政府创新补贴对中国工业自有研发支出的影响研究 ——基于空间计量模型

从空间关联视角再审视政府创新补贴的效应,并基于2001—2017年我国省际面板数据,运用空间面板模型分析了政府创新补贴对中国工业自有研发支出的影响。结果表明,政府创新补贴显著激励了本省市工业自有研发支出,同时,也正向影响相邻省市工业自有研发支出。在控制了内生性问题后,该结论依然成立。另外,在不同所有制和创新水平下,政府创新补贴对工业自有研发支出的空间影响效果存在差异。根据研究结论,本文提出加大政府创新补贴力度并充分考虑溢出效应、融合政府激励和市场驱动以及营造支持成功创新的环境等4项政策建议。     

Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly

It is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution. It has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage. In this paper, I derive the optimal pollution tax for a Cournot duopoly. If firms have different production costs, the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage. This is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm. It is also shown that, if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level.     

More on subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers

In an earlier article in this journal I compared two R&D-stimulating policies: allowing for R&D cooperatives and providing direct R&D subsidies (see Hinloopen, 1997:Journal of Economics 66: 151–175). I also considered the implementation of both policies simultaneously. Since then Amir (1998: Discussion Paper 1/1998, Odense University) has shown that the model I used as a starting point (i.e., that of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988:American Economic Review 78: 1133–1137) is not well-defined with respect to a crucial parameter (the technological spillover) and subsequently proposes an augmentation of the model. Replicating then my original analysis with this augmented model reveals that all results stated before remain valid. In addition I correct a minor error in Hinloopen (1997) related to the comparison of optimal R&D subsidies.     

To adjust or not to adjust after a cost-push shock? A simple duopoly model with (and without) resilience

We characterize the equilibrium in a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly in which firms have the choice to react to a cost-push shock by paying a lump-sum adjustment cost in order to offset the initial rise in marginal cost. Our results show that the size of the shock and the size of the adjustment cost jointly determine the nature and the number of the equilibria generated in the game. In particular, if the adjustment cost is high enough, at least one firm decides not to adjust at the pure-strategy equilibrium, and such a partial adjustment by the industry can be socially efficient as well. The main conclusions are robust to the endogenization of the adjustment cost as an increasing function of the shock size. Some implications of this partial equilibrium analysis about industry's resilience are outlined.     

政府产品创新补贴下的企业R＆D策略选择

为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R＆D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R＆D的三阶段博弈模型：第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R＆D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R＆D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R＆D补贴率。研究表明：从企业的R＆D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH AN R&D RIVALRY

This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.     

一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易模型——以石油市场为例的国家福利实验模拟分析

中国作为大宗商品的国际大买家,争取国际定价权已经成为再也无法回避的问题.有鉴于此出,文章以石油为例,着重探讨石油定价战略选择的经济学机理,在一个具有双寡头垄断性质的三边贸易体系中,对OPEC和非OPEC石油输出国之间的博弈进行了一般均衡分析.根据模型设定参数及实验模拟发现,在Cournot双寡头垄断下,国家M的福利水平增加32.4%,而国家F的福利水平却下降0.8%.由此作出的解释是:与M相反,F是石油净进口国家,高油价和商品y较低的相对价格所产生的负面效应要大于闲暇带来的正面效应.此时,整个社会福利下降0.7%.石油在消费者效用函数中的权重较小时,石油生产的一个负向冲击对福利损失的影响非常有限.在F和M的纯策略集合{双寡头垄断,完全竞争,不生产石油}中,存在唯一的纳什均衡{完全竞争,完全竞争},这使得国家H和F从中获益.模型给人的启示是,除了尽快完善国家石油战略储备体系外,中国应积极参与到石油定价权的争夺中,改变目前完全被动承受油价变动影响的不利地位.     

Trade and the Transmission of Technology

This paper integrates earlier studies on the link of productivity and research and development (R&D) in different industries of a closed economy with the more recent emphasis on R&D-driven growth and international trade in open economies. In this framework, technology in the form of product designs is transmitted to other industries, both domestically as well as internationally, through trade in differentiated intermediate goods. I present empirical results based on a new industry-level data set that covers more than 65 percent of the worlds manufacturing output and most of the worlds R&D expenditures between 1970 and 1991. The analysis considers productivity effects from R&D in the domestic industry itself, from R&D in other domestic industries, as well as in the same and other foreign industries. I estimate strong productivity effects both from own R&D spending and R&D conducted elsewhere. The contribution of R&D in the industry itself is about 50 percent in this sample. Domestic R&D in other industries is the source of 30 percent of the productivity increases, and the remaining 20 percent are due to R&D expenditures in foreign industries.     

Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function

In this paper we analyze a duopolistic market with heterogeneous firms when the demand function is isoelastic (Puu, T., 1991. Chaos in duopoly pricing. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 1, 573–581.). We consider the same heterogeneous firms of Zhang et al. (Zhang, J., Da, Q., Wang, Y., 2007. Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players. Economic Modelling 24, 138–148.) introducing a nonlinearity in the demand function instead of the cost function. Stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium and complex dynamics are studied. In particular we show two different routes to complicated dynamics: a cascade of flip bifurcations leading to periodic cycles (and chaos) and the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation which originates an attractive invariant closed curve. Comparisons with respect to the Puu model and the model of Zhang et al. are performed.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

Managerial firms’ profitability,unions, and environmental taxes

This article examines how determining an optimal environmental tax in a Cournot duopoly with unionized labour markets and managerial firms departing from the strict profit-maximization. It is shown that firm-specific monopoly unions that set wages (1) reduce both the environmental tax and environmental damage and (2) counterintuitively, increase firms’ profitability when the abatement technology is not too “efficient”, and the public evaluation of environmental quality is sufficiently high. Within this framework, the work also develops the endogenous game played by firms that must choose between sales delegation (SD) and profit-maximization. Results show that the SD contract always emerges as the unique, deadlock sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, thereby solving the (prisoner's) dilemma emerging in the related existing literature assuming a competitive labour market.     

R&D COOPERATION WITH UNIT-ELASTIC DEMAND

The present paper shows that R&D cooperation leads to the monopoly outcome in terms of price and quantity if demand is unit-elastic. If the demand function exhibits an upper bound for the willingness to pay, R&D cooperation is inferior to a scenario in which firms cooperate both in their R&D and their output decision.     

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.     

Clean technology — Innovation and environmental regulation

The development and diffusion of clean technologies has an important role to play in preventing pollution. Government must address the issue of how firms can be given the necessary incentive to develop environmentally sound production techniques and products. This paper focus on how subsidies can — under certain restrictive conditions — stimulate innovation. Subsidization is usually assumed to involve unit subsidies for pollution reduction. Unit subsidies have little to do with the subsidy schemes in actual use. Our focus is on subsidy schemes specifically designed to promote the development of clean technologies through the use of grants/financial aid. Based on data from the development projects initiated through The Danish Clean Technology Programme we analyze how environmental innovations take place when the polluters, their suppliers and consultants are actively engaged in the development processes. The main merit of subsidy schemes like the Danish one is its direct focus on the innovation processes and the active incorporation of the network of firms surrounding the polluters. Our findings lead us to conclude that when it comes to subsidization, the role of government should be redefined. Government can act as a matchmaker by providing firms with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding more efficient technological solutions to specific environmental problems.