The economics of credit cards,debit cards and ATMs: A survey and some new evidence

This paper provides a critical survey of the large and diffuse literature on credit cards, debit cards and ATMs. We argue that because there are still many outstanding issues and questions about the pricing, use and substitutability of these payment mechanisms, that there are significant further opportunities for research in these areas. A large number of questions are examined in this survey, including the pricing of credit cards, the impact of networks on the provision and pricing of ATMs, as well as the tradeoffs that consumers make between different types of payment mechanism, including debit cards, credit cards and ATMs. Importantly, this paper is also amongst the first to provide new evidence on this latter question from bank level data (from Spain). We conclude that point of sale (debit card) and ATM transactions are substitutes, and that ATM surcharges impacts point of sale volume significantly.     

The impact of mobile payment on payment choice

This paper investigates the effect of mobile payment on the adoption and use of traditional payment instruments such as cash, checks, and credit, debit and prepaid cards at the point of sale (POS). Data are from a 2012 representative survey on consumer payment choice in the United States. Using discrete-choice random utility models to simulate consumer behavior, the estimation provides two major findings. First, mobile payment does not replace physical payment cards, but is likely to substitute for paper-based payment methods such as cash and checks at the adoption stage. Second, mobile payment does not statistically significantly influence the choice of payment means at the POS in terms of usage. However, there is suggestive evidence that it is complementary to card payments and a substitute for paper-based payment instruments. The findings highlight the potential social welfare gains of mobile payment and provide key insights into challenging issues for the private industry sector. This paper furthermore offers novel evidence on the impact of mobile payment on the use and adoption of existing payment instruments and contributes to the literature on consumer payment choice.     

Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the Netherlands

In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments. However, such rules are prohibited in the Netherlands. Dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use. This setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice. Based on consumer and retailer survey data, our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash. Half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect. Removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than EUR 50 million in the long run.     

Consumption response to temporary price shock: Evidence from Singapore's annual sale event

Exploiting debit card and credit card transactions of a large, representative sample of consumers from a leading bank in Singapore, we examine the consumption response to an anticipated, transitory price shock generated by the nation-wide annual sale event. Consumers significantly increase their spending during the sale event. More importantly, we find inter-temporal substitution where consumers spend less immediately before the event, and cross-categorical substitution behavior where consumers decrease spending in items unaffected by the sale event. However, consumers exhibit little substitution behavior when they use credit cards or when they are liquidity constrained, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity in assessing the aggregate impact of such stimulus programs.     

Why Do Shoppers Use Cash? Evidence from Shopping Diary Data

Recent studies find that cash remains the dominant payment choice for small‐value transactions despite the prevalence of alternative payment methods such as debit and credit cards. An important policy question is whether consumers truly prefer using cash or merchants restrict card usage. Using unique shopping diary data, we estimate a payment choice model with individual heterogeneity, controlling for merchants' acceptance of cards. Based on a policy simulation imposing universal card acceptance among merchants, we find that overall cash usage would decrease by only 8.0 percentage points, implying that cash usage in small‐value transactions is driven mainly by consumer preferences.     

Price incentives and consumer payment behaviour

In this paper we estimate the effect of particular price incentives on consumer payment patterns using transaction-level data. We find that participation in a loyalty program and access to an interest-free period tend to increase credit card use at the expense of alternative payment methods, such as debit cards and cash. Interestingly though, the pattern of substitution from cash and debit cards differs according to the price incentive. An implication of the findings is that the Reserve Bank reforms of the Australian payments system are likely to have influenced observed payment patterns.     

Consumer payment choice: Merchant card acceptance versus pricing incentives

Using transaction-level data from a three-day shopping diary, we estimate a model of consumer payment instrument choice that disentangles the effect of merchant card acceptance from credit card pricing incentives (rewards) at the point-of-sale. The lack of merchant card acceptance plays a large role in the use of cash, especially for low-value transactions (less than 25 dollars). Participation in a credit card rewards program induces a shift toward credit card usage at the expense of both debit cards and cash. In contrast, changes in the amount of rewards (ad valorem) has a small or inelastic effect on the probability of paying with credit cards. Our findings highlight the importance of the two-sided nature of retail payment systems and provide key insights into consumer and merchant behaviour.     

Debit or credit?

Empirical consumer payment price sensitivity has implications for theory, optimal regulation of payment card networks, and business strategy. A critical margin is the price of a credit card charge. A revolver who did not pay her most recent balance in full pays interest; other credit card users do not. I find that revolvers are substantially less likely to incur credit card charges and substantially more likely to use a debit card, conditional on several proxies for transaction demand and tastes. Debit use also increases with credit limit constraints and decreases with credit card possession. Additional results suggest that debit is becoming a stronger substitute for credit over time.     

Pricing of payment cards, competition, and efficiency: a possible guide for SEPA

This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card competition. In particular, we model competition between debit and credit cards. The paper argues that optimal consumer and merchant fees must take safety, income uncertainty, default risk, and the merchant’s handling cost of cash into account. Market segmentation where debit and credit cards serve different merchant segments yields a preferred “payment mix”. However, when markets are segmented, payment card fees do not necessarily reach their socially efficient levels. Hence, thoughtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may still be necessary to raise total surplus.     

Did a Public Campaign Influence Debit Card Usage? Evidence from the Netherlands

Did consumers change their payment behaviour after being exposed to a public campaign that encouraged them to use their debit cards more often? We analysed the impact of such a campaign that started in 2007, using debit card transaction data between 2005 and 2013. The overall results show positive effects of the national campaign to promote debit card usage, both in the short and in the long run. The results suggest that high campaign intensity aimed at consumers had a positive impact, as did a focus on certain large retail chains. Interventions aimed at increasing debit card acceptance by retailers were effective to some extent. Providing information to retailers about the benefits of debit card acceptance led to higher card acceptance, but no proof was found for the effectiveness of financial incentives for retailers.     

Empirical evidence on payment media costs and switch points

This paper recovers micro cost schedules of consumers’ payment instruments from aggregate transaction costs. We assume that only two moments of the size distribution of payments matter: the number and volume of transactions. These variables explain the transaction costs of currency and debit card payments with much precision for a representative 1998 sample of Dutch retailers. The results imply that low fixed transaction costs favor currency for small transactions, while low variable transaction costs favor debit card payments for large transactions. The switch point is 30 Euros, but including the hidden costs of currency would lower it to 13 Euros.     

Explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by US consumers

Motivated by recent policy intervention into payments markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of adoption and use of payment instruments by U.S. consumers. Our structural model differentiates between the adoption and use of payment instruments. We evaluate substitution among payment instruments and welfare implications. Cash is the most significant substitute to debit cards in retail settings, whereas checks are the most significant in bill‐pay settings. Furthermore, low income consumers lose proportionally more than high income consumers when debit cards become more expensive, whereas the reverse is true when credit cards do.     

Choosing how to pay: The influence of foreign backgrounds

Is having a foreign background a relevant factor in choosing between payment instruments in consumer point-of-sale transactions after migration? We analyze this question using a unique diary survey in which both participants with a Dutch and a foreign background documented their daily purchases. We present several pieces of evidence suggesting that foreign backgrounds still influence the choice between payment instruments after migration to the Netherlands. For instance, we find that first-generation migrants from a number of countries that can be seen as cash-oriented are more likely to use cash in the Netherlands. At the same time, second-generation migrants have similar payment habits as individuals with a Dutch background. This finding suggests that payment behavior is not passed on between generations, but affected by host country payment habits. Finally, we suggest that, in this context, special information campaigns to increase debit card usage will not have clear net social benefits.     

Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice

By using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers’ attitudes toward each payment method, we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods. Our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity. We find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types. Our policy experiments suggest that for the sub-population who hold both credit and debit cards, removing rewards would increase their share of paper-based payment methods (i.e., cash and checks), measured in terms of in-store transactions, by no more than 4 percentage points.     

Substitution of Noncash Payment Instruments for Cash in Europe

The substitution of noncash (check, giro, credit and debit card) payments for cash transactions is of interest for monetary policy and for determining central banks' future seigniorage revenue. We develop a novel method for approximating the share of cash transactions using public information on currency stocks, noncash payments, and card payment technology for 10 European countries. We also provide a forecast of future cash use by country. The trend in cash substitution across countries is quite similar, but the countries themselves are at significantly different stages in this process. The spread of debit and credit card payments has been the key factor behind the substitution away from cash as the use of electronic cash is still in its infancy.     

Unshrouding: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey

Lower prices produce higher demand… or do they? A bank's direct marketing to holders of “free” checking accounts shows that a large discount on 60% APR overdrafts reduces overdraft usage, especially when bundled with a discount on debit card or autodebit transactions. In contrast, messages mentioning overdraft availability without mentioning price increase usage. Neither change persists long after the messages stop. These results do not square easily with classical models of consumer choice and firm competition. Instead, they support behavioral models where consumers underestimate and are inattentive to overdraft costs, and firms respond by shrouding overdraft prices in equilibrium.     

The Check's in the Mail: Why the United States Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments

The United States payment system costs around $225 billion annually and checks account for 75% of all noncash payments. Other electronic payment methods (debit cards, automated clearing house direct deposits, and debits) cost only around one third to one half as much as a check. This paper outlines the main reasons why the shift from checks to cheaper electronic payments has been slow, much slower here than in other countries. We also forecast the future use of checks and electronic payments and end by discussing policy initiatives that may speed up this substitution process.     

Financial literacy and shrouded credit card rewards

Credit card companies charge an interchange fee for each transaction, and almost half of this fee is returned to consumers in the form of a reward or perk program. Among credit card users who do not use cards for borrowing (convenience users), rewards are a means to negotiate the implicit price of the interchange fee. Any consumer whose time cost is less than the value of rebates should rationally choose a reward card. Half of convenience users do not own a reward card. We hypothesize that credit card companies segment customers by marketing non-salient credit card characteristics to appeal to naïve consumers while offering lower-price cards (net the rebate) to compete for more sophisticated consumers as suggested in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Consumer sophistication is measured using a 20-question financial literacy instrument in a large national data set. When household characteristics such as education, income and wealth are controlled in a multivariate analysis, respondents in the highest financial literacy quintile were twice as likely to own a rewards card. The relation between literacy and reward cards provides evidence that credit card rebates resemble other markets where hidden product attributes create a welfare transfer from naïve to sophisticated consumers.     

The future of cash: falling legal use and implications for government policy

As legal use of cash falls with the expansion of privately-issued payment cards, governments lose seigniorage benefits and revenues will be needed to redeem currency. To address this issue, one country is considering replacing cash with government-issued smart cards. The first step in assessing the need for such a policy lies in determining a county’s trend in cash use and its forecast for the future. As no country regularly collects data on cash use, this has to be estimated. We provide an econometric model that determines the share of cash in consumer transactions and illustrate how this information can be used to estimate illegal use as well. Applied to Norway, the share of cash in consumer transactions fell from 81% in 1990 to around 54% in 2000 and may fall to 25% by 2010. Cash used in illegal activities was 7.5% of GDP in 2000.     

Why payment card fees are biased against retailers

I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two‐sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns.