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1.
We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.  相似文献   

2.
Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.  相似文献   

3.
洪水保险的合理定价是制约洪水保险建立和推广的瓶颈之一,以往的洪水保险定价研究都是从供给的角度考虑的,而供给与需求之间存在差异.为了探索居民对于洪水保险的需求价格,从居民的洪水保险支付意愿出发,运用条件价值评估法(CVM法),借助调查问卷,实证分析得出:我国居民洪水保险支付意愿价格为81元,并分析了对于支付意愿的影响因素.  相似文献   

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This paper examines some properties of portfolio insurance that are linked to the risk aversion and the prudence of the investor. We provide explicit conditions to measure portfolio sensitivity to downside risk. We also characterize the degree of portfolio insurance by means of the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion.  相似文献   

6.
Pratt [1964] establishes that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense has a higher compensating risk premium for full insurance, but no comparable result has been established for partial insurance. Ross [1981] shows that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense may not be willing to pay more for a reduction in risk in the sense of mean-preserving contraction. We show that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense has a higher compensating risk premium for all empirically relevant forms of partial insurance because they induce a reduction in risk in the stronger sense of Bickel and Lemann [1979].JEL Classification No.: D81  相似文献   

7.
This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage–risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.  相似文献   

8.
Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents. Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract also depend on individual past performance (such as in car insurances). We show that dynamic insurance contracts yield a welfare improvement only if they are conditional on past performance. With conditional contracts, the first‐best can be approximated if the contract lasts long. Moreover, this is true for any fraction of low‐risk agents in the population.  相似文献   

9.
We price equity-linked life insurance with surrender guarantees and account for risk preferences in the form of risk-averse and loss-averse policyholders in continuous time. Risk-averse policyholders surrender their policy for higher equity index values. Compared to optimally surrendered policies, this behavior creates substantial policy value losses. In contrast, loss-averse policyholders surrender once the surrender benefit realizes a gain but keep under-performing policies. This disposition effect reduces the policy value relative to both optimally surrendered policies and policies surrendered by risk-averse policyholders. Insurers in competitive markets need to estimate their policyholders’ risk preferences accurately.  相似文献   

10.
Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.  相似文献   

11.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper examines U.S. residential consumer willingness to pay for location efficiency, a normative advancement of new urbanism. Drawing on a...  相似文献   

12.
We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterised version of the lemons’ model of Akerlof in the insurance context predicts total crowding-out of low risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of these experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding-out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding-out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. The latter can be sustained because insureds who objectively differ in their risk level do not perceive themselves as being so much different.  相似文献   

13.
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The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of preferences that are not necessarily additively separable. The enlargement we propose is relevant for the evaluation of life‐saving programs: current practice, we estimate, puts too little weight on mortality risk reduction of the young. Our correction exceeds in magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to the notion of years of life saved.  相似文献   

15.
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.  相似文献   

16.
This paper considers the relationship between risk preferences and the willingness to pay for stochastic improvements. We show that if the stochastic improvement satisfies a double-crossing condition, then a decision maker with utility v is willing to pay more than a decision maker with utility u, if v is both more risk averse and less downside risk averse than u. As the condition always holds in the case of self-protection, the result implies novel characterizations of individuals’ willingness to pay to reduce the probability of loss. By establishing a general result on the correspondence between an individual's willingness to pay, and his optimal purchase of stochastic improvement when there is a given relationship between stochastic improvements and the amount paid for them, we further show that all results on the willingness to pay can be applied directly to characterize the conditions under which a more risk averse individual will optimally choose to buy more stochastic improvement. Generalizations of existing results on optimal choice of self-protection can be obtained as corollaries.  相似文献   

17.
While the topics of risk aversion and utility theory have been discussed extensively in the academic literature on risk and insurance, this literature does not include a pedagogical discussion that is widely accessible for classroom use. This article provides a practical introduction to risk aversion that is designed for readers with little prerequisite course work in economics or statistics. We describe a simple model of insurance demand that can be applied to the property, liability, life, and health insurance markets. We also demonstrate how risk aversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of auto insurance coverage. Exercises and practice problems are provided so that readers can test their mastery of the concepts presented in the article. An instructional note on using this article to teach risk aversion in the classroom is also provided.  相似文献   

18.
基于对涉外保险业务经营情况的调查,从外汇保险市场、险种、币种及业务等方面揭示当前外汇保险现状及在该类业务经营中存在的若干问题,并从宏观环境、微观管理及外汇政策等方面进行深入分析,并提出改进建议。  相似文献   

19.
随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。  相似文献   

20.
为了改善信息不对称对保险市场交易效率的影响,分投保人为两种及两种以上风险类型建立了带甄别期的保险契约模型,指出可以利用投保人在甄别期的风险发生情况来推断投保人的风险类型.带甄别期的保险契约是指:自保险合同生效之日起的一段时间内(甄别期),如果投保人发生风险,保险公司将给予一定的赔偿,甄别期过后,如果投保人再次发生风险,保险公司将不再给予任何赔偿;如果投保人在甄别期未发生风险,而在甄别期之后的剩余保险期发生风险,保险公司仍然给予与上述情况相同的赔偿.证明指出效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约不比R-S传统部分保险契约差,并给出了前者是后者严格帕累托改进的充分条件.此外,对于两种以上风险类型情形,证明了满足对次低风险投保人的激励相容约束是满足对其余高风险投保人激励相容约束的一个充分不必要条件,并给出了相应的充分条件,进一步指出该充分条件的集合恰是带甄别期的保险契约能够产生分离均衡的一个充分条件.最后,以一个算例说明确实存在效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约是R-S传统部分保险契约的严格帕累托改进情形.  相似文献   

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