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative, the B&R free trade agreement (FTA) and the US–European–Japanese FTA (UEJFTA) have become the two regional economic integration processes with the greatest potential impact on the world economic landscape. The present paper examines the game situation as well as the economic effects of China's B&R‐FTA 2.0 network against the United States' UEJFTA to study the optimization of China's B&R FTA system. By constructing a four‐country extended game model under a two‐part expansion, we find that an increase in members will promote the welfare of each country when there is a single regional trade agreement; the potential member countries tend to choose larger organizations for higher economic benefits when there are several regional trade agreements. Our quantitative simulation shows that promoting the construction of the FTA 2.0 network based on the B&R can significantly alleviate the impact of FTA entered into by the United States with its major trading partners.     

FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment

This study examines a foreign firm's entry decision and its effects on the host country's welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalising trade in the final‐good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalisation, whereby the domestic firms' profitability is traded off with the host country's social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing, respectively. Finally, the welfare after simultaneously liberalising trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.     

Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labor

The purpose of this paper is to develop an imperfect competition model of a small open developing country to analyze the effects of trade sanctions on the incidence of child labor. We show that a uniform tariff levied by the developed countries on imports produced with the help of child labor is a failure in terms of reducing child labor. A more effective course of action would be a firm‐specific tariff where the tariff rate varies with the amount of child labor incorporated in a single good. While such an instrument reduces child labor, however, it worsens the children’s well‐being due to lower income and consumption. Contrary to expectations, the entrepreneurs in the developing countries, supposedly the main beneficiaries of child labor, are better off under trade sanctions as they realize higher profits.     

Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*

A two‐country, two‐commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash‐equilibrium, a non‐free‐trade outcome. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the “contingent threat situation” to reformulate tariff retaliations. In this context, we show that the free trade is a stable outcome. More surprisingly, this interesting result is also valid for the “Johnson case,” where one country is better off under the tariff‐ridden Nash equilibrium compared to free trade.     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries

The striking result has been shown by Richardson that tariff revenue competition between two symmetric member countries of a free trade area (FTA) results in complete elimination of external tariffs if there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium at all. Richardson also conjectures without building a model that if member countries are asymmetric in market size, there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in which both countries set positive external tariffs. We explicitly extend his tariff competition model into the case of asymmetric FTA member countries, and confirm his conjecture. We also show that there exists a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric countries.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization in a Vertical Structure

Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of a labor union. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalization on the final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionized wage and imports intermediate goods. We show that trade liberalization on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (decreases) the unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit. Trade liberalization on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or decrease the domestic unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producers and the union's objective function.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

Shared Renewable Resources: Gains from Trade and Trade Policy

This paper examines the effects of international trade and trade policy in a two‐country, two‐good model with an open‐access renewable resource that is internationally shared. We show that both countries may still benefit from trade when they specialize in the production of their comparative advantage good, although the shared resource is reduced by trade. In addition, we demonstrate that the steady state utility of a resource‐good importing country may be reduced by trade, even if it specializes in the production of a non‐resource good. Import tariffs and export taxes on a resource good may increase or decrease the shared stock level depending on the production patterns in a trading steady state. The trade policy is likely to be Pareto‐improving when the shared stock rises, while both countries may be made worse off by the trade policy when the shared stock falls.     

Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy

This study investigates the effect of a country's suppression of competition in its market for nontradables. It assumes that the initial equilibrium is stationary and demonstrates that if competition is suppressed in a small country, the country's trade surplus increases in the short run. In the large country case, the same change creates an excess demand for future tradables and affects the relative price between present and future tradables. Using a two‐country model, the study shows that this price change redistributes real wealth from the country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus.     

How Do Technical Barriers to Trade Influence Trade?

This paper empirically estimates the trade effects of technical barriers to trade (TBT) based on all TBT notifications from 105 World Trade Organization (WTO) countries during 1995–2008. The paper adopts a modified two‐stage gravity model to control for both sample selection bias and firm heterogeneity bias. It was found that a country's TBT notifications decrease other countries' probability of exporting, but increase their export volumes. The result can be explained by the TBT's differential effects on the fixed and variable cost of export, and consumer confidence. It was further found that (i) a developing country's TBT have significant effects on other developing countries' exports, but no significant effects on the developed countries' exports, (ii) a developed country's TBT have significant effects on the exports from both types of countries, and (iii) exports from developed countries are affected by a developed country's TBT more seriously than a developing country's TBT.     

ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS IN TWO‐COUNTRY MODELS*

This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles of large‐country economies in a free‐trade equilibrium. We consider a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor general equilibrium model with Cobb‐Douglas technologies and linear preferences. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in the consumption good sector. We first identify the determinants of each country's global accumulation pattern in autarky equilibrium, and secondly we show how a country's business cycles may spread throughout the world once trade opens. We thus give capital intensity conditions for local and global stability of competitive equilibrium paths.     

Can a Regional Trade Agreement Benefit a Nonmember Country without Compensating It?

RTAs are generally formed without any tariff concessions or transfers to nonmember countries. Can such an RTA benefit nonmembers' welfare? In a two‐good three‐country competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, an RTA without concessions to a nonmember will hurt nonmembers' welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves nonmembers' welfare. In a three‐good three‐country model, an RTA without concessions damages the nonmember's welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.