Why has Income Inequality in Germany Increased From 2002 to 2011? A Behavioral Microsimulation Decomposition

This paper proposes a method to decompose changes in income inequality into the contributions of policy changes, wage rate changes, and population changes while considering labor supply reactions. Using data from the Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP), this method is applied to decompose the increase in income inequality in Germany from 2002 to 2011, a period that saw tax reductions and a controversial overhaul of the transfer system. The simulations show that tax and transfer reforms have had an inequality‐reducing effect as measured by the mean log deviation and the Gini coefficient. For the Gini, these effects are offset by labor supply reactions. In contrast, policy changes explain part of the increase in the ratio between the 90th and the 50th income percentiles. Changes in wage rates have led to a decrease in income inequality. Thus, the increase in inequality was due to changes in the population.     

EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON URBAN AND RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY

We use three conventional inequality indices—the Gini, the coefficient of variation of income, and the relative mean deviation of income—and the Atkinson index to examine the effect of income tax rates, the minimum wage, and all the major government welfare and transfer programs on the evolution of income inequality for rural and urban areas by state from 1981 to 1997. We find that these programs have qualitatively similar but quantitatively different effects on urban and rural areas. Most importantly, taxes are more effective in redistributing income in urban than in rural areas, while welfare and other government transfer programs play a larger role in rural areas.     

A Gini decomposition analysis of inequality in the Czech and Slovak Republics during the transition1

Disposable income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and using the Family Budget Survey data, increased very little, and by a similar amount, from 1989 to 1993 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This surprising result is examined with an analysis of changes in the channels of redistribution and Gini decomposition. We find that the sizeable increase in overall inequality due to changes in the wage earnings component is mitigated by changes in the tax and transfer components in both republics. As for the relative effects of government policies, changes in the transfer component contributed more than changes in the tax component to lowering the growth of inequality in the Czech Republic, while the reverse was true for Slovakia.     

收入分配不平等对刑事犯罪的影响

本文利用1988—2006年中国省级面板数据,采用动态面板数据估计了收入分配不平等对刑事犯罪率的影响。研究发现,控制跨省人口迁徙、福利支出、失业率等因素并作相关的稳健性检验以后,以基尼系数度量的收入分配不平等上升1个百分点,刑事犯罪率将至少上升0.185个百分点,并且收入不平等程度不断上升会导致政府增加福利支出以降低刑事犯罪率;城市化会导致刑事犯罪率上升;提高人力资本水平和增加福利支出都会对遏制犯罪发挥重要影响。     

Calculation and decomposition of income inequality in low- and middle-income countries: a survey data analysis

This article estimates income inequality in a sample of four low- and middle-income (LMI) countries namely; Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania using the household survey data – Nepal Living Standard Measurement Survey Second. First, we estimate the income generation function for each country and calculate the income inequality using Gini index (GI). Second, we decompose the income Gini into the determinants of income generation functions. Based on the decomposition result, socio-economic factors are the most important determinants of income inequality followed by geographic factors. Demographic factors have the least effect on income inequality in all four countries. Third, we propose a new method to quantify the effect of change in each covariate of income generation function on income Gini. That allows us to quantify the effects of change in specific policy such as increase in investment in schooling or public health to specific group of the population in society on income inequality. A carefully chosen, integrated policy can significantly reduce inequality in all four countries under study.     

Measuring Attitudes Towards Inequality

Individuals' attitudes to inequality aversion are measured using survey data, based on the leaky-bucket experiment, for several groups of students in Australia and Israel. Three forms of social welfare function are estimated. It is found that measures of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and that these estimates are substantially lower than the values typically used by those measuring inequality and examining optimal tax structures. Furthermore, a welfare function based on the Gini inequality measure is generally found to give a better fit than forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion.
JEL Classification : C 91; D 63     

On the Limitations of Some Current Usages of the Gini Index

This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.     

A COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME: SWEDEN AROUND 1970.

The concern with income distribution has always mainly existed because of a concern with individuals' economic welfare. In recent years, the question has arisen whether the distribution of annual income—the distribution most often studied—is the best proxy for the distribution of economic welfare. Other measures, such as lifetime income, have been proposed instead.
The paper starts with a discussion of how to define and measure the distribution of lifetime income. By using a simulation model, which partly consists of estimated functions and partly of tax functions taken directly from tax laws, distributions of lifetime income, variously defined, are then constructed. These distributions are compared with each other, and with distributions of annual income. The simulations indicate that the distribution of lifetime income is considerably less unequal than the distribution of annual income. Whether inheritances are included or not seems to be of no importance for the inequality of lifetime income. If, on the other hand, we include the value of leisure time in lifetime income, inequality increases by about 10–15 percent. Distributions of income after tax have Gini coefficients which are approximately 25 percent less than the Ginis for the before-tax distributions. We thus find that the picture of inequality we get is very much dependent on which income concept we use.     

The Long‐Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark

We use historical publications and micro data from tax returns to construct internationally comparable estimates of the development in income inequality in Denmark over the last 140 years. The study shows that income inequality and top income shares have declined during several distinct phases in between periods of stability. Furthermore, the quality of the Danish data allows us to analyse not only the development in top income shares but also broader inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. These analyses show that top income shares are a good proxy for the underlying development in inequality.     

A tale of two Ginis in the US, 1921–2012

Following a methodology by Jantzen and Volpert (2012), we use IRS Adjusted Gross Income data for the US (1921–2012) to estimate two Gini indices representing inequality at the bottom and the top of the income distribution, and to calculate the overall Gini as a function of the parameters underlying the two indices. A steady increase in the overall Gini since the Second World War actually hides two different periods of distributional changes. First, the increase in inequality from the mid 1940s to the late 1970s is driven by rising inequality at the bottom of the income distribution that more than offsets a decrease in inequality at the top. The implication is that middle-income earners gained relative to high-incomes, and especially relative to low-income earners. Second, the rise in the Gini after 1981 is driven by rising inequality at the top. Third, top-driven inequality follows a U-shaped trajectory consistent with Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006). Fourth, the welfare effects of the different distributional changes behind increasing inequality can be evaluated in light of the Lorenz-dominance criterion by Atkinson (1970): we argue that the rise in inequality since 1981 is much more likely to be associated with a social welfare loss net of compensating growth.     

中国农村地区间居民收入差距及构成变化:1995—2008年——基于基尼系数的分解

本文采用分省的面板数据对农村地区间基尼系数分解结果表明,1995—2008年,中国农村地区间收入差距总体上仍然呈现上升趋势,基尼系数上升了0.0639,但增幅出现明显减弱趋势。基尼系数变化及农村居民工资性收入对基尼系数的贡献变化显示出与经济发展阶段变化一致的含义;结构性效应已不再是农村地区间收入差异的唯一构成来源,收入集中效应对基尼系数起了明显的增加作用,工资性收入的集中效应超过了其他收入来源。这些构成来源的变化蕴含着中国面临调节地区间农村收入差距的政策机遇。     

城镇家庭收入差异研究——基于2005-2009年安徽省城镇家庭月度住户调查数据的分析

本文以经典的经济增长理论为基础，结合中等收入国家的特点，提出如下理论假设：通胀所造成的家庭福利损失会影响中等收入国家宏观经济的发展，进而推动相关国家陷入“中等收入陷阱”。而后通过FGLS、差分GMM，以及系统GMM的方法对陷入“中等收入陷阱”的典型国家进行回归分析。分析结果表明，在控制了基础设施、债务水平、技术创新以及储蓄率这些影响因素之后，通胀对上述国家人均GDP增长率均有显著的负向影响，即使是在年均通胀率只有514%的东亚国家组，通胀对人均GDP增长率的平均影响也达到了123个百分点～221个百分点，影响比重达到了27%～48%。所以，我们应该加强对通胀的调控，以确保我国经济能够持续健康地发展。     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF AGE‐RELATED OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION

Using an overlapping generations model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we quantify the gains of age‐dependent labor income taxation. The total steady‐state welfare gain of switching from age‐independent to age‐dependent nonlinear taxation varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the gain descends from relaxing incentive–compatibility constraints and part is due to capital‐accumulation effects. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as that which can be achieved by moving from linear to nonlinear income taxation. Finally, the welfare loss from tax‐exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age‐dependent labor income tax.     

How large is income inequality in China: assessment on different estimates of Gini coefficient

The rising income inequality in China has attracted social attentions, especially since SWUFE published the unbelievably high Gini coefficient in December 2012. In order to answer the question how large income inequality in current China is, this paper compares existing different Gini coefficients estimated from four different household surveys, which are the NBS household survey, the CHIP survey, the CHFS of SWUFE, and the CFPS of Peking University, and then assesses these household surveys themselves. The relevant evidences indicate that the national Gini coefficient in current China is between 0.47~0.52. The sampling defects of the CHFS are significantly major and that the national Gini coefficient of 0.61 published by SWUFE is seriously overestimated.     

The effects of transition on the distribution of income in China

Using two large samples for 1988 and 1995 we decompose the Gini coefficient of household income according to type of income with the purpose of analyzing reasons for the rapid increase of inequality. The results show that the change in relative size of money income and its changed profile are found to be the major processes behind the rapid increase of income inequality in rural China. Changes in housing allocation and an increased number of retirees in combination with higher benefits have made inequality increase in urban China and in China as a whole. JEL classification: D31, P27.     

Carbon-reducing taxes and income inequality: general equilibrium evaluation of alternative energy taxation in Taiwan

Recently, several studies have been a detailed evaluation of the economic implications of energy taxation as a policy instrument to conserve energy and reduce carbon emissions. However, little attention has been devoted to inquiring about the economic implications of energy taxation in the newly industrialized countries (the so-called NICs). In this paper, we use a multisector, multihousehold computable general equilibrium model to assess the distributional effects of alternative energy taxation on the Taiwan economy. The counterfactual simulation technique is applied to investigate the income distribution implications of: (1) an increase in the import taxes of crude oil; and (2) an increase in the excise taxes of petroleum products. Our empirical results basing on Taiwan's data show that both energy taxes increase government revenue and the Gini coefficient, but reduce net value-added, private consumption, disposable income and equivalent variation. A raise in the Gini coefficient implies that there is a worsening in the distribution of income. The lowest income group suffers relatively large welfare and income loss, but the highest income group suffers a relatively small welfare and income loss. The distributional effects differ from household to household depending on the composition of their total consumption and the source of their factor income. Our findings reveal that the energy tax appears to be mildly regressive, there are broadly consistent with those cases of developed countries reported in previous studies.     

Averaging Income Distributions

Various inequality and social welfare measures often depend heavily on the choice of a distribution of income. Picking a distribution that best fits the data involves throwing away information and does not allow for the fact that a wrong choice can be made. Instead, Bayesian model averaging utilizes a weighted average of the results from a number of income distributions, with each weight given by the probability that a distribution is ‘correct’. In this study, prior densities are placed on mean income, the mode of income and the Gini coefficient for Australian income units with one parent (1997–8). Then, using grouped sample data on incomes, posterior densities for the mean and mode of income and the Gini coefficient are derived for a variety of income distributions. The model‐averaged results from these income distributions are obtained.     

我国居民收入不平等的主要原因：市场还是政府政策？

市场因素和政府收入再分配政策是决定一国居民收入不平等程度的两个重要因素。本文采用中国家庭收入调查（China Household Income Project ,CHIP）住户数据,计算出我国居民市场收入基尼系数与可支配收入基尼系数,并同发达国家进行比较,借此探讨目前我国居民收入不平等是由市场力量造成的,还是政府收入再分配政策力度不足的结果。研究发现,从市场收入基尼系数来看,我国与发达国家之间的差距并不大。由此认为,政府收入再分配政策效果不明显是导致我国居民收入分配不平等状况较发达国家严重的主要原因。加大转移支付等再分配政策力度是缓解和改善目前我国居民收入不平等的主要途径。     

二次分配对城镇居民收入差距的调节效果分析——基于2007—2010年安徽省城镇住户调查数据

本文利用安徽省城镇住户调查数据探讨了二次分配对城镇居民收入差距的调节效果。研究表明,个人所得税和最低生活保障制度对收入差距的调节效果微乎其微;社会保障支出在一定程度上缩小了可支配收入的基尼系数,但是考虑到单位对住房公积金、养老保险、医疗保险的配套支出,最终的结果扩大了城镇居民的收入差距;目前,养老金和退休金对调节收入差距的效果最为显著,但是养老金和退休金的收入差距也比较大。     

The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.