RENT SEEKING AND TAX REFORM

Tax reform can either increase or reduce the amount of rent seeking, depending essentially on what is done. If tax reform involved eliminating special treatment of special groups and using the money saved either to lower the general tax rate or to discontinue government activities that most people would be better off without, then it would reduce the amount of rent seeking. Savings may, however, be used to reduce the degree of generally beneficial government activity. This is rather apt to increase the amount of rent seeking in the long run.     

RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda-setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost-benefit analysis.     

INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS

In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders'expenditures.     

RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE*

We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto-preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto-preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking.     

TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK†

This paper synthesizes a body of work in trade theory and commercial policy. A common theme unifies this literature: The prospect of protection, institutionalized in the policy formation process and the rules for administered protection, can induce real changes in economic activity independent of whether actual barriers to trade have been imposed. These changes are designed to indirectly manage policy outcomes by either encouraging or defusing protectionist pressures. Thus firm conduct may be distorted by incentives to optimize on a politically-determined margin and the evolution of protectionist events may be shaped by more than the direct lobbying efforts of interest groups.     

SPURIOUS INJURY AS INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: FREE TRADE UNDER THE PROSPECT OF PROTECTION*

In the literature on directly unproductive profit seeking or rent seeking, intervention-seeking by labor and industry groups is generally restricted to direct lobbying activity. However, import-competing producers may have an additional instrument to influence the decision to grant protection. Under well-established injury criteria for protection import-competing producers have an incentive, either collectively or individually, to feign injury. To the extent that the free-rider problem can be overcome, orchestrating the appearance of injury is an intervention-seeking activity that may be complementary to DUP lobbying. When the established indicators of industry well-being include variables controlled by the prospective beneficiaries, therefore, free trade under the prospect of protection is potentially accompanied by a concomitant spurious-injury distortion. Some of the positive and welfare implications of the theory of spurious injury are investigated in both a partial equilibrium framework and in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.     

RENT DISSIPATION AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE POLICY

This paper uses a general equilibrium-based exchange economy model to examine rent seeking for a price policy. Opposing interests spend resources to influence the government's choice of a price vector. Rents, the willingness to pay for the policy, are determined endogenously from the Nash equilibirum of a non-cooperative game. Numerical simulations explore the degree to which rents are dissipated by wasteful rent seeking. It is found that dissipation, measured as the ratio of rent-seeking costs to rents garnered, can grow without limit, and is greatest when opponents are evenly matched. Dissipation is smallest with widely disparate groups, a result that might help explain the underdissipation that seems to occur in many industries.     

THE BENEFIT OF REDUCED COMPETITION AND THE COST OF INFORMATION RENT UNDER OUTSOURCING

We analyse the cost and benefit of outsourcing with adverse selection in a duopoly by comparing outsourcing with in‐house production in terms of the manufacturer’s expected profit. When two manufacturers faced with ex ante cost uncertainty compete in a differentiated duopoly, outsourcing brings about a benefit in terms of reduced competition, while it entails the cost of information rent. We show that the manufacturers always choose in‐house production in Cournot and Bertrand competition, when outsourcing and in‐house production follow the same ex ante cost distribution. When the manufacturers compete in Cournot fashion, the cost of information rent always exceeds the benefit of reduced competition under outsourcing. On the other hand, when they compete in Bertrand fashion, it is possible that even if the benefit of outsourcing exceeds the cost, both manufacturers cannot choose outsourcing.     

地区引资的成本-效果分析与投资环境优化

各地优化其投资环境以吸引投资需要成本,引资成本与其所获得的引资效果之间存有一般关系.而这种一般关系曲线在现实中要考虑各地投资环境的先天条件和具体引资操作等因素而对其起点和过程进行修正.对引资所用方式和手段的无差异曲线的分析可为更经济地优化投资环境提供参考.投资环境优化首先需要确定优化目标,它是地区的目标引资项目的公共影响因素和专业影响因素所包含的各方面.投资环境优化措施就针对优化目标来提出,并要综合考虑这些措施所需成本与其所获综合引资效果来实施.     

THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.     

ECONOMIC RENT AND ESTIMATION OF SOVIET GNP GROWTH

The extraction of fuels and metals and production of agricultural goods in the USSR involve increasing marginal cost, which generates economic rent. In computing Soviet GNP accounts, though, the CIA excludes economic rent in measuring value added. The effect is to value output at average, as opposed to marginal, cost. The exclusion of rent understates the shares of fuels, metals, and agriculture in Soviet GNP, which adversely affects the CIA's calculations of Soviet growth. In this paper, the author estimates the economic rent generated by Soviet extraction of fuels and metals and agricultural production. He then uses the estimates to recompute the shares of these sectors in Soviet GNP, and GNP growth. The results suggest that inclusion of economic rent in value added (or alternatively, marginal cost valuation of output) more than doubles the share in GNP of mining (fuels and metals extraction), and increases agriculture's share during the 1980s from 20 percent to about 25 percent. The reestimates of Soviet GNP growth also differ from those of the CIA by 10–30 percent.     

ENVIRONMENT-ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING AND INDICATORS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACTIVITIES

In this paper, we define environmental protection (EP) activities in the context of an input-output (I-O) framework. The U.S. I-O table is adjusted to separate inputs purchased by various economic sectors to abate pollution. We use I-O concepts and the I-O matrix adjusted for EP activities to derive a matrix of inputs to EP activities, which is independent of the matrix of inputs to traditional economic activities. This matrix is the basis for deriving measures of the economic importance of EP activities, including the size of EP activities relative to GNP and direct employment and indirect employment attributable to EP activities.