Parallel Imports in a Model of Vertical Distribution: Theory, Evidence and Policy

Parallel imports are goods traded without the authorization of an original trademark or copyright owner. In this paper, a model where parallel imports arise because of incentive problems in vertical distributions is discussed. A distributor receiving goods from a manufacturer at a low wholesale price can profitably sell the goods in another country, outside the authorized distribution channel. The manufacturer can limit such parallel imports by raising wholesale prices, but this reduces vertical pricing efficiency. Parallel imports can thus occur in equilibrium. The model is supported by empirical evidence from existing studies and new econometric work. Policy implications of the analysis are discussed.     

Vertical distribution, parallel trade, and price divergence in integrated markets

We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). The manufacturing firm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing interests: restricting competition in the PI-recipient market, avoiding resource wastes due to actual trade, and reducing the double-markup problem in the PI-source nation. These tradeoffs imply the counterintuitive result that retail prices could diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even as the volume of PI increases. Thus, in some circumstances it may be misleading to think that permitting PI is an unambiguous force for price integration.     

Pharmaceutical regulation under market integration through parallel trade

In this paper, I study the effect of parallel trade (cross-border resale of goods without the authorization of the manufacturer) on pharmaceutical regulation. Governments may restrict prices directly (price caps) or limit third-party payer reimbursement for the drug (reimbursement limits). I find that parallel trade may relax regulation in the source country of parallel imports under both instruments and intensify regulation in the destination country under a reimbursement limit. I also find that parallel trade may change regulatory preferences: under no parallel trade, both the source and destination country set price caps, and under parallel trade, the source country sets a price cap but the destination country sets a reimbursement limit, thereby enforcing a higher price cap in the South. This implies that drug prices are higher under parallel trade in both source and destination countries.     

Retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade

The volume of retail-level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences. We offer an agency-based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer. The model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market. The manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer. If parallel trade is permitted, this offer will fall if there is incomplete information, resulting in a small, or zero, volume of parallel trade. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off, while offering little benefit to home consumers, compared to the case where such trade is banned.     

EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEMS IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTING OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

Developing countries which typically have import surpluses and inflationary pressures because of insufficient savings are prone to use indirect taxes on imports (Tm) and subsidization of exports (Sx) in order to prevent deterioration of the balance of trade. If these substitutes for devaluation are included in the net indirect tax component of product at current market prices (Ym) the import surplus is likely to be understated, and Ym upward biased. This distortion will be avoided if imports and exports are measured at effective exchange rates (ER), that is, at official rates (OR) plus Tm and Sx respectively, and if (Tm - Sx) is deducted from the net indirect tax component of Ym. Only in this manner become imports and exports consistent with the other uses and resources at market prices and can be articulated with them. At base-year prices the volume index of product at OR diverges from that of ER to the degree that the composition of imports and exports in regard to tax and subsidy rates computed ad valorem significantly changes. Such a case is similar to that of the price indexes of imports and exports moving in diverging proportions: the trade balance at base-year prices will differ from that at current prices. The resulting discrepancies in national accounts have led to proposals of deflating, for example, exports by the price index of imports. Suchlike approaches are incompatible with the principle of national accounting that prices are supposed already to measure substitution values. Deflating exports by import prices means reintroducing substitution values, as does, for example, deflation of incomes by a consumer price index. Correspondingly, since the trade balance at ER conceptually expresses the value of imports at domestic market prices as compared to the corresponding domestic market value of exports, and if at ER the trade balance diverges from that at OR, the former balance has an important meaning (as has the trade balance at base-year prices as compared to that at current prices) and the resulting discrepancy between the two measures should not be removed merely for the sake of accounting smoothness. In contrast to the market price approach, the measurement of product at base-year factor cost is indifferent to the measurement of the trade balance at ER and at OR. It is, therefore, proposed in countries in which part of import taxation and export subsidization substitutes for devaluation, to record imports and exports in the national accounts at effective exchange rates, and to correct the net indirect tax component of product correspondingly. Imports and exports at official exchange rates should be shown within the balance of payments, and the latter separately as a memorandum item.     

Export and import composition as determinants of bilateral trade in goods: evidence from Russia

Conventional theory and several empirical studies state that incomes and exchange rates are the key determinants of the trade balance. Here, we argue that export and import composition are also key explanatory variables because some goods are inelastic and/or with a high added value, directly and indirectly affecting income and price elasticities and trade balance. Thus, if exports and/or imports significantly consist of price inelastic products, then, a positive and a negative effect, respectively, should be expected on the trade balance. Using bilateral trade data and dynamic panel models, we found that the ratio of exports of crude petroleum and natural gas (price inelastic goods) to total exports is significantly and positively associated with the Russian trade balance in goods. For its part, Russian imports of high-tech goods (income elastic and price inelastic with a high added value) show a negative association. The goods balance of Russia also responded to changes in relative income, but there is only weak evidence of reactions to changes in the exchange rate. These findings partially explain the persistent surplus in the Russian trade balance and current account.     

Japanese Rice Market Liberalization: A Competitive Equilibrium Approach

This paper quantifies the effect of Japanese rice imports on the Japanese rice market with special attention to the farmland market in the year 2000, based on information available in 1997. Tariff and quota policies do not affect the equilibrium price of rice and rent significantly, given the current acreage controls. The removal of the acreage control programme would reduce the autarky price of rice by 30%. With free importation of rice into Japan, the price of rice would be halved, and the potential increase in the consumer surplus could be 0.3% of the 1995 Japanese GDP.
JEL Classification Numbers: F14, Q17, Q18.     

长期协议、价格指数和铁矿石定价研究

在长期协议市场和现货市场并存的条件下,当市场存在不确定性和信息不对称时,可以减小随机交易波动,这不仅有利于保持长期协议供给方的领先优势,还能有效降低市场的均衡价格。在我国进口铁矿石定价体系中,国外厂商铁矿石价格指数和中国铁矿石价格指数存在差异和共同点,因此,只有建立运行高效的铁矿石市场交易机制,我国才能获得国际铁矿石定价权。     

政府补贴下区分制造商类型的合约设计

考虑政府补贴下由一个供应商和一个制造商构成的绿色供应链.供应商通过对原材料和产品生产过程的控制来提供绿色产品,也因此能够获得政府补贴.政府依据供应链的最终产品数量向供应商提供补贴,供应商选择制造商以完成最终产品的生产过程,并除采购价格以外按一定比例与制造商分享政府补贴,制造商有生产成本等私人信息.在分析供应商和制造商成本、收益的基础上,建立了一个逆向选择模型,其中供应商提供包括供应数量和补贴分享比例的合约菜单,制造商从中选择一个合约或者拒绝全部合约,依据成本制造商可分为两种类型:较高机会成本和较低机会成本,通过优化合约设计,供应商对不同类型制造商提供不同的供应数量和补贴比例,以实现供应商收益最大化.     

Estimating an Import Demand Function in Developing Countries: A Structural Econometric Approach with Applications to India and Sri Lanka

Owing to the unavailability of time‐series data on the domestic market‐clearing price of imports, the estimation of notional price and income elasticities of aggregate import demand remains a daunting task for a large number of developing countries. This paper develops a structural econometric model of a two‐goods representative agent economy that incorporates a binding foreign exchange constraint at the administered prices of imports. A theoretically consistent parameterization of the “virtual relative price” of imports circumvents the data problem, and thus enables the estimation of income and price responses by cointegration approach. The price and income elasticity estimates for India and Sri Lanka, in contrast to the extant literature, have correct signs, high statistical significance, and plausible magnitudes.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

A model of intra-brand competition and related pricing policies for manufacturers

Casual observation suggests that retail price distributions develop for products sold by retail outlets that are not restricted in their pricing by the manufacturer. Manufacturers, however, often restrict retailers so as to promote a uniform retail price — manufacturer's suggested retail prices and minimum resale prices are examples of such policies. This paper examines retail competition under assumptions that imply, in the absence of manufacturer-imposed restrictions, the development of an equilibrium retail price distribution. It is then shown that, depending on the distribution of consumer search costs and on the dispersion of marginal retailing costs, the manufacturer may find certain vertical pricing restrictions (either uniform, minimum, or maximum prices) to be more profitable than simply choosing an optimal wholesale price schedule and allowing retailers to price as they wish.     

Unionized oligopoly and vertical integration

Labor market structures may have important effects on imperfectly competitive rivalries between firms. This paper examines the consequences of unionization for the rivalry between duopoly firms in two types of contracts: vertical integration and vertical separation. If a franchise fee is used to extract the retailer’s profit, then it is in the individual interest of each manufacturer to choose vertical separation and charge his retailer a wholesale price in excess of the unit production cost, depending on the specific time structures. These arguments could make integration preferable for the manufacturer if the wage bargaining power of the union is relatively powerful.     

Input Prices as Signals of Costs to a Downstream Rival and Customer

We consider a dual distribution channel in which a vertically integrated manufacturer competes with a downstream rival in a retail market and also sells an input to the rival. We use a signalling model with a continuum of types to examine a situation in which the manufacturer has private information on the production cost of its retail product. We show that in a separating equilibrium under Cournot (Bertrand) retail competition, the manufacturer signals the uncompetitiveness (competitiveness) of its firm by charging a smaller input price than the optimal price under complete information.     

The strategic value of partial vertical integration

We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know their costs and engage in price competition with differentiated goods. The partial misalignment between the profit objectives within a partially integrated manufacturer–retailer hierarchy implies a higher retail price than under full integration. This ‘information vertical effect’ translates into a ‘competition horizontal effect’: the partially integrated hierarchy's commitment to a higher price induces the competitor to increase its price, which strategically relaxes competition. Our analysis provides implications for vertical merger policy and theoretical support for the recently documented empirical evidence on partial vertical acquisitions.     

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ANTITRUST POLICY

Some scholars would legalize all purely vertical resale price maintenance (RPM). They acknowledge that RPM can harm consumers when it facilitates horizontal collusion among manufacturers or dealers. But when RPM is purely vertical (i.e., when it is imposed by a manufacturer acting independently), they argue that it must be procompetitive. Recent theoretical research has shown, however, that purely vertical RPM can reduce economic efficiency. This result occurs when the higher prices and dealer services induced by RPM benefit marginal consumers but substantially reduce the welfare of intramarginal consumers, who would have preferred the product without the services at a lower price. Since these circumstances are empirically plausible, a rule of per se legality may not be appropriate. At the same time, evaluating RPM under the rule of reason might not be workable. Anticompetitive instances of the type described could be difficult to prove. These research findings, therefore, are most consistent with a rule of per se illegality for RPM, with exceptions for situations in which RPM is most likely to be pro-competitive (e.g., new entry).     

Competition under manufacturer service and retail price

This research highlights the importance of service from manufacturers in the interactions between two competing manufacturers and their common retailer, facing end consumers who are sensitive to both retail price and manufacturer service. A game-theoretic framework is applied to obtain the equilibrium solutions for every entity. This article studies and compares results from three possible supply chain scenarios, (1) Manufacturer Stackelberg, (2) Retailer Stackelberg, and (3) Vertical Nash. This research concludes that consumers receive higher service level when every channel member possesses equal bargaining power (e.g., Vertical Nash). An interesting result shows that as the market base of one product increases, the competitor also benefits but at a lesser amount than the manufacturer of the first product. Furthermore, when one manufacturer has some economic advantage in providing service, the retailer will act to separate market segment by selling the product with low-cost/lower-quality service at a low price and selling the product with high-cost/high-quality service at a high price. The results and the modeling approach are useful references for managerial decisions and administrations.     

THE MORISHIMA ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION FOR THE VARIABLE PROFIT FUNCTION AND THE DEMAND FOR IMPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES*

In this article, I derive expressions for the Morishima elasticities of substitution (MES) for the variable profit function and estimate these elasticities to shed some light on the substitutability between imports, capital services, and labor services. The results reveal that capital services and imports are Morishima substitutes, irrespective of whether the price of capital services or imports changes, and imports and labor services are also Morishima substitutes, irrespective of whether the price of imports or the wage rate changes. Thus, an increase in the price of U.S. imports (through tariffs or duties) will result in substitution (in the Morishima sense) into labor and capital services.     

On the effects of emission standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly: A note

Employing a model of an environmentally differentiated product market, we analyze how an emission regulation as non-tariff barriers to trade affects imports, the environment, and welfare in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly. Related to this issue, we reconsider the result of Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero [Moraga-González, J.L., Padrón-Fumero, N., 2002. Environmental policy in a green market. Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 419–447] that a strict emission standard on a dirtier product degrades the environment and reduces the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger. On the other hand, we show that a strict emission standard on a cleaner product always improves the environment and the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.