SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

This paper discusses five common divisional performance measurement methods—cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, investment centers, and expense centers—and provides the beginnings of a theory that attempts to explain when each of these five methods is likely to be the most efficient. The central insight of the theory is that each of these methods offers an alternative way of aligning decision-making authority with valuable specific knowledge inside the organization.
The theory suggests that cost and revenue centers work best in cases where headquarters has good information about cost and demand functions, product quality, and optimal output mix. Profit centers—defined as business units whose managers have responsibility for overall profits, but not the authority to make major capital spending decisions—tend to supplant revenue and cost centers when the line managers have a significant informational advantage over headquarters and when there are few interdependencies (or synergies) between divisions. Investment centers—that is, profit centers in which unit managers are allowed to make major investment decisions—tend to prevail when the activity is capital-intensive and when it is difficult for headquarters to identify the value-maximizing investment strategy.
In evaluating the performance of profit centers, rate-of-return performance measures like RONA (return on net assets) are likely to be effective when unit managers have little influence over the level of new investment. But, in the case of investment centers, Economic Value Added, or EVA, is likely to be the most effective single-period measure of performance because it is best designed to encourage value-maximizing investment decisions.     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

BIASES IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT DURING CONTRIBUTIONS: A NOTE

This note demonstrates that a statistical error (e.g., due to pricing error) made in valuing an investment fund at the time of an intra-period contribution leads to an error in calculating the period's total return, even if the fund was valued correctly at the beginning and end of the period. On average, even if the valuation error is distributed randomly with mean zero, the fund's performance will be biased.     

DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: A PROJECT ON PRODUCING RETURN ON INVESTMENT METRICS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

This paper reports on a project concerned with developing a return on investment (ROI) performance metric for a law enforcement organisation. The paper's contributions are twofold. First, it addresses concerns in the literature about how different stakeholder interests are balanced in the development of performance measures. Second, it helps to remedy an oversight in the literature regarding the hybridisation of accounting and economic expertise, whereby cost benefit techniques and ROI combine to produce a metric of public sector achievements. By virtue of its law enforcement context the paper also discusses a further hybridisation where accounting, economics and criminology/law enforcement intersect.     

ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE IN SMALL PORTFOLIOS WITH EVENT‐INDUCED VOLATILITY: THE CASE OF STOCK SPLITS

In this article I present a test for detecting abnormal returns when the event analyzed induces volatility and the portfolio is small. The results show that the test is well specified and leads to significant gains in power. I subsequently analyze the abnormal returns around the stock split ex date according to the split factor and find significant abnormal returns only when the factor is greater than 2. The varying motives behind the splits may explain this finding.