Selecting public goods institutions: Who likes to punish and reward?

We study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand, and preferences over, as well as behavior within, various public goods institutions on the other hand. We incentive‐compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions. We find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. Somewhat surprisingly, preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics. Conversely, individual characteristics, including institutional preferences, are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, risk‐averse individuals preemptively punish more often. This suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty—although they may not affect the original selection into institutions.     

Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study

We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi‐battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all‐pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best‐of‐three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning.     

The Sound of Others: Surprising Evidence of Conformist Behavior

In this article we use the “Click” version of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task to explore preferences for conformism. In the task subjects can infer the behavior of others from the mass of clicks heard. This signal is uninformative about the precise choices of the other participants, and never mentioned in the instructions. We control the exposure of subjects to clicks by implementing treatments with and without earmuffs. We further test the effect of the introduction of a common rather than individual resolution of uncertainty, still keeping individual payoffs independent of other subjects’ choices. We find strong evidence of conformist behavior even in such an inhospitable environment. Simply hearing the others clicking marginally affects subjects behavior. Introducing a common random draw results in a dramatic shift of the average choices toward risk loving, in particular by women, which is consistent with social preference considerations.     

Bubbles and experience: An experiment with a steady inflow of new traders

We revisit the effect of traders' experience on price bubbles by introducing either one‐third or two‐thirds steady inflow of new traders in each of four consecutive experimental asset markets. We find that bubbles are still reduced in the treatments with a steady inflow of new traders, but at a slower pace compared to the baseline treatment in which new traders are only introduced in the last market. Our analysis of individual trading behavior shows that the slower abatement of bubbles in the inflow treatments can be attributed mainly to the inexperienced traders who make more mistakes than experienced traders.     

The Effect of Subtracting a Constant from all Payoffs in a Hawk‐Dove Game: Experimental Evidence of Loss Aversion in Strategic Behavior

Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision‐making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multiplayer games. I report results showing the strongest evidence I know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk‐dove games that are identical up to a constant; in one, all payoffs are positive, while in the other, payoffs are negative if and only if both players choose “hawk.” Under both fixed pairs and random matching, differences between the games are substantial, significant, and consistent with loss aversion.     

Endogenous,Intra‐household Decision‐making and its Impact on the Labor Supply of Couples in Rural India*

Using data for rural India, this paper analyzes households' labor supply decision‐making, taking into consideration non‐participation, endogenous intrahousehold bargaining and nutritional status. Analyses of unitary and collective models suggest that bargaining between household members forms the basis of households' decisions, and these decisions alter households' internal power balance. Analysis of households' internal bargaining process suggests that women's bargaining power increases when their wages are higher and they are better educated. The results indicate that it is crucial to account for the mechanics of decision‐making within households when studying the effects of changing labor market conditions or designing development policies to improve individual well‐being or to empower women.     

Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game

We run between‐subject dictator games with exogenously specified “give” or “take” frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than under the giving frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking frame. In the taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame both are equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females is considered, giving is found to be equivalent to “not taking,” because the opposing gender effects offset each other.     

Sabotaging Another: Priming Competition Increases Cheating Behavior in Tournaments

Trophy. Goal. Dominated . Does priming individuals with competitive concepts such as these influence the temptation to cheat? We utilize a standard laboratory cheating task in a tournament setting and test whether nonconscious priming impacts the nature of cheating behavior. The results demonstrate an asymmetry in a winner‐take‐all setting: a competitive prime does not increase cheating to improve one's own outcome, but does significantly increase the willingness of an individual to sabotage a competitor.     

The effects of competition on the nature of cheating behavior

Competition among individuals comes in a variety of forms: for mates, for resources, and for prestige and recognition. Such competitive pressure can lead individuals to engage in unethical behavior in an effort to get ahead. There are several forms of cheating in which individuals may engage to improve their own outcome: they may lie about their own performance in a task and they may lie about others’ performance in a task. Our research is the first to examine how competition affects each of these two types of cheating behavior. We find that individuals are much more willing to cheat by lying about themselves than they are willing to sabotage another when under competitive pressure.     

Are You Risk Averse over Other People's Money?

Decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences. Whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others, such as in the typical corporate structure, does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences? We examine this question in two simple settings, lottery choices and sealed‐bid auctions, using controlled laboratory experiments. We find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger, there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion. This reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences, and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others. This result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents.     

Direct Evidence on Sticky Information from the Revision Behavior of Professional Forecasters

We provide evidence on the sticky‐information model of Mankiw and Reis ( 2002 ) by examining how often individual professional forecasters revise their forecasts. We draw interest rate and unemployment rate forecasts from the monthly Wall Street Journal surveys. We find evidence that forecasters frequently leave forecasts unchanged but revise more often the larger the changes in the information set; additionally, the information sensitivity of revision frequencies increased after 2007. We also find that, on average, forecasters in our sample revise more frequently than found in previous research but that revised forecasts are not consistently more accurate.     

Are People Equally Other-Regarding When Selecting a Match Versus Choosing an Allocation?

There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other-regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well-being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting—even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves.     

Worthiness versus Self‐Interest in Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Low‐Income,Minority Neighborhood

We examine the impact of perceived worthiness and financial self‐interest on charitable giving. Both participants and recipients come from a low‐income, predominantly African‐American community in the United States. To examine this issue, we introduce a “Comparative Dictator Game,” where participants make dictator allocations for four possible recipients, each with different characteristics. We find higher charitable giving toward more “worthy” (i.e., disabled, females who are head of household, and individuals with more children) recipients when individuals donate money to different recipients. Additionally, subjects then select their preferred recipient/allocation. When only one recipient must be selected for a donation, individuals select recipients to whom they provided smaller donations and recipients with children. The results highlight the trade‐off between a desire to engage in philanthropy, supporting those who are deserving, and financial self‐interest.     

Effort and Performance: What Distinguishes Interacting and Noninteracting Groups from Individuals?

We study how group membership affects behavior both when group members can and cannot interact with each other. Our goal is to isolate the contrasting forces that spring from group membership: a free‐riding incentive leading to reduced effort and a sense of social responsibility that increases effort. In an environment with varying task difficulty and individual decision making as the benchmark, we show that the free‐riding effect is stronger. Group members significantly reduce their effort in situations where they share the outcome but are unable to communicate. When group members share outcomes and can interact, they outperform groups without communication and individuals. We show that these groups do as well as the best constituent member would have done on his or her own.     

Social Learning in Beauty‐Contest Games

We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty‐contest game. Naive advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social learning trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. We find that subjects who receive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others' past behavior before making their decision only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. A series of control‐treatments and simulations indicate that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.     

How Do Long‐Shot Outcomes Affect Preferences for Climate‐Change Mitigation?

This article takes a fresh look at how public uncertainty influences willingness to pay (WTP) for climate‐change mitigation programs. I elicit subjective distribution functions over future global mean temperatures and WTP for mitigation. I find, not surprisingly, that subjects, on average, view climate change as a “bad,” and the higher the expected temperature increase they perceive, the more they are willing to pay for mitigation. Subjects are generally risk averse, so that they are WTP more for mitigation programs when the outcome of the program is more certain. The skew of the subjective climate‐change distribution also affects preferences, so that aversion to catastrophic outcomes is an important component of WTP for mitigation. I find that models that ignore skew are likely to underestimate the influence of uncertainty on willingness to pay for climate‐change mitigation.     

Smokeless Tobacco Use Following Smoking Bans in Bars

We test for a unique form of compensatory behavior among smokers who wish to continue their nicotine consumption following the smoking bans placed on bars. We find a substantial increase in smokeless tobacco use among smokers, particularly those who drink and are of typical bar‐going age. We also find that everyday smokers, who clearly have the strongest nicotine dependence, are more likely to increase smokeless‐tobacco use than occasional smokers are.     

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.     

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land‐assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi‐person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff‐improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi‐period bargaining treatments relative to single‐period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi‐period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single‐period treatments, both with and without delay costs.     

Financial Incentives and Herding: Evidence from Two Online Experiments

Social conformity and information-based herding have been studied extensively in the social sciences, but there is little experimental evidence on how financial incentives impact the likelihood that an individual will follow the crowd. We present the results of a pair of two-stage online experiments where we use answers to and confidence about trivia questions—with and without information about the choices of others—to test the impact of financial incentives on an individual's likelihood of engaging in herd behavior (i.e., switching their answer to the most popular answer when it is revealed). We find strong evidence that individuals are more likely to herd when there are financial incentives to be correct, suggesting that individuals are less likely to rely on their own beliefs and judgments when the stakes are higher. We also exploit the unique design of our experiments to show that in the absence of information about others' choices, men report higher levels of confidence than women.