Vertical specialization in the EU and the causality of trade

We use a novel classification scheme to identify three stages of production in the manufacturing sector: parts, components and final goods. In particular, we offer evidence on the revealed comparative advantage of the EU-27 countries concerning the three vertically separated stages of production. Moreover, we investigate whether, and if so how, imports of parts, and components can work as a predictor for the exports of final goods. We find that countries specialize at different stages of production, and that components are Granger causal for the export of final goods in many countries with a lag of 3 months.     

A model of trust in quality and North–South trade

Why do some countries produce higher quality goods than other countries? This paper suggests that one reason is self-perpetuating reputations, modelling the idea with a Klein–Leffler reputation model embedded in a general equilibrium model of trade. Reputation differences are particularly interesting because reputation is a form of “social capital”. Like product differentiation, it can explain why countries might trade even if their technologies and endowments are identical, why firms could profit from exports even if the foreign price is no higher than the domestic one, and why governments like to have “high-value” sectors. Ideally, a developing country would shift its own producers to a high-quality equilibrium; if that is not possible, the next best thing is to import experience goods and substitute to home production of goods for which reputation is not important.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Do environmental regulations influence the competitiveness of pollution-intensive products?

According to “Pollution Haven Effect”, in order to circumvent stringent environment standards, polluting industries in developed countries will be chosen to locate into developing countries; another way is that developed countries increase imports of pollution-intensive products instead of producing by their own, both of which can contribute to the changes of comparative advantages in the past 30 years. Since 1990s, many scholars have paid special attention on whether environmental regulations affect the trade patterns or not, but the conclusions are ambiguous. This paper, based on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model and using 95 and 42 countries sample data in year of 2005, is an empirical analysis which shows that: (1) according to the estimated results based on the “environmental governance” index calculated by CIESIN, environmental regulations do not change the comparative advantages of five types of pollutionintensive goods; (2) On the other hand, when the per capita income is considered as an endogenous indicator of environmental regulation, environmental regulation will significantly promote the comparative advantages in chemical products, iron and steel products and paper products, though environmental regulations do not take any influence on non-metallic minerals products and non-ferrous metals products. I think that appropriate level of environmental regulation can promote a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods.     

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP-adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro-foundation for the cross-country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors' rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.     

Open-access renewable resources and pollution: Trade and policy implications in a two-country model

We examine the interaction between the relative inter-industry pollution externality and resource stock externality of harvesting in deciding trade patterns and welfare gains from trade in a two-country model (less-developed countries) with renewable resources in the absence of resource management. This paper focuses on the impacts of trade policies on resource conservation and welfare outcomes in two countries with different environmental management regimes. Differences in pollution management standards between both countries determine the direction of trade flow and gains from trade in a diversified production case. The country with a lower pollution intensity parameter, an exporter of resource goods, certainly experiences welfare loss in the post-trade steady-state and may also suffer a decline in utility throughout the transition path. However, a country with higher pollution intensity and importers of resource goods tend to gain from trade. Under national open-access resources, given that pollution is regulated up to a certain point in both countries, this study finds that implementing better restrictions on only one externality factor is not optimal from a post-trade welfare perspective. Lastly, from the point of view of policy suggestion, this paper offers an optimal trade policy that the economic and environmental effects of enforcing import tax on resource goods are likely to be Pareto-improving consequences compared to the implications of using an export tax.     

Privatization of state holding corporations

Many countries have privatized part of their state holding corporations in recent years. However, the literature on this issue has analyzed mainly the privatization of uniproduct public firms. We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce complement or substitute goods. Assuming that private firms are more efficient than the state holding corporation we find the following: If the marginal cost of the state corporation is low, it is not privatized either if goods are substitutes or if they are complements. However, if the marginal cost of the state corporation is high the two plants of the state holding corporation are sold to a single private investor if goods are complements, and to different investors if goods are substitutes. If goods are close substitutes and the marginal cost of the state corporation takes an intermediate value only one plant is privatized. We extend the model to consider that firms are equally efficient, that they face quadratic cost functions and that there are n uniplant private firms producing each good. We find two differences with the previous result: The government never privatizes just one plant of the state corporation, and when goods are complements the two plants of the state corporation are sold to different investors if n is high.     

Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits

This paper argues that OECD countries allocate more aid to recipient nations who import goods in which donor nations have a comparative advantage in production. The estimates indicate that a substantially larger amount of aid is provided to recipients who import capital goods, while imports by other category groups have no significant effects. Given that developed donor nations are major producers and exporters of capital goods, this result at least partially supports their trade benefits motive. Donors also appear to be more concerned about alleviating physical miseries (infant mortality) and rewarding good human rights conditions, but less towards reducing economic hardships (poverty). Moreover, the usual political and strategic considerations of donors continue to be the major determinants of aid allocation even in the Post Cold War era.     

Taylor rules and equilibrium determinacy in a two-country model with non-traded goods

We analyze a relation between interest rate controls and equilibrium determinacy using a two-country model featuring traded and non-traded goods. In addition, parameters of preference and production may differ between the two countries. We find that macroeconomic stability strongly depends on such heterogeneity including monetary policy, and that it is easier to generate determinate equilibrium under perfect liberalization of the economy, but to operate monetary policy in the economy with non-traded goods.     

Is export diversification good for profitability? First evidence for manufacturing enterprises in Germany

This article uses a tailor-made newly available data set for enterprises from manufacturing industries in Germany to investigate for the first time the links between export diversification over destination countries and goods on the one hand and the profitability of the exporting firms on the other hand. We find that profits tend to be larger in firms with less diversified export sales over goods and in firms with more diversified export sales over destination countries.     

International Technology Transfer: Who Gains and Who Loses?*

When one country has a superior technology in all commodities, a Ricardian model with two goods and two countries is used to examine uncompensated transfers of superior technology in one or both goods. A transfer of the superior but second‐best technology always benefits the advanced country because it was improting that good initially and now gets it cheaper. But the free gift of the first‐best technology can also benefit the advanced country if a certain productivity condition is satisfied because that country may now export its former import good at an even better terms of trade.     

The Structure of Europe: International Input–Output Analysis with Trade in Intermediate Inputs and Capital Flows

In this paper we theoretically derive an international Rybczynski matrix. Its elements indicate the aggregate output change in a country when endowment with one or more factors in the same or another country is increased. This allows us to characterize the production structure in 11 countries of the European Union. Starting from a baseline case with free trade in final goods only, we analyze two types of interaction between countries: international trade of intermediate inputs and internationally mobile capital.     

产业结构对贸易政策的影响

有别于其他讨论上下游进出口策略性贸易的文献,我们将产业结构因素加入技术领先国(外国)与技术落后国(本国)之间的贸易问题,在中间产品市场和最终产品市场都是古诺竞争的假设下,利用两阶段博弈模型,考虑当技术先进国同时出口中间产品和最终产品到技术落后国时,技术落后国的策略性贸易政策问题.文中的研究结论,可以解释我国一些产业发展中的现象,同时也可以给我国在制定上下游企业的国际贸易政策时提供一定的理论依据和参考思路.     

Extra-union exports of industrial goods from customs unions among developing countries

Formation of a customs union by developing countries is likely to affect extra-union exports of industrial goods. Two competing hypotheses as to the likely direction of such effects are presented, related to the more conventional concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, and tested. On one hand, increased competition and intra-industry specialization may lead to the emergence of larger, more specialized firms which will be more able to export to the rest of the world. On the other hand, expansion of the protected ‘domestic’ marke may induce firms to sell domestically products that they would otherwise have exported. Evidence from the Central American Common Market (CACM) is consistent with each of the two hypotheses for different goods. In aggregate, CACM extra-union exports of industrial goods did not keep pace with the increase in extra-union imports during 1962–1968.     

Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods

In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.     

Should Small Countries Fear Deindustrialization?

Will small countries deindustrialize when opening up to trade with large countries? Donald Davis (1998 ) shows that for the home market effect to lead to deindustrialization of small countries, trade costs for homogeneous goods must be sufficiently smaller than trade costs in differentiated goods, a condition which is not supported by empirical evidence. We show that if differentiated goods production uses tradable inputs small countries can become deindustrialized when trading with a sufficiently large country and if trade costs are low.     

The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks*

If two disjoint country service networks involving a small and large country are connected as part of international liberalization in the presence of network externalities, the per capita gain for the small country from access to a large network will be large, and the per capita gain for the large country will be small. In contrast to goods, the benefits of liberalization in network‐related services are more likely to be approximately equally divided between large and small countries than is true of trade in goods, where benefits accrue disproportionately to the small country. We also argue that non‐cooperation in network‐related services trade may involve more extreme retaliation than suggested for trade in goods by the optimal tariff literature, so that relative to a non‐cooperative outcome, gains from liberalization in network‐related services become larger than from liberalization in goods. We develop simple models which we use for numerical examples showing these points, along with an empirical implementation for global telecoms liberalization for the US, Europe, Canada, and the rest of the world using the framework developed in the paper. This shows similar proportional gains to regions, consistent with the theme of the paper that goods and services liberalization differ.     

Preferential trade agreements and manufactured goods exports: does it matter whom you PTA with?

This article explores two questions. First, do preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect manufactured goods exports of developing countries? Second, does it matter for developing countries whom they sign the PTAs with? We find that the answer to both questions is yes. Using bilateral manufactured goods exports data from 28 developing countries during 1978–2005; we find that South–South PTAs have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports. In contrast, no such effect is detected in the case of South–North PTAs. We confirmed the robustness of these findings to estimation methodology, sample selection, time period, zero trade flows and multilateral trade resistance.     

The Transmission of Sustained Growth through the Terms of Trade in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper develops a two‐country model of endogenous growth and international trade in intermediate goods. In autarky just one of the economies enjoys sustained growth. The trade situation may be characterized by complete specialization of both countries, or by incomplete specialization of the growing economy. In either case, trade transmits perpetual growth to the stagnant economy because of the permanent improvements in its terms of trade. The existence of a non‐reproducible factor in the growing economy is crucial to ensure propagation of growth. Moreover, under incomplete specialization countries converge in per capita income. This result relies on two assumptions. First, there must be a large enough share of world income to pay for the input in which the stagnant economy has comparative advantage. Second, all technologies producing intermediate goods should be equally intensive in the non‐reproducible factor.     

On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition

We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and imperfect competition in one industry – we show that an employment dividend is plausibly obtained. However, for countries where labor taxes are high and households spend a large share of their income in favor of environmentally harmful consumption goods a double dividend can nevertheless not be obtained, for under these conditions environmental quality deteriorates.