基于机构投资者参与公司治理结构的研究

由于机构投资者能够有效地解决上市公司治理机制中个人投资者监督成本内化和收益外化的"搭便车"的现象,从而决定了机构投资者本身就是一种解决企业监控难题的制度。不同性质的机构投资者在证券市场中的功能定位、市场空间和实际作用的不同,完全可以考虑以机构投资者的多元化对企业内部控制和外部控制所能产生的市场互补和功能整合效应,来充分发挥机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance

This paper examines the relationship between CEO incentives and strong and weak corporate social performance. Using the KLD database we find that incentives have no significant relationship with strong social performance. Salary and long-term incentives have a positive association with weak social performance.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Long-term Compensation: Evidence from Canada

This paper examines the association between long-term compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 90 publicly traded Canadian firms. Social responsibility is considered to include concerns for social factors and the environment (e.g. Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564-578; Kane, E. J. (2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26:, 1919-1933; McGuire, J. et al. 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45 (4), 341-359). Long-term compensation attempts to focus executives efforts on optimizing the longer term, which should direct their attention to factors traditionally associated with socially responsible executives (Mahapatra, S. 1984, Journal of Financial Economicsit 20, 347-376). As hypothesized, we found a significant relationship between the long-term compensation and total CSR weakness as well as the product/environmental weakness dimension of CSR. In addition, we found a marginally significant relationship between long-term compensation and total corporate responsibility. Our findings are that executives long-term compensation is associated with a firms environmental actions, and that firms that utilize long-term compensation are more likely to mitigate product/environment weaknesses than those that do not. Implications for practice and research are discussed.     

机构投资者参与公司治理的理性决策分析

近年来,机构投资者迅速崛起,越来越多的人们关注机构投资者的发展与成熟程度对公司治理结构的影响。本文借鉴日、美在机构投资者与公司治理关系方面的经验与教训,构建成本收益比较分析模型分析了机构投资者的集中投资与分散投资的决策问题,利用股数效应模型分析了机构投资者对于集中投资的单个公司是否应积极参与公司治理的问题,并对如何提高机构投资者参与公司治理的效率提出了对策建议。     

投资者保护与公司治理

公司治理是近 30年来理论研究的热点 ,但人们大多把注意力集中于对经理行为的研究 ,而忽视了对投资者保护的关注。随着以哈特为代表的新产权学派的兴起 ,特别是LLSV( 1 998)的实证数据使得人们把视角转为对投资者保护机制的关注。我们发现 ,在投资者保护的研究框架下 ,可以更好地理解公司治理 ,以及它们对一国金融市场和经济发展的重要性。     

An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory.     

论西方机构投资者对公司治理的参与

有关机构投资者的研究在公司治理领域内对传统理论提出了强有力的挑战 ,但仍处于初步发展阶段 ,尚未形成逻辑一致、系统的分析框架。借鉴美英公司治理模式下机构投资者对公司治理的参与 ,为进一步深入开展机构投资者与公司治理关系系统研究提供一个理论框架     

公司治理与公司网络投资者关系管理的及时性——对中国百强的实证研究

以12个指标评估中国百强公司网络投资者关系管理(IRM)的及时性,通过董事会结构和股权结构两个维度对公司治理与公司网络IRM及时性的关系进行实证检验。研究发现:公司治理机制尤其是股权结构对网络IRM及时性产生了显著影响,高管持股激励机制及国有性质股权有利于提升网络IRM及时性,而第一大股东对网络IRM及时性具有显著的负面影响;中国百强虽均建有网站,但对网络IRM及时性的重视度不足,及时性分值普遍偏低,中国公司的网络IRM活动尚需有效的引导。     

公司治理的路径依赖性及其对公司治理趋同的影响

在全球化背景下,各国(地区)出于提高治理效率以提高竞争力的目的,纷纷对其公司治理加以改革,并表现出一定程度的趋同现象;但是,公司治理具有路径依赖特征,一国公司治理的变迁必然受到其原先路径的影响.因此,即便在全球化的推动下,不同国家(地区)的公司治理也不会发生完全的趋同;公司治理的差异化将是一个长期的现象.     

两权分离与公司治理的演进——英美经验与我国实践

公司治理的演进过程也是所有权和控制权以及经营权分离的过程。通过对英美国家公司发展不同时期两权分离的历史考察,发现两权分离与公司治理演进之间存在依存关系：两权分离依次经历了所有权和经营权分离、所有权和控制权分离、控制权和经营权分离和同股不同权等阶段,不同形式的两权分离带来不同的公司治理问题,从而产生相应的治理手段,推动着公司治理的演进。通过对中国企业改革和发展过程的历史回顾也证明了两权分离与公司治理之间存在共同演进关系。针对研究发现,最后提出了我国公司治理改革的方向性建议。     

公司治理中推行独立董事制度的必要性

随着所有权与经营权的分离 ,公司的健康发展与公司有效治理直接相关 ,而董事会的运作效果是公司治理的核心 ,推行独立董事制度对于建立高校运作的董事会 ,保护中小投资者的利益及实现公司有效治理意义重大。     

Does Good Governance Matter to Institutional Investors? Evidence from the Enactment of Corporate Governance Guidelines

Corporate governance guidelines are a mechanism that a firm can enact which should reduce agency costs and better align the interests of boards and the suppliers of capital. This study examines stock price reactions primarily attributable to institutional investors occurring when corporations announce the enactment of corporate governance guidelines. A final sample of 77 firms was derived from the first announcement of corporate governance guidelines exclusive to the SEC-EDGAR database. The results indicate that good governance does matter. Firms that announced the enactment of corporate governance guidelines experienced increased stock prices following the announcements. There was an immediate (days 1–4) reaction for firms that provided all or part of the guidelines’ substance; a delayed (days 8–10) reaction occurred for those firms that only referenced the guidelines’ enactment. Additionally, firms with either a potentially greater following or that had a previous history of acrimonious relations with stakeholders were rewarded by the announcement of the enactment of guidelines.     

公司治理机制下独立董事功能分析

独立董事具有监督公司管理层,评价董事会,树立公司形象等功能,但其自身存在信息不灵、缺乏动力及不能真正独立等缺欠。应从对其功能合理定位,完善选拔机制与选聘程序、完善激励与约束机制,建立健全相关法律法规体系等方面施以对策,以更好地发挥独立董事的功能及作用。     

Concepts and Working Instruments for Corporate Governance

Enterprises seem to entirely operate on their management. But behind the scenes directors play a very important role. On a strategic level (in the long term) they will determine the direction of the company.Even though on the level of daily management a great deal of quality instruments and control systems exist, this is not the case on the highest level, the board. It is in this specific area that the idea of corporate governance must be situated.In 2000 the Association of Christian Employers and Executives in Flanders (VKW) facilitated the formation of a consultation committee consisting of leading employers and business executives, having the task to translate this idea of corporate governance into useful working instruments. The author of this paper was the secretary to this consultation committee.One of the main questions in this area considers the ethics of the board. The other way around corporate governance is a very important instrument realising more responsible business, because it depends on the specific business model in the board and the firm.The first results were presented in February 2001. In February 2002 a first update was published, with some new insights, information and working instruments.     

公司治理机制与财务业绩:效率还是盈利

本文基于杜邦分析体系(DuPontAnalysis),以我国资本市场在2002-2004年期间的上市公司年度数据为研究样本,实证检验了公司治理水平的提高对促进企业绩效增长的实现路径。研究表明,上市公司的治理水平越高,高管人员也就越加重视通过公司内部资源整合、完善营销策略和客户管理等方式提高资产营运效率。而且公司治理水平对改善企业绩效的影响并没有突出体现在努力提高主营业务收入或降低生产成本环节,而主要是通过加强资产管理和提高营运效率来实现的。     

独立董事制度与我国上市公司治理结构的完善

2001年8月,中国证监会颁布《指导意见》标志着独立董事制度在我国的全面推行。刚刚修订的《公司法》明确规定上市设立独立董事。但四年多的实践表明,独立董事制度在我国实施的并不成功。“花瓶董事”甚至“饿狼董事”的斥责以及对独立董事制度的争论从未停止过。由于我国上市公司自身的结构性问题,来自异域的独立董事制度扎根我国存在着适应性问题。只有在完善公司治理的前提下,改革创新,不断探索,完善资本市场,健全法律体系,才能够探索出一条适合我国国情的,使有效的独立董事与监事会协调一致,成为互为补充的监督体制。     

股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响研究

股权分置的制度缺陷导致了上市公司治理缺乏共同的利益基础,扭曲了资本市场发挥作用的机理。股权分置改革有利于上市公司逐步形成共同的治理基础。从股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响关系框架可以看出,指出股权分置改革通过上市公司股东行为、董事会作用及经营者激励约束机制等内部治理因素和资本市场定价机制、控制权市场并购重组机制及监督约束机制等外部治理因素影响着上市公司整体治理的优化,从而使后股权分置时代促进上市公司治理优化。     

公司治理与公司管理的关系研究

理顺公司治理与公司管理的关系是企业保持持久生命力的关键。两者相互依存,又互有区别。公司治理与公司管理的相互依存来自两者之间的匹配协调,两者的区别根源在于现代企业所有权与经营权的分离。公司治理与公司管理之间的匹配协调是动态的,随着企业内外部环境的变化,两者需经适时调整,以达到新的平衡。     

Corporate Governance and Institutional Transparency in Emerging Markets

This paper posits that differences in corporate governance structure partly result from differences in institutional arrangements linked to business systems. We developed a new international triad of business systems: the Anglo-American, the Communitarian and the Emerging system, building on the frameworks of Choi et al. (British Academy of Management (Kynoch Birmingham) 1996, Management International Review 39, 257–279, 1999). A common factor determining the success of a corporate governance structure is the extent to which it is transparent to market forces. Such transparency is more than pure financial transparency; as it can also be based on factors such as governmental, banking and other types of institutional transparency mechanism. There may also be a choice for firms to adopt voluntary corporate disclosure in situations where mandatory disclosure is not established. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 and the more recent corporate governance scandals such as Enron, Andersen and Worldcom in the United States and Ahold and Parmalat in Europe show that corporate governance and business ethics issues exist throughout the world. As an illustration we focus on Asia’s emerging¹ markets, as, both in view of the pressure of globalization and taking into account the institutional arrangements peculiar to the emerging business system, these issues are important there. Particularly for those who have to find an accommodation between the corporate governance structures and disclosure standards of the Emerging system and those of the Anglo-American and Communitarian systems.     

Corporate Governance Reforms: Redefined Expectations of Audit Committee Responsibilities and Effectiveness

Comprehensive regulatory changes brought on by recent corporate governance reforms have broadly redefined and re-emphasized the roles and responsibilities of all the participants in a public company’s financial reporting process. Most notably, these reforms have intensified scrutiny of corporate audit committees, whose role as protectors of investors’ interests now attracts substantially higher visibility and expectations. As a result, audit committees face the formidable challenge of effectively overseeing the company’s financial reporting process in a dramatically changed – and highly charged – corporate governance environment. This paper discusses the new expectations of audit committee responsibilities and effectiveness in the wake of corporate governance reforms, key challenges, “whistleblower” provisions and shortcomings, and provides some directions for future research.