Walter Adams and Chicago

Walter Adams is one of the strongest critics of the Chicago School of Economics. Yet he was trained at the University of Chicago. This article traces Adams' education in economics and delineates two distinct Chicago traditions of antitrust policy. Adams is linked to the earlier Chicago tradition of Henry Simons and, to some extent, Frank Knight. The consistency of Adams' policy views on antitrust is shown and the connection of these views to pragmatism and Jeffersonian precepts is argued.     

Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics

The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.     

Introduction to the RIO Special Issue on Antitrust and the Platform Economy

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

     

Institutional Environments, Employer Practices, and States in Liberal Market Economies

This article draws on the new institutionalism in economics, sociology, and political studies in order to establish a foundation for analyzing how states shape employer human resource management and union relations. It then reviews and extends the available literature on this topic, establishing how, in addition to legal regulation, states help to shape the cognitive and normative rules that undergird employer decision processes, the social and economic environment within which employers act, and ultimately, the relations of authority constituting the employment relation itself and hence employer policy orientations. The article concludes with a discussion of the prospects for state policy initiatives in view of established employer paradigms, institutional logics, and state traditions, and identifies possibilities for further work in this area.
A neoclassical world would be a jungle, and no society would be viable. Douglas North (1981:11)     

Progress under pressure: The evolution of antitrust policy in Australia

Australia has developed a balanced and comprehensive antitrust policy. But the process of evolution has seen conflict, misunderstanding and error in applying the relevant economic concepts. Whether antitrust legislation is needed, and in what form, is still debated, as are ways of incorporating new approaches in economics. This is a documented account and commentary on the twenty years of evolution, designed especially for non-Australian readers seeking to gain advantage and avoid error by studying the experience of another country.     

Economic doctrines and network policy

Disagreements over how to craft Internet policy have become more and more contentious and political. Beyond the technical and engineering aspects are economic questions, and the points of view of various stakeholders and participants on such network policy issues stem from differing economic philosophies. This paper postulates and describes four competing economic doctrines: conservative neoclassical, liberal neoclassical, neo-Keynesian, and innovation economics. It explains how each doctrine leads to different views of appropriate network policy and explores the influence of doctrine on four controversial network policy issues: broadband competition, net neutrality, copyright, and privacy. Understanding this doctrine based source of differences over network policy should help policy makers better understand core issues and make more informed policy decisions.     

Comment on “Merger Policy in the United States”

This paper comments briefly on a merger policy article by Dennis Mueller. It concurs with Mueller's judgment that X-efficiency consequences are of crucial relevance in developing a sound antitrust policy toward mergers. It agrees also that firms proposing mergers overstepping structural guidelines should be permitted an efficiencies defense, but it stresses the difficulties of making ex ante efficiency predictions.     

Economics at the FTC: Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Settlements and Behavioral Economics

Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) supports both the competition and consumer protection missions of the agency. In this year’s essay we discuss two issues, one from each of the agency’s missions. First, we focus on intellectual property issues in pharmaceuticals. Specifically, we discuss the principal rationale for antitrust concerns about certain patent dispute settlements in the ethical drug industry. Then, we discuss consumer economics, our recent behavioral economics conference, and how behavioral economics influences our thinking about consumer policy.     

On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

Correlation,causality, and all that jazz: The inherent shortcomings of price tests for antitrust market delineation

A substantial economics literature has developed in which price data have been relied upon to delineate antitrust markets by empirically implementing definitions offered by classical economists. The forces driving these price tests are not the same as those that give rise to market power, and therefore these price tests are likely to reach erroneous conclusions if used to delineate antitrust relevant markets. The price tests should be used with great caution, if at all.     

Markets,Morals, or Wealth? Delusions of a Standardized Antitrust Value

Since the 1980s, courts have chosen corporate wealth generation as antitrust's sole value, justifying their choice under``Chicago School' economics, while abandoning counter-values like justice and democracy. The difficult consequences of``Chicago's' univocal corporate wealth generating ``value' are explored in this article, while a broader, multi-valued, antitrust alternative is discussed and proposed.     

Antitrust in the Reagan administration: A report from the Belly of the beast

This paper is a report on selected aspects of antitrust policy in the Reagan administration. It was written while the author was Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. The topics covered include: merger guidelines, the general drift of antitrust policy, deregulatory initiatives, consumer protection policy, and the stronger emphasis on economic analysis in the conduct of antitrust policy. The conclusions drawn are not very sanguine in a normative sense. perhaps our solace lies in the positive study of why the antitrust bureaucracies behave as they do.     

OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS*

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.     

Towards a typology of collusive industrial networks: Dark and shadow networks

The prevailing understanding of collusive B2B networks is primarily based on the theories of industrial economists and organizational criminologists. ‘Successful’ collusive industrial networks (such as price-fixing cartels) have been seen to endure due to formal managerial structures of coordination and control. In this paper, we seek to transcend and challenge the understanding of these illegal forms of co-opetition by drawing on evidence from an in-depth examination of four price-fixing cartels that were facilitated chiefly by marketers. Our contribution introduces the notion of ‘shadow networks’ (networks where although attempts are made to ensure secrecy, multilateral modes of network structure dominate akin to ‘normal’ managerial endeavours such as joint ventures) and ‘dark networks’ (networks which appear more opaque and secretive through the adoption of bilateral modes of network structure and limited bureaucracy) to illustrate the types of collusive network forms that may exist. In addition, this allows us to build a deeper understanding of collusive network forms and related inter-firm interaction for an industrial marketing audience. We provide implications for marketing practice, theory, and policy. Specifically, we outline how organizations and the marketing function can perform self-administered antitrust audits in order to help avoid breaches of antitrust. Further, we consider the importance of the two forms of collusive inter-firm networks uncovered where marketers have attempted to render these secret from antitrust agencies, introducing a relatively new line of inquiry to the industrial marketing literature.     

The new merger guidelines of the department of justice

The statement of antitrust enforcement criteria regarding mergers issued by the Justice Department in June 1982 embodies not only a significant change in policy but also an important improvement in the quality of the underlying economic analysis. The statement clearly sets forth the overall objective of the policy, its underlying rationale, and the criteria to be followed in deciding whether to proceed against horizontal and non-horizontal mergers respectively. As compared with the 1968 Guidelines, the new statement devotes less attention to long-term economic effects, contemplates a more extensive “behind-the-scenes” consideration of economic benefits, and confines probable challenge to a smaller range of transactions. Neither set of criteria provides a satisfactory basis for predicting the actual incidence of enforcement; neither is based on a demonstration that the implied policy will probably produce net economic benefit. The valuable contribution of the new statement to both law and economics is its realistic treatment of the problem of market definition.     

Regulation and transaction costs in telecommunications: A research agenda

Antitrust and regulatory policies influence the vertical and horizontal integration of firms and the characteristics of their contractual arrangements. This paper examines the relevance of transaction cost economics for the analysis of regulatory policy in telecommunications. It explores the impact of changes in national telecommunications regulation on the level of transaction costs. After building a new theoretical framework based upon previous transaction cost contributions, the paper sets out a research agenda concerning the importance of transaction costs for antitrust and regulatory policies.     

Restraints of trade by durable good producers

Whether they face competition or not, durable good producers may have an incentive to impose vertical restraints on their customers in order to protect quasi-rents in the aftermarkets for maintenance and repair. In this paper, we show that these vertical restraints have little to do with the usual antitrust concerns regarding tying arrangements. Nonetheless, imposing such restraints involves antitrust risks. We examine these risks and the associated antitrust policy questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent Kodak decision. We also offer some suggestions for the appropriate antitrust policy.     

论市场结构范式的标准与评价体系

出于反对重商主义和垄断的需要,自由经济理论建立了完全竞争范式,并把完全竞争奉为经济学的金科玉律。自从20世纪40年代,熊彼特深刻地批判了完全竞争的缺陷以后,经济理论研究实际陷入了市场结构范式缺失的境地。50年代,舒马赫重谈完全竞争的老调,提出了“小的是美好的”理论。近期有学者根据SCP标准,提出了寡头垄断范式。也有学者希望通过对垄断企业的科学规制,建立完全垄断的市场结构范式。毫无疑问,作为经济学的基础理论,市场结构范式不可或缺。因此,建立一个合理的市场结构范式评价体系刻不容缓。     

Impact of deregulation on marketplace diversity in the USA

The current deregulatory mood sweeping Washington has changed the policy approach from one of government enforced diversity to one of marketplace-facilitated diversity. This is evidenced in the recent bills to revise the Communications Act of 1934, and the settlement of the AT&T antitrust suit. This article explores these public policy shifts as they relate to the information industries and suggests some impacts on the concept of diversity.     

International aspects of merger policy: A survey

This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities.