Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

Firm balance sheets and monetary policy transmission

The functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates facilitates a novel identification strategy of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. We look at small subsidiary banks that are affiliated with the same holding company but operate in different geographical areas. These banks face the same marginal cost of funds due to internal capital markets, but face different borrowers as they concentrate their lending with small local businesses. Exploring cross-sectional variation in local economic conditions across these subsidiaries, we investigate whether borrower creditworthiness influences the response of bank lending to monetary policy. Our results are consistent with a demand-driven transmission mechanism that works through firm balance sheets and is independent from the bank lending channel.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Internal capital markets and lending by multinational bank subsidiaries

We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest multinational bank holdings to analyze what determines the credit growth of their subsidiaries. We find evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Multinational bank subsidiaries with financially strong parent banks are able to expand their lending faster. As a result of parental support, foreign bank subsidiaries also do not need to rein in their credit supply during a financial crisis, while domestic banks need to do so.     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.     

Assessing the riskiness and profitability of credit-card banks

This article measures the riskiness and profitability of financial institutions specializing in credit-card loans and related plans. Focusing on explicit accounting returns on explicit credit-card assets, we find that credit-card banks, whether subsidiaries of bank holding companies or independent banks, earned extraordinary returns over the years 1984 to 1991. On average, credit-card firms had pretax return on assets of 3.36 percent compared to .95 for noncredit-card banks. The costs of the higher returns are greater variability of ROA and higher probabilities of insolvency, indicating that credit-card banks are riskier than other commercial banks.After a decade of rapid and profitable growth, America's credit-card business is slowing down and turning cut-throat. Card companies must adap to survive.-The Economist, November 2, 1991     

Are Banks Affiliated with Bank Holding Companies More Efficient Than Independent Banks? The Recent Experience Regarding Japanese Regional BHCs

Few studies have investigated whether Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more efficient and profitable than independent banks. The present paper tests this hypothesis by using both a stochastic frontier approach and a market valuation approach. First, our results suggest that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are not more cost-efficient than are independent banks. Because of the brief history of Japanese BHCs, it is fair to conclude that the formation of regional bank holding companies has not achieved efficiency gains so far. Second, we find that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more profit-efficient than are independent banks. This is particularly apparent when the establishment of the bank holding companies increases market power in regional markets. This supports the Financial Services Agency’s policy to increase the profitability of regional banks through bank consolidation. Finally, based on standard event study methodology, we find that the market did not regard news about the establishment of bank holding companies as significant events.JEL Classification: G21     

Multinational banking and the international transmission of financial shocks: Evidence from foreign bank subsidiaries

Using bank-level data on 368 foreign subsidiaries of 68 multinational banks in 47 emerging economies during 1994–2008, we present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign subsidiaries. We find that internal capital markets transmit favorable and adverse shocks by affecting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal funds for lending. We also find that the transmission of financial shocks varies across types of shocks; is strongest among subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by Asia and Latin America; is global rather than regional; and becomes more conspicuous in recent years. We also explore various conditions under which the international transmission of financial shocks via internal capital markets in multinational banking is stronger, including the subsidiaries’ reliance on funds from their parent bank, the subsidiaries’ entry mode, and the capital account openness and banking market structure in host countries.     

Evidence on the role of holding company acquisitions in the management of bank capital

This article addresses the issue of the impact of bank acquisitions on the capital positions of acquired banks. The hypothesis tested is that acquisition-related capital changes reflect divergent capital-related acquisition motives which induce significant infusion of capital into some acquired banks and significant withdrawals from others.This study confirms that,on average, bank holding company acquisitions reduce the relative capital position of acquired banks, but it also indicates that this average effect masks evidence that acquisitions contribute to relative increases in capital in a significant subset of acquired banks. The results herein demonstrate that results of prior studies regarding the impact of acquisition and/or holding company affiliation on bank capital positions suffer from misspecification.The finding that there are divergent implications of acquisition for capital growth is consistent with the notion that acquisitions by bank holding companies may be providing important financial synergies to the banking industry by serving as a mechanism for relatively efficient reallocation of equity capital among affiliated banks.The authors wish to acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions of Harold Black, Tom Boehm, Ronnie Clayton, Stephen Rhoades, and anonymous referees.     

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITHIN BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

This study explores financial transactions within bank holding companies in both a theoretical and an empirical context. Empirical analysis focuses on two major types of interaffiliate financial transactions—extensions of credit and transfers of assets—between holding company banks and their nonbank affiliates (defined to include the parent company and nonbank subsidiaries of the parent) over the period 1976–1980. The data generally point to a net downstream flow of funds from the nonbank sector to the bank sector of a holding company, with the downstream fund flows particularly strong in the case of extensions of credit. In part, this result may reflect the statutory restrictions on bank lending to affiliates, particularly the collateral requirements.     

The bank capital channel and bank profits

This paper develops a microeconomic model of banking to highlight an endogenous loan creation process that emerges from bank profits via the capital accumulation of retained earnings and uses a simple bank capital‐loan multiplier to illustrate constraints on lending. The study also analyzes how sufficient net interest margins are important for banks to maintain lending portfolios and avoid financial fragility. The model offers support to bank capital channel (BKC) economists by illustrating how changes in interest rates may influence bank lending through the bank's internal capital accumulation growth rate and on a bank's portfolio choices.     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.     

On the wealth and risk effects of commercial bank expansion into securities underwriting: An analysis of Section 20 subsidiaries

We investigate the abnormal returns and market-based risk effects of four Federal Reserve Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through Section 20 subsidiaries. Positive abnormal returns for commercial banks were observed for initial, limited powers granted by the Federal Reserve. However, authorization to engage in underwriting corporate debt and equity and subsequent expansion of potential revenues from underwritings produced negative abnormal returns and increases in risk.     

Financial Dampening

We propose a novel mechanism, “financial dampening,” whereby loan retrenchment by banks attenuates the effectiveness of monetary policy. The theory unifies an endogenous supply of illiquid local loans and risk sharing among subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs). We derive an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that separates supply-driven loan retrenchment from local loan demand by exploiting linkages through BHC internal capital markets across spatially separate BHC member banks. We estimate that retrenching banks increase loan supply substantially less in response to exogenous monetary policy rate reductions. This relative decline has persistent effects on local employment and thus provides a rationale for slow recoveries from financial distress.     

Portfolio performance and accounting measures of earnings: an alternative look at usefulness

Measures of economic performance, such as accounting earnings, working capital and cash flows, have been evaluated in tests of relative explanatory power of regressions of market returns on earnings, working capital and cash flows. We employ a different test. Using Basu’s (J Finance 663–682, 1977) investment trading strategy, we measure portfolio returns based on these three accounting measures of earnings. The objective is to ascertain whether investment performance also supports the findings of the explanatory power studies that accounting earnings is the premier measure of performance. The evidence does not support this conclusion. Our findings are at variance with prior conclusions that accounting earnings is more useful than cash flow. The Basu trading strategy is effective for all three measures. Excess market returns are observed for all three measures, even when controlled for risk and for low priced stocks. But accounting earnings portfolios do not dominate working capital or cash flow portfolios. In fact, the raw returns to cash flow portfolios are marginally (statistically) larger than accounting earnings portfolios. Economically, a dollar invested in a portfolio using accounting earnings to select the stock would have an accumulated value of 22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of 33.94 over the same 16 years starting with the second quarter of 1988 and concluding at the end of the first quarter of 2004. Thus, our results have implications for the studies of explanatory power of different measures of earnings and their comparison in the US and other markets.     

Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?

How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.     

The effect of stock-for-debt swaps on bank holding companies

Twenty-two of the numerous stock-for-debt swaps that have taken place since August 1981 have been by bank holding companies. Although the most oft-quoted reason for making the swap is its positive effect on reported earnings, we argue that the effects of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 on the tax treatment of early retirement of discount debt often makes stock-for-debt swaps a preferable alternative to cash repurchases of discount debt for sinking fund obligations. Furthermore, for bank holding companies, the swaps allow them to adjust their capital positions to new optimal levels ad dictated by the more stringent capital standards promulgated by the regulatory authorities in 1981. For 99 non-banking firms we found a significant and negative abnormal average return on the swap announcement date of ?0.49 percent. For the 22 bank holding companies, however, we found no significant abnormal average return on the announcement date of the swaps. The results suggest that swaps may be reducing the potential costs of regulatory interference for bank holding companies if they are overlevered, which offsets whatever other force is driving down stock prices on new issue announcement dates.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Trends in Organizational Form and their Relationship to Performance: The Case of Foreign Securities Subsidiaries of U.S. Banking Organizations

Debate about the effects of permitting U.S. commercial banks to expand their range of activities has intensified in recent years. Some observers worry that banks with access to a federal safety net have strong incentives to use new opportunities to take greater risks and increase their likelihood of failure at possible cost to the FDIC and taxpayers. Others fear that the safety net might give banks a competitive advantage relative to nonbank rivals. A key element of this debate is whether a holding company structure does a significantly better job of mitigating against these potential problems than a bank subsidiary alternative and should be made mandatory for banking organizations that want to engage in nontraditional activities. Unfortunately, hard, current empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of alternative structures generally is lacking. The purpose of this paper is to provide this sort of evidence. In the study, annual financial data for the 1987–1997 period for an unbalanced panel of foreign securities subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations are used to investigate two questions: What factors influence how bank holding companies organize securities activities when they have a choice? And are the observed differences in organizational form related to significant differences in key measures of subsidiary performance? This sort of study is possible because U.S. banking organizations can and do engage in securities activities through subsidiaries of the bank as well as holding company affiliates. These subsidiaries also file financial reports with bank regulators. A probit model is used to empirically identify important factors influencing structural choice. Univariate and multivariate statistical techniques are used to determine whether or not differences in subsidiary structure are related to differences in subsidiary risk, funding costs, and efficiency. Simultaneity is investigated to a limited extent. In brief, the empirical results do not support the position of the holding company proponents. Safety net subsidy incentives don’t appear to be a primary determinant of structural choice. The evidence does not indicate that bank-owned securities subsidiaries tend to be more risky than holding company securities subsidiaries. Bank securities subsidiaries also do not appear to enjoy any funding advantage relative to holding company subsidiaries. These two results are particularly noteworthy because section 23A and 23B restrictions on intracompany funding currently do not apply to transactions between banks and their direct and indirect bank subsidiaries. Finally, some evidence indicates that bank subsidiaries tend to be more efficient.     

Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It

Major European banks are significantly undercapitalized as compared to large American banks, and, more importantly, as compared to the capital levels they would need to survive another severe financial crisis. Bank capital shortfalls in Italy, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are largely the consequence of European bank regulations that: (1) apply static risk weights to assets like mortgages and sovereign debt; (2) fail to require an overall market‐based capital ratio that is high enough to enable banks to survive a severe financial crisis; (3) fail to get banks to promptly write down their impaired assets to market value; (4) subject banks to weak stress tests that can create a false impression of capital adequacy; and (5) fail to compel banks to retain sufficient earnings and to raise sufficient capital externally to eliminate capital shortfalls promptly, all apparently out of fear that being tougher might cause investors and customers to lose confidence in the banks. This article summarizes important recent independent bank stress testing that has quantified the capital shortfalls in European banks. The recent highly publicized regulatory interventions to resolve failing European banks were inevitable due to these shortfalls. The authors recommend steps European bank regulators should take to address the problem and to eliminate the risk of serious capital shortfalls. In the absence of such steps, bank depositors, customers, and security holders should be prepared to expect further unwelcome surprises as the risks inherent in allowing undercapitalized banks to operate will continue to materialize in more bank failures.