Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint Ventures

We show that ex ante identical oligopolists may find it optimal to contribute asymmetrically to a research joint venture. The reason is found in the trade-off between the desire to increase the variance of the distribution of unit costs within the oligopoly (which increases gross profit, though not necessarily net profit, of the group) and the incentive to efficiently carry out R&D activities by equalizing marginal R&D costs across firms. Conditions for non-existence of symmetric contributions are given. We also propose a profit sharing rule for asymmetric research joint ventures.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L23.     

On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations

This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games of incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure as the original game. In particular, continuation equilibria are correlated equilibria. (ii) Players are typically uncertain about their opponents' past observations and actions, and they use their entire own private history to learn about these actions. As a result equilibrium strategies are in general nontrivial and increasingly complex functions of past observations. We bypass these difficulties by looking at correlated equilibria of the original game and find correlated equilibria in which the decision problem faced by each player remains the same over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

Under–provision of Inputs in Joint Ventures with Market Power

A joint venture with market power benefits from restricting its output which, in turn, requires the partners to restrict the supply of their inputs. However, since each partner benefits only partially from restricting its input, both over–supply their inputs from the viewpoint of the optimal use of market power. We show that this pecuniary negative externality in the partners' input decisions mitigates the standard under–provision problem that arises in joint ventures. We also show that the degree of this problem declines as demand becomes less elastic.     

Protectionism, Export Requirements, and Joint Ventures

Economic distortions often accompany the attempt by lower-income countries to develop. This paper examines the consequences of two such distortions: an export-share requirement whereby foreign capital producing in a local enclave is allowed to sell only a fraction of its output in the local protected market, and some local capital must be allowed into a joint venture in the enclave, even if it must be paid a higher return there than foreign capital earns in its country of origin. The welfare effect of such measures is investigated as well as the effect on local wages of measures that drive out some foreign investment. Such a loss of foreign capital may serve to raise the wage rate.     

Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in International Joint Ventures

In a model of a joint venture between a local and a foreign firm who provide complementary inputs, this paper derives optimal ownership structures under different sharing rules. The local firm's profits may be maximized by assigning a majority share to the foreign firm. Efficiency (i.e., the minimization of double moral hazard) requires that the firm with the more productive input should get majority ownership. When only the foreign firm can upgrade its input, it should receive a larger share than what it receives in the absence of upgrading. The analysis implies that a blanket policy of prohibiting majority foreign ownership is theoretically unfounded.     

跨国合资的技术偏向性与经济增长

文章将偏向性技术进步理论和基于谈判实力的合作博弈理论相结合,分析了股权结构、谈判实力差异对偏向性技术进步和宏观经济增长的影响。文章得出以下结论:首先,在跨国合资模式下,技术进步具有偏向性,而股权结构和谈判实力对偏向性技术进步具有正向影响。其次,谈判实力对经济增长具有正向促进作用;股权结构与经济增长之间的关系呈现U型曲线,股权结构的不平衡性越强,经济增长速度越快,而合资双方越倾向于平均分享股权,经济增长速度则越慢。最后,股权结构和谈判实力对于跨国合资双方在国际经济中的地位和作用也会产生不同的影响。     

Profit Share and Partner Choice in International Joint Ventures

This paper suggests a new approach to the determination of profit allocation between the partners in international joint ventures (IJVs). We also examine the issue of partnership choice. The foreign firm gives a large share of profits to its partner and in return receives a better tax treatment from the host government. Under linearity of costs and demand functions, it would choose the more efficient domestic firm as an IJV partner, and the domestic firms would happily accept the offer of partnership from the foreign firm. However, the host government, under certain situations, may persuade the foreign firm, by a suitable lump‐sum transfer, to form a partnership with the less efficient firm.     

Feasibility,Stability, and Multiple Research Joint Ventures

We study multiple research joint ventures (RJVs) using a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. Compared with the single joint venture case, we show that cooperation in multiple joint ventures creates two advantages for participating firms. First, by linking decisions together across all joint ventures firms can mitigate the likelihood of cooperation breakdowns following bad R&D outcomes. Second, as the incentive cost to sustain cooperation is independent of the number of joint ventures, the economy of scale effect reduces the efficiency loss due to imperfect monitoring.     

Joint Ventures versus Contractual Agreements: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures. This paper was partially written while the first author was visiting the University of the Basque Country. We would like to thank Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database. Financial support from projects Progetto Giovani Ricercatori – 1999 Universitá di Udine, SEJ 2004-02172/ECON, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001, UPV 00038.321-13503/2001 is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures

This paper addresses whether the welfare analysis of the agreements and rules of a professional sports league should depend on the organisational form chosen by the league's participants. Courts have analysed sports leagues both as associations of horizontal competitors and as single entities. The former approach suggests much less tolerance for rules that affect competition. Drawing on the distinction between ex ante and ex post competition that has been found useful in the economic analysis of intellectual property rights, the authors suggest a middle road in the horizontal competitors versus single entity characterisations of professional sports leagues.     

Takeovers, Joint Ventures and the Acquisition of Resources for Diversification

This paper explores the influence of acquisition costs on the choice between the takeover and joint venture modes of obtaining the resources required for diversifying expansion. It uses the conditions created by privatisation in the UK utility sector as a natural experiment to examine the determinants of mode choice across groups of firms with unusually homogeneous opportunity sets. The empirical design is able to incorporate acquirer, target and geographical market variables as explanatory factors in mode choice. It is shown that the form of diversifying expansion adopted is highly sensitive to the anticipated costs of using the acquisition process.     

合资公司控制和学习的关系研究

现有文献在重视合资公司中控制对学习绩效产生影响的同时,却忽视了学习对控制的反作用机制。本文贡献了该领域的文献。本文认为,(1)只有在学习类型和控制方式匹配的条件下,才有助于学习绩效的提高;(2)对合资伙伴的学习将降低伙伴企业强调正式控制的可能性;(3)如果一方的学习使另一方察觉到议价力转移,越有可能强调正式控制;(4)一方的学习导致越来越依赖另一方完成合资公司任务,学习方越有可能要求社会控制。本文最后在结论基础上提出了若干建议。     

Joint Ventures versus Fully Owned Subsidiaries: Multinational Strategies in Liberalizing Economies

As ceilings on foreign shareholdings are withdrawn during liberalization, multinationals enter through fully owned subsidiaries that compete with their own joint ventures, unless local partners permit them to raise their stakes. In a framework of quantity competition, this paper demonstrates that an entry threat is more credible when joint venture investment is reversible, the units are independently managed and the local stake is high. Further, profitability of horizontal merger between the units encourages a share reallocation, while its absence favours a new subsidiary. Under irreversible investment, the threat is less credible and both share reallocations or new subsidiaries are less likely.     

中国汽车合资企业管理学习绩效的关键影响因素

基于文献综述,结合中国汽车工业的实践,构建了中国汽车合资企业管理学习绩效影响因素分析框架,对中国本土企业通过建立合资企业学习国外企业的管理技术提供了管理启示。     

Joint Ventures, Universities, and Success in the Advanced Technology Program

America's most innovative firms (with 40%+ of U.S. patents assigned to U.S. entities during 1988–96) participate, often repeatedly, in the Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Program (ATP). Participation significantly increases firms'innovation (patenting) while receiving ATP support versus before and after. Firms generally increase patenting by 5–30 patents per year when participating—up 4 to 25% from before participation. University participation in a project increases firm patenting. Funding amount matters for single participants (often startups with small R&D budgets) with positive impact limited to firms with large grants. For joint ventures, participation is more important than funding level. (JEL O3 , H5 , L24 )     

中国汽车合资自主品牌发展模式的因素分析

由于2008年世界金融危机,发达国家汽车市场集体低迷,然而中国汽车市场仍然保持了良好的增长势头和发展潜力,并在2009年成为世界第一产销国。随着世界汽车工业巨头在华布局的不断完善,形成了以合资品牌为主、民族自主品牌与进口品牌为辅的市场竞争格局。2008年4月广汽本田提出了合资自主品牌的创新发展模式。本文基于以上背景,通过研究影响中国合资自主品牌发展模式的经济、政治、市场环境和企业内部四大因素,并重点论述经济因素中重要变量与中国合资自主品牌导入时机的直接关系,从而提出了中国汽车合资自主品牌导入时机的研究系统。     

中外合资企业的人力资源管理的问题及对策

中外合资企业对中国经济的发展具有重要的促进作用，但是在合资过程中存在着许多问题，特别是在人力资源管理中的问题尤为突出，主要表现为招聘，报酬和福利，培训和发展，绩效评估，退出机制等方面的问题，本文还进一步分析了产生这些问题的主要原因并提出了建设性的意见。