基于Logit模型对新型农业经营主体农业保险购买偏好的特征研究

新型农业经营主体对农业保险的购买偏好与传统小农户存在明显的区别.运用二分类Logit回归模型,以对8个省份的问卷调查为基础,实证分析新型农业经营主体农业保险的购买偏好特征.结果表明:对市场价格反映较为敏感;更愿意提高保额的同时提高保费,对保费支出意愿较强;更迫切需要高保障型产品,提高损失补偿度;对政府提高保费补贴意愿强;对收入保险需求更迫切;补偿或救助发挥着正向作用.     

农村居民购买商业养老保险意愿的影响因素分析

通过对湖南省112户农村居民的调查,运用 Probit 模型对农村居民购买商业养老保险意愿的影响因素进行实证分析,结果表明：目前我国有超半数以上的农村居民不愿意购买商业养老保险,商业养老保险在农村地区还未充分发挥其保障作用。农村居民年龄、受教育程度、家庭年纯收入、对商业养老保险的了解程度、对养儿防老的态度、政府宣传商业养老保险的影响程度等对农村居民购买商业养老保险的意愿有显著影响。     

Pooling and Separating Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Distribution Costs

In the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] model of a competitive insurance market with adverse selection, pooling equilibria cannot exist. However in practice, pooling contracts are frequent, notably in health insurance and life insurance. This is due to the fact that distribution costs are nonnegligible and increase rapidly when more contracts are offered. We modify accordingly the Rothschild-Stiglitz model by introducing such distribution costs. We find that, however small these costs may be, they entail possible existence of pooling equilibria. Moreover, in these pooling equilibria, it is the high-risk individuals who are rationed, in the sense that they would be willing to buy more insurance at the current premium/insurance ratio.     

Framing the decision to buy long-term care insurance: losses and gains in the context of statistical and narrative evidence

Rational models have difficulty explaining low levels of demand for long-term care insurance. We posit that insurers have framed the need for insurance in a manner that unintentionally promotes risk-seeking behavior (i.e., high probability loss frame), and that alternative frames can better promote willingness to insure. We further posit that emotional frames are more effective than rational risk frames in promoting willingness to pay. Survey evidence supports these hypotheses: emotional narrative frames are associated with greatest willingness to pay, and the high probability loss frame was associated with among the lowest average amounts willing to pay.     

Zur bedeutung einer Ausfallbedrohtheit von Versicherungskontrakten — ein Beitrag zur Behavioral Insurance

Kahneman / Tversky 1979 introduced the notion of so-called probabilistic insurance contracts. These are insurance policies involving a small probability that the consumer is not reimbursed because of a possible default of the insurance company. Extending the study ofWakker / Thaler / Tversky 1997, the present study contains an experimental analysis of the willingness of potential policyholders to pay for probabilistic insurance in dependency on the rating of the insurance company. It can be shown that people dislike probabilistic insurance and demand a substantial reduction in the premium to compensate for default risk. This reduction is rising with the default risk of the company. In addition, the results show a new phenomenon. The more an insurance company is threatened by default risk the less people are willing to accept contracts of this company at all. Finally the paper discusses implications for the control of insurance companies.     

A Note on Partial Insurance and the Arrow-Pratt Measure of Risk Aversion

Pratt [1964] establishes that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense has a higher compensating risk premium for full insurance, but no comparable result has been established for partial insurance. Ross [1981] shows that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense may not be willing to pay more for a reduction in risk in the sense of mean-preserving contraction. We show that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense has a higher compensating risk premium for all empirically relevant forms of partial insurance because they induce a reduction in risk in the stronger sense of Bickel and Lemann [1979].JEL Classification No.: D81     

Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry

The number and severity of natural catastrophes has increased dramatically over the last decade. As a result, there is now a shortage of capacity in the property catastrophe insurance industry in the U.S. This article discusses how insurance derivatives, particularly the Chicago Board of Trade's catastrophe options contracts, represent a possible solution to this problem. These new financial instruments enable the capital markets to provide the insurance industry with the reinsurance capacity it needs. The capital markets are willing to perform this role because of the new asset class characteristics of securitized insurance risk: positive excess returns and diversification benefits.
The article also demonstrates how insurance companies can use insurance derivatives such as catastrophe options and catastrophe-linked bonds as effective, low-cost risk management tools. In reviewing the performance of the catastrophe contracts to date, the authors report promising signs of growth and liquidity in these markets.     

On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An experimental study

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the factors that affect the dynamics and severity of bank runs. Our experiments demonstrate that the more information laboratory economic agents can expect to learn about the crisis as it develops, the more willing they are to restrain themselves from withdrawing their funds once a crisis occurs. Furthermore, our results indicate that the presence of insiders, who know the quality of the bank, significantly affects the dynamics of bank runs and helps mitigate their severity. We also show that deposit insurance, even of a limited type, can help diminish the severity of bank runs.     

The Valuation of Insurance under Uncertainty: Does Information about Probability Matter?

In a laboratory experiment we test the hypothesis that consumers' valuation of insurance is sensitive to the amount of information available on the probability of a potential loss. In order to test this hypothesis we simulate a market in which we elicit individuals' willingness to pay to insure against a loss characterised either by known or else vague probabilities. We use two distinct treatments by providing subjects with different information over the vague probabilities of loss. In general we find that uncertainty about probabilities has a weak impact on consumers' valuation of insurance. However, additional information about probabilities tends to marginally increase the price individuals are willing to pay to insure themselves. Implications for the insurance market are derived.     

"Any Willing Provider" laws not preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. et. al. v. Miller, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Insurance

"Any Willing Provider" laws are not preempted by ERISA because they are state laws regulating insurance if they are (1) specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance and (2) substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. Thus, a state may prohibit health maintenance organizations (HMOs) from creating exclusive "provider networks" of doctors, hospitals and other health care providers by excluding other providers who are "willing and able" to comply with all the HMO's contractual terms if the law meets the new two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in this case. The Court made a "clean break" from using the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors for determining whether certain practices constitute "the business of insurance," when deciding when they regulate insurance for purposes of ERISA preemption.     

Feasible fraud and auditing probabilities for insurance companies and policyholders

Insurance claims fraud is counted among the major concerns in the insurance industry, the reason being that excess payments due to fraudulent claims account for a large percentage of the total payments each year. We formulate optimization problems from the insurance company as well as the policyholder perspective based on a costly state verification approach. In this setting??while the policyholder observes his losses privately??the insurance company can decide to verify the truthfulness of incoming claims at some cost. We show simulation results illustrating the agreement range which is characterized by all valid fraud and auditing probability combinations both stakeholders are willing to accept. Furthermore, we present the impact of different valid probability combinations on the insurance company??s and the policyholder??s objective quantities and analyze the sensitivity of the agreement range with respect to a relevant input parameter. This contribution summarizes the major findings of a working paper written by Müller et?al. (Working Papers on Risk Management and Insurance (IVW-HSG), No. 92, 2011).     

Relationship intention of South African banking and life insurance customers

The effect of increasing competition, globalization and tough economic conditions has led to changes in how banking and life insurance firms operate. This has resulted in banking and life insurance firms focusing on retaining and building long-term relationships with their existing customer base by implementing a relationship marketing strategy. However, not all customers are willing to invest in building long-term relationships. Therefore, firms need to identify and target those customers who intend to support long-term relationships with the firm, that is those with a high relationship intention. The objective of this research was to investigate South African banking and life insurance customers’ relationship intention by determining the constructs constituting relationship intention and to determine whether differences exist between high and low-relationship intention customers for the identified relationship intention constructs. A non-probability, convenience sample was used to gather data from 401 respondents, with 202 from banking and 199 from life insurance customers. The results identified five constructs constituting relationship intention for the sample of respondents and indicated that high- and low-relationship intention respondents see four of the five constructs differently.     

Relationship intention of South African banking and life insurance customers

The effect of increasing competition, globalization and tough economic conditions has led to changes in how banking and life insurance firms operate. This has resulted in banking and life insurance firms focusing on retaining and building long-term relationships with their existing customer base by implementing a relationship marketing strategy. However, not all customers are willing to invest in building long-term relationships. Therefore, firms need to identify and target those customers who intend to support long-term relationships with the firm, that is those with a high relationship intention. The objective of this research was to investigate South African banking and life insurance customers’ relationship intention by determining the constructs constituting relationship intention and to determine whether differences exist between high and low-relationship intention customers for the identified relationship intention constructs. A non-probability, convenience sample was used to gather data from 401 respondents, with 202 from banking and 199 from life insurance customers. The results identified five constructs constituting relationship intention for the sample of respondents and indicated that high- and low-relationship intention respondents see four of the five constructs differently.     

Cybersecurity insurance and risk-sharing

In today’s interconnected digital world, cybersecurity risks and resulting breaches are a fundamental concern to organizations and public policy setters. Accounting firms, as well as other firms providing risk advisory services, are concerned about their clients’ potential and actual breaches. Organizations cannot, however, eliminate all cybersecurity risks so as to achieve 100% security. Furthermore, at some point additional cybersecurity measures become more costly than the benefits from the incremental security. Thus, those responsible for preventing cybersecurity breaches within their organizations, as well as those providing risk advisory services to those organizations, need to think in terms of the cost-benefit aspects of cybersecurity investments. Besides investing in activities that prevent or mitigate the negative effects of cybersecurity breaches, organizations can invest in cybersecurity insurance as means of transferring some of the cybersecurity risks associated with potential future breaches.This paper provides a model for selecting the optimal set of cybersecurity insurance policies by a firm, given a finite number of policies being offered by one or more insurance companies. The optimal set of policies for the firm determined by this selection model can (and often does) contain at least three areas of possible losses not covered by the selected policies (called the Non-Coverage areas in this paper). By considering sets of insurance policies with three or more Non-Coverage areas, we show that a firm is often better able to address the frequently cited problems of high deductibles and low ceilings common in today’s cybersecurity insurance marketplace. Our selection model facilitates improved risk-sharing among cybersecurity insurance purchasers and sellers. As such, our model provides a basis for a more efficient cybersecurity insurance marketplace than currently exists. Our model is developed from the perspective of a firm purchasing the insurance policies (or the risk advisors guiding the firm) and assumes the firm’s objective in purchasing cybersecurity insurance is to minimize the sum of the costs of the premiums associated with the cybersecurity insurance policies selected and the sum of the expected losses not covered by the insurance policies.     

Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.     

探讨我国保险电子商务的发展

保险电子商务具有降低成本、提高效率的特点,能够帮助保险公司解决营销方式单一化与保险市场多样化的矛盾。在我国发展了十几年的保险电子商务已经成为一种保险销售应用的新型商业模式。本文介绍了保险电子商务的三种营销模式,分析了现阶段我国保险电子商务发展状况以及存在的问题,并为解决这些问题、促进保险电子商务进一步优化发展提出了一些建议。     

Banking for the public good

Bank shareholders cannot be expected to provide good stewardship to banks because there is a conflict of interests between the shareholder owners and a non-mutually owned bank's depositors; who provide the bulk of the funds in traditional retail banks and are willing to accept a lower return on their savings than shareholders, in return for lower risk exposure. Regulation is required to protect depositors where deposit insurance schemes are at best partially funded and underwritten by taxpayers, who in turn need to be protected, and to deliver financial stability, a public good. Once some banks become ‘too big (to be allowed) to fail’ (TBTF), they enjoy additional implicit public (taxpayer) insurance that enables them to fund themselves more cheaply than smaller banks, which gives them a competitive advantage. The political influence of big banks in the US and the UK is such that they can be regarded as financial oligarchies that have hitherto successfully blocked far reaching structural reform in the wake of the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ and lobbied successfully for the financial sector liberalisation that preceded it. The TBTF problem and associated moral hazard have been worsened by mergers to save failing banks during the crisis and as a result competition within a number of national banking systems, notably the UK, has been significantly reduced. Solutions alternative to making the banks small enough to be allowed to fail are considered in this paper, but it is difficult to be convinced that they will deliver banks that promote the common or public good. It is argued that regulating retail banking as a utility and pooling insurance against financial instability using pre-funded deposit insurance schemes, with risk related premiums that can also serve as bank resolution funds, should be pursued; and that capital leverage ratios and/or Financial Activity Taxes might be used to ‘tax’ the size of banks.     

Aufsichtsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für die Tätigkeit von EU-Versicherern in der Türkei

In recent years the Turkish insurance market has exerted a strong appeal, especially for insurers seated in the EU, in view of its exponential growth rates and its dormant growth potential. EU insurers are, however, subject to more stringent insurance supervisory requirements when entering this insurance market, external to the EU, than when expending into other European insurance markets.     

Insurance and economic policy uncertainty

Just as the world has witnessed the increased importance of the insurance sector over the past few decades, it has also witnessed a sharp rise in risks and uncertainties. Surprisingly, studies analyzing the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the insurance sector are almost non-existent. Another major limitation of insurance literature is the choice of methodology. Most studies on the insurance sector do not take into consideration issues of heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence, and are therefore subject to errors. To address the identified gaps, this research investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on insurance premiums in a panel of 15 countries over the period 1998–2016 by employing heterogeneous panel estimation techniques with cross-sectional dependence. The Durbin-Hausman cointegration tests of Westerlund (2008) confirm that a long-run relationship exists between the variables. Findings from the error correction based panel estimations show that the insurance sector is not immune to the effects of economic policy uncertainty. Economic policy uncertainty raises insurance premiums both in the short and long run, although the long-run impact is greater than the short-run impact. In addition, economic policy uncertainty exerts a bigger influence on non-life insurance premium than on life insurance premium, indicating that the economic risks covered by non-life insurance are more sensitive to uncertainty than the mortality and longevity risks covered by life insurance. Our findings further show that national income, education, population, financial development and institutional quality all raise insurance premiums, while inflation lowers insurance premiums.