Two stages credit evaluation in bank loan appraisal

Traditionally, banks conduct standard credit evaluation such as credit scoring following the receipt of loan request and make the accept/reject decision accordingly. This research explores the possibility of two stages credit evaluation in lending process. When the evaluation cost drops below the trigger cost, it pays to conduct the second-stage loan appraisal. We derive two trigger cost thresholds for borrowers who are rated as credible and default in the first stage, respectively. Contingent on the share of good borrowers relative to the bad ones, the optimal strategy of the bank can be differentiated to implement second-stage evaluation on either (1) both types, or (2) only one type, or (3) neither type of the borrowers. We find that during severe economic contractions or in geographic areas/industries which are in deep troubles, whilst the borrowers who repay the loan are out-numbered by the borrowers who fail to pay, the trigger cost for good borrower is higher than that of default borrower. In this scenario, the banks are more inclined to undertake the second-stage credit evaluation on good borrowers. On the other hand, if the percentage of credible borrowers is higher than that of default borrowers, the trigger cost for good borrower lies below the trigger cost of default borrower. As a result, the banks are less inclined to undertake the second-stage evaluation on good borrowers.     

THE TREATMENT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF AUSTRALIA

This paper is divided into two main sections. The first part summarises briefly the main points which have arisen in the lengthy debate over the treatment of banking intermediaries in the national accounts. The discussion emphasises the method adopted in the early Australian accounts when banks were treated in the same way as the general government. It is argued that this method is simpler and provides a more realistic account of the functions of banks than the current SNA proposal.
The second part of the paper examines the functions of banks in Australia. It uses data of interest and administration cost for separate banking institutions to examine the incidence of bank costs. It is concluded that the costs do not fall on borrowers or lenders but are a charge in providing a communal service in the establishment and maintenance of the financial system.     

中小企业信贷市场的监控研究——基于信息和产品差异化模型

中小企业信用缺损成为中小企业陷入融资困境并制约其发展的重要原因,但中小企业信贷市场风险高,对中小企业信贷市场的监控便成为研究的重要课题.银行监控中小企业信贷市场的有效途径之一是对借主的事前监控.构建监控模型和产品差异化模型在于银行利用资源在发放贷款之前监测企业,通过银行获取信息或者在市场力(产品差异化)投资模型的分析表明两种选择产生不同的预测,即银行加大分支机构和人力资本的投入,有利于提高信息获取的范围以及信息获取的准确性,但对市场力增长不显著;银行对借主资金交易的管理有利于提高借贷风险控制能力.     

Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of corruption in bank lending. Corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely related to legal enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’ willingness to lend. Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only judiciary corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can alleviate firm’s financing obstacles.     

Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model

This paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification (or auditing) by banks is costly. Peer group formation reduces interest rates due to a 'collateral effect', namely, cross subsidisation amongst borrowers acts as collateral behind a loan. By uncovering such a collateral effect, this paper shows that peer group systems can be viewed as an effective risk pooling mechanism, and thus enhance efficiency, not just in the full information set up.     

Perverse Effects of an External Ratings-Related Capital Adequacy System

It has recently been proposed that banks should be allowed to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favourable rating by an approved external credit assessment institution (ECAI), or rating agency. But a plausible model of rating agency behaviour shows that this strategy could have perverse results, actually increasing the risk of deposit insurance outlays. First, there is an issue of signalling, whereby low-ability borrowers may alter their behaviour so as to secure a lower capital requirement for their borrowing. Second, the establishment of a regulatory cut-off may actually reduce the amount of risk information made available by raters. Besides, the credibility of rating agencies may not be damaged by neglect of the risk of unusual systemic shocks, though it is these that cause the major bank failure costs.
(J.E.L.:E53, G21, G33)     

Relative Performance Evaluations in a Model of Financial Intermediation

This paper focuses on the delegation by bank managers of lending decisions to their agents, typically subordinate employees of the bank. We assume that agents may base their decisions about lending to borrowers on decisions other banks have made about these same borrowers. Then we show that there exist some lazy or negligent agents who neither directly monitor the borrower nor imitate the other banks if managers use relative performance evaluations as incentive schemes. In addition, it is shown that the learning or adjustment process of agents exhibits cyclical dynamics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D83.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy–namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances–support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.     

The determinants and profitability of switching costs in Chinese banking

This article models the determinants of bank switching costs in China in terms of bank characteristics and non-bank variables. It also determines the contribution of switching costs to banks’ profits. Using a sample of 151 banks over the period 2003–2013 it reports a positive relationship between bank profitability and switching costs. The main result is that bank size measured by total assets has a complex relationship with switching costs. Competition between small banks creates the incentive for lock-in and increased switching costs whereas very large banks are less exercised by lock-in and switching costs.     

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy,Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour.     

Cash policy and the bank-firm relationship

Bank health affects a firm's cash holding - a healthy bank can result in either more (because of the influential bank power) or less (because of precautionary motive) firm-level cash holding. Motivated by the contrasting views in the existing literature, this paper investigates whether bank policy determines firm-level cash policy. Using Japanese firm-level data over 2000–2014, we find that the difference in bank health effects stems from the firm's investment status. We find that healthy banks induce growing firms to hold more cash while declining firms hold more cash when borrowing from unhealthy banks. Furthermore, we find that banks with more liquidity also induce their growing borrowers to have more cash. Our results are robust to the endogeneity of bank selection. Our study indicates that bank-firm relationship can serve as an advance-signalling device for a firm's shareholder-wealth-maximizing investments and contributes to the literature that explains the cash holding puzzle.     

转移成本、价格歧视与银行竞争——基于霍特林模型的实证分析

在银行业竞争中,转移成本能够锁定消费者,使银行能够对锁定的消费者定一个较高的价格,但是,转移成本也使银行对没有被锁定的消费者的竞争更加激烈。研究发现,转移成本的存在增加了银行的利润,并且转移成本越高,银行从信贷中获得的利润越高。但是,当存在存款市场和贷款市场竞争时,由于价格歧视的存在,银行的利润随着转移成本的增加而降低,转移成本没有给银行带来优势。     

中国银行体系关系型信贷的有效性——基于宣告效应的研究

在不对称信息下,关系型银行可以利用信息优势参与借款企业治理,降低代理成本.文章实证分析了1996-2008年中国上市公司发布获得银行信贷公告后的市场反应,发现上市公司发布获得银行授信和债务重组公告引起股价显著上涨,表明中国银行体系自1996年以来有意识地建立长期稳定的银企合作关系的政策具有治理效应.文章还发现,信息不对称程度越高、公司治理越差的公司,治理效应越显著.这种效应主要体现在贷前甄别企业质量和贷后救助方面,而在贷中监督企业机会主义行为,降低代理成本方面则没有体现.     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful deterrent. Yet, we show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addition, the auditing costs of the insurers are heterogeneous, it can be optimal not to commit, because committing to a fraud-detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity about auditing. Thus, strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium outcome in the market. Even competition does not force firms to provide the relevant information. This finding is also relevant in other auditing settings, like tax enforcement.     

The effect of US stress tests on monetary policy spillovers to emerging markets

This paper explores the transmission of US monetary policy through US banks to emerging market economies (EMEs) and the role that stress tests play in this transmission. Data on US banks’ monthly commercial and industrial loan originations shows that: (a) US bank lending to EMEs was sensitive to domestic monetary policy changes during the zero‐lower bound period. (b) Effects of monetary easing were heterogeneous across banks and depended on banks’ stress test results, a proxy for their capital strength. Only banks that comfortably passed the stress tests issued more loans to EME borrowers. (c) Effects of monetary tightening were more similar across banks. (d) Banks shifted their lending to safer borrowers within EMEs in response to monetary easing, leaving the risk of their overall loan books unchanged. These results support the hypothesis that bank capital affects the transmission of easier monetary policy, including across borders. We conjecture that bank lending to EMEs during the zero‐lower bound period would have been even higher had the United States not introduced stress tests for their banks.     

The effect of lender and loan type on a borrowing firm’s equity return

Past empirical studies appear to support the idea that banks and finance companies do not differ in their ability to resolve adverse selection problems associated with issuing new debt. In this article, we find there is a difference. More specifically, using an event study we find larger abnormal returns for secured loan disclosures to lower quality borrowers when the lender is a finance company versus a bank. This suggests the market views finance companies as more effective than banks in evaluating/monitoring lower quality borrowers obtaining secured loans. We posit this is due to finance companies’ greater expertise in this type of lending, resulting from specialization. Our findings extend the literature on how lender identity can influence signals about firm value from loan disclosures. Our results also support recent findings that positive abnormal returns to borrowing firms may not be a general feature across the loan population, but may be restricted to smaller, lower quality borrowers. Finally, we are the first to provide evidence that the market takes loan type into account, not just lender and borrower type, when considering the information embedded in loan disclosures.     

Firm size,credit scoring accuracy and banks’ production of soft information

Research on SME bank financing generally assumes that smaller firms are more opaque from a lender’s perspective. We propose that the discriminatory power of credit scoring models can be thought of as a proxy for firm opaqueness, given that when these models perform poorly, lenders must invest in the production of ‘soft information’ to supplement the financial data used in these models. Measuring the discriminatory power of probit default models across quintiles of the Irish SME size distribution, we show that our proxy for firm opaqueness increases monotonically as firms get smaller. This finding supports an assumption that is the starting point to a wide strand of literature on SME bank financing. Our findings can also be interpreted as providing an insight to the literature on the determinants of banks’ choice of lending technology. While smaller banks may, as found in a substantial previous literature, produce larger amounts of ‘soft information’ due to their organizational advantages, they may also do so out of necessity: hard-information-based default modelling is less effective among smaller firms, thereby forcing banks that lend to these borrowers to invest more in relationship banking technologies to retain competitiveness.     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.